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ABSTRACT
Freedom of expression has been postulated in the American legal 
system as a constitutional right and the Federal Judiciary has undertaken 
to enforce it against legislative enactments that abridge it. Thus, the 
various liberal and democratic justifications for the free exchange of 
ideas, opinions and information have been moulded in legal theory and 
practice with the theory of constitutionalism.
Constitutionalism is analysed as the amalgam of the theories of natural 
law, legal positivism and popular sovereignty. In the I9th century the 
natural law element predominated and freedom was identified with property 
rights. But after the New Beal, the democratic element and political 
freedom asserted a central position in constitutional discourse. 
Constitutional theory, however, remained within a paradigm dominated by 
concepts of the classical political philosophy: power is presented as a 
unitary essence, law as a unified and coherent body of rules and 
legitimation as a normative characteristic of the sociopolitical order, 
while the Constitution represents the unity of these elements. The 
constitutional mode of discourse built around these concepts, seeks to 
emphasize the legal and social continuity guaranteed by the Constitution 
and the Supreme Court but is a poor description of the mass democratic- 
welfare state. Power should be examined as relational, law as a social 
process politically determined and contradictory and legitimation as a 
complex and contested characteristic not exclusively normative.
American law and jurisprudence on freedom of expression are then 
examined. The cases are analysed as the political claims of groups and 
individuals to enter the public sphere; judicial intervention is one of 
the means through which the latter is constituted. Issues, ideas, 
individuals and organisations claim participation in it and through their 
officially sanctioned admission/exclusion the parameters of public 
discourse are continuously contested and differentially demarcated in 
each historical moment. Four periods of free speech adjudication are 
distinguished, each of which presents thematic and doctrinal similarities.
The "bad tendency" of speech doctrine was utilised in the first quarter 
of the century against socialists, pacifists and syndicalists. In the 30s 
and 40s the contextual characteristics of expression became the subject of 
regulation and the legal persecution of political dissenters became 
relaxed. But in the 50s and 60s an attempt to purge the public sphere 
from radical or reformist ideas and people was undertaken, which was 
endorsed by the Supreme Court by means of the "balancing" doctrine.
Finally, in the 60s and 70s the federal judiciary distinguished among the 
various methods of protest through a number of particularistic approaches 
and while it did not recognise a full right to protest publicly, it 
prevented an outright legal repression of public political dissent.
(iv)
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INTRODUCTION
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
or the right of the people peacably to assemble and 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
The First Amendment to the American Constitution 
adopted in 1791
1. The words of the First Amendment to the American Constitution 
encapsulate one of the most honourable traditions of the liberal 
constitutional state. They postulate positively that social discourse - 
the spoken and written word - should be left free and unhindered; they 
postulate furthermore, according to their democratic interpretation, 
that the needs and interests of society should be subjected to rational 
debate open to all citizens and that political power should be criticized, 
controlled and ultimately exercised by the reasoning and sovereign 
public, the body politic. In a negative way, the First Amendment 
constitutes an absolute-sounding injunction against (federal) 
governmental interference in the process of free debate. Its inclusion 
in the higher legal order of the Constitution transforms the injunction 
from a general political principle into a legally enforceable command 
and creates by implication an institutionally guaranteed individual 
right to free speech.
When the American revolutionaries declared the inalienable rights 
to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" as self-evident, they 
believed that they were asserting no more than the ancient rights of 
"free-born Englishmen". Indeed, the concepts of individual rights 
pertaining against the secular powers and deriving from a higher moral- 
legal order, of the organisation and exercise of political power in 
accordance with the principles of public debate and of limited sovereignty
(xii)
can all be traced to pre-18th century political traditions. But their 
peculiar amalgamation and symbolic enunciation in the great revolutionary 
documents of the 18th century constitutes a dramatic departure in 
political history. A large number of 19th century social struggles, 
particularly in Europe, were concerned with the extension of political 
and democratic rights, among which freedom of speech, of association 
and of the press ranked high. Some of the most eloquent treatises on
i
the value of free speech originate in that period. John Stuart Mill's 
essay "On Liberty" remains the unsurpassed exposition of the liberal 
case for free speech.
In the United States, the enactment of the Alien and Sedition Acts 
in 1799' by the Federalists sparked off a major political controversy on 
the meaning of freedom of speech and of the press and contributed to the 
Republican victory in the presidential elections of 1800. Jefferson- 
let the Acts lapse and in his famous inaugural speech addressed the 
question of freedom of political expression.
"And let us reflect that having banished from our land 
that religious intolerance under which mankind so long 
bled and suffered, we have yet gained little if we 
countenance a political intolerance as despotic, as 
wicked and capable of as bitter and bloody 
persecutions...
If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this 
• union or to change its republican form, let them stand 
undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error 
of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free 
to combat it'.12
After the repeal of the Alien and Sedition Acts, no major free 
speech controversy occurred for some time. The Supreme Court ruled, in 
1833» that the Bill of Rights does not apply to state and local
3
authorities. But the existence of various social and ethnic groups 
with their own divergent values and beliefs - religious, moral, 
political - gave the impression of a great diversity of opinion. In 
the period up to the Civil War, the suppression of unorthodox views was
effected mainly through local mob-violence rather than through legal 
means and processes. "The masses, charmed by this idea of the rule of 
the people, were convinced that it made small difference whether you 
downed the minority by ballots or by brick-bats, which they understood 
better".^ Almost all Southern States passed lavs prohibiting the 
discussion of the slavery problem, but "lynch law" was found a swifter 
and more effective deterrent. "The development of the mob as a means 
of suppressing abolitionism reached its climax during the period 1833“ 
1840, receding in the North after 1845 and continuing with undiminished
«5
force in the South until the Civil War". In the aftermath of the 
Civil War, the control of obscenity became the major free speech issue.^ 
However, rapid industrialisation and massive immigration created new 
areas of political friction. Toward the end of the century, the 
struggles of the young trade union movement and the appearance of 
political radicalism, imported in the main from Europe, shattered the 
image of political and social tranquility which had followed the end 
of the Civil War. The political and legal reaction to the twin threats 
of "imionism and radicalism was the prelude of a new era.
It is true, however, that during the 19th century America gave the 
impression of a society much freer than any comparable European one. 
Indeed, many European liberals and radicals saw the American arrangements
iI
as an example to be imitated. A. de Toqueville spoke with admiration 
for the flourishing press and for the tendency of Americans to form 
political associations in order to deal with a variety of issues. But 
he was apprehensive about the levelling and mediocrity that democracy 
would eventually impose and saw "the liberty of the press... [as] the
7
only cure for the evils that equality may produce". The young Marx, 
too, in his polemics against German censorship of the press pointed to 
America as an example of "the natural phenomenon of freedom of the
(xiii)
press... in its purest, most natural form" and insisted that "in North
America... censorship, like slavery, can never become lawful, even if
8it exists a thousand times over as a lav".
At the beginning of the 20th century, however, as trade union and 
socialist activities gained momentum, federal and state governments 
started passing a series of laws prohibiting and punishing radical 
speech and political activities. These laws culminated in the Federal 
Espionage Act of 1917» the first federal seditious libel law since 
1798» which was designed to suppress radical and pacifist dissent to 
WWI. Prosecutions under these laws soon reached the federal judiciary 
which was forced for the first time to define the meaning of the 
constitutionally protected right of free speech.
2. In a 1919 opinion, Justice O.W. Holmes of the Supreme Court ruled that 
the pacifist leaflets of a socialist leader created a "clear and present 
danger" to national security and affirmed his conviction under the 
Espionage Act. The origins of First Amendment theory and adjudication 
are usually traced to that opinion. In one of its latest contributions 
to the subject, the Supreme Court held, in 1981, that live nude.dancing 
is an expressive activity protected by the First Amendment. In the 
meantime, American constitutional theory and practice have been 
increasingly preoccupied with freedom of expression, and a continuously 
expanding area of expressive conduct has come under legal overview and 
sanction.
Traditional party politics, radical dissent and protest, religious 
proselytising, trade union picketing, the press and the electronic media, 
artistic, scientific and academic expression, obscene and libellous 
speech, sit-ins and symbolic acts like flag-burning have become, among 
others, the subject of legal intervention. Categories of expression 
have been drawn, according to its content, its effects or the context
(xv)
of the utterance; individuals and groups have been linked with certain 
categories of speech and their expressive activities have been endorsed 
or prohibited; means of communication have been distributed to some 
groups and withdrawn from others, access to them has been opened for 
some messages but not others. A proliferation of legal discourse 
dealing with social discourse has taken place. The spoken and Written 
word, the speaking subject have increasingly come under public scrutiny. 
Opportunities for communication expand - after all we live in the era of 
the "communications revolution" - but at the same time it seems as if a 
certain logophobia, a fear for the dispersal of discourse has taken 
hold of the powers that be: the State and the law have tried to 
regiment the universe of social discourse, to put it under control, to 
have the final word about what is to be said or written.
But is this undeniable multiplication of legal discourse about 
expression and communication, a linear expansion of repression? Is it 
a universal negation that excludes, prohibits and punishes, an 
injunction to silence? Or has this expansion of legal discourse 
contributed, on the contrary, to a regulated licence, to a prompting 
and sanctioning of diversity of opinions and expressions, as many 
constitutional writers have argued? After all, constitutional 
decisions of the Supreme Court have declared speech free, picketing 
and other forms of expressive conduct have been construed as protected 
speech, publishers and editors have been allowed an almost absolute 
freedom in the running of the mass media. Indeed, many contemporary 
liberals and radicals this side of the Atlantic have been casting as 
admiring a glance to the American system of expression protection as 
Marx did in 1842.
v
To answer these questions, one needs a clear dividing line between 
free speech and repression and a definition of the theoretical meaning
and the practical import of freedom of speech. If such a line existed, 
then the concrete legal incursions in the area of expressive activities 
the laws, administrative decisions and judicial rulings - could be 
classified and the "state of freedom" in each society and historical 
epoch could be assessed. In the United States, the Supreme Court has 
attempted to draw such a line, since 1919»
3. Two, analytically separate, approaches have been utilised by the 
Supreme Court in its effort to draw the line between protected and 
prohibited expression. The first addresses the question why should 
expressive activities be protected even though they lead to undesirable 
or harmful consequences. This approach looks for theoretical 
justifications for the institutional protection of freedom of speech and 
attempts to construct a consistent theory of free speech with practical 
intent.
Classical utilitarian political philosophers have justified freedom 
of expression as the means through which truth and knowledge may be 
arrived at and individual fulfilment and happiness achieved (English 
utilitarians - J.S. Mill). Social utilitarianism perceives the market 
place of ideas as the institutionalised medium of group competition and 
as the’method for striking a balance between the antagonistic claims 
of coupe ting social groups and interests (O.W. Holmes and the 
pluralists). Social contractarian democratic theorists, on the other 
hand, perceive the institutionally guaranteed exchange of ideas, 
opinions and information on matters of common interest, as the necessary 
condition for the realisation of the democratic scheme of self- 
government by a sovereign and - in principle - homogeneous body politic 
(Al. Meiklejohn and democratic humanism). Finally, independent non- 
consequentialist arguments have been put forward deriving from moral
(avii)
philosophy and natural law theories. Freedom of expression is 
perceived as a species of the general category of individual freedom 
or autonomy, or as a moral right against the power of the state (T.
Scanlon, R. Dworkin).
Although none of these theories has been adopted, in its pure v
form, by the Supreme Court, they have all been reflected in • 
constitutional jurisprudence. But the inclusion of the First Amendment 
in the Bill of Rights has raised freedom of expression to the status of 
a constitutional right, i.e. a legal right of a higher order which the 
Supreme Court has been empowered to enforce even against legislative 
enactments. Thus, theories of freedom of expression have been 
intrinsically linked in constitutional adjudication and theory with 
general theories related to the nature of the American legal order and 
to the role of the Supreme Court in it.
j
4. The position of the Supreme Court within the American legal 
system is unique. Entrusted with the supervision of the application of 
the provisions of the Federal Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the 
Court has gradually asserted the role of the institutional guarantor of 
the federal scheme of government and of the principles of limited 
government and individual freedom. The Court did not address questions 
of free speech during the 19th century, but it did intervene in most 
important political disputes and acquired a reputation, as the spokesman 
for the spirit of the Constitution and the conscience of the nation, 
beyond the legal profession. This direct political role of the Supreme 
Court was facilitated by the twin theories of constitutionalism and 
judicial review.
Constitutionalism may be defined as the legal requirement that all 7 
state action is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution
(xviii)
and the Bill of Rights; theories of judicial review acknowledge and 
justify the power of the federal judiciary to invalidate such action if 
it violates the Constitutional commands. Both theories can be seen as 
the gradually effected amalgamation of three separate - even opposing - 
theoretical trends: natural law, legal positivism and popular 
sovereignty, or theories of democracy. During the 19th century the 
natural law element predominated and freedom was identified with 
property rights. Federal and state measures of economic regulation were 
repeatedly invalidated as violations of economic freedom. By the 1950s, 
however, the democratic tradition and the protection of political and 
expressive rights acquired a central position in constitutional 
adjudication. Thus, the first period of free speech case-law coincided 
with a fundamental rearrangement of the constitutive elements of 
constitutionalism and with a reappraisal of the role of the Supreme 
Court within the new sociopolitical structure of the mass democratic- 
welfare state.
The first two chapters of this thesis examine the evolution of 
the theoretical justifications of freedom of expression and of the 
theories of constitutionalism and judicial review and attempt to place 
them within a broad historical perspective. The problems and concerns of 
the two approaches finally converged in the 50s when the Supreme Court 
undertook to define the parameters and guarantee the protection of the 
constitutional right to free speech. From that point, the task of line­
drawing between protected and prohibited speech became increasingly 
influenced by the theoretical assumptions and differences which inhered 
in the two bodies of free speech and constitutional theory.
5. The increasing involvement of the Supreme Court in free speech 
constitutional adjudication led to an expansion of writings in this
field. Literally hundreds of books and articles have been -written about 
freedom of speech and of the press which have become one of the most 
commented upon aspects of American constitutional law. However, the 
differences between the utilitarian and democratic justifications of 
free speech as well as those concerning the democratic character of 
judicial review have led to the production of a series of contradictory 
theoretical positions and practical - in terms of legal doctrines -
i .
recommendations.
Despite the changes in the arrangement of the constituent elements 
of constitutionalism and underneath the differences in their 
appreciation, constitutional theory - and its part dealing with freedom 
of expression - are still dominated by concepts of power, law and 
legitimation adopted from classical liberal political philosophy.
Chapter III examines briefly the three concepts and argues that the 
promise of constitutionalism that relations of power and domination may 
be dissolved into legal-technical ones, ensuring thus the legitimation 
of the sociopolitical order, underrate the complexity of the 
contemporary reality. Power is presented as a unitary essence seated 
in a single sovereign centre - the state - that monopolises coercion; 
law as a unified and coherent body of public and positive rules (or
values) arranged in a hierarchised fashion; finally, legitimation as
i
a series of predominantly normative characteristics of the sociopolitical 
order, the existence of which creates a positive - political and/or 
moral - obligation of obedience for the agents of that order. This 
presentation was justifiable during early capitalism, but is less so 
after the social and political changes introduced in advanced Western 
societies, since the 30s.
The explicit or implicit adoption of these concepts from classical 
liberalism and their retention in constitutional theory, in a virtually 
unaltered form, have led to the creation of a particular constitutional
mode of discourse. This mode occupies a privileged position within 
American: legal discourse and has been utilised by groups and 
individuals who wish to advance political claims within the relatively 
independent structure of the judicial system or in wider political 
struggles. However, beyond its tactical use in political struggles - 
particularly those which end up in the courts - the constitutional mode 
of discourse remains a poor paradigm for the description and explanation 
of contemporary sociopolitical reality. An alternative theoretical 
approach toward its main tenets is, therefore, tentatively suggested.
Power should be seen as a relational concept and should be disarticulated 
from its complete identification with state/political power; law as a 
politically determined and therefore contradictory social process, which 
involves elements of repression and ideological planning as well as a 
protective role; and legitimation as a series of contested characteristics 
of the sociopolitical order, among which normative integration is not the 
sole or even the dominant one.
6. • Constitutional theorists have tried to provide a consistent 
theoretical justification for freedom of expression and to build a 
general - in principles - and specific - in import - system of 
expression protection which would qualify both as a description of 
political and legal reality and as a normative blueprint for legislators 
and judges. The theoretical assumptions of the constitutional mode of 
discourse have hindered this effort and have given to the debate a 
repetitive and inconclusive image. But at the same time, the federal 
judiciary under the guidance of the Supreme Court has continued in 
earnest to draw in practice the line between prohibited and protected 
expression.
(xx)
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Judges share the theoretical assumptions of constitutional theory.
But the institutional obligation to render a judgment, once a case has 
been properly brought before a court, often defies the ideological need 
of preserving the internal coherence of the law. The elastic use of 
legal doctrine and precedent in adjudication mediates between the need 
for consistency and reverence toward the law-as-given and the impossibility 
of subjecting new and conflictual sociopolitical situations to simple, 
uniform principles. (Chapter Y). The various legal doctrines that have 
been developed and applied in free speech constitutional adjudication are 
examined as complementary, as a panoply of approaches which has allowed 
the courts to differentiate the various aspects of the diverse and 
multiform claims to free speech that have ended up and have been decided 
in courts.
The first four chapters of the thesis attempt to clear the way for 
the examination of 20th century American legal material - laws and 
judicial decisions - dealing with freedom of expression. The common 
thread that hopefully unites this first part is the suggestion that the 
field of legally sanctioned social discourse cannot be seen as realising 
some central principles which may be discovered through a theoretical 
enterprise undertaken within the respective paradigms of classical 
liberalism, contractarian or empirical democratic theories, moral 
philosophy or the constitutional mode of discourse. One could argue *4
that there is no theoretically interesting way in which the line of 
protected/prohibited speech may be drawn in advance to be compared, in 
a second step, with the concrete institutional decisions which deal with 
the problem. As communicative and expressive activities come increasingly 
under political and legal sanctioning, state and legal practices and 
agencies with their own diverse determinations and conditions of existence 
undertake the task of defining and demarcating the realm of social 
discourse itself. Thus, while state/legal intervention cannot be easily
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placed on the one or other side of a theoretically determined and 
clearly defined divide between freedom and repression, it may be examined 
as an increasingly important factor in the constitution of the -public 
sphere.
7. The constitution of the public sphere is examined as an ongoing 
and antagonistic social process. In each particular society and epoch 
the public sphere constitutes the historically specific articulation of 
a series of formal and substantive elements. The extent of formal 
political rights, the issues and alternatives admitted in public debate, 
the groups and individuals admitted in or excluded from participation in 
it, thejdistribution and access to the means of communication are all 
constitutive elements of the public sphere. Antagonistic groups and 
interests advance conflicting claims to commandeer the public sphere 
and state institutions have increasingly undertaken to balance these 
claims and sanction some against others. Thus, the parameters of the 
public sphere are continuously contested and differentially demarcated. 
The- protection of the established sociopolitical order against radical 
challenges has been one of the paramount concerns of state agencies 
involved in the sanctioning process and structural inequalities among 
competing groups and interests have also contributed to their 
differentiated positioning and endorsement (ChapterIV" ).
While the constitution and sanctioning of the public sphere has 
remained the paramount concern of legislative and administrative 
agencies, in the United States the judiciary has been increasingly 
involved in its delineation. Facilitated by the theories of 
constitutionalism and the injunctions of the Bill of Rights it has 
participated in the process as an independent political actor. The 
second part of the thesis examines this process of judicial intervention
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and through it the role of the state in the regulation and 
disciplining of the public realm. The legal material is classified in 
chronological order and four periods are distinguished which display a 
broad thematic unity.
During the first third of the 20th century, the legal institutions 
dealt with radicals, socialists and trade-unionists who challenged the 
American involvement in WWI and the corporate capitalist development that 
preceded and followed the Great War. In those cases, two legal doctrines 
appeared in constitutional adjudication which have dominated the field 
since, in various disguises and transformations. The first addresses 
the content of ideas and expressions and prohibits or punishes those 
deemed as inherently dangerous, undesirable, immoral etc. (the bad 
tendency test). The second examines the expressive activities in their 
context and makes their prohibition or punishment dependent upon the 
circumstances surrounding the specific communication (the clear and 
present danger test - Ch.VIand VI$.
In the 30s and early 40s the legal persecution of political 
dissidents was relaxed and the courts adopted a more active stance of 
protection of expressive activities. The democratic justification of 
free speech became predominant and political and expressive rights 
became the judicially '’preferred freedoms" replacing economic freedom as 
the main concern of constitutional adjudication. At the same time, 
the Supreme Court undertook a much more extensive role in the 
constitution of the public sphere and participated actively in the 
direct legitimation of the new sociopolitical order instituted by the 
New Deal (Ch.VIIl).
The 50s and early 60s is the most important period in free speech 
adjudication. Under federal legislative and administrative guidance 
a wide-ranging effort was undertaken designed to purify ideologically 
the public sphere. A series of criminal prosecutions and administrative
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and legislative punishments were employed against communists and more 
importantly against all radical or reformist individuals, groups or 
ideas. The line between private and public beliefs, opinions and 
activities became blurred and the central economic regulation initiated 
by the New Deal was complemented by a rigorous ideological planning 
The Supreme Court, through the use of the balancing technique virtually- 
abandoned the field and extended constitutional legitimation to these 
measures (Ch.IX).
Finally in the 60s and 70s, the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war 
movements claimed the right to use public fora for the expression of 
militant - but mainly peaceful - political dissent. Original forms of 
protest, direct action and civil disobedience were utilised to put 
presstire on the political/legal system outside the bounds of the 
established modes of political action. The traditional theories and 
legal doctrines of expression protection were largely irrelevant to the 
new situation, and the judicial answer to the protest movement’s 
challenge became ambiguous and particularistic. The Supreme Court did 
not recognise a constitutional right to protest, but a degree of protest 
protection was carved out based on the contextual characteristics of 
the dissenting activities. At the same time, the Court extended almost 
complete protection to the editorial freedom and autonomy of the mass 
media and in particular of the press (Ch*X).
The examination of the legal material of each period follows a 
brief historical introduction which places the law and judicial 
decisions within the historical conjuncture in which they evolved.
The tendency to examine legal material independently from its proper 
historical setting, its causes and consequences is one of the 
characteristics of the constitutional node of discourse. Furthermore, 
the use of methodological and substantive advances from the social
sciences is necessary in order to redress the essentialist and
idealist assumptions of a large part of American constitutional law.
The legal materials critically reviewed in the second part of the
thesis constitute one of the most comprehensive and up-to-date
9collections in constitutional literature. However, certain areas which
come under the main concern of the thesis have not been included. The
most notable absentees are cases that come under the general title of
obscenity; cases related to the application of the Freedom of
Information Act and finally cases related to the regulation of the
electronic mass media. Their inclusion would prolong an already overlong
thesis. It should be noted here that some aspects at least of the
obscenity law appear settled. First and most importantly, obscenity
has been ruled outside,constitutional protection. The free market of
ideas does not include material which appeals solely to prurient
interest and titilation. According to the most recent contributions
of the Berger Court, obscenity is defined as material which appeals
to prurient interest in a patently offensive way and constitutes an
affront to the average person applying contemporary local standards.
But it is redeemed if it has some literary, artistic, political or
scientific value, a phrase that indicates the qualities that obscenity 
*
proper lacks. "Pandering" might make some material obscene, even if 
it is not such in the abstract, but private use cannot be wholly 
banned. "Thematic" or "ideological" obscenity, i.e. the advocacy of 
obscene or immoral conduct, cannot be banned however. Finally, a 
double standard exists toward obscene material addressed to minofs 
and adults.^®
8. At the end of the examination of the laws and judicial decisions 
no clear answers emerge as to the dividing line between freedom and 
repression. The problems encountered in the attempt to draw a
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theoretically determined dividing line are present, too, in the effort 
to extract such a line from the legal material. It seems that in the 
place of the bipolar freedom/repression analysis a series of historically 
specific questions should be posed: Freedom of speech for whom or for 
what messages; when; and under what circumstances. Who has the power 
to define and sanction expressive activities; or their means and 
content; or to decide the distribution and access to the media of 
communication. The legal answers to these questions involve as many 
distinctions and differentiations among the ideas, the social and 
political groups that claim admission to the public sphere, the context 
and the means of communications as similarities and analogies. The 
theory and practice of freedom of expression may be seen, therefore, as 
the highly differentiated and historically evolving sanctioning 
(validation/prohibition) of a series of political claims and struggles. 
The importance of the constitutional right to free speech as developed 
in Supreme Court jurisprudence lies in the fact that a relatively 
independent agency (the federal judiciary) has asserted the role of a 
political actor which participates in the sanctioning of expressive 
claims - and the constitution of the public realm - through its own
peculiar mode of technical discourse and institutional and procedural
«
guarantees. The highly specific and historically determined intervention 
of the Supreme Court in the resolution of free speech conflicts displaces 
the freedom/repression problematic and makes difficult the drawing of 
any generalisable conclusions.
One Judge of the Supreme Court, Justice Jackson said once that "in 
this country... we rarely have a political issue made of any kind of 
invasion of civil liberty. The attitude seems to be, leave it to the 
judges. Years after the event takes place, the judges make their 
pronouncement and that ends the matter. Whether the political conscience
(xxvii)
is relieved because the responsibility here is made largely a legal
one, I cannot say".^ Although Jackson’s statement seems generally
true, the Justice somewhat underestimates the judicial role. Judicial
pronouncements are mostly footnotes in history, but sometimes they
constitute, too, yardsticks for the future and the "matter does not
always end" there. The attitude toward this ultimately political
role and responsibility of the judiciary can only be formulated in
the same way, i.e. politically. As Professor J. Griffith put it, we
will not find "even temporary solutions in appeals to reference points
like social solidarity, the conscience of mankind or justice or
12fairness or fundamental legal principles".
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CHAPTER I
A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS OF FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION
1. John Stuart Mill and Individualistic Utilitarianism
John Stuart Mill’s essay "On Liberty", included in its second 
chapter the most celebrated liberal essay on the justification of 
freedom of thought and discussion. Although Mill has been criticized 
for not providing any new and original ideas on the subject, his essay 
may be justly seen as a break from older notions about expression and 
his justifications are still canvassed by contemporary writers on the 
subject.^
The main points that differentiate Mill from earlier writers who 
defended speech may be summarized as follows.
As to the character of expression, most of the earlier liberals
were mainly concerned with religious as against secular expression.
Thus, Milton, possibly the best known early theorist of freedom of
speech would extend religious toleration to all Protestant churches
but "...Popery, (as) being idolatrous, is not to be tolerated either in
2Public or in Private". His position toward criticism of the secular 
power was even more ambiguous. He acted as a censor for Cromwell and 
concluded his celebrated"Areopagitica"with the admonition that "those 
which otherwise come forth, if they be found mischievous and libellous, 
the fire, the executioner will be the timeliest and the most effectuall 
remedy that man’s prevention can use".^ John Locke was equally 
preoccupied with sectarian as against secular expression. He believed 
that no opinions contrary to human society, are to be tolerated by 
the magistrate. One clause of the "Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina" 
stated that "no person whatsoever shall speak anything in their
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religious assembly irreverently or seditiously of the government or
governors, or of state matters".^ According to Professor L. Levy both
Milton and Locke accepted the assumption that the state had the
"...incontestable right to proscribe sedition, a commodious concept
encompassing anything from mild criticism of public policy to attempted
5overthrow of government”.
J.S. Mill's principles on the contrary attempt to cover all forms 
of expression. He deals with religion as one subcategory merely in 
the field of moral, aesthetic and political ideas which are to be 
given full protection. Mill commences his tract by blandly stating 
that there is no more need to defend "liberty of the press” against a 
corrupt and tyrannical government. He assumes that the governments of 
constitutional countries will not attempt to control expression 
"except when in doing so it makes itself the organ of the general 
intolerance of the public".^ His main concern, therefore, is directed 
at the intolerant public which either directly or indirectly, by making 
the government its organ may exercise coercion upon individual 
conscience and expression. For Mill, as for A. de abcqueville in his 
earlier "Democracy in America", the greatest menace to freedom lies 
in the "tyranny of the majority", a deformation of majority rule which 
both see as the logical and inevitable outcome of the extension of 
representative democracy.
Mill's argument is not based like those of earlier liberals on 
the need for toleration of minority or dissenting views. Arguments 
for toleration are grounded on the acceptance of the basic correctness 
or truthfulness of certain received beliefs and toleration is usually 
defended on moral principles. Mill is based, on the contrary,on the 
epistemological position that knowledge and truth may be attained 
through a free clash of differing and opposing views. Although the 
truth about social, political and moral questions may be discovered,
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there can never be absolute certainty about it and in any case not the 
same certainty as that, in principle, attainable in the natural 
sciences. All people are fallible and any suppression of an opinion 
on the ground of its alleged falsity implied an unacceptable assumption 
of infallibility on the part of the censor. However, his fundamental 
relativism does not go as far as to reject all rationally grounded 
capacity for action. Individual or state action may be rationally 
undertaken if its principles, justifications and grounds are open to 
counter-argument by those who oppose it. Mill, therefore, is less 
concerned with true opinions than with the conditions of attaining 
truth, of "being in the truth", as it were. Such conditions should 
pertain in all aspects of social life and are those of an open and 
public confrontation of ideas. They are not only the necessary and 
sufficient requirements for reaching truth but also for keeping the 
thus arrived at truths in a state of vitality, capable of being adapted 
to changing circumstances and contingencies and protected from dying 
out as dogmas. One could summarize the argument by saying that truth 
is ian evolving notion which may be approximated through the principle 
of competition of ideas, the market place of ideas as it came to be 
known.
Secondly, the utilitarian Mill does not base his defence of speech 
on absolute principles and human or natural rights but on the concept 
of utility. Knowledge and truth, are conducive to human happiness 
and progress both individual and social. Free thought and expression 
enables people to attain the dignity of thinking beings. The principle of 
individuality that Mill defends in all his writings is seen as the 
outcome of the free competiton of ideas. The search for knowledge 
and truth and a critical posture toward received wisdom lead to thé
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full growth of Individuality and hence happiness.
Both claims, that freedom of opinion is the only way to truth
and that truth and knowledge lead to individual fulfillment and
happiness have been criticized on empirical grounds, the basis on
which Hill himself always attempted to ground his theories. Thus, in
the realm of science. the obvious example of 1 9 th century philosophers,
20th century epistemology and philosophy of science have questioned
Mill(s assumptions. To be sure Karl Popper*s notion of falsification
7and defence of the "open society" strongly resemble Mill*s emphasis
on the market place of (scientific in this case) ideas. Yet, according
8to Kuhn*s "Structure of Scientific Involutions" the normal operation of
science involves the unquestioned acceptance of a given paradigm
and problem solution within its parameters. Religion, necessarily,
involves truth claims not open to discursive validation or falsification,
which, therefore, must be accepted on faith. But even in the realm of
political and social issues, where Mill is at his strongest, his
assumptions have come under criticism. Thus A.Y. Dicey argues that
freedom of expression does not necessarily lead to any "special vigour
gor originality either of intellect or of character". Equally,
Isaiah Berlin believes that the relation between freedom and 
individuality cannot be empirically proven, since as early conservative 
critics of Mill insisted integrity, love of truth and individualism 
grow equally in severely disciplined societies, among "the puritan 
Calvinists of Scotland or New England, or under military discipline".^ 
Berlin goes on to distinguish this confused argument for liberty from 
what he believes to be the true meaning of the liberal concept of 
liberty, i.e. the prohibition of state intervention in private affairs 
which is for him the only mark of high civilization.
Mill*s utilitarian premise that "knowledge makes man happy" has 
been equally criticized. Wolff in his radical critique of liberalism
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shows that no empirical verification of the relation between knowledge 
and hapiness exists or is feasible: such a test presupposes an 
ab initio resolution of the question and the setting up of the
11conditions of a free society where the relation is to be examined.
Thus both the "conservative" Berlin and the "radical" Wolff believe
that Mill’s premises are not empirically provable and they must be
12seen as declarations of faith.
The Millian defence of speech contained a third point, that
has largely passed unnoticed in the literature. It could be called
13the principle or assumption of differentiated rationality. Mill
had accepted that people who are not fully rational cannot be
entrusted to participate in rational debate. Freedom of speech
"appli[es] only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties".^
Minors and children are excluded as well as non-civilized peoples:
"despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with
15barbarians, provided the end be their improvement...". However, 
lack or diminished rationality is not restricted to these apparently 
"trivial" cases.
Mill’s "On Liberty" was written at a period when the already 
established market society was increasingly coming under strain. The 
optimistic assumptions of the political economists and earlier 
Utilitarians (including Mill's father James Mill) that the workings 
of the market, once set free from state intervention, would naturally 
lead to ever-increasing productivity that would upset real inequalities 
were being challenged both in theory and practice. The conditions of 
the British working class had become insufferable; certain of its 
sections were moving toward trade union and socialist activities that
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challenged the sanctity of private property, the cardinal principle of both 
liberal theory and society. The 1848 revolutions had marked the 
beginning of a new era in which the "spectre of communism" was to 
become a real threat for the recently victorious European bourgeoisie. 
Against that background Mill's theory may be seen as a further attempt 
within the English utilitarian tradition to answer a double political 
problem: That of conceiving and setting up a political system that 
"should both produce governments which would establish and nurture a
16free market society and protect citizens from rapacious governments."
Since, a representative government of sorts had already been established
in England, the main issue at stake was the extent and genuineness of
the franchise. Earlier liberals had consistently attached the franchise
to the level of rationality of the electorate. As C.B. Macpherson has
convincingly argued, liberal theory had associated since Locke the
level of rationality with economic status. "Locke had always assumed
fully rational behaviour to be accumulative behaviour, [so when]
labouring and appropriating became separable [he could] find that full
17rationality lay in appropriating rather than in labouring". 1 For 
Locke, the labouring class, "the greatest part of mankind have not 
leisure for learning and logick, and superfine distinctions of the 
schools. Where the hand is used to the plough and the spade, the head 
is seldom elevated to sublime notions, or exercised in mysterious 
reasoning".^®
J.S. Mill did not attribute full rationality and individuality 
solely to the propertied class and sincerely regretted the inhuman 
conditions of the working class which since Chartism had started agitating 
for the extension of the franchise. Yet in his "Representative 
Government" Mill too accepted that the rationality of the poor was less 
than full. Thus, although the full integration of the working class 
in bourgeois society and politics could not be resisted for long, the
- 8 -
adverse effects of such an eventuality should be upset through various
institutional guarantees: in the long run the knowledge of the
people should be raised through the extension of education, so that the
poor would become more content with the existing state of things. In
the shorter run, his model of democracy proposed an elaborate system
of plural voting as a guarantee against the numerical strength of the
working class which could use the franchise to "direct the course of
19legislation and administration by its exclusive class interest".
Plural voting by giving a greater say to "those whose opinion is
20entitled to greater weight" would avert "class legislation" (Mill's
term). Those who received poor relief or did not pay direct taxes
or could not read or write were to be completely excluded. For the
rest, superior intelligence and economic success would determine the
number of votes. Thus an unskilled worker should have one, a skilled
two, a foreman three, farmers, manufacterers and traders three or four,
21while professionals and the educated should have five or six votes.
Examined against the background of his general political theory,
Mills*s defence of free speech takes on a meaning slightly different 
from that attributed to it by later liberals. Although the free clash 
of opinions is the necessary condition for the flourishing of individuality, 
entry to the political market place must be organised in such a way 
that the extension of the franchise to the uncultivated populace 
would not endanger the assumed higher rationality and ability to govern 
of the educated and propertied classes and the basic postulates of the 
capitalist market. His main concern and target of attack in the essay 
"On Liberty" is therefore the public opinion which, if democratically 
integrated on a "one man one vote" principle, would lead to a kind of 
coercion much stronger than that exercised by the most tyrannical 
government. Mill's theory written at the threshold of a new era of 
profound‘social change which the economically and politically entrenched
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bourgeoisie apprehended with great fear can be seen as containing both 
the culmination of a great tradition in liberal political philosophy 
and the anticipation of the dangers to come.
The gradual destruction of an all-encompassing world view of a
religious character that up to the Enlightenment had both described
and explained the natural and social worlds and had sanctioned the
static position of the individual within a religious-secular
hierarchized continuum had already started with Eobbes and Locke and
22the transition from classical to rational natural law. The answer 
to practical questions about social and political organisation, the 
ends of life and the rights and duties of individuals were not to be 
found any longer in an ossified tradition. Instead, they should 
be released and become subject of inquiry and debate, initially 
among the philosophers who were supposed to have a privileged insight 
into the workings of society and the human self. Social institutions 
were perceived as justified not by the mere fact of their existence 
and their religious sanctioning but by their utility to a rational 
plan to be worked out by political philosophers and carried out by 
enlightened secular authorities. Mill*s theory on freedom of expression 
may be seen as the culmination of that process: all those qualified 
to participate in rational debate are the practical "philosophers" who 
think about, debate and confer about all important questions. The 
principle of the intellectual market, so forcefully advocated, does 
not accept any force other than that of the better argument in a 
presumably fully rational discourse. Yet, as soon as that principle 
becomes the organizing principle of a democratically integrated social 
power that -understands itself as the sovereign political power, 
the fears of the 19th century bourgeoisie can be explained. The 
extension of the franchise would shatter the existing coherence of a
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reasoning political public united by its common class interest in the 
maintenance of private property and the sanctity of the economic 
market. The extension of the political public and the introduction of 
the market model in the politics of a fully integrated electorate 
could, in principle, lead to the destruction of those institutions - 
alienable private property and the markets in commodities and labour- 
that came to liberate mankind from the yoke of an irrational tradition 
and a stagnating society. If the free market in ideas was celebrated 
as the only mechanism through which practical and normative questions 
could be answered; if no institution could be accepted as sacred and 
as being beyond criticism and debate; then there was no guarantee - and 
indeed a great likelihood - that even private property and the economic 
market would be criticized as irrational and unjust and would be 
abolished. Thus 19th century liberal political philosophers were 
caught in a dilemma. The extension of the franchise could not be 
resisted for long, but it should be so organised as to guarantee that 
the principles of the capitalist market would be accepted by the whole 
society as the final stage in the evolution of civilization.
' Thus, Mill formulated the most advanced liberal defence of 
free debate, but qualified participation in the political market in 
accordance with the stakes that each class of the population presumably 
held in the maintenance of the background premises of capitalist 
organisation. The individualistic-utilitarian defence of the intellectual 
market is not necessarily an eccentric article of faith which should be 
attributed, as it has,to Mill*s peculiar personal problems. It could be 
alternatively seen as a coherent justification referring to a public 
that necessarily shares a number of common background assumptions.
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Around the turn of the 20th century the class coherence of that public 
was shattered through the extension of the franchise, as Mill had 
foreseen. However, his prescriptions on plural voting were 
nowhere adopted.
It was the shattering of the class coherence of that public that 
necessitated extensive state intervention in the organisation of the 
newly extended political market. The purpose of this essay is to 
trace the development of this intervention and the theoretical 
justifications offered for it. Thus, the critique of Mill*s theory 
does not purport to dismiss the Millian political vision for its 
ideological-class character. The faith in the market of ideas as 
conducive both to knowledge and individual fulfilment may be 
profitably used as a starting point and a referent in order to 
examine how these principles fared in the radically changed social 
conditions of 20th century United States. Mill*s legacy remained and 
still is the dominant trend within the discourses of political 
philosophy and constitutional law, so that it would not be illegitimate 
to take it as a yardstick for later developments.
2. Oliver V. Holmes and Social Utilitarianism
*
Turning from Mill and 19th century England to early 20th century 
America, it is the Supreme Court dissenting opinions of Justices 
O.V. Holmes and Brandéis written in the first quarter of the 20th 
century that have captured the imagination of contemporary liberals.
The Holmes dissents in the Abram3 and Gitlow cases along with Brandéis* 
dissent in Whitney have been hailed as the high point of democratic 
liberalism and used as the starting point for the elaboration of a
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legal doctrine on freedom of expression in the United States. The 
most eloquent of these statements appeared in the dissenting opinion 
in the Abrams case:
•'Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me 
perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises 
or your power and want a certain result with all your heart 
you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all 
opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate 
that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that 
he has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole­
heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your 
power or your premises. But when men have realized that 
time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe 
even more than they believe the very foundations of their 
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached 
by free trade in ideas - that the best test for truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground 
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at 
any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an 
experiment, as all life is an experiment."24 ;
and the famous aphorism that "if in the long run the beliefs expressed
in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant
forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they
?<5should be given their chance and have their way", found in the Gitlow 
dissent, is accepted as part of the same theory.
The praise of the opinion has been endless. It is "the most
26eloquent and moving defence of free speech since Milton's Areopagitica"
and has put the case for speech in "perhaps its most literary form 
' ! 27for modem times". 1 Justice Frankfurter thought that "it is not 
reckless prophesy to assume that this famous dissenting opinion in
the Abrams case will live so long as English prose retains its power
28to move". For Professor T. Bnerson the aphorism of the Gitlow dissent
29quoted above is the classic statement of liberalism, ' while Max Lemer 
could "add little to what has been said of Holmes' language. It has 
economy, grace, finality, and it is the greatest utterance on 
intellectual freedom by an American, ranking in the English language 
with Milton and Mill" . 50
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There are a few criticisms too. Meiklejohn (for his theory 
see infra 3 »l) has attacked the passage as inadequate to "give us, as 
[Holmes] intends to do, the theory of our Constitution";^ and a 
contemporary neo-conservative has remarked that "with all respect for 
those who have praised this statement, it is not at all evident that
xoit can provide a sound foundation for the law of the First Amendment". 
However, the overwhelming majority of the commentators agree with the 
assessments of the previous paragraph, and Holmes has been thus 
raised to the ranks of the hierophants of contemporary liberalism.
Holmes* use of the market place metaphor strongly resembles 
Mill*s statement "On liberty" although Mill himself did not literally 
refer to the market place. It could, thus,appear at first sight 
that Holmes* theory is a mere repetition of the liberal classics and 
particularly of J.S. Mill. This has apparently been the general 
understanding of his opinion and the reason why so much emphasis has 
been put upon the style and grace of the utterance: the greatest 
value of the repetition was to put it in an elegant and concise form 
and to enter it into the Supreme Court Eeports. It can be argued, 
however, that Holmes* theory on freedom of expression put in the context 
of his general theoretical outlook and the historical conjuncture in 
which he wrote is not just a reformulation of earlier liberal doctrines.
(a) The market place, the universal principle of competition in 
an antagonistic society, is for Holmes more than a mere metaphor. It 
has already been fully implemented, it is the reality of life and- "the 
theory of our Constitution". The principles of the economic market 
have been extended to the political and intellectual ones. While Mill 
had been somehow cautious about such an eventual extension, Holmes 
writes as if it has been accomplished and accepted by all. To the
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extent that he refers to the social domination of the basic tenets
of a capitalist market economy) Holmes1 reading of the situation
appears realistic and the Supreme Court had played a not inconsiderable
role in upholding and extending "laissez-faire" economic measures
(see infra, Chapter II). But as regards the political market Holmes
was much less realistic than Mill. A large part of the population had
yet to be fully admitted to the franchise (in particular blacks and
women); even more significantly large parts of the working population
had rejected the capitalist market assumptions around the turn of
the century. Socialist and radical trade •union activities were
at a peak, never repeated in 20th century American history.
(b) For Mill, the intellectual market was necessary for the
flourishing of individuality and the development of personality as
well as for the testing of theories and ideas related to general
practical and normative questions, to the "common interest". For
Holmes, on the contrary, the market place is the mechanism through
which isolated and antagonistic individuals and groups can carry out
their "wishes". The competition of the market is the best or the
only means for self-gratification. Holmes* "social darwinism" is
evident in his theoretical writings: "For my own part, I believe that
the struggle for life is the order of the world, at which it is vain 
33to repine" or again,"the ultima ratio of private persons is force, 
and ... at the bottom of all private relations, however tempered by
34sympathy, and all the social feelings,is a justifiable self-preference". 
The intellectual and political markets can be seen, therefore, as 
providing a mechanism through which self-preferences backed by the 
state force can hold sway. The "fighting faiths" that compete and the 
resulting "truths" are nothing more than the publicly sanctioned
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interest of the more powerful forces in society seeking their
self-interest. After the establishment of the conditions of
universal competition, Holmes' function as an influential Supreme
Court judge is to sit back and see to it that if "his fellow
35citizens want to go to Hell, he will help them".
(c) However, if the "truth" is no more than a private "wish", 
a self-interest that has won in the market, and "men have realised 
that this is the best way in which they may.successfully press their 
claims" then any "truth" that loses out in the competition has no 
claim at all for protection. If the "political market" decides that 
a particular "fighting faith" is not in demand by the consumers, then 
its "persecution" appears and, indeed is, logical. It is based on 
the strict and ruthless logic of the ultimate and valid test of 
truth, the market. Seen in this light Holmes' Voltairian liberalism 
about the freedom of opinions that he "loathes and are fraught with 
death" and the protection of ideas in proletarian dictatorship sounds 
more rhetorical than substantive. Holmes, the judge, would protect 
anti-market "fighting faiths" (like those of the socialists Abrams 
and Gitlow and their associates) if their talk was "puny anonymities" 
without chance of success. Gitlow's left-wing manifesto was "the
■zá
right of an ass to drool about proletarian dictatorship". On the
contrary, referring to the Debs case, in which he affirmed a 10-
year imprisonment of a famous socialist leader, Holmes would dryly
and dismissively state that there was "a lot of jaw about free 
37speech". (For analysis of the cases above, see infra, Chapter VI).
Thus, for Holmes the political market is not the same 
place as that defended by J.S. Mill. He,surely, shares a 
philosophical relativism. which according to A. Hunt
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derives from his acquaintance (as with all legal realists) with the
38a
pragmatic philosophy of Villiam Jemes. Although "all life is an
experiment", the established political market which has been accepted
by the dominant social forces can take care of all necessary reforms.
But if the legitimacy of the market or of any of its outcomes is
effectively challenged, Holmes who "despised any tinkering with the
39institutions of private property"' will give no help. To enjoy
i ' .
"the blessings of the market" to paraphrase the U.S. Constitution, one 
must fully accept its legitimacy.
Thus, when Holmes from a position of authority came to deal with 
the problem that Mill had faced - albeit as a future but inevitable 
eventuality - his answer appears at the surface as self-complacent.
The 19th century fears about the incompatibility of democracy and 
the free enterprise system had proven unfounded. But underneath the 
rhetoric a lingering apprehension remained. The market system had 
to be protected, not through the undemocratic methods of plural voting 
and the like, but by imposing and propagating the intrinsic value of 
the existing social system and repressing those who challenged it.
In the process, the market had changed from the test of truth into 
the "ultimate truth".
3. The Democratic Justifications of Freedom of Expression
3-1.1. The democratic humanism of Alexander Meikle.iohn. The political 
theory
The most influential treatise in 20th century American theory on 
freedom of expression was the little book "Political Freedom" written 
in 1948 by the philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn. Meiklejohn attempts 
to ground both the function and justification for free expression in 
what he calls the plan of "government by consent" or "self government"
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or simply political freedom. According to that "plan”, there is no
radical separation between rulers and ruled, the government and the
people. The people through an original compact have pledged themselves
to take all decisions on public policy collectively and have delegated
their sovereign powers to the removable government of the day which is
charged with carrying out the sovereign will. Since all laws and
other governmental,measures are the outcome of this process, seen as a
continuous re-enactment of the social contract, their acceptance by
the sovereign people is not a submission to some external rule but the
very gist of self-control. The sovereign people obey these laws and
policies that they themselves have enacted, through their delegates.
Each individual has two roles: as a citizen he or she discusses
issues bearing on the common good and thus governs. As a private
person he pursues his own interest and is governed. The public
interest, embodied in laws is hot the simple aggregate of the
individual antagonistic interests but compounded out of them is an
"organisation of them, a selection, an arrangement, based upon
judgments of relative values and mutual implications".^
Based on this version of democratic theory, Meiklejohn argues
that freedom of expression is necessary in order to ensure that
the process of self-government and its formal completion,voting, can ^
take place. It enables citizens to inform themselves about the issues,
exchange information and opinions, get "as wise as possible" and
ultimately cant their votes. The rationale, therefore, of free
expression lies on the right of the listening citizens. "The point
42of ultimate interest ... is the minds of the hearers". This
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interest is not based on "the need of Hitler or Lenin or Engels
or Marx to express his opinion in matters vital to him if life
43is to be worth living" but is a deduction from the basic American 
agreement that "public issues should be decided by universal 
suffrage". He draws a line between freedom of public discussion 
and a private right of speech. The former must never be' abridged; 
no idea or doctrine referring to the common needs and interests of
i
the republic may be ruled out as false or dangerous as they are all 
"relevant" to a self-governing, politically free nation. The 
government has the legitimate right to regulate the place, the manner 
and the time of expression, to put rules of order and procedure, but 
it may not forbid or discriminate against any idea because of its
icontent.
The private right to speak, on the other hand, like "life" and 
"property" is an individual possession, related to the private 
person's quest for his own interest. It is one of the "most highly 
cherished private possessions",^ but has nothing to do with the 
absolute prohibition of the First Amendment and may be denied or 
limited, as every other possession, in accordance with the "due process 
of law". Meiklejohn protests against the identification of the two
•  i*  i"distinct" categories of freedom that results in the underestimation
of political freedom and of the concepts of public or common interest.
Meiklejohn belongs to the pragmatist and idealist tradition in
45American political philosophy exemplified by Dewey and Mclver. Like 
them he believed in the basic soundness of the existing political 
institutions, which can be made to work towards the conmon good once
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the "excessive individualism" of the American way of life has been 
mitigated. If people stop thinking as "farmers, trade-union workers, 
as employers, as investors and become more of citizens devoted to 
the common welfare",^ the plan of self-government enshrined in the 
Constitution will be accomplished. He ascribed to individuals a dual 
rationality - a "higher" public and a "lower" private one - and 
believed that the process of civil education and political information 
would inevitably lead to the triumph of the former. People will 
then realize that they possess a public will and an overriding common 
interest which the existing institutions are capable of expressing.
Meiklejohn*s political theory is the apogee of liberal democratic 
humanism: a eulogy for the harmonious state where the common 
interest will be acknowledged and guaranteed and human personality 
will develop and prosper, He, thus, returns to the Millian faiths on 
human rationality and dignity but in the process the reality of 
conflicts of antagonistic interests injected by Holmes and the Realists 
is lost. By borrowing from Rousseau an ahistorical concept of 
compact and an elusive sovereign "general will" and from Hegel the 
idealistic notion of "common welfare" that is moving forward toward 
its realization in a teleological fashion and is inscribed in the 
"citizen-part" of a divided self; and by insisting that the existing 
political arrangements are capable and destined to realize his vision, 
Meiklejohn*s description of the political system was completely
A 7
unrealistic. As C.B. Macpherson has said of Dewey and Mclver, it 
was those unrealistic assumptions that "left them wide open to the 
shattering attack of the mid-20th century empirical political theorists. ft
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3.1.2. The theory of freedom of expression
Meiklejohn*s main points on freedom of expression may be 
summarized as follows:
First, freedom of expression is grounded on the political plan 
of self-government embodied in the American Constitution and the 
existing political institutions. The ”absolute” language of the First 
Amendment, its legislative history and its place - as the first - 
within the whole constitutional scheme indicate that an absolute 
protection of expression was intended by the Founding Fathers. Moreover, 
history and tradition have shown that political freedom is the para­
mount organising principle of the American Republic. Thus, the 
question becomes whether the actual institutional functioning matches 
up the postulated functions.
Secondly, the main function of the market place of ideas is neither 
to discover truth through the clash of opinions (as in Mill), nor - 
even more emphatically - to allow the imposition of private wishes 
through an ongoing give-and-take process. Its function is to enable 
citizens to govern themselves, not "a device for the winning of new 
truth ... [but] for the sharing of whatever truth has been wonM. ^  The 
main beneficiaries are the listeners and not the speakers, an idea 
that was later developed by the supporters of a right of access to the 
media and in particular by Professor Barron. Through its workings the 
initial compact gets re-enacted and a continuously renewed public 
consent becomes the principle and sole arbiter of state power.
Thirdly, the distinction between public and private speech - the latter 
is protected not by the First but by the Fifth ”due process” Amendment - 
determines the degree of protection necessary. The drawing of the line
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is unproblematic, since it has been included by definition in the 
constitutional plan and is implicit in the allegedly clear distinction 
between common needs and public good and private interests.
Within the postulated public speech category, full protection 
must be given to all propositional contents because they are all 
relevant. Regulation of the context of speech, though, is both 
permitted and desirable so that all messages may have a hearing.
However, the legislature and the executive may, and have, tried to force 
the democratic process, so the Supreme Court must guarantee that 
those in power are denied the opportunity to coerce public consent.
This idea was adopted in the 30*s and 40*s by a majority of 
Supreme Court Justices. Thus Jackson speaking for the Court in 
1943 stated that: "There is no mysticism in the American concept 
of the state or of the nature or origin of its authority. We set up 
government by the consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights 
denies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent.
Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion, not public .
50opinion by authority."'
Finally, free expression of ideas on public matters, the very 
essence of the plan of self-government, can never endanger the safety 
of the state. Certain inconveniences that may arise in the short-run 
will be alleviated by the long-run benefits of the realization of the
plan. Free public discussion is the safety of the Republic and the
51only way to progress.'
3 .1 .3 . The receival of democratic humanism in constitutional theory
Meikle John's analysis provoked a fierce debate among constitutional 
authors,^ intensified by the fact that its main tenets had been accepted 
by a majority of the post-New Deal Supreme Court. In particular 
Justice Black had become the most prominent exponent of the "absolute"
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theory of speech protection from the bench. The main criticisms
were addressed to the legal part of Meiklejohn's theory.
The attribution of the theory to the absolute language of the
First Amendment and the unambiguously libertarian intentions of
the framers has been challenged by the "revisionist shcool" of
constitutional history (see infra, Chapter.II). Following the
publication of Professor L. Levy’s influential book "Legacy of 
53Suppression" the belief that constitutional language, legislative
history or tradition could yield a clear-cut libertarian meaning
was discredited. MeikleJohn’s reading of them and the two-tiered
(First-Fifth Amendment freedoms) theory were ctiticized as
arbitrary. But it was Meiklejohn’s theoretical distinction between
public and private speech which created the most controversy.
Meiklejohn himself wavered in the enumeration of the categories of
expression that should be included in each region. In the first
edition of his book (19 4 8) he included among the "forms of speech"
that legislatures have both the right and the duty to prohibit
"libel, slander, words that incite men to crime, sedition and
treason". ^ In the second edition (i960) he wanted the sentence
"sedition may be expressed by speech or writing" eliminated because #
sedition is a "tricky and misleading word" suggesting a crime
55where under the Constitution no such crime exists. Professor
Z. Chafee repudiated the distinction because it would put valuable
forms of expression, like literature and the arts, under the private
56speech rubric and allow them restricted protection. Meiklejohn
57replied in a later article by including in the absolutely protected 
area of public speech, "education, philosophy and the sciences, 
literature and the arts". All these forms of speech are necessary,
according to the.new Version, for a successful public discussion on 
public issues and the formation of a citizenship capable to exercise its 
public power to vote. Thus, even for Meiklejohn, the line was somewhat 
elastic.
In its later version, MeikleJohn’s theory came under attack by 
constitutional authors for its excessive liberalism,attributed to his
ignorance of the workings of the law, and its inflated faith in the self-
!
regulatory character of public opinion. However his main thesis that the 
justification for freedom of expression lies in democratic theory or the 
functioning of the political process (the two terms are used inter­
changeably) has been widely accepted. Thus "the social interest that 
the First Amendment vindicates is... the interest in the successful 
operation of the political process, so that the country may be better 
able to adopt the course of action that conforms to the wishes of the
CO
greater number whether or not it is wise or founded on the truth".J
For Bork the only premise on which freedom of expression may be
59protected is the discovery and spread of the political truth. Analogous 
statements can be found in all constitutional texts dealing with 
freedom of expression after the Second World War.
However, underneath the apparent unanimity on the main thesis, 
the consensus breaks up on two points:
(a) on the definition of democracy or the political/public.
(b) on the extent to which the actual functioning of the 
political institutions accords with the postulated theory and 
consequently on the necessity - if any - and direction of institutional 
reform.
The variations on the points (a) (b) above, provide an interesting
matrix of opinions among the various constitutional authors and have
led to an unprecedented inflation of books and articles on freedom of
60expression. At the one end Meiklejohn et al. define democracy as a
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"way of life", a process of public discourse on the common good that
may be extended up to and including protection of "obscenity". Against
such a yardstick he finds the actual protection of expression rather
poor and calls for changes in legal doctrine (the adoption of the
"absolute" doctrine in place of the "clear and present danger" one) so
that the actual political process matches up with the theory. At the
other end conservatives like Bork, Bickel or Bems define as political
those activities that are directly related to governmental behaviour,
policy or personnel. ^Legally protected status should not be granted
to other forms of expression (scientific, educational, commercial or
literary) that only indirectly influence political attitudes. Their
protection should be entrusted to the enlightened society and
6 3"obscenity" is a form of cultural pollution. If the legal scales need
any change it should be towards withdrawing protection from political
expression that challenges the existing political order, and from non-
64directly political speech.
Thus, questions about the theoretical justification of freedom of 
speech get linked with the practical line-drawing between protected and 
unprotected expression and both depend on the definition and under­
standing of the political process. It would be helpful, therefore, 
to take a closer look at the empirical theories of democracy that have 
dominated American political science after the last war and their 
implications for the theory of freedom of expression.
3.2. Empirical Political Science. Pluralism and Freedom of Expression
»
3.2.1. The pluralist and elite theories of democracy
Based on a number of empirical studies on political behaviour the 
revisionist school in political science questioned the assumptions of 
the "classical doctrine of democracy" . Schumpeter, an
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early and influential member of the school, in his book "Capitalism,
Socialism and Democracy" rejected what he called the traditional
definition of democracy as "an institutional arrangement for arriving
at political decisions which decided the common good by making tne
people itself decide the issues through election of individuals, who
65are to assemble in order to carry out its will", for being based on 
empirically improvable postulates. The rationality of sovereign 
citizens,who assemble to debate on public matters and for whom 
participation in politics was one of the most gratifying activities, 
did not exist in reality as a long series of behaviouralist studies 
had, allegedly, proven. Citizens normally respond to political issues 
on the basis of emotions and not of rational argument. Both Schumpeter 
and later B. Berelson, P. Lazarsfeld and W. McPhee, in their influential 
book "Voting", concluded that a too active participation of people in 
politics was actually harmful to the stability of the system.^ The 
"common good", the "general will" were fictitious abstractions and 
a new model of democracy emerged which could allegedly better describe 
and explain political reality. The empirical school, drawing from and
Cn
refining Bentley's seminal 1908 study of the British political process, 
defined politics as a pluralistic competition among interest groups.
Such groups define and defend the interests of their members in a 
continuing process of give-and-take with other groups. Power is 
diffused among the various groups (for example, trade unions, employers' 
associations, churches, professional and leisure groups etc.) and this 
diffusion is the main guarantee against oligarchy: no group or sectional 
interest can perpetually dominate and impose its will upon the rest of 
society. According to Dahl, another prominent member of the school, 
ihe distinction between dictatorship and democracy is not one between a 
government by a minority and a government by a majority, but between 
"government by a minority and government by minorities". Political
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parties guarantee the democratic character of the model and of 
the societies it describes. They ensure a healthy dosage of 
\ stability and change, while a generalized consensus on the validity 
of the "rules of the game" holds the system together. Orderly change 
makes it move by accommodating through institutionalized channels 
the evolving demands of the various interest groups. Thus, "institu­
tionalized conflict" on the input side balances the output and leads 
to overall "system equilibrium". Democracy, far from being a "way 
of life" or a process of experimentation, is a formal method. Its 
political values form part of the process of political socialization 
and civil education; their active acceptance, however, is much 
stronger among the elites than the ordinary people whose main concerns
are restricted to the work place, the family and the immediate peer
69group.
The revisionist theory of democracy started as a reaction to the
exalted claims of the "classical model". However, it soon took a
justificatory aspect as well. The model as described was the only
realistic one, it had survived, it was therefore the best and
70"anything loftier is unworkable".
3.2.2. Sociological .jurisprudence and legal realism
The theoretical framework of the empirical school was easily 
assimilated in mainstream American legal theory owing to the influence of 
Roscoe Pound1 s Sociological Jurisprudence and of Legal Realism. These 
two schools had dominated legal thought in thé United States since the 
beginning of the century. Their main concern was directed at the role
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of law and the judicial function, but their pragmaticism and
empiricism as well as the "interest” theory of law to which both
adhered, were moving parallel to empirical political science.
According to Dean Pound,an interest is"a demand or desire which
human beings, either individually or through groups or associations or
71in relations, seek to satisfy". These claims are satisfied by being
officially granted legal status. The main hypothesis of the interests
theory of law is of a society where a basic harmony among the various
competing groups has been realized. "Social control theory ... tended
to focus attention upon the factors leading to "stability" or "order"
in society ... Law is conceived of as operating to achieve a positive
social function through "eliminating friction and waste". It rests
upon the assumption that the task of law is concerned with the
72"balancing of interests". The theory has been criticized for its
conservatism, its logical ambiguities and the obscure threefold
75classification of individual, social and public interests. Its 
main postulates, however, were adopted by the Legal Realists who worked 
with a much more explicitly pluralistic model of society. To be 
sure, the Realists conceded that weaker groups were losing out in the 
market and proposed an activist role for legal institutions and the 
judges, in particular, in order to redress the balance by reconstituting 
what A.Hunt has called a "dynamic equilibrium". "Social engineering" 
was the order of the day and many realists welcomed and participated 
in the New Deal. Legal institutions should not only aid and supervise 
the compromise of group interests but provide as well for the legitimation 
of the whole system. "The court decision reaches out beyond the
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individual case and enters into moulding and channeling the action 
of the community”. ^
3.2.3. The pluralist .justification of freedom of expression
These converging trends in law and political science had 
great importance for the theory of freedom of expression. They 
crystalized in the so-called "balancing” theory of expression, which 
dominated constitutional thought and practice from the late 40*s to 
the early 60*s. The main changes in the theoretical understanding 
of freedom of expression were the following.
First, expression is no longer seen as an end in itself, or as 
the vehicle through which individuals confer on political and practical 
questions, but is dealt with as one more interest that enters the 
terrain of competition with so many other interests and group claims.
Secondly, the status of that interest is somehow ambiguous.
Julius Stone, the most influential disciple of Pound, thought that the 
free speech conflict was between the social interest in the preservation 
of existing political institutions and the social interest in political 
and cultural change.' For others any free speech claim refers to a 
mere individual interest which must be weighed against the various 
social and political interests. Thus ”[w]here First Amendment rights 
are asserted ... resolution of the issue involves a balancing by the 
courts of the competing private and public interests at stake ...
[T]he right of self-preservation [is] the ultimate value of any society"^ 
stated the Supreme Court in a case involving the right of a witness to 
a Congressional Committee investigating communist activities to remain
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silent. Such a balancing is "mere play on words" said Justice 
Black in dissent. The scale is rigged and can give only one 
result.
The variations in the conceptual status of the interest in 
expression, indicate that the latter has broken up from a 
generalizable category into a series of claims of varying validity. 
Each expression claim is bound to a particular group interest and 
such claims have to be weighed against other social interests and 
against each other. Their balancing leads not only to the 
hierarchization and sanctioning of certain claims but also to the 
placing of groups and individuals within a legitimate/legal - 
illegitimate/criminal space.
Thirdly, in the place of the discarded assumptions of the
"classical democratic model" about the common will and interest a
new concept emerges. That of the governmental or state interest
in sustaining the institutional framework of society. The
identification of free expression and progress and the market
metaphor of truth break down. Expressive activity, in its various
facets, may have serious disruptive effects and must be centrally
regulated. The notion of the market place as competition for self-
78gratification was already implicit in Holmes' theory. Yet,
Holmes in his relativism. was prepared,rhetorically at least,to take 
his arguments to their logical conclusion. If the social forces who 
wanted to go to Hell (have a "proletarian dictatorship") won in the 
market place, he would help them. In the revised theory, the framework 
of the pluralist competition has been firmly established; it allegedly
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works for the benefit of all; and the alternatives have been seen
through and rejected as totalitarian, or anti-democratic or simply 
79anti-American. A new "truth" claim is therefore readmitted. It is
no more the outcome of the competition, since that is invariably seen
as a temporary arrangement of group interests. To be sure, the market
may malfunction in which case state intervention is necessary to
neutralize the side effects. However, the market itself, the process
of pluralist competition, becomes the truth that must be protected.
As a constitutional writer has recently put it: "Many people trust
the market mechanism to value goods and services when conditions of
competition exist. Eliminate the market, however, and many become
extremely uncertain of their abilities to place a value on a particular
good or service, for they are suspicious of concepts like intrinsic
80value. It is the same with ideas and truth." In other words if
there exists any intrinsic value, it is that of the market. Others
have put the same basic idea in a more particular way: "American
citizenship and Communist Party membership are intellectually
81incompatible but physically possible"! or, "it is an important 
function of the law... to pin the label of illegitimacy on a group
op(the Communists) that is, by American standards, truly illegitimate".
Alexander Bickel, one of the leading constitutional writers of the 60's
and 7 0 *s,expresses in a paradigmatic way the change from Holmes'
rhetorical market place to its contemporary equivalent.8^ Although much in
human experience is random and no absolute proof for the validity of
any truth exists, people need values and beliefs in the "foundation of
their conduct". These are the values of the judges themselves and
of the other "leaders of opinion". Judges must see to it that their
values become the "true lies or indispensable illusions" that society
adopts. The market place is "not the best place to test ideas like
84Communism or genocide". Incidentally, one may note, the identification
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between communism and genocide was in a text written in the immediate
aftermath of the Vietnam War and was put impassively. Others have more
cautiously kept to advocacy of genocide as the obvious example of an
idea that cannot be admitted in the market.
Thus by the mid-50*s constitutional theory had accepted that
the justification of freedom of expression lay predominantly in its
relation to the successful functioning of democracy or the political
process, as Meiklejohn had argued. The basic incompatibility,
however, between his democratic humanism and the various versions
86of pluralism was obscured. Thus, Wellington identifies
Meiklejohn* s theory with those of Bickel, whose nostalgic glances
87towards Burkean theories ' belong to an opposing tradition, and Bork*s
88neo-conservative pluralism. Such unbridgeable differences have led 
89others to despair about the possibility of building a justificatory
theory of freedom of expression with practical intent out of political
philosophy or an existing liberal tradition. Finally Professor T.
Emerson, who has set himself auch a task, ends up with a compilation of
justifications (individual self-fulfilment, and attainment of truth,
and participation in decision making, and balance between stability
and change)^ with not much internal coherence.
The majority of those theoretical efforts, however, were made
within the pluralistic model, without much elaboration of its premises
91with the notable exception of two authors, who explicitly adopted and 
discussed it, before presenting their freedom of expression theory.
It is to the reformulation of the justificatory theories in the 60*s 
and 7 0*s, when the pluralistic model came under strain, that the next 
part addresses itself.
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4. Pluralist Theories in the 60s: The Two Versions of Pluralism
Even during the 4 0*s and the 5 0*s, some doubts remained as to 
the accuracy of the pluralistic model. The first objection 
questioned the extent to which citizen participation in the 
political process through voting and membership in the "intermediary" 
groups was formally guaranteed. A series of state "voter 
qualifications" like poll taxes allegedly discouraged poor people 
from voting; "malapportionment" was widely exercised in Several 
states: through elaborate constituency boundaries drawing some 
areas (predominantly urban, poor and black) were given much less 
electoral weight than others (predominantly rural, rich and white). 
The Supreme Court»under Chief Justice Warren,moved carefully in 
the field and in a series of cases involving various aspects of
92the electoral system imposed the "one man - one vote" requirement.
The premise behind the Warren Court voting rights cases was to 
redress the inequalities and guarantee conditions of formal equality 
in voting power.
The second, deeper objection, however, questioned the bas ic 
assumptions of the model. The Supreme Court had accepted during 
the New Deal that certain groups were consistently losing out in 
the pluralist process and had indicated in a famous opinion that • 
it would consider extending greater protection to particular 
religious or national or racial minorities. "Prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition which 
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities."93
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The Federal Government attempted during the 50*s and early 60*s
through various programmes against racial discrimination and poverty^
to ameliorate the worst side effects of the "ordinary" political
process. The Supreme Court, equally, in the desegregation and positive
95discrimination cases under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution 
moved in the direction the Carolene Products case had indicated. The 
success of these attempts, however, was not as wide as expected.
Direct protest action and widespread civil disobedience of an 
unprecedented scale became common in the 60's and early 
70*s. The Civil Eights movement first and the Anti-Vietnam War movement 
later took to the streets.^ The Supreme Court had held, per Justice 
Boberts, in 1939» that "Wherever the title of streets and parks may 
rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the 
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from 
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and 
liberties of citizens.
The grievances aired in these turbulent years were as multiple as 
the methods used to communicate them. Protest was directed at local
and state laws and policies (Southern discrimination and segregation
|
practices), at national ones (the War and the draft) as well as at 
deepseated social causes of deprivation. The methods ranged from 
peaceful demonstrations and marches to sit-ins, sleep-ins, read-ins 
(and other original forms related to the circumstances of the 
particular protest), to symbolic newsworthy acts like draft-card or 
flag burning etc., to some violent protest. But whatever the objects 
or the methods, the protest movement shattered the optimistic assumptions 
of pluralistic political science. The vote had been extended and formally 
equalized but quite sizeable groups were choosing to press their demands
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outside the postulated channels of lobbying, inters and intra-party
bargaining, pluralistic give-and-take, or voting. Bickel argued
in 1970 that the Supreme Court had attempted to imprint on history its
own vision of social progress. In so doing it had both violated the
democratic process by usurping powers it did not have and had failed
98miserably even according to its own criteria.
Bickel exemplifies the increasingly confused reaction of the
1
academic world to the protest movements. The near-consensus of the 50*s
and early 60*s that had declared the "end of ideology" broke down.
Even the architects of the pluralist theory had to revise their
99initial optimistic assumptions. But, according to a recent
constitutional author, although "pluralism has come under powerful
attack, as more stress has been placed on the undeniable concentrations
of power and inequalities among the various competing groups, in
100American politics", "much of the legal community continues to invoke 
[pluralism] in its original unqualified form".^
One can distinguish,however, two broad trends developing within 
constitutional theory in reaction to the protest movements which had 
serious implications for the theory of freedom of expression.
4.1. The School of "Unqualified" Pluralists
At the end a number of conservative and disappointed New 
Deal liberals retained the assumptions of the unqualified pluralist model. 
One could call this loose school the "unqualified pluralists". The 
political process proper is functioning satisfactorily, according to 
them, due riot least to the Supreme Court*s "equality under the law" 
decisions of the 60*s. Any activity, therefore, that challenges the 
political process or its outcome - the concrete laws and policies seen 
as the result of the legitimate group competition - undermines the
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"majesty of the law" and weakens the overall authority of the legal
and political systems. Direct action and civil disobedience cannot
be tolerated. Ex-Solicitor-General A. Cox has put the argument in
a paradigmatic ways The "rule of law" depends on voluntary compliance.
Although not every law is morally justifiable, there are three
paramount moral justifications that require obedience to all laws. The
"rule of law" secures maximum individual freedom, provides the best
opportunities for peaceful change and aids the ultimate objectives of
society "individual growth toward responsibility and freedom of 
102choice". The force of the legitimacy of law, that guarantees its
"civilizing-liberalizing" influence, is undermined by civil disobedience
which by attacking particular laws attacks at the same time the spirit
of law. Equally for Bickel, free discussion is essential in American
politics but it cannot be allowed when it "disrupts or coerces" the
political process or breaches valid laws, "the majority decisions 
103embodied in law". In these cases the arguments for free expression 
are completely subordinated to general ones about the "rule of law", 
the morality of consent and dissent and "compelling state interests", 
in which the protestors of the 60*s are simply substituted for the 
communists of the 3 0*s.
A similar reaction is found in the civil rights opinions of 
Justice Hugo Black. Black had publicly accepted the premises of 
Meiklejohn*s theory and had forcefully dissented in most of the 
anti-communist cases of the 50*s. The so-called "absolute" 
protection of speech doctrine had been associated with him and 
in a famous interview he had stated that he would not limit such 
absolute protection to public/political expression like Meiklejohn 
but would extend it to all categories of speech. Black, 
himself a Roosevelt appointee, had fully accepted the assumptions of
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individualism and regulated market competition. He believed that if
the government was made fully accountable to an equitably integrated
popular will both harmony and social progress would be assured. He
had complete confidence in the patriotism, decency and shared values
of the American people and disagreed with the 50's persecution and
harassment of Conmrunists because "the people know Soviet Communism;
the doctrine of Soviet revolution is exposed in all of its ugliness
105and the American people want none of it". The Great Depression,
however, had shown that political reality was not in full accord with
106
the ideals of popular sovereignty. Certain "vested interest" (Black's
phrase) combined to frustrate the legitimate interests of the underdog.
Black, an activist "social engineer", saw his role as to ensure equality
in the political market place (by sanctioning the equalization of
voting rights and First Amendment protection of political dissenters)
and pending the full democratic integration of society, to ameliorate
the side-effects of economic competition (by supporting trade unions
and welfare legislation). 'However, by the late 60's, faced with the
protest movements, Black's change could not have been more dramatic.
The black protests challenged public order and threatened "mob violence",
sit-ins in segregated establishments were unjustified trespass to
private property, the anti-War movement was "the beginning of a new
108revolutionary era of permissiveness fostered by the judiciary".
To be sure, if the complaint had any justification it was his earlier
opinions, in majority or in dissent, that had shown such "permissiveness".
His deep seated confidence in the patriotism and common sense of
Americans,which in the 50's had led him to believe that Communists,
these "miserable merchants of unwanted ideas" would never win in an
open political competition even if they were left free to disseminate
them,was profoundly shaken: the people had rejected "character,
109morality, hard work and self-denial". ' Respect for property,
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privacy and the rule of law became the rallying cries of his opinions.
It would not be unreasonable to argue that the bitterness of 
Black's late opinions arose from a sense of personal betrayal. He 
had been at the forefront of the judicial effort to recognize the 
claims of the disenfranchised and deprived, a fact that had cost him 
many personal attacks and even attempts at impeachment. Tet, the 
protest movements and the conservative backlash came to halt and 
reverse the process of integration when it was coming close to its 
completion. In a way, Black had been convinced that "the end of ideologies" 
was at hand and a new era of national consensus and progress was dawning. 
Seen in this light, Black's change cannot be merely explained by a 
conservatism that took hold of him as he grew older.11^ His odyssey 
represents the road of many New Beal reformist liberals. It marks the 
end of a school of thought which believed that the extension of 
formal political rights and the amelioration of the economic and 
social conditions of the most deprived parts of the population through 
cautious reforms "from above" would dissolve the structures of 
domination and "domesticate" social conflict. According to a conser­
vative critic of the Warren Court's reapportionment decisions (in 
which Black had participated wholeheartedly) its ideology can be
t -•
described as the "guardian ethic": "the bureaucratic, elitist
ideology of action-minded intellectuals in the modem age, most of
whom thought they were beyond ideology".111 Elliott claims that despite
its democratic rhetoric, the Warren Court led to a transfer of power
from legislature and parties to bureaucrats, judges and academics,
112the main constituencies of the Supreme Court.
An interesting presentation of the premises of "unqualified 
pluralism" and its relations to legal developments appears in an
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article by an American legal sociologist which appeared in 1972.
Truber examines the "instrumental approach to law" and its relation to 
democracy. He defines legal instrumentalism as the use of legal rules 
for social engineering and control, a technique whereby law is the 
tool or means for achieving preselected goals. The relation between 
law and democracy, therefore, depends on the way the ends are chosen. 
Truber believes that the state in America is not "distinct and 
superior" to society, but is "the process which organises the struggle 
between competing and conflicting groups and the policy output that 
results from it ".^Constitutional law guarantees that all legitimate 
groups will be heard and the law output will thus be the contractual 
manifestation of - the compromises struck in the political process. The 
ends that the "instrument law" serves arise from the functioning 
political process and their implementation through "purposeful legal
113
115
reasoning" limits governmental power to such compromises. Instrumentalism
and pluralism reinforce each other and guarantee the enforcement of
limitations on state power called for by liberal democratic principles.
If the pluralist process is not functioning, however, as is the case
with developing countries (Trüber*s main concern), instrumentalism
might aid in the implementation of ends arbitrarily chosen and thus
116lead to totalitarianism.
It is perhaps ironical that Justice Black who earnestly adopted
the premises of legal instrumentalism and humanistic pluralism, as
described by Truber, became late in his judicial career witness to the
inaccuracies of the model and its failure in its ultimate claim that
it would guarantee social peace through apolitical-technocratic social
engineering. Justice Black and Professor Bickel, "a Robert Kennedy
117liberal [until] 1968'! t ' represent the conservative solution. Others 
tried to revise the pluralist model in various ways. One may call them 
the "qualified pluralists".
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4.2. The "Qualified” Pluraliste
The "qualified pluraliste" retained the assumptions of the pluralist
model hut qualified them in two principal ways. Either the model did
not as yet fully represent social and political reality and/or some
of its most optimistic premises about social peace and consensus,
distributive justice, institutionalization of social conflict, and the
like, were too exaggerated and should be modified in order to account
for and help redress the continuing concentration and imbalances of
power. They, therefore, call for a renewed effort to open up the
formal democratic process and remove blockages that continue to keep
sizeable parts of the population in its margins; and for a continuation
and intensification of welfare programmes and greater protection
of those "discrete and insular" minorities that keep losing out in the
pluralistic process. To be sure the intellectual underpinnings within
this loose group of reformist academics are quite varied: thus John 
118 119Rawls and Ronald Dworkin put a renewed emphasis on practical
moral philosophy and react strongly against the positivistic and
linguistic philosophy that has dominated Anglo-Saxon philosophy
120departments since Wittgenstein and Austin; J.H. Ely emphasizes the
need for the strengthening of the formal political processes; while 
121B. Ackerman, building on economic analysis of law, calls for greater 
use of scientific concepts in law-making and adjudication. The common 
theme of all these trends may be traced to a liberal reaction against 
the conservative backlash of the mid and late 70* s in the academic and 
political worlds, and on both sides of the Atlantic. The realism of 
the renewed pledge to the principles of the New Deal and Keynesian Welfare 
Liberalism cannot be discussed here. 122The neoliberal reaction to the protest 
movements, however, and its implications for the justificatory theory 
of freedom of speech have some relevance to our concerns, though the 
official attitudes are still going the opposite - conservative - direction.
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The main neoliberal concern is to work out a framework that
would allow some room for protest action and civil disobedience
within the existing legal framework. As one constitutional author
put it, the problem is to work out a method of "accommodation between
123majority rule and consent". "Majority rule" refers to the assumptions
of democratic humanism and popular sovereignty as expounded by
Meiklejohn and the pragmatist political philosophers. Thus, "the
extension of the franchise, voting-rights legislation and one-man-one
vote constitutional interpretation" ^ have transformed the assumptions of
earlier democrats to political reality. The fear of "majority tyranny"
remains, nevertheless. "No matter how open the process those with
most of the votes are in a position to vote themselves advantages at
125the expense of others". Pluraliste insist that the "reality of
126majority rule is the existence of shifting majorities", which ensure
that no single minority is capable of permanently voting itself to
power. The qualified pluralists, however, call for a safety-valve
for those social groups that might find themselves in a permanent
minority situation. Drawing from Hannah Arendt ' s essay on civil 
127disobedience, ' Professors Wellington and Bickel conclude that there 
is a second aspect in the "spirit of American law" deriving from the
t -
Lockean social contract theory and Tocqueville.
According to it, continuous consent to the laws and policies
arising from the pluralistic process is a necessary condition for the
maintenance and reproduction of the original contract that established
the American republic. Since the right to dissent, combined with a
128failure to do so, amount to consent some "domesticated dissent" must 
be allowed. To be sure, such dissent cannot be allowed against the 
"consensus universalis", the essential features of the socio-economic 
order, since its very function is to reactivate consent towards that
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order; but solely, against specific laws and policies, the outcomes
of the process. There are quite a few specific proposals for the
practical implementation of this domesticated dissent. E. Arendt,
more interested in the political side of the idea, proposes the
admittance of political dissenters and disobedient minorities within
the formal pluralistic process as one more "interest group, that,
through their representations - that is, registered lobbyists - [will]
influence and ‘assist* Congress by means of persuasion, qualified
129opinion, and the numbers of their constituents". ' The more legally
minded constitutional authors propose constitutional methods that
130would protect some protest based on the First Amendment: either by
using the two-tiered character (state-federal) of the American
constitutional order that allows some law violation so that the
conformity of a state or local statute with the federal constitution
131and Bill of Bights may be tested by the Supreme Court; or through 
the exercise of greater discretion and sensitivity by prosecuting
132authorities in initiating criminal prosecutions against protesters.
Various - and often contradictory - distinctions and definitions are
proposed: between "direct action"/"civil disobedience", degrees of
civil disobedience etc; or theories about the conditions that make
133civil disobedience legally protected protest.
4.3« The "Kvde Park" Theory of Legitimation
The particulars of the proposals are of no direct interest here 
and, in any case, none of the more formal ones* has been officially 
adopted. What is more interesting, however, is the explicit or implied 
appearance in all these contributions of an additional, and in some 
cases exclusive, justification for free expression. One could call it 
the. "Hyde Park" theory of expression: allowing dissenters some measure
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of legalized protest makes them, as one writer put it graphically, "let 
134-off steam”. The "soap-box orator" releases energy and political
opposition is channelled into courses consistent with law and order.
The same argument has been extensively used by the proponents of a
135legal right of access to the print and electronic media. Thus, 
the Commission on the P r e s s c o n c l u d e d  that free expression provides 
a "safety-valve" for minority groups which by publicly airing their
i
grievances are prevented from turning into violence. According to 
T. Emerson this justification for free expression is part of the 
more general argument about political legitimation: if people believe 
that they had their say and were given a fair chance to persuade others 
to adopt a certain course of action, they will accept and obey the
137final decision as legitimate, even if it goes against their interests. 
4*4* Conclusions
One may conclude that despite the ritualistic references to J.S. 
Mill, Holmes, Brandéis and Meiklejohn the theory of free expression has 
moved quite a long way from its original bearings. This fact is not 
surprising, by itself, although the insistence of each new theory that 
it reinterprets the spirit of the classics is more so.
1 9 th century liberals claimed that free expression would lead to 
the development of human personality, to the enjoyment of human life 
as an open process of experimentation and innovation and to social 
progress. J.S. Mill feared the "tyranny of the (working people) 
majority" and presented the most famous arguments for free expression 
in anticipation of such an eventuality. Although his fears did not 
materialize in the West, his exhortations have not lost their relevance 
for the 20th century. If direct coercion of beliefs is the order of the 
day.in the states of "real socialism", administration and manipulation
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of beliefs is not unknown in the Vest. According to the - far from
radical - American philosopher C.S. Pierce:
"If liberty of speech is to be untrammelled from the grosser 
forms of constraint, then uniformity of opinion will be 
secured by a moral terrorism to which the respectability 
of society will give its thorough approval. Following the 
method of authority is the path of peace. Certain non­
conformities are permitted; certain others (considered 
unsafe) are forbidden; and thus a shade of prima facie 
doubt is cast upon every proposition which is considered 
essential to the security of society. Singularly enough, 
the persecution does not all come from without; but a 
man torments himself and is... most distressed... finding 
himself believing propositions which he has been brought up 
to regard with aversion..."138
Herbert Marcuse has equally pointed at the contradiction he finds
between classical liberal theory and its contemporary application:
"Tolerance which was the greatest achievement of the 
liberal era is still professed, while the economic and 
political process is subjected to an ubiquitous and 
effective administration in accordance with the predominant 
interests. The result is an objective contradiction 
between the economic and political structure on the one 
side and the theory and practice of liberation on the 
other."139
The democrats, on the other hand, from J.J. Rousseau to Meiklejohn
viewed free expression as the method of integration of the general
will of a sovereign and self-governing people. For the pluralist
however, elites rule and the people must be content in periodically
acclaiming them and accepting their scientific definitions of reality,
normality, state, group and individual needs and interests.
"In the modern representative, parliamentary or direct 
democracy the majority does not result from the 
development of independent thought and opinion but 
rather from the monopolistic administration of opinion... 
this majority is self-perpetuating, closed... it repels 
a priori any change other than changes within the 
system... [it is] all but the opposite of Rousseau's 
•general will'."140
The main neoliberal addition to the classical liberal-democratic 
theory of expression, is a justification of free expression as the 
means of social control for those who could not see their lives as 
enjoyable or consider themselves as sovereign self-governing people.
In theory, at least, the distance covered is not inconsiderable.
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5. A Recent Philosophical Attempt to Formulate a Theory of Freedom 
of Expression; Thomas Scanlon and the Argument from Autonomy
A recent attempt to provide a philosophical justification of
141freedom of expression has been made by T. Scanlon. His essay has
attracted wide interest, particularly among neo-liberal constitutional
142authors, some of whom have accepted the main points of the theory 
and tried to work out its implications for legal doctrine.
Scanlon starts from the assumption that a certain category of
iacts, acts of expression, enjoy greater legal immunity than other 
conduct, although they lead to harmful consequences. His main concern 
is to enquire whether the definition of the protected category of acts 
and the immunity afforded is based, as in most traditional theories, 
on consequentialist arguments (i.e. arguments about the benefits 
arising from free expression); or on arguments about individual rights; 
or, finally, on independent moral grounds, not identifiable with any 
particular constitutional order or provision (for example the American 
First Amendment), but generally applicable. He concludes that all 
three grounds are involved, but identifies as the core of the theory a 
non-consequentialist, non-rights-based justification, which he calls 
the "Millian principle". According to it "legitimate government is 
one whose authority citizens can reoognize while still regarding them­
selves as equal, autonomous, rational a g e n t s . A  citizen regards 
himself as autonomous if he "see(s) himself as sovereign in deciding 
what to believe and in weighing competing reasons for action ... he must 
apply to these tasks his own canons of rationality ... an autonomous 
person cannot accept without independent consideration the judgment of 
others as to what he should believe or what he should do."^^
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This principle, therefore, organizes the relations between, 
individuals and the state (when government is legitimate). Scanlon 
insists that it does not create an individual right but states a 
limitation on governmental power, which is also the basis of its exercise 
and acceptance as legitimate. To obey political power, citizens must 
feel autonomous and free.
The Millian principle, which is the legal particularization of the 
general theory, has two parts,both limiting the power of the state to 
restrict acts of expression: according to the first, the state cannot 
restrict acts of expression because of their, allegedly, false 
propositional content (such action would deny autonomous citizens the 
opportunity to decide freely what is true and false); the second 
stipulates that expression advocating harmful or illegal conduct cannot 
in itself be made illegal (that would deter citizens from deciding 
autonomously and on the basis of all available information, whether 
they should conform to some conduct required by the state).
Scanlon's area of interest and methodology is that of analytical 
philosophy. He contends that his theoretical defence of freedom of 
expression converges with notions of autonomy derived from Kant, Hobbes 
and J.S. Mill, but, his method for arriving at it is based on what he 
calls intuitions about (a) illegitimate justifications for state 
interference with acts of expression, and (b) notions of legal 
responsibility, which may be derived from real legal materials (laws 
and judicial decisions). He believes, correctly, that no "theoretically 
interesting" description of the protected category of acts exists: we 
may say that to the same extent that an "expressive act" (an act 
undertaken with communicative intent) ^  is also externally observable 
conduct (movement of the lips, writing or distributing a leaflet etc.), 
forms of conduct that do not involve speech may have an additional or 
dominant communicative component (for example picketing, burning a
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flag or even a political assassination). Thus, any attempt to distinguish 
conceptually between speech and a c t i o n ^  or between public/political 
and private speech^^ necessarily neglects both the illocutionary force 
of speech acts and the communicative aspects of other conduct. Scanlon, 
equally rejects consequentialist arguments based on the function of 
expression as conducive to knowledge or truth (they are not verifiable).
Scanlon then attempts to define the justifications that the
state may not legitimately appeal to, in order to restrict expressive
acts. He lists those restrictions of expression considered as
legitimate (assault, defamation etc.) and concludes that the crucial
distinction emerging is between "expression that moves others to act
by pointing out what they take to be good reasons for action and
expression which gives rise to action in other ways, e.g. by providing
149them with the means to do what they wanted to do anyway". The 
protection of the former category is supported by "normal views about 
legal responsibility" and philosophical notions about human agency: 
an agent is not legally responsible for certain harms, if his causal 
relation to them is restricted to providing to another person arguments 
and reasons for performing the harmful conduct or, alternatively, the 
responsibility of the former is superseded by that of the actor once 
the latter in full "possession of his faculties" has weighed up the 
offered arguments and decided to act according to his own uncoerced 
judgment.
Scanlon*s interesting insight is that there does not exist an 
area of protected expressive acts that may be defined independently of 
what the state allows or prohibits. No original or essential realm of 
discourse may be identified through independent theoretical justifications
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and definitions, to be afterwards measured up against the reality of 
state intervention. He thus reverses the assumption of most previous 
theorists who tried, firstly, to demarcate the principles of free 
expression in a social realm independent of state intervention and 
then, in a second step, compared the principle(s) with its realization/ 
violation by state/legal practice. The state and its laws are always 
present, as it were, in the constitution or demarcation of what is 
discursively allowed or prohibited.
Having made this important departure from previous theory, Scanlon 
then reverts to his intuitions about legal responsibility and agency, 
and the edge of his critical reversal, as I understand it, is lost.
If there is no theoretical definition of expressive acts
independently of state or legal intervention, there does not exist
either any essential definition or single principle of legal
responsibility included in all legal enactments or judicial decisions,
as Scanlon implies. "The principles of liability ... are greatly
150influenced by changing moral and social ideas", and many other 
factors, one could add (economic and political pressures), that 
disallow the notion of a single,uniform, across the board, principle 
of legal responsibility.
Equally, Scanlon's intuition that there is a coherent and . 
"theoretically interesting definition" of the harms that the state may 
not prevent by curtailing expressive acts is at the theoretical level un-
wsrrantedly essentialist and at the empirical level simply not true.
151The essentialism, characteristic of much legal philosophy, is evident 
in Scanlon's attempt to discover a principle that permeates all state 
or legal activity related to expression. According to the "Millian 
principle" all state/legal intervention that prohibits and punishes 
expressive acts because of their content is absolutely prohibited.
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The legal Bystem, or its part related to expressive acts, is presented
as a coherent, homogeneous whole that follows singular principle(s).
This whole, independent of external influences, moves on its own,
animated by the predicates of the Millian principle which are materialized
in all its distinct parts be they statutory enactments or judicial
decisions. Thus the "spirit of the law" (or this part of the law),
presented as the two liberal injunctions on state activity, becomes
the homogenizing force of the actual legal system inscribed in its
parts. Stated as a normative proposition (what the state should do),
Scanlon* s principle would constitute as advanced a liberal position
on free expression as any encountered in the literature. By prohibiting,
in its second part, state control of advocacy of illegal action, it
152"taxes government patience" greatly. But Scanlon presents it as an 
empirically discoverable principle as well, emanating from an 
examination of actual legal statutes and decisions. However, in this 
interplay between the "spirit of the law", as construed, and legal reality, 
the latter resists its reading according to any one principle, let alone 
Scanlon*s extra-liberal one. At one point, he realizes the difficulty 
and he preempts a possible accusation that he is an anarchist: his 
principle is, in reality, "extremely weak" and "at any rate [he] would 
not call what [he is] maintaining a n a r c h i s m " . H e  further insists 
that it is the legal material that yields the postulated principles, and 
not his philosophical predilections, anarchistic or not. I would 
suggest, however, that it is only a highly selective process of inclusion 
and exclusion of legal material in his list that makes the principles 
feasible at all. Laws relating to obscenity or seditious libel, for 
example, that reach out and control the content of expressive acts are 
not mentioned, although not unknown in contemporary legal history.
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Even in the more limited area of political expression the list is
arbitrary: "... advocacy of action or conduct enjoys less protection
[than that he assumed] ... Scanlon seems to be concerned with
advocacy of conduct [and] his claim about autonomy is factually incorrect
154in most situations'1«
Having thus problematized the existence of a free "universe of 
discourse" (see infra, Chapter IV) that state and law seize a
posteriori, he attempts to redeem freedom or autonomy as the principle
155of a homogenized legal corpus. According to Huger, the concept
that freedom is realized through obedience to the law is a main
characteristic of the Kantian theory. However by conducting his
argument within the existing legal system and ordinary legal discourse,
while rejecting one of its cardinal premises, i.e. that law cannot
earily permit law violation or its advocacy,  ^"^Scanlon ultimately
fails in his task. Either autonomy as legally sanctioned is less than
what he claims it to be: in that case since his conditions of autonomy
are "extremely weak" what remains is no autonomy at all. Or his
philosophically arrived at concept of freedom/autonomy is not in any
sense materialized within the actual legal institutions: then the
search for a "moral" justification of free expression which conforms
with legal reality has not been, satisfactorily, concluded.
Scanlon*s theory, however, presents much greater interest than the,
somewhat tired, repetitions of the classics of liberalism often
enoountered in the literature. To be sure, the philosophical notion of
agency that he assumes without much discussion is not an uncontroversial
one. The relation between agency and structure is one of the most vexed
problems in social science. Scanlon bypasses it completely by accepting,
in an unproblematized fashion, the full sovereignty of free will against
157the emphasis put by both Marxist and non-Marxist theory on the
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structural unacknowledged causes and unintended effects of human 
action. Even within legal philosophy, which after religion and theology, 
remains the area of free will par excellence, the trend has been 
away from naive notions of agency and responsibility.^8
Yet Scanlon*s theory, first, points toward the intrinsic relation 
between theories of freedom of expression and theories of legitimation 
of power in a much more consistent way than previously. It, secondly, 
stresses the importance of the state and its law for expressive activity. 
Any contemporary theory of freedom of expression that starts from an 
independent examination of the importance or function of speech and 
measures up it s conclusions against state/legal intervention necessarily 
neglects the fact that state and law, with their own determinations 
and "conditions of existence", are at the root of any theory or legal 
doctrine about expression protection. No theory of free discourse, 
outside the bounds of pure philosophical speculation, can have any 
meaningful relation to reality, if it does not account for the role 
that the state, laws and judicial decisions play in the determination 
and demarcation of the realm of discourse itself. It, finally, points 
in a negative way to the problems created by conceiving "the law" as 
a homogenized whole permeated by singular principles, an attitude 
familiar to legal philosophy and constitutional law.
The implications of these remarks for constitutional theory, in 
general, and for the theory and practice of freedom of expression will 
be examined in the rest of this thesis.
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CHAPTER II
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
1. Introduction
The discussion on the nature and limits of free expression is
linked in American legal theory, as all legal controversy, with the
problem of the role and function of the Supreme Court within the
constitutional order of the United States. Questions about the
permissibility of judicial review of statutes and executive decisions
within a regime of constitutional ism form an intrinsic part of all
1legal doctrines proposed; it has even been suggested that two of the 
most prominent doctrines on freedom of expression (absolutism and 
balancing) must be seen as "tactical" answers to the question of the 
Supreme Court's role rather than as meaningful theoretical or 
practical elaborations on free expression. It is, therefore, 
necessary before examining the actual legal material to have a closer 
look at the evolution of theories of constitutionalism and judicial 
review.
Judicial review, in the broad sense, is the power of a court 
of law to decide authoritatively the applicability of a legal enactment 
to a particular situation, to construe its meaning in case of doubt 
and finally to apply it to the facts of the case brought before it. It 
constitutes the main component of judicial action or adjudication and it 
is traditionally based on the theory of separation of the unitary state 
power into institutionally and functionally differentiated parts. The 
mainsprings of the theory in the legal history of England as described 
and interpreted by Montesquieu in his "De l'Esprit des Lois" are well 
known as are the criticisms that have been raised against it both at
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the theoretical and empirical levels, particularly against its most 
extreme form the so-called "phonograph theory of adjudication".
The Supreme Court of the United States performs this task, as the 
final instance of statutory interpretation and application of Federal 
Legislative and Executive Acts. But what separates it from similar 
courts of the last instance, like the House of Lords, is its power to 
examine both federal and state action for their conformity with the 
federal Constitution and declare them null and void if they contravene 
the constitutional provisions. This power of the Supreme Court may be 
called judicial review in the strict sense.
The relevant constitutional provisions are of two kinds: first, 
those provisions that regulate the allocation of powers and competences 
among the various institutions of federal government and between federal 
and state governments; and secondly, the constitutional provisions that 
restrict federal or state power from invading certain promulgated 
areas, that are thus declared beyond the scope and reach of state 
power. Our main concern is with that second part of judicial review 
in the strict sense, stemming from the entrenched character of the 
Bill of Rights and in particular the First Amendment to the Constitution 
which postulates that: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances".
Judicial review in the broad sense is coeval with the notion of 
legality, in the strict sense it is coeval with constitutionalism.
They both postulate that state power is limited and the foremost of its 
limitations lies in its organisation and exercise in accordance with 
legal procedures and formalities. In their pure form, both theories 
are unconcerned with the source of legal miles as long as political 
power follows their demands. An entrenched Bill of Rights, however,
2
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imposes additional requirements on state activity by, allegedly, 
withdrawing its power to intervene in those domains specified in the 
constitutional text. When these additional requirements take the form 
of individual rights as is the case with the American Bill, then 
beyond the legal formalities further substantive requirements are 
imposed. Not only the form but the content of state action becomes 
an issue of legal involvement. To be sure, this substantive demand 
is presented in a negative fashions the state (or Congress) can or must 
not intervene in certain spheres of activity which must be left free 
from external constraint. To the extent that state action is 
presented as taking predominantly or exclusively legal form, the 
injunctions of constitutionalism are mainly addressed towards positive, 
state law, and whoever is competent to enact it.
I will later suggest that constitutionalism is a rather poor 
approximation of legal and political reality. It would be, however, 
instructive to start by examining the theoretical bases of 
constitutionalism, which, I would suggest, are three: Natural law, 
legal positivism'(and in particular constitutional positivism) and 
notions of popular sovereignty or democratic theory. I will examine 
them, firstly, in turn, with particular emphasis on their understanding 
within American legal and political theory; and then the process of 
moulding them together in one whole, which may be called the 
"positivization of natural law”, will be described in its stages.
2. The Theoretical Bases of Constitutionalism 
2.1.1. Natural Law
All natural law and natural rights theories include two common 
themes. They, first, postulate that there exists an essence or 
content, a number of principles or ideas that pemneate law, which
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are always/already given and may be in principle revealed or 
discovered through human reason. The site of their existence 
differentiates the various schools that seek it out alternatively in 
God and the divine Word, in human nature or in society. Thus, the 
transition from classical Thomist natural law to modem natural law 
marks a change in the identification of the site where the invariable 
principles of law inhere and the method according to which they may bei
3discovered. The unifying theme, however, remains: such principles 
exist and are amenable to discovery, once tneir proper site has been 
identified.
The second theme is that natural law and its principles is the 
supreme law and controls (or should control) positive law. The 
classical tradition asserts the primacy of its principles, understood 
as realized within a continuum, that reaches out and regulates 
individual existence, communal life and external nature in a uniform 
fashion sanctioned by God. Modem natural law, however, since Hobbes 
and Locke revolts against the feudal hierarchized and immobile space and 
its sanctioning by the classical tradition. It discovers its principles 
by reasoning (change in method) and seeks them out in the empirically 
ascertainable behaviour of individuals (change of site). As C.B.
1  A
Macpherson has convincingly argued, both Hobbes and Locke after 
discovering their principles in the sociopolitical reality of their 
times, then postulated them as natural principles, eternally and 
invariably existing within the state of human and social nature, 
although corrupted (in the case of Hobbes) or potentially corruptible 
(Locke) by positive law. Thus the modem or rational natural law 
takes on initially a critical attitude towards the existing socio­
political reality and asserts that positive law should be profoundly 
changed to accommodate the newly discovered principles. All means
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toward that end are justified, even revolution and violent resistance
5to established authority.
There is, therefore, an ideal (or superior) law comprised of a 
small number of ideas (or principles). Both themes may be found in 
theories of constitutionalism. Thus, according to a recent constitutional 
author, the Constitution is superior to ordinary law and both Constitution 
and law form one single corpus intrinsically connected and hierarchically 
organized. When the Supreme Court invalidates a law for being in 
violation of the Constitution "it reverts to the state of law as it 
would have been if the statute had not been passed".^ This original 
"state of law" "contains a number of general principles describing 
the abstract ideals which the legal system is understood to further" 
and these principles or ideals "form a self-consistent whole... the 
rules of the system are... the product of legislative and judicial 
efforts to implement /them/."^
The relation between natural law theories and constitutionalism
cannot be easily denied, although positivistically-minded constitutional
8authors have tried to do so. Corstitutionalism evolved as a reaction 
and answer to those problems that every natural law theory faces: 
what are the principles and ideals that should control state law; 
how and where can they be discovered; and finally what mechanism ,
can ensure their supremacy over state law once revolution has 
outlived its usefulness. In order to understand the theoretical 
evolution of these problems and their gradual absorption in theories 
of constitutionalism, it would be instructive to look briefly at the 
political theory of revolutionary America.
2.1.2. Natural:Law in Early American Political Theory
Thomas Paine's polemical philosophical tracts capture the liberal
ideology of the American Revolution. His "Common Sense" had a great
impact in pre-revolutionary times. According to the historian
Henry Collins, "the declaration of independence... conveyed in thought
9and style, the indelible imprint of Common Sense" . In his later
10essay on "The Rights of Man" Paine presents his model political 
and constitutional system, which he believes has been accomplished 
by the American revolution and the establishment of the United 
States.^
Paine believes that society and civilization are the natural
conditions of man while governments are artifices that "far from
being always the causes or means of order, are often the destruction
of it". In reality order has its origins in the principles of
12society and the natural constitution of man. These principles are
"those of trade and commerce" and are followed because it is "in
the interest of the parties so to do, and not on account of any
13formal laws their governments may impose". At the instant,
therefore, that formal government is abolished, "society begins to
act... common interest produces common security". 4
The American revolution, however, created a new form of government
whereby "by the simple operation of constructing government on the
principles of society and the rights of man, every difficulty retires,
and all parts are brought into unison... Government is nothing more
15than a national association acting on the principles of society".
This "new" system of government "is the most ancient in principle...
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being founded on the original inherent Rights of Man". Once
established through a compact of the people with each other - the
Constitutional Convention being presented as such a compact - the
government must be based on the representative principle and
majority rule as a guarantee that it will not usurp any powers not
given it in the compact and resulting Constitution. "Every man is a
proprietor in government, and considers it a necessary part of his
business to understand. It concerns his interest, because it
17affects its property". .
Equally Jefferson foresaw a radicalization of democracy through 
the complete domination of public opinion that would make government 
and formal laws redundant: public opinion articulated and 
communicated through a flourishing press would itself become the law. 
Political power would finally return to society where it rightfully 
belongs.
The assumptions of an essentially harmonious society and an
overriding community of interests and rights are also evident in the
attitudes of the Pounders toward political parties and factions.
While society is naturally orderly "the spirit of party agitates the«
community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms; kindles the
animosity of one part against another; forments occasionally riot
18and insurrection" warned President Washington. Political parties and
coalitions were seen as subversive and conspiratorial since they
"revealed an abiding human perversity rather than a normal pattern of
19political exchange" writes an American historian. Por Jefferson, 
Madison and Hamilton society had its easily discoverable natural laws. 
Normal political controversy on issues of economic or foreign policy
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was therefore interpreted as a deliberate attempt on the part of the
20political opponents to subvert them.
All the revolutionaries, therefore, agreed that the principles of 
natural law coincided with the laws of society: the laws of "trade and 
commerce" and the natural and inalienable rights of man. Their 
discovery did not create problems. They were the "common sense" of 
the matter: the ancient rights of Englishmen and the principles of 
commodity exchange and social labour were understood by all Americans 
since they coincided with their interests. Their protection, 
accordingly, was equally unproblematic. It was only a matter of 
popular supervision ¿f the government, lest it usurped their rights 
and invaded their interests.
However not all revolutionaries accepted fully the harmonious
assumptions as exemplified by Paine's theories. Thus Madison,
answering a delegate to the Pennsylvania Assembly who had asserted
that poverty would be eliminated by the operation of the market economy,
was more pessimistic: "An increase of population will of necessity
increase the proportion of those who labor under all the hardships
of life, and secretly sigh for a more equitable distribution of its
blessings... How is this danger to be guarded against on republican
principles?" and he proceeded to propose the establishment of a body
in government that would represent property and, thus, avert any danger
to freedom arising from the extension of the franchise to the
21unpropertied class. Equally, A. de Tocquevil'le had said of the
Americans that they displayed a love for property not encountered in
any other country: "Nowhere does the majority display less inclinations
22for those principles that threaten to alter the laws of property".
In his more pessimistic mood, however, he had warned against the
- 59 -
'•tyranny of the majority" that under the principle of the sovereignty
of public opinion could impose a levelling equality perceived as the
23greatest of evils.
Thus, although the "laws of nature" were conceived as self- 
evident, the problem of their full implementation and protection 
became a major concern in legal and political theory.
2.2. Legal and Constitutional Postlvism .
Positivism in legal theory comes as a direct attack on all
versions of natural law and in particular its modem, rational, version.
Based on Humean epistemology, positivism, in general, argued that
sensory experience, the only basis of scientific knowledge, cannot
yield any moral judgments, values or principles. A radical divide
is thus established between fact and value statements. For legal
positivism, the sole theoretically interesting law is positive law,
the legal enactments posited by the state; knowledge of the law
can be achieved through the study of this state-created law. Laws
as social facts stand in an instrumental relation to the values and
ends of the lawmaker. ^  Law, instead of realizing some immutable
essence, is the expression of the sovereign will, the voluntas of/
the state. There is no law to be found in the realm of ideas and 
metaphysical speculation, nor is there any law superior and controlling 
state/positive law.
Legal positivism, therefore, postulates as the object of its 
study questions of validity and effectiveness of legal enactments.
The legal system is presented as an ensemble of rules and decisions.
The validity of its parts depends solely on their source and the 
conformity of the law-making authority to a series of formal 
procedural requirements. Thus, legal validity becomes a statement 
"internal" to the whole body of rules which is presented as a
coherent, hierarchized and closed whole emanating in a pyramidal way
from the central site of sovereignty. H.L.A. Hart has argued that each part
of the legal system can be traced back, through a series of delegations
of power* to a central set of rules that he has called the "rule of 
25recognition". Thus, the organization and exercise of state power 
conforms to a set of legal rules, and those at the top of the pyramid 
(the Kelsenian "Qrundnorm" or the Hartian "rule of recognition"), the 
ultimate legal rules are, in the main, although not exclusively, embodied 
in the Constitution.
The constitutional text, therefore, itself a set of positive legal
rules becomes the ultimate criterion for the testing of legal validity
of any other component of the legal system, of its very existence. At
the same time it imposes restraints and cnnditions on political power
itself by prescribing the formal procedures (and substantive requirements
in case of an entrenched Bill of Eights) that it must follow in order
to create valid and obligatory laws. Thus legal positivism in
constitutional theory examines political phenomena in the domain of
legal discourse. Political reality is presented as conforming with
legal discourse declared supreme.
A.de Tocqueville had remarked that in America all political
problems end up in the courts and that lawyers and judges were the new
American aristocracy. Justice Frankfurter writing some 100 years later
agreed: "Scarcely any political question arises in the U.S. that is
26not resolved sooner or later into a judicial question". Constitution­
alism sanctions this belief: political problems are to be treated as 
legal. "They still are political [a concession not made by all 
constitutional authors] but courts must treat them as legal". ' The 
idea that law is distinct from politics and.politics follow legal rules 
is encapsulated in the famous American adage that "we are a government 
of laws and not of men". Combined with the theory of separation of
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powers (or checks and balances) it creates the basis of judicial review 
in the strict sense. The mode of legal discourse that seeks to 
dissolve political power into legal relations but at the same time 
conceives law as positive state law emanating from a single sovereign 
centre, accepts judicial review as a logical conclusion. The 
theoretical antinomy of a political power bound by the formalities of
i
a law that it (the state) can only create is thus resolved in definition.
The Constitution itself is a law, like any other albeit superior,
and a special institution is charged with tne duty to guarantee that
28political power will behave in accordance with its own rules.
Thus, the constitutional historian Mcllwain stresses that judicial
review is an old as constitutionalism and essential for it. It is
based on three assumptions: (a) that there exists a fundamental
constitution that has the characteristics of every other law, (b)
that judges, therefore, are competent to interpret it, as they do
with all laws and (c) that in doing that they just interpret it
29and not "make or give law". y
To be sure, the antinomy cannot be easily wished away, through
definitions and rhetoric. Thus, one constitutional author concludes
30that "it is a naive but worthwhile idea". And Archibald Cox, a 
former Solicitor General, closes his passionate defence of 
constitutionalism in a similar note: "I cannot prove these points,
31but they are the faith to which we lawyers are dedicated".
It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that mainstream
constitutional positivism retains strong aspects of natural law 
32theories. There is a superior law that controls state power, 
embodied in the Constitution. To be sure, even this superior law is
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created by the state, and it is the normal function of judges to 
discover it, by interpreting the Constitution.
2.3. Popular Sovereignty and Constitutionalism
The modem democratic tradition, that can be traced back to J.J.
Rousseau and the French Revolution, stands for equality and popular
participation in the exercise of political power. It accepts the liberal
notion of state sovereignty but demands the equal participation of all
citizens in its ultimate expression, lawmaking. The role of public
opinion and representative institutions is seen by Paine and Jefferson
as mainly defensive: they are the means through which society ensures
that the state does not abuse its strictly delineated power. The
democrats, on the other hand, saw political participation as the
positive means for the continuous integration of the will of sovereign
citizens into the sovereign will of the state. ^ Marx calls
3 Ademocracy the "essence of all political constitutions", and in his
early critique of Hegel *s"Philosophy of Right"»describes his ideal of
democracy, in Rousseauan terms, as an organic community like the
ancient Greek polis, where there is no separation between the social
35realm and the state. "  L. Colletti and others have suggested that
the main thrust of Marx's political theory can be found in his early
• *
writings, which are influenced by "older traditions of... democratic 
thought [and] in particular Rousseau".^
Be that as it may, by the mid-nineteenth century, and while 
positivism was becoming the dominant tradition in legal theory, the 
democratic legacy, exemplified by President Jackson's simple maxim 
that "people rule" was gaining ground in American politics. Justice 
Story describing the 1828 Inauguration Ceremony of Jackson complained 
that the White Bouse had been opened "from the highest and most polished, 
to the most vulgar and gross in the nation" and lamented that "the
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reign of the King Mob” had arrived. However democracy had come to stay:
"within fifty years, democracy ^ that used to be a bad word/ became a 
38good thing".
The incorporation of notions of popular sovereignty in the theory 
of constitutionalism was facilitated by the social contract component
39of liberal political theory. As we saw, Paine had presented the 
Constitutional Convention as a "compact of the people with each other" 
by means of which the United States had been established. The
i
Constitution, therefore, as a written text formulated by the elected  ^
representatives of the people was not only the supreme law but also the ) 
supreme embodiment of the popular will. Its interpretation and ^
application by the Supreme Court was but the implementation of the 
sovereign popular will. The invalidation of statutes passed by state 
assemblies had been authorized by the people themselves, in the form of 
the various limitations imposed upon state power in the constitutional 
text. Thus, parallel to the stipulation of a higher (constitutional) 
law and subordinate parts of the legal system, popular sovereignty 
was equally hierarchized. In its supreme expression, it enacted the 
Constitution and limited its future exercise. "The democratic 
argument of trusting the people is valid to the extent that people are 
trusted because they do not trust themselves... Judicial review is the 
institutionalized means of self-control."^
Arguments from democracy and popular sovereignty came to support 
and, buttress the power of judicial review. The problems created by 
the gradual uncoupling of the essence of law - conceived as positive law 
embodying the popular will - from the natural rights of man had made 
the fears of Madison and Tocqueville about an omnipotent majority 
adversely inclined toward the laws of property more realistic. The 
proclaimed identity of these laws with the rights and interests of all 
men could not suffice in the new era of positivism and democratic
37
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rhetoric. The democratic cult of the constitutional text demanded that 
all substantive limits on state power should be authorized by the text 
itself. The Supreme Court accepted the challenge: reinforced in its 
task by the mid-1 9 th century claims of the political economists, who had 
pronounced<the universal validity and scientific character of the laws 
of the market economy, the Court read these laws in the constitutional 
text. This process, which may be called the "positivization of natural 
law", sealed the moulding of the three disparate - and opposing - theories 
of natural law, legal positivism and popular sovereignty into the 
modem theory of constitutionalism.
3« The Process of "Positivization of Natural Law"
The process was completed around the turn of the 20th century in 
the now infamous Lpchner case and its progeny. Its importance for 
legal and political discourse cannot be overemphasized. All 20th 
century constitutional theory revolves around the main assumptions and 
antinomies of constitutionalism and judicial review as they were 
developed during the previous century. It would be therefore 
instructive, to retrace briefly, the main legal steps of this development. 
At the same time, the judicial construction of another liberal concept
* y
par excellence, that of freedom or liberty, will be dealt with.
There were three main stages in the legal-judicial evolution.
(a) The doctrine of judicial review. The doctrine was enunciated
41by Chief Justice Marshall in the famous Marbury v. Madison case. In 
this case, probably the most commented upon in English-speaking legal 
literature, the Supreme Court asserted the right to decide finally on 
the authoritative interpretation of the Constitution and rule on the 
conformity of legal enactments with the constitutional provisions.
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Marshall*s doctrine was based on the social contract assumptions of the 
revolutionaries: "the people have an original right to establish, for 
their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall 
most conduce to their own happiness... This original and supreme will 
organises the government...". This original will established limits 
on the powers of the various governmental branches and in order "that 
those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution (was)
i
written". The written constitution is a law as any other and "it is
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is... if two laws conflict... the courts must decide...". The
Constitution, however, is superior and paramount, and in case of
conflict "the constitution and not /the/ ordinary act j/of the
legislature/, must govern the case". The latter must be "obligatorily"
42declared void by the court. Thus judicial review is the logical 
deduction from a series of assumptions already established in political 
theory: Social contract and original will, a written constitution 
that embodies this will and strictly circumscribes the exercise of 
state power and a. special institution (the Supreme Court) that links 
the first two propositions.
(b) In the period up to the Civil War, the doctrine of vested 
43rights made the protection of property the prime criterion of
constitutional validity of legislative acts. According to Professor
E. Corwin this doctrine gave "notification that the courts would
disallow any legislative act which they found to bear unduly harshly
upon existing property rights, or else would construe the act in such a
44way as to avoid this effect". The justifications advanced for this 
extensive protection of property were based on natural rights and social 
contract theories, while some reference to the "principles of republican 
government" were not lacking. Characteristically, Justice Story 
declared in 1830 that "government can scarcely be deemed to be free
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where the rights of property are left solely dependent upon the will
of a legislative body without any restraint. The fundamental maxims
of a free government seem to require that the rights of personal
45liberty and property should be held sacred".
(c) The post-Civil War 14th Amendment to the Constitution gave 
the Supreme Court the opportunity to complete the process of positivization.
The Amendment reads that no state "shall deprive any person of life,
i
liberty or property without due process of law". The Supreme Court read 
the clause’s reference to liberty as meaning freedom of contract in 
industrial disputes, and in particular freedom of the employers to impose 
upon their employees whatever terms they saw fit; in a series of cases 
it disallowed the first state welfare measures and union protective 
laws and with greater restraint federal measures, using the "due process" 
clause of the 5th Amendment.^ "Liberty became assimilated to 
property... with investment capital, about which an immunity was cast...
/that/ remained unmodified in our constitutional law •until the War with 
Germany /w.W.l/. And as the principles of economic laissez-faire 
and Social Darwinism had taken on the status of scientific truths "the 
Bar Association and the courts /Tocqueville»s American aristocracy/ 
saw the constitution as giving legal and political sanction to Adam 
Smith and Herbert Spencer."
The class character of the Supreme Court decisions of the late 19th 
century was as evident as its grandiose rhetoric was somewhat absurd.
In the Pollock cases, the Court found that a federal tax on income 
derived from real estate, municipal bonds and personal property was a 
direct tax and should be apportioned among the States and invalidated the first 
federal income tax since the Civil War. The statute was attacked by an advocate 
before the Supreme Court as a "class law": "The Act of Congress... is commun­
istic in its purposes and tendencies, and is defended... upon principles as
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communistic, socialistic, populistic as ever have been addressed to any
political assembly in the world" to which the Supreme Court's prompt
reply per Justice Field was that "The present assault on capital is but
the beginning. It will be but the stepping stone to others, larger and
more sweeping, till,our political contests will become a war of the
poor against the rich; a war constantly growing in intensity and 
49bitterness..."  ^ On the same day the Court decided that the Sherman
50Anti-Trust Act did not apply to manufacturing monopolies, but applied 
51to trade unions. And in the Lochner case, that has come to symbolize
this period of constitutional adjudication, the Court declared that the
52workers are "in no sense wards of the s t a t e a n d  therefore the state 
had no business to protect them. Ironically enough, 
this distinction between proteges and "no wards" of the state
undermined the assumption of the universal harmony of interests that 
underlined all laissez-faire thinking. A. Wolfe has argued that a 
notion of "dual citizenship" was enhanced by the Supreme Court:
"Workers were considered a class that would organize society only for 
their own ends... while industrialists were entitled to hold power
53because what was in their interest as a group would benefit everyone".
The role of the Supreme Court was accordingly the protection of capital 
presented as "...the preservation of public and private rights, notwith­
standing the representative character of our institutions. The 
enforcement of these limitations by judicial process is the device of
self-governing communities to protect the rights of individuals and
54minorities... against the power of numbers". Another Justice expressed
the same idea as a rhetorical question: "Are we all at the mercy of
55legislative majorities?"-^ The clear answer was no, by virtue of the 
Supreme Court.
Thus, at the end of this 100-odd year process all three threads of natural 
lav/natural rights, positivism and popular sovereignty had been
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woven into the complementary theories of constitutionalism and judicial
review. Freedom should not he intruded by positive law, because that
was the demand of the supreme law of the Constitution which embodied
the popular sovereign will. Freedom was defined as property rights and
the laws of a largely unregulated market in commodities and labour. In
the Slaughterhouse cases of 1873» the Court introduced a notion of
dual citizenship and held that the "privileges and immunities" clause
protected the rights of federal citizenship, but not those of state
citizenship. The Bill of Rights was not applicable to the states,
through some doctrine of incorporation, and the federal authorities
had no obligation to protect civil and political rights against state
violation. Judtice Field, dissenting, argued that the 14th Amendment
protected a man*s "fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities
which belong to him as a free man and a free citizen".^ But as R.
McCloskey has remarked, the libertarian rhetoric related to the humble
right of a few butchers to have a statute regulating the slaughtering
of animals annulled. Field*s theory on individual rights was that "the
property right is the transcedent value; political ambition ranks next
when it is relevant; and the cause of human or civil rights is
57subordinate to these higher considerations". Political freedom had
not captured the Supreme Court imagination. The first case in which
* 1
the Court addressed itself to issues arising from the First Amendment,
CO
came as late as 1919* When the Court was aksed, in 1897» to
recognize a constitutional right of assembly and demonstration in public
places its answer was that "for the legislature absolutely or 
*
conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or a public park 
is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than 
for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house", affirming 
the opinion of - the later liberal hero - Justice Holmes, then a member 
of the Massachusetts Supreme Court. The 14th Amendment ruled the
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Supreme Court "does not have the effect of creating a particular and
personal right in the citizen to use public property in defiance of
59the constitution and laws of the state1’. By the 1950*s, however, 
the Supreme Court changed radically its definition of freedom. It 
is to this change, and its, relation to the theoretical bases of 
constitutionalism, as suggested above, that the next part addresses 
itself.
4. Constitutionalism in the 20th Century: From Economic to 
Political Freedom
4.1. The ’’Preferred Position” of Personal and Political Freedoms
The legal consensus established around the turn of the century
was expressed by a federal judge, in 1922, who declared solemnly that
”of the three fundamental principles which underlie government and for
which government exists, the protection of life, liberty and property,
60the chief of these is property".
Yet within the next 20 years the tenor of the Supreme Court rhetoric 
had changed completely. The origins of the new approach have been 
usually traced to a footnote in an opinion delivered by Justice Stone:
"...There may be narrower scope for operation of the 
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears 
on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the 
Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, 
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced 
by the fourteenth... It is unnecessary to consider now
whether legislation is to be subjected to more exacting 
judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
14th Amendment than are most types of legislation... Nor 
need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into 
the review of statutes directed at particular religions... 
or national... or racial minorities...; prejuduce against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, 
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial enquiry." 61
Statements to the same effect case in clearer positive language can 
be easily found in a series of Supreme Court decisions of the late 30*s
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and 40*s. Thus, Justice Black, turning completely on its head the
earlier identification of freedom with property rights declared that
"/he views/ the guarantees of the First Amendment as the foundation
upon which our governmental structure rests and without which it could
not continue to endure as conceived and planned. Freedom to speak and
write about public questions is as important to the life of our
government as is the heart of the human body. In fact this privilege
is the heart of our government. If that heart be weakened, the result
62is debilitation; if it be stilled, the result is death". Equally, 
Justice Cardozo: "Of that freedom (of speech) one may say that it is
1
the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of 
freedom. With rare aberrations a pervasive recognition of that truth 
can be traced in our history political and legal".^
Four years after the celebrated Carolene Products footnote,
Justice Stone again put the final touch in the new apprach declaring that 
"the Constitution by virtue of the First and the Fourteenth Amendments 
has put those freedoms in a preferred p o s i t i o n " t h e  preferred 
position of personal and political freedoms was the new orthodoxy in 
constitutional adjudication.
The change of heart that put personal and political rights at the 
forefront of judicial interest was generally praised by constitutional
65authors. M. Konvitz called it a great improvement in civil liberty.
Schwartz, thought that speech rights were "most suitable for inclusion
66in the preferred position theory". To be sure, some judges and
authors disagreed with the new faith. Justice Frankfurter called the
title "preferred freedoms" a "mischievous phrase" that had no support
in the constitutional text and pointed out, promptly, that its launching
6Tby Stone was made in a dissenting opinion. ' Justice Jackson objected
that if some freedoms were preferred, that meant that others would be,
6Snecessarily, relegated. Equally Judge Learned Hand thought that the 
introduction of a double standard of judicial review would allow
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governmental intrusion in economic freedoms, a quite unacceptable notion
since "property is the matrix that must be conserved if other values are
to flourish". P. Freund quoted approvingly John Adams, who had declared
that "the moment the idea is admitted into society that property is not
as sacred as the laws of God(l) and that there is not a force of law
69and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence".
70Analogous doubts were voiced by some constitutional authors. According.
to P. Freund, the cases that extended First Amendment protection to
industrial picketing arbitrarily transformed economic pressures into
71rights of free expression.
It would be reasonable to conclude, however, that a majority of
"learned opinions" was formed around the "preferred position" of personal
as against economic freedoms in the period between the mid-301s and the
mid-40*s. Even Justice Frankfurter after attacking the preferred
position theory, in the case referred to above, conceded that "First
Amendment liberty came to this Court with a momentum for respect
lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from
72economic arrangements".
The main concern of constitutional theory against this background
of - at least rhetorical - acceptance of the priority of personal
freedoms moved to the role of the Supreme Court and the permissible
extent of judicial review. The battleline was drawn between the theories
of judicial activism, supported and practiced by Justices Black, Douglas
and Chief Justice Warren, and of judicial restraint advocated mainly by
73Justices Frankfurter, Harlan and Judge Learned Hand.
The activist position strongly resembled the earlier blend of 
property-inclined constitutionalism. It comprised all three ingredients 
of natural law, constitutional positivism and popular sovereignty.
Although the arguments and counter-arguments usually draw from all 
three traditions, I will attempt for analytical purposes, to examine 
them in turn.
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4.2.1. Natural Law and Positivism
a. The activists accepted that the limits imposed by the higher law 
of the Constitution on positive law create an assumption of
unconstitutionality of the latter, if it touches upon the prohibited domain, or 
that they cal], at the least, for greater judicial vigilance in case of 
conflict between the two. They are, therefore, inclined to relax the 
procedural requirements for the examination of questions of constitution­
ality. According to one of those, for example, a party to judicial 
proceedings could attack a statute only if it could show its unconstitut­
ionality as applied to theparticular situation and not its potential 
invalidity. The rule was adopted in the 30*s, in relation to federal 
economic regulation programmes. It postulated that the objection of 
unconstitutionality could be raised only in cases of "absolute 
necessity".'4 The new activist judges, however, were prepared to
invalidate legislative acts as "void on their face" or for having
75"chilling effects" for the future exercise of the protected freedoms.
Talk of natural and inalienable rights is not hard to find either,
although not as grandiose as in the earlier property cases. Thus,
reversing the Davis case (see above, p. 69 ) the Court held that
"Wherever the title of streets or parks may rest, they have ■imtnemorjally
been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets
and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the... rights
76
and liberties of citizens." Of course the 40-odd years between 1897 
(when Davis was decided) and 1939 in no way can qualify as time out of 
mind. They can qualify, however, as the vital time in which a majority 
of the Supreme Court Justices changed their definitions about the 
"rights .and liberties of citizens". The "notion of basic inalienable 
human rights... finds its expression in early Court decisions... It
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also is as contemporary as last week's Court decision".
The Constitution and the Bill of Eights is the supreme law but
it is also a positive, written law; the meaning of its injunctions
must be appropriately construed, therefore, to give the Supreme Court
a clear mandate to enforce it. Thus, the question of the proper meaning
of the constitutional text became one of the main points of the debate.
Three main methods for discovering the meaning of the Constitution
or any one of its clauses were advanced.
The first relies on the language of the text. Chief Justice B.
Taney had declared, in the 19th century, that the Constitution "speaks
78not only in the same words but in the same meaning for all time".'
The judicial function is, therefore, simple: "The judicial branch of
the Government has only one duty, to lay the article of the Constitution
which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide
79whether the latter squares the former". Justice Black referred to the
First Amendment in similarly unequivocal terms: Words mean what they
80say. "No law" means no law. But the theoretical understanding of
language has moved a long way from Black's "naive" reliance on the
indexical value of words. It is, indeed, through the rejection of
such older notions of language-as-representation and its examination
as a "form of life" that various schools in philosophy and the social
81sciences came to converge in their concerns. This discrediting of
linguistic fixity and transparency made formalism implausible in 
82legal reasoning. No constitutional author accepts Roberts * and 
Black's faith in words, in its unadulterated form.®^
When the sovereignty of the language is challenged, the meaning 
of the text is sought in its legislative history. History may be used 
in two ways to confer meaning on terms, as "freedom of speech", "abridge" 
or even "no law". The first, adopted by constitutional historians, 
searches the record of the body that passed the particular constitutional
77
- 74 -
provision and attempts to extract from it the meaning that the clause or a
word in it had had for its framers. Thousands of pages have been
written about the debates and the intentions of the constitutional
authors, in particular the authors of the controversial 14th Amendment,
without much agreement.®^ But even the clearer sounding words of
the First have not fared better: "the origins of the First Amendment
are sphinxlike... the meager discussion [at the Constitutional Convention
of 1791] seems to provide little guidance". J Even if they did, one
could go on, that would have little or no relevance to the problems
that a late-20th century court faces in dealing with the First or any
other constitutional clause. As Justice Hughes put it: "if by the
statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption
is what is meant today, it is intended to say that the great clauses of
the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation, which the
framers, with the conditions and outlook cf their times would have
86placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation".
In answer to these objections a more sophisticated historical
approach is proposed: The record should be examined not in the dry
way of historiography but under a hermeneutically oriented methodology.
The Constitution, after all, contrary to the literalist fallacy,was
"intended to endure for ages to come and consequently to be adapted
to the various crises of human affairs". ' The role of historical
research is accordingly to identify the broad principles posited or the
categories of evils guarded against in a particular clause and draw
the necessary conclusions for the contemporary problems. As expressed
by a supporter of this line, the task is to determine "the present
scope and meaning of a decision that the nation, at an earlier time,
88articulated and enacted into the constitutional text". It would be 
instructive to examine the usefulness of this method in relation to 
questions arising from the First Amendment.
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One of the problems that has preoccupied the literature (and the
Supreme Court) was whether the First Amendment was intended to abolisn
the common law crime of seditious libel. A number of Justices and
scholars subscribe to the Holmesian position tnat "the First Amendment
/did. not leave/ the common law as to seditious libel in force. History
89seems... against this notion." Justices Black and Douglas accepted 
90the idea, and some authors are even more emphatic: "One of the
objects of the revolution was to get rid of the English common law on
91liberty of speech and the press". However, following the publication
by Leonard Levy of his influential history of the First Amendment, the
historical verdict changed profoundly. Its meaning cannot be
accurately ascertained and, moreover, the framers themselves were
sharply divided,and understood it in their own differing ways. Levy
concluded that if he was pressed to choose "between the two propositions,
first, that the clause substantially embodied the Blackstonian
definition and left the law of seditious libel in force, or that it
repudiated... and superseded the common law, the known evidence
92points strongly in support of the former proposition."
Interestingly, the Supreme Court itself put a footnote in the
historical controversy. 166 years after the passage of the Alien and
Sedition Act, which had sparked the debate, the Court declared in 196 4
that "the attack on its validity has carried the day in the court of 
93history," and the Act was, therefore, unconstitutional. To come to 
this conclusion, the Court cited both Holmes, Douglas, Cooley and 
Chafee (the traditionalists) and Levy (the revisionist), all with 
approval. "The central meaning of the First Amendment is that
94seditious libel cannot be made the subject of government sanction" 
was the conment of one distinguished writer on the case. But if that 
was the central meaning in 19^4* it was not in 1799* in 1919 or in 1951 
when the three clearest examples of federal sedition laws, the Alien
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and Sedition Act, the Espionage Act and the Smith Act were accepted as 
constitutional by the Supreme Court.
John Roche, a "revisionist" historian has argued that the successive
efforts to read the constitutional text and history, through the
varying predilections of each particular epoch and author, answer the
95need for "retrospective symmetry": ideological needs of the present
get authorized by being referred back to the improvable or conflicting 
intentions of the framers. One could add that "authorization" thus 
regains its double meaning. The original author confers "authority" 
on the contemporary author's utterances. While something new is 
said each time, it must be presented as an incessant repetition of the 
original word. According to structuralism (borrowing from Lacanian 
psychoanalysis) this "double mirror image(Author-authors, Text­
commentary) is one of the main characteristics of ideology.
Roche instead suggests that the judicial protection of freedom of 
speech should be seen as a developing tradition in which each stage 
builds upon and advances from the previous toward full protection. 
However, the canvassing of the notion of a teleologically progressing 
freedom in the place of the "inaccurate" reading of history (particularly 
during the late 50s when the "revisionist"school became prominent) is 
equally vulnerable to accusations of ideological bias. "[A]t the 
height of the McCarthyism controversy... [Roche] suggested that 'we 
never had more freedom'." since each new stage is necessarily better 
than the previous.
b. The proponents of judicial restraint - who call for a minimization 
of judicial intervention in the form of judicial review - attack the 
activist position but often in an embarrassed way. Frankfurter 
after all, as a professor before he was appointed to the Court, had 
fully supported the New Deal principles of social engineering and
QQ
judicial activism.7
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One is constantly reminded of the debacle of the "old” property-
inclined court, that led to Roosevelt's court-packing plan and the "judicial 
99revolution". Holmes' aphorism about the old Court, that had identified
"Mr. Herbert Spencer's social statics with the theory of the Constitution", "*^
is used as a warning against the tendency of the new activists to shape
the Constitution according to their new interpretation of natural
rights. As Cox put it, "invalidation should result only in the case of
101clear-cut constitutional provisions". But as has been indicated,
such provisions are hard to come by. One way out has been suggested
by Judge Learned Hand. He denies, almost completely, that the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights impose any substantive demands on
governmental activity, or can be compared with or treated as positive
law. The Bill of Rights is a mere declaration of principles, like the
Premable to the Constitution, and the Constitution itself should be
treated as a scheme for the delineation of the jurisdiction and
competence of the various federal and state institutions, as
predominantly procedural. But judicial review in cases involving
conflicting jurisdictional claims (which Hand accepts) necessarily
involves substantive choices, too. On the other hand substantive
judicial review has been an established part of the constitutional
order - which Hand and Frankfurter allegedly want to protect from the
unwarranted intrusions of the activists - since Marshall's Marbury
decision in 1803. Thus the proponents of judicial restraint -
particularly those on the bench - are caught in a dilemma which makes
102them behave, as one author put it, like schizophrenics: they reject 
judicial review in theory but have to accept it in practice.
Thus the respective arguments about the higher status, the 
legal nature of the Constitution, the clarity of its meanings, its 
legislative history or the legal-political tradition, get repeated 
incessantly in a somewhat tired fashion. Within the parameters of
legal discourse, the only possible verdict of the controversy so far, 
can be a Scottish "not proven" one. At this point, the third line of 
argumentation related to questions of political theory and the role of 
judicial review in a democratic society, must be examined.
4.2.2. Democratic Theory
a. In the post-New Deal period of democratic rhetoric, the grounding 
of judicial review in political theory became the paramount concern of 
constitutional authors. Yet, the varying attitudes toward democratic
i
theory and practice, indicated above in a different context (Ch.I, j)
led to differing conclusions on the present issue as well.
The proponents of judicial restraint accept the assumptions of
empirical political science and "unqualified pluralism" (see Ch.I, 4
above). They identify the existing political process described as group
pluralism and elite selection with the gist of democracy and take it
as being fully operative. The Supreme Court, appointed and politically
unaccountable, is therefore of a profoundly undemocratic character.
When it invalidates a law passed by the democratically accountable
branches, it thwarts the properly expressed popular will and contributes
to the creation of political apathy by implying that the people are not
capable or responsible enough to deal with the pressing political
issues which should be entrusted to the hands of some neo-Platonic
103philosopher-kings. Variations of this basic argument and 
additional points are not hard to find in the literature.
Thus, it is argued that the finality of a Supreme Court decision 
based on constitutional grounds, necessitates for its reversal 
the cumbersome process of constitutional amendment; that an 
extensive and frequent intervention would create "such wide­
spread political reaction that the Court would be destroyed in 
104its wake"; that the theory of .separation of powers is
violated when the judicial branch instead of merely interpreting
and declaring existing law undertakes to make new law; that the notion of
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law, as the organic outgrowth of the "community as a continuing 
105society", a process embodying the dominant values of society is
undermined. The last argument has found much favour with neo-conservative 
106
authors who have discovered in Burkean and Durkheimian notions of
e
"organic solidarity" the best arguments against judicial activism.
Finally, the realist strictures against a naive formalist jurisprudence
that believed that the judiciary could maintain its neutrality and
avoid the "prerogative of choice" and the ensuing value-imposition
through literalism are used to reinforce the arguments about the
undemocratic character of judicial review.
The proponents of restraint, however, cannot escape the antinomy
identified above: judicial review is theoretically defined as i
undemocratic for violating the outcomes of the political
process, but it has been traditionally accepted as an integral part of
those democratic processes. The theorists who do not accept Learned
Hand's near complete repudiation of judicial review, concede that some
review is authorized but should be coupled with an assumption of
constitutionality of state action. Only clearly "unreasonable" statutes
107should be invalidated. According to Justice Stone the criterion of
reasonableness should be an "objective" one: a considered judgment
of what the community regards as within the limits of reason. The
question, therefore, shifts from one about the law making or law
declaring character of judicial review to whether laws should "be
judged according to the [Justices'] own standards or those of the 
108community". To be sure, for the pluralists the best site to search 
for the standards of a society is its laws. And every law or policy 
seemed "reasonable", at least to those who enacted it. Thus, within 
the postulated pluralist premises, judicial review can never be fully 
justified. The search for objectivity appears as a chimera.
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b. The proponents of judicial activism present an equally impressive
selection of arguments deriving from political theory, answering point
for point the objections of their opponents.
Judicial review in the area of personal and political freedoms,
far from being an undemocratic incursion on the popular mandate, is
the necessary prerequisite for the articulation of the popular will and
its communication to the competent governmental bodies. The temporary
ruling majorities cannot be entrusted to tamper at will with those
processes that ensure the principles of political change. There can
be no absolute guarantee that some majority will not attempt to
preclude such change. The position of the Supreme Court, therefore,
removed as it is from the immediate vicissitudes of the give-and-take
of the pluralistic process, makes it the most competent body in the
constitutional arrangement to keep the "channels of political change" 
109open. ' To be sure, the activism of the old Court that frustrated
the federal programmes of economic regulation, is universally derided.
But for the new activists, their version of natural law is based on
the allegedly clear mandate of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
while the old was constitutionally unauthorized.
The more empirically oriented activists stress the unrealistic
110assumptions of any theory of strict separation of powers. They
claim that restraint proponents wrongly overemphasize the democratic
character of the Congress and the Executive as against that of the 
111Supreme Court; that they exaggerate the power of the Supreme Court
1 1which in reality makes only "marginal contributions" on policy issues; 
and that the Supreme Court as all other political agencies must select 
and protect certain interest groups and create its clientele mainly 
out of marginal groups under-represented or unsuccessful with other 
agencies.^  ^
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Thus, the overall picture that emerges from the rehearsal of the 
arguments from political science is of a basic disagreement on the 
definition and description of the political/democratic process. The 
activist position has been expressed in a simple - and rather naive 
way - by one writer: "if we accept the thesis that the government 
created by the Constitution is a democracy, and is therefore 
»democratic*, it follows that [judicial review] is consistent with 
democracy, and is therefore ’democratic* to confine and supervise 
majority r u l e ' O ^
Justice Black’s standard reply to the accusations of the undemocratic
character of judicial review was that the people themselves had imposed
checks on their own power by means of the Bill of Rights. Certain
areas of action had been placed beyond majority control and the
implementation of that mandate by the Court was the ultimate exercise
of popular sovereignty. The simplicity and logical elegance of
Black's position has been accepted even by writers who disagree with
him: "...it supports judicial review while answering the charge that
the practice is undemocratic... when a court strikes down a popular
statute or practice as unconstitutional, it may also reply to the
115resulting public outcry: 'We didn't do it - you did'." J Black,
however, was prepared to accept the normative implications of his
views. Thus, in a famous interview he conceded that his activist
protection of freedom of expression was based not only on the clear
mandate of the First Amendment but also nn his belief - old-fashioned
as he put it - that the State should not invade personal and political 
116freedoms. But his more' positivistically-minded followers shy away 
from such natural law resembling declarations of belief. They are, 
thus, caught in a different dilemma from that of the proponents of 
restraint. They theoretically reject natural law, but by defending an 
active judicial review they accept in practice its natural law
premises
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Thus, on that point too, the arguments seem circular and the debate 
a barren one. A closer look at constitutional theory is, therefore, in
order
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CHAPTER III
A CRITIQUE OF THE »'CONSTITUTIONAL MODE OF DISCOURSE"
1. Introduction
The review of the development of theories of constitutionalism and 
judicial review undertaken in the previous chapter leads to two 
preliminary conclusions.
First, during the 19th century the theory evolved in a rather 
uninterrupted way, spearheaded by important Supreme Court decisions 
which were, in the main, favourably received and elaborated upon by the 
legal community,practising and academic.^ However, around the New 
Deal,the consensus was broken and a proliferation of conflicting 
theoretical positions emerged. A parallel development has been traced 
as regards the theoretical justifications of freedom of expression 
(chapter I).
Secondly, the essence of constitutionalism that emerges from the 
review may be captured in three propositions: the Constitution is a 
positive law, it is the supreme law within a hierarchized body of 
rules and is related to notions of popular sovereignty. All three
elements of positivism, natural law and democratic theory are involved
!
in constitutionalism, although the interpretation of each of them*as 
well as the overall mixture differs in each version. During the 19th 
century the naturalistic element predominates, freedom is identified 
with the rights of private property and a distrust toward popular 
sovereignty is expressed. After the New Deal the democratic element 
asserts the primary position, freedom is redefined as personal and 
political and the arguments revolve around the various versions of 
democratic theory and increasingly the role of the Supreme Court in a 
democratic society.
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In order to account for the persistence of the main propositions as 
well as the changes in their understanding in legal theory that led to 
the theoretical "polyphony" since the 3 0*s, it is necessary to examine 
constitutionalism in the context of classical liberal political 
philosophy and the social and political order it came to 
explain and justify? and then in the context of mass democracy and 
welfare capitalism that emerged in the West, in the aftermath of the 
First World War and the great Depression.
2. Power, law and Legitimation in 19th Century Political and Legal
Theory
Within liberal political philosophy, constitutionalism may be
defined as the ensemble of legal doctrines and practices that, allegedly,
restrain political power and ultimately attempt to dissolve all power
2relations into legal ones.
This theoretical construction involves three themes: a 
representation of power in society, and in particular political power; 
a representation of law and the legal system; finally a relation 
between the two, which in classical liberalism was called "political 
obligation", while contemporary social science examines it under the 
broader concept of legitimation:^ a theoretical assertion of the 
conditions necessary, so that a social and political order may be 
recognized as right and just by its subjects. Legitimation may be 
examined either as the claim of a political order to be recognized, 
advanced by the dominant groups in that order, or as the degree of 
acceptance (obedience) to that claim on the part of the ruled.
Bach of these themes will be examined in turn, first in the 
setting of classical liberalism and the emerging capitalist society.
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All classical political philosophy understands power as a 
unitary essence seated in a single centre, the state, that monopolizes 
the means of coercion and exercises sovereignty. Treated as necessary 
and revered but at the same time as threatening and potentially 
dangerous, power is a Janus-like concept. All early political 
philosophers share this ambiguous attitude. Hobbes, Locke and the 
Utilitarians^ are preoccupied in varying degrees with the problem of 
reconciliation between freedom and coercion and attempt to raise fences 
around power.
If classical liberalism is seen (as it is accepted^) as
the polemical ideology of a rising bourgeoisie, then its ambiguous
attitude toward political power can be historically explained.
Revolting against the fixed institutional order of feudal society, in
which political power, economic possession and personal status are
inextricably linked under the sanctioning of a pervasive world view
that explains and justifies the position of the individual and the
organization of society according to a hierarchical and immutable
model, classical liberalism comes to fight for and justify a
profoundly different social order: a highly mobile one, based on an
antagonistic civil society^ of freely competing individuals, possessors
of exchangeable commodities and alienable labour power, who relate to
each other, solely, according to the exigencies of a universalizable
market. Political power must, therefore, be separated from the social
7and economic domain and confined to a cnntrolled centre, leaving
society - the area of freedom par excellence - to the instrumental
calculations of individuals acting as ’'infinite appropriators and
8infinite consumers". To be sure, the public power of the state must 
undertake certain central tasks, necessary for the emancipation of 
market forces that will reorganise the whole social order, once set 
free: it must guarantee the general conditions of a functioning market;
2.1. Power
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it must sanction contracts, so that economic transactions are calculable 
and reliable; it must prevent and punish transgressions against private 
property; finally it must provide for some central - though limited - 
economic needs of an infrastructural character. Thus, power conceived 
as solely political and condensed in the modem state must guarantee the 
conditions of freedom seen as economic. But, as the same time, the 
coercive apparatus of the state that monopolizes all force, remains a 
potential threat for the embattled bourgeoisie and its newly acquired 
freedom. The potentially disruptive element of a political power 
abstracted from society and entrusted in a separate and functionally 
demarcated realm, must be organized in such a way as to guard against 
its dreaded self-aggrandizement or its capture by social forces inimical 
to economic freedom and capitalist property.
The ambiguous attitude of early liberals towards power and the
9state can, thus, be explained. Civil society can flourish only if set 
free from political power, but civil society cannot survive without 
state intervention which must serve the needs of the emancipated 
market. The state must perform a few central tasks but must be limited 
only to those. According to M. Friedman, who has recently repeated 
the arguments of the 19th century liberals, the state must "maintain 
law and order, define property rights, adjudicate disputes about the 
interpretation of rules, enforce contracts, promote competition, provide
10a monetary framework, protect the irresponsible whether madman or child" 
and do nothing else.
The suggested arrangements for the reconciliation of power and 
freedom vary according to the historical epoch, in which each theorist 
wrote, from Hobbes* authoritarian liberalism to Locke*s property 
emphasizing liberalism to Paine’s somewhat anarchistic beliefs. But 
all liberals as well as J.J. Rousseau the founder of the rival 
democratic tradition agree as to one means that may effecuate the
reconciliation: law
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2.2. Law
The concept of law that gradually dominates liberal thinking is that
13of a public and positive rule.
The publicity of the legal rule implies the acceptance of the
capacity of the state to order a secular, profane social order in
accordance with the objectives of power holders. According to
Habermas,"*^ this attitude is the result of a profound methodological
change in the study of politics initiated by Machiavelli and completed
by Hobbes. Politics become transformed from the philosophical study
of "good life", to a workmanlike technical knowledge, a science "which
will regulate the affairs of men with the reliability that a clock
15regulates the motions of time". Such a profound reorganisation
requires a strong central power that will enforce the scientifically
determined prescriptions of the theorist.
The formal characteristics of the positive rule and the liberal
legal system (generality in content, uniformity in application) ensure
equality of individuals before the law irrespective of their personal 
16circumstances: they open up morally neutral areas of personal autonomy
within which self-centred individuals may pursue their interest by 
means of instrumental judgments. The main way in which these spheres 
of personal autonomy may be reconciled is through external constraint. 
Thus positive law by divorcing morality from legality, becomes the law 
of freedom and at the same time of external coercion. Criminal law is 
the reverse side of the law of property and contract. Self-interested 
autonomy is coupled with state violence or psychologically motivated 
self-restraint (obedience). '
Thus, in liberal legal theory, law is the language of the unitary
state power. Internally, law is unified through its formal
characteristics and it is these latter that make it the principal
18emancipating force of the new social and political order.
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2.3. Legitimation
The distinction between morality and legality made the problem of 
"political obligation" or legitimation a fundamental concern of liberal
18citheorists. Formal, positive law answers partially only the problem
created by the gradual destruction of the ancien regime which led to
its own genesis: its characteristics described above create and
reproduce the conditions necessary for an expanding capitalist economy.
Both in its formal and substantive aspects the law of freedom (property
law) and the law of coercion (criminal law) contribute in the organization
of a dynamic economic system which according to Habermas is capable of
self-legitimation, as long as the politically active agents perceive
market society as the best mechanism for the fulfillment of self-
interested purposive action. Thus, the relations of production and
economic activity become themselves legitimate for the first time in
19history, and political power is justified in terms of them. Formal
law becomes the essence of freedom, an idea examplified in Kantian
legal and political theory and retained strongly in the continental
20versions of legal positivism.
The legitimatory or ideological function of law has been, recently,
extensively commented upon particularly by writers in the Marxist 
21tradition. Thus, E.P. Thompson states that "the law assumed unusual
pre-eminence in £ the 18th centuxy7, as the central legitimizing 
22ideology". Although this is a welcome corrective to the earlier
reductionist Marxist approach to law as solely legalized violence, it
should be stressed that the legitimatory role of law in an expanding
capitalist economy is mainly indirect: through its form and content
it serves the needs of expansion of the "economic subsystem of
23purposive-rational action". Max Weber*s identification of legality . 
as the form of legitimacy in 19th century capitalist states comes into
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its own under the perspective suggested above.
However, the formal characteristics of positive law - which to be
sure retain strong naturalistic elements in its assertions of universal
validity, rationality and realization of values like equity and justice,
as is clearLy borne out by historians of 17tn and lbtn century hugland
25like E.P. Thompson and Douglas Hay - leave unanswered the question of .
the substantive or "material" content of legal rules. Negative freedom,
the freedom of property par excellence, may be accommodated by both an
absolutist monarchy and a parliamentary democracy as the.comparison of
2719th century Germany and England or the United States indicates. 1 
Once formal positive law has been accepted by the dominant forces of 
Western societies as the language of the sovereign state, the 
organization of the state became the paramount concern of the victorious 
bourgeoisie.
The democratic and socialist traditions call for the full popular 
integration of the law-making sovereign power of the state. A new 
concept of freedom emerges, that of active or political freedom 
according to which, through the extension of the franchise and political 
rights, political power will be guided by the whole of society, a body, 
politic comprised of politically equal self-determining citizens. The 
concept of equality changes, too: from that of formal equality before 
the law to that of substantive equality of social conditions and 
opportunities. Most of the political and social struggles of the 19th 
century centred around these conflicting concepts. The labour and 
socialist movements adopted the demands of active freedom and substantive 
equality, while the bourgeoisie resisted and qualified them, fearing 
the capture of the state by social and political forces inimical to 
negative freedom and capitalist property. The conflict and eventual
24
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compromise of the two traditions of liberalism and democracy around the 
turn of the century led within legal discourse to the creation of the 
modem theory of constitutionalism.
The state itself is presented as a fictitious legal person (most 
explicitly in the German theory of Eechtsstaat) in the form of public or 
constitutional law. All its interventions in society must follow legal 
formalities. Thus, the legality of private transaction frees civil 
society for the instrumental calculations of antagonistic individuals; 
while the legality of public transactions (constitutionality) promises 
the dissolution of power relations, among the branches of the state 
and between the state and civil society, into legal-technical ones.
In legal positivism, the legal system is a unified whole through 
(among other things) its emanation from a single sovereign state; 
in constitutionalism the sovereign state is unified through its 
organization and exercise according to legal formalities.
2.4. Legal and Constitutional Theory
Keeping this analysis in mind, one may re-examine the process of
"positivization of natural law", as described above in 19th century
constitutional theory and practice.
(a) The Supreme Court intervention in the field of property rights
cannot be explained as' an answer to extensive state curtailment of them
during the 19th century. As Tocqueville had accurately foreseen, respect
for property and economic competition fanned by the untapped riches of
the West, was the dominant American ideology. "There would seem to be
no question that conditions of life have fostered among us a rather
special regard for property and the property right... Great riches have
28represented with us some sort of personal achievement". On the 
contrary both federal and state law had extended full protection to
91 -
property rights, a fact that was not always fully appreciated:
"...the special favours of the law have gone unnoticed or have been
29treated as the spoils of those who knew their way about". The
federal judicial intervention may be better explained as a process of
nationalization or homogenization of property law that broke down the
barriers for national corporate expansion created by the existence of
49 jurisdictions regulating property rights at state level. E. Corwin
praised the Supreme Court for its role in this process: "The
spread of capitalistic industry made... palpable... the fact that
industrially, commercially, economically we were one people... [The]
Supreme Court... under the "commerce" and "due process" clause...
30clear ted] the field for nation-wide industry and commerce". By
helping to open up the national market, the Supreme Court created the
legal conditions for rapid economic expansion and capitalist
accumulation. At the same time it reinforced the achievement ideology
of the property order. The property order does not only engender its
own legitimation, it also legitimizes the political and legal orders
and institutions that create and reproduce its conditions of existence.
(b) The identification of freedom with the property order of a
nationally expanding capitalist economy within the constitutional
discourse of the Supreme Court, had in itself, accordingly, a secondary
significance. However, the identification of the Supreme Court as the
national protector of freedom enhanced its authority within the federal
system of government as well as against state legislatures and
»
executives. Of equal importance was the identification of the 
democratically accountable institutions as potential enemies of 
freedom, if they were to lead through majority rule to tampering with
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the property order. Madison's quest for a "body in government
sufficiently respectable for its wisdom and virtue to aid" against
demands of the people for a more equitable distribution of property's
31blessings, was resolved in practice by the Supreme Court.
(c) The process of giving positive status to natural law through 
the Supreme Court's reading of the 14th Amendment had a great importance 
for the development of American constitutional theory. -It protected the 
Supreme Court from accusations of undemocratic behaviour and lack of 
respect for popularly elected assemblies. At the same time it inserted 
substantive criteria in the determination of validity of legal enactments. 
The legal system was, thus, presented as permeated by a number of 
principles or ideas, the faithful and uniform application of which the 
Supreme Court undertook to ensure. The importance of that development 
cannot be underestimated, particularly at a time when continental 
jurisprudence (particularly German) had identified legal validity with 
the following of formally correct procedural requirements. During the 
1 9 th century the fundamental value of the legal system was the protection 
of property rights,' and the role of the Supreme Court as a creator of 
legitimation was mainly indirect. But the change of the freedom theme 
indicates that the Court undertook in the 30s a more active role in 
the direct legitimation of the new social and political order.
3. 20th Century Changes in Political and Legal Theory 
3.1. Legitimation
The institutionalization of the welfare, mass democratic state, 
symbolized in the U.S. by the New Deal and the Roosevelt administration, 
led to changes in all three main themes of constitutionalism.
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The identification of political power as the sole threat to freedom 
becomes qualified. Economic and social arrangements, the site of 
freedom par excellence in liberal political philosophy, are reluctantly 
conceived as inhering structures of domination which if left unregulated 
would, and did in the Great Depression, lead to extensive de­
stabilizing social problems. The state undertakes to intervene in 
the economy, to channel and regulate economic conflicts and to 
redress deficiencies thus leading to an increasing politicization 
of the previously private domain of economic and social transaction. 
Similar policies had been followed by the Republicans during the 
reconstruction era, particularly in banking, tariffs and transport.
But the Republican plan' of a centralized urban-industrial development 
was resisted and mostly abandoned in the 1870s and 1880s. In the
1930s, however, the great liberal divide between public and private
32started breaking up. The older liberal concept of freedom, as 
absence of deliberate, man-made constraint, in which the individual 
is assumed as distinct and independent from the political order of 
society, is supplemented with a new one according to which individuals 
and groups advance claims for the improvement of their economic and 
social conditions and circumstances which the state has the capacity 
and duty to meet.
^ However, once the naturalness of a social and economic order, 
that is reproduced and expanded if kept free from state intervention, 
has been questioned and the concept of freedom has been divorced from 
the economic freedom of the capitalist entrepreneur, the traditional 
notion of letitimacy becomes eroded as well. The formal legitimacy 
of legality is based, as we saw, on the self-legitimizing potential
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of the economic order and the generalizable ideology of equal exchange 
realized in the commodity and labour markets. The demise of both 
legitimatory functions of the economic system in the 3 0 's reactivated 
the need for direct legitimation of the political order that now 
directly and openly intervenes in the economic system while maintaining 
its basic feature, i.e. private ownership of productive means albeit 
in new corporate forms. The formal correctness of legal procedures 
does not suffice and the existence of some substantive values that 
permeate state intervention, making it acceptable must be canvassed.
The solutions that have emerged as an asnwer to the need for 
direct legitimacy of the politically integrated post World War Two 
society are of relevance to the constitutional debates.
The first theme is that of democratic legitimacy? it postulates
that the procedures for state intervention in the economy and in
society should guarantee, on top of and sometimes against legal
formalities, the representativeness and, therefore, substantive
correctness of the decisions reached. The various democratic theories,
we have examined above, may be seen as a response to this need for
democratic legitimacy. The more humanistic and reformist thinkers
call for the unblocking of the political processes,wherever barriers
* •
to their capacity to represent social interests accurately still 
exist (e.g. vote restrictions, "malapportionment11 etc.). The more 
empirically oriented political and constitutional autnors ascribe 
democratic credentials to the existing process of group and elite 
competitions accepting with greater complacency its representative- 
legitimate character. Overall, however, the existence and degree of 
representativeness of political decisions becomes the paramount 
concern of political science. Democracy, from mob-rule, gets transformed
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into something to he fought for.
The second legitimatory theme may be called the technocratic one: 
the residue of social conflict, which to be sure has, in the main, been 
institutionalized by means of the pluralistic process, may be in 
principle eliminated through scientific-technological progress. This 
latent social conflict is perceived as antagonistic claims over the 
distribution of the national income among social groups; a technologically 
administered expansion of national wealth will, therefore, bring about 
the end of the already virtualized social conflict. The substance of 
political problems can be reduced to technical ones, not accessible to 
the lay citizen, which should be left to the unquestionable wisdom of 
scientific planners and elite politicians. Politics accordingly take
3 3  I - ' ^on a predominantly symbolic function: their importance lies not in
the creation of a public opinion on issues of general interest but In
the procurement of an administered societal acclamation to the
imperatives of technocratic regulation; certain issues and interests
must be kept outside the threshold of opinion formation (military
planning is here a prime example). According to M. Edelman*s well
34known study of the "symbolic use of politics" such ideals as justice,
equality and freedom are used as symbolic reassurances to people in
respect of insoluble social problems. Of course, technocratic
legitimacy may be reconciled with the most formal - and therefore
devoid of any substantive content - theories of democracy which
postulate political apathy as a positive virtue and necessary condition
35of the political process. Thus, according to the radical critics of
pluralism,a new antinomy is created: political intervention in economic
and social life - their direct politicization - depends on the existence
36of what Habermas has called a "depoliticized public" that should 
accept the new integrated system of political authority and restrict its
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political participation to a recurring ritual acclamation or removal of 
ruling elites.
3.2. Law and Legal Theory
To the extent that state intervention retains a largely legislative 
character, the new functions of law lead to profound changes in both 
its form and content. From a body of abstract and general rules, it 
is tfransformed into a series of highly specific regulations and open- 
ended standards by means of which the state carries out its economic 
and social policies. However, the erosion of the axiomatic and formal 
characteristics of legal rules undermines the separation that the 
liberal concept of law had purportedly achieved between legality and 
morality and between law and politics. Laws are for the first time 
clearly perceived for what they always were: the outcome of political 
conflict among antagonistic groups and interests. "The... assumption... 
that everyone's interests are essentially identical, is obviously a hard
37one for our generation to swallow" writes a contemporary constitutional 
author. Law cannot be presented any more as the embodiment of the public 
good or common interest, a homogeneous body of rules permeated by the 
supreme values of the political order. Laws and regulations are instead 
seen as the means through which social groups secure the backing of 
state power for their interests.
I
Faced with the polyphony of laws, administrative regulations and
judicial or semi-judicial decisions, legal and constitutional theory has
attempted to reconstruct the notion of the "rule of law" as a coherent,
closed ensemble of rules and values. The neo-conservative writers decry
38the "decline of law"^ and long for a renovation of the 19th century 
faiths in the harmony of interests and strict procedural guarantees.
The neo-liberals, on the other hand, attempt to discover new principles 
that permeate the contemporary legal order and give it its apparently
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lost coherence and claim to legitimacy. Two such attempts that have
39jus tifiedly attracted widespread interest are those of H.L.A. Hart
40and Eonald Dworkin.
Hart constructs the legal system as a closed ensemble of legal
rules, empirically observable. They derive in a pyramidal fashion
from a basic rule which in a way akin to Kelsen’s "Grundnorm" ascribes
validity to the various parts of the legal system. This base rule, the
"rule of recognition" exists as a ljurkheimian social fact and may be
observed in any existing legal system. The question of its validity
cannot be posed, since it. is its very existence that makes the notion of
legal validity theoretically intelligible and ascertainable. He
distinguishes the validity of law from questions of morality and
41obedience which are treated as largely metalegal. Thus, in a way
resembling empirical political science, Hart claims that the legal
order, which derives from and depends upon the rule of recognition,
is legitimate not because it contains any substantive values but
simply because it exists. Legitimacy from a normative claim becomes
an empirically ascertainable fact.
Dworkin, on the other hand closer to the natural law tradition,
attempts to discover a fundamental value or ideal that permeates and,
therefore, homogenises the legal system. Dowrkin's quest ends up to a
42ground value, instead of a ground rule: the "vague but powerful" 
value of human dignity and the individual moral right to equal respect 
and concern. Dworkin claims that these values may be discovered both 
through philosophical speculation and empirical observation of the 
American legal order (but see the criticisms of the parallel position 
on the theory of freedom of expression of T. Scanlon above).^ The 
legal and political order is legitimate if it furthers the postulated
moral values.
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3.J. The Effects of the Changes on Constitutional Practice and Theory 
Both these trends, the positivist and the value-orientated, 
inhere within the American tradition of constitutionalism. As we 
saw, the constitution is presented as both the source of validity of 
the whole legal system, a kind of written rule of recognition which 
the Supreme Court has undertaken to enforce through judicial review; 
and as the depository and guarantor of the fundamental values of the 
legal system.
It may be argued, therefore that the stake behind the long debates
in constitutional theory about strict constructionism, judicial
activism and restraint or the fundamental values of the constitution -
and their echo in the theory and practice of freedom of expression - is
the attempt to reconstruct the claim of existing unity or potential
homogeneity of the transformed legal system, an attempt conceived as
intimately linked with the problem of legitimation of the contemporary
social and political order. Both legitimatory themes, distinguished
above, are indeed to be found in the constitutional discourse on and
off the Supreme Court bench: The procedural-democratic in the debates
44about the preferred position of personal and political freedoms, judicial
45activism or restraint on First Amendment issues and the increasingly
dominant democratic justification of freedom of expression.^ The
technocratic, in the reformist decisions of the Warren Court in
desegregation, voting rights and reapportionment cases. According to
its critics, the Court attempted through constitutional adjudication,
to remould political and social reality by imposing over and against
the political process proper, principles that future generations would
47accept as progressive. The Justices took on the role of Platonic 
guardians. The "guardian ethic" promises to link knowledge and power 
and entrusts the "experts" with the necessary power to carry out their 
scientifically arrived at policies. However, the expansion of both
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knowledge and power potential leads to an increase in "opportunities 
48of manipulation".^
Thus, the Supreme Court already identified as the protector of
freedom and the spirit of the Constitution played an important part in
the process of social and political reorganisation both by adopting
and popularizing the new legitimatory themes and by cautiously
participating in post New Deal social reform. While its 19th century
intervention has been described as aiding the nationalization of the
49capitalist property order and market economy, its 20th century role
must be seen as an answer to the need for direct legitimation of the
reconstructed social and political order. This process - which may be
called the nationalization of legitimation, was embarked upon in the
Gitlow case (see infra,Ch.VI,5). In that case the free speech clause
of the First Amendment, which is addressed, in terms, to the federal
government (Congress shall make no law) was read, against previous 
50rulings, as applying to state governments too, by being incorporated 
in the "due process" clause of the 14th Amendment. From that case 
onwards, the Supreme Court undertook an increasingly active role in the 
determination of the political ideologies and groups that could be 
admitted as legitimate or excluded from the political process, 
insisting,, on the democratic character of its interventions. The 
examination of this process is the object of the second part of this 
thesis.
Constitutional theory in its part, faced with the theoretical antinomy 
between the vocal democratic rationale and a technocratic tendency, 
that thrives in expert activism, secrecy, ideological planning and 
distrust for popular participation, both expressed in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, attempted to reconcile them in a consistent whole and 
to exorcise parts of the legal material that did not fit into the 
postulated scheme. The persisting issues and ongoing controversies
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that mark much post-New Deal legal and constitutional theory, may be
explained as the effort of theorists to account for a profound change in
social, political and legal realities within the terms and presuppositions
of an older notion of rule of law and constitutionalism and reassert
51the continuity, coherence and centrality of law. This effort to
52reconstruct constitutionalism, admittedly a "naive faith" even in its 
old version, led both to the persistence of the old themes of 
constitutionalism and to the inconclusive - even acrimonious - character 
of the debate. The new social and political reality puts up an even
istronger resistance to its reduction to singular principles and moral 
values, formally correct procedures, the clear meaning of the 
constitutional text, an unfolding liberal tradition or a universally 
acceptable moral philosophy.
The continuously expanding and largely contingent regulatory inter­
vention of the state, in which the Supreme Court plays its own distinct 
pari* is asked to yield fundamental values that the Court does or should 
enforce. The neo-conservative dislike for social reforms is transformed 
into a seemingly insoluble debate between proponents of judicial 
restraint and judicial activism in which both sides draw their arguments 
from differing accounts of the political process; in the field of 
freedom of expression the contradictory demands of democratic legitimation 
and ideological planning are translated into the legal doctrines of 
absolutism and balancing, the first of which asserts the primary 
importance, constitutional derivation and historical tradition of 
political freedom while the latter relegates it to one social interest 
at a par with all other state concerns, to many of which it has to give 
way.
There emerges, accordingly, a proliferation of legal theories, 
global and regional, that set themselves the task to regularize the 
legal material, exorcise the antinomies and pacify the conflicts that
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permeate legal and political activity. It would not be untrue, however,
to conclude that so far they have not fully achieved their aim, which,
in a confused way, has been declared by one author to be the answer to
53the question "when authority is legitimate" (sic).
4. The "Constitutional Mode of Discourse"
The problem underlying all versions of constitutionalism is that 
of the legitimacy of political power, although it has been only recently 
acknowledged by constitutional authors. It is usually presented as a 
normative problem in the following form: what are the conditions that 
make political power appear to its subjects as right and just, thus 
creating a valid obligation of obedience as an intemalized- 
psychological motivation that minimizes the need for external restraint.
I would like to argue that: it is a certain (wrong) way of 
presenting social and political reality, that has dominated constitutional 
theory, which has necessitated both the primacy attributed to the 
concept of legitimacy and has made its use theoretically uninteresting 
and empirically hardly verifiable; further that this (normative) 
concept of legitimacy is intrinsically connected with essentialist
concepts of power and law, according to which the legal system is,.. . i
unwarrantedly, presented as a unified whole; i therefore, in order 
to examine and explain the legal material, the concepts of power, law 
and legitimacy must be placed within a different problematic freed 
from the assumptions of constitutionalism (below, § 5)*
The importance of the concept of legitimacy in constitutional 
theory can be traced to the legacy of classical liberal political 
philosophy to which constitutionalism owes its parentage and basic 
concepts.
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Classical liberalism has been built around a postulated distinction
between the individual and the organized collectivity, private life and
public power, the individual and the state where the first pole of the
dualisms represents the domain of freedom or autonomy, while the second
represents that of constraint, force or power. The classical problem
was to reconcile, therefore, in theory and in the practical arrangements
of social institutions, the two antagonistic notions of freedom/power-
force, to answer as T. Parsons has put it the "Hobbesian problem of
54order": How can organized life become possible, bearing in mind the
fact that the wants, desires and interests of individuals are 
incompatible, and hence that the natural condition of social life is 
a war of all against all. Put in other words, how can political 
obligation to the sovereign state that monopolizes organised force, 
be validly grounded, leaving at the same time enough room for the 
free action of antagonistic individuals. Whatever the solutions 
provided (some have been examined above, Chapter II), the way of 
putting the problem inhered the following theoretical problematic: If 
legitimacy, a normative characteristic of the political order, exists, 
then the subjects of that order are assumed to have a moral commitment 
toward the commands of that order in toto. toward the whole order as 
constituted. Inversely, to the extent that such commands take on a 
legal form, it follows that a legitimate order creates an internalized, 
moral "ought" toward its legal commands.
It is not hard to find the same problematic in contemporary legal 
theory: "Since a system of political authority is most clearly identified 
by its legal system, the range of questions which can be grouped under 
the head of legal obligation... is more or less co-extensive with the 
queries traditionally discussed under the heading of political 
obligation: 'Why and to what extent ought men to obey their mlers
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55and the law?'", or according' to another writer: "What we believe about
the law is related directly to the legitimacy of our political
56
institutions". Legitimate power (political authority) is identified
with the legal system, the law is the only form of power and power should
57always be exercised according to the form of law.
This power-law construct resides in and emanates from a single 
sovereign centre, the state or a designate locus within the state (the 
monarcn, tne Constitution, tne people, tne legislature, the executive or 
tne ruling class, tne capital etc.). The state is tne site of power, 
power materializes the sovereign will that possesses it, law is the 
language and the form of organization of power. Once this 
representation of reality has been accepted the problem of legitimacy 
takes one of two forms: it either becomes a question of the values and 
procedures that ensure the continuity and coherence of Law, thus 
ascribing power its form and limits; or it becomes a question of the 
constitution of the Subject that possesses and exercises power, of the 
organization of the Sovereign that decides the content of law. Freedom 
and power, voluntary acceptance and external constraint are, thus, 
reconciled either through the unity of the legal system or the unity 
of the sovereign Subject that controls the state and possesses power.
The Constitution is the symbol of the unity of the triptych 
sovereignty, unitary power object of possession, law as a hierarchized 
whole. The Constitution is accordingly the supreme law: as supreme 
it decides the question of validity of all parts of the legal system; 
as a law, it is a rule comprised of clear words, and in case of "open- 
textured" words the intentions of their authors should decide their 
proper meaning; as a legal rule, it has a normative content of a 
•negative character: it bars political power from Tindertaking certain 
activities. The unity of the Law is found in the original text that
authorizes all laws
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But if the Constitution does not have a settled meaning, to be
discovered in its words or the authors' intentions, as the Legal
Realists insisted, then the Constitution is ’’what the Supreme Court 
58says it is". In this case the unity of the legal system must be 
found in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court; the question of 
legitimacy of power is reduced to that of the legitimate Supreme Court 
intervention and constitutionalism comes to be preoccupied with questions 
of judicial reviews the quest then starts for the values or principles 
that the Court does or should impose.
Alternatively, legitimacy is sought in the identification of the 
sovereign power of the state with the natural sovereignty of society 
conceived either as a body of atomized citizens, or, of interacting 
interest groups. The will of the state is the will of the sovereign 
people, state action follows the social consensus or the societal 
compromises and shifting group constellations attained in the 
pluralistic process. Law then becomes the "neutral" instrument by. 
means of which such consensus or compromises are expressed. The 
principle of unity of the law is found in its embodiment of the value 
consensus of society reflected in the value-dispositions of its 
individual members. Legitimacy gets, accordingly, transformed from 
a continuously contested mormative claim into an empirically observable 
social fact.
Thus, the unity of law becomes the symbol of the unity and legitimacy
of power and is successively sought in the sovereignty of the text
(constitution or constitutional decisions); the sovereignty of the
author (the Framers or the Justices); the sovereignty of some moral
principle or value [Justice (Rawls), moral rights (Dworkin), neutral
59 60principles (Wechsler), science (Ackerman) etc.]; or the
sovereignty of the people
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Although, as it will be argued in the next part, power, law and 
legitimacy should be examined in a different theoretical framework 
which questions their postulated unity or unifiability, constitutionalism 
can be seen as a unified body of discourse. The various, conflicting 
theories and doctrines discussed above bear resemblance to the 
procedures of organization of discursive practices as defined by M. 
Foucault. According to Foucault^ the production of discourses in 
every society is controlled and guided by a number of procedures, a 
"discursive police" so to speak, that unify discursive subject, object 
and practice. Among these, the "internal" procedures have as their task 
the classification, ordering and distribution of discursive "events": 
the new and random ones are neutralized by being attributed to a small 
number of generative principles, thus presenting the discourse as a 
coherent and disciplined one. Such internal procedures that "master the 
random event" and "rarify the discourse" are those of the commentary 
of a major text: it permits the construction of new propositions on 
condition that the new is presented as the repetition of a meaning 
always-already existing in the major text, which is thus cloaked in 
prestige and reverence; of the author in which the new and random is 
integrated in the discourse by being attributed to an individual 
originator. Knowledge of the author's historical life is mobilized to 
decode the hitherto "hidden" meaning of his work; finally discipline: 
new propositions are admitted if they follow strict conditions in the 
form of rules, so that each new event is presented as a reactualization 
of a limited body of rules, as inhering, in other words, in these 
rules.
I would suggest, therefore, that the constitutional text and the 
legislative history, the constitutional decisions and the opinions of 
judges, the legal doctrines and the political theories can be seen 
as the procedures that taken in conjunction attempt to construct and
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present power in the language of law and thus present it as a unified 
essence, exercised for the benefit of the whole society. To be sure 
the non-rational element of power is non-reducible to law as F. Neumann* 
has warned. This impossibility guarantees that the increasingly 
sophisticated attempts of constitutional theory to account for 
political and legal reality cannot fully succeed. But on the other 
hand the intellectual odyssey and the continuing controversies are the 
sign of a success: the building of a body of discourse which may be 
called the constitutional mode of discourse. ^  In its incessant, 
albeit conflicting repetitions, in its singular but competing values 
and doctrines, in the known and yet unknowable intentions of its 
authors, the reality of a social and political domination both presents 
its evolving, contradictory image and conceals itself under the promise 
that it may be, in principle, tamed by the principles of law or 
identified with the values of an assumed solidarite sociale.
5. Theses for an Alternative Theoretical Construction
5.1. Power
The analysis above indicates that a critique of the constitutional 
mode of discourse should accept that the sovereign origins and unitary 
principles of constitutional theories must be seen as both enabling 
the extension of the reach of power in society; and as restricting, 
unifying and rarifying its discursive representations and thus presenting 
social reality as a totality in which stability and orderly change, 
consensus and institutionalized conflict, common and individual or 
class interest, rulers and ruled form an organic, harmonious whole.
In such a critical approach power cannot be seen as an essence, object 
of possession seated in a single centre of sovereignty, the state or 
some location in it. As Professor Griffith put it "the state is yet
another metaphysic invented to conceal the reality of political power". 64
- 107
Power should be treated, as recent advances in social science 
indicate, as a relational concept: it involves "reproduced relations of
65autonomy and dependence in social interaction". The resources, 
however, that are mobilized by social agents in interaction, in order 
to produce desired outcomes, are drawn from structures of domination 
and are asymmetrical. Relations of power and domination inhere in 
economic arrangements and structures as well as in cultural and social 
practices as writers in the Marxist tradition have insisted. Claus 
Offe has suggested, indeed, that one of the criteria of the 
repressive character of a political system is the extent to which it 
excludes certain spheres of action from its intervention (as the 19th 
century "nightwatchman" state extensively did) thus sanctioning as 
natural and inviolable the interests of particular social classes and 
the mundane domination of economic structures. And as the changes in 
the understanding of the various constitutional clauses, described 
above, have indicated, even "meaningfullness" is constantly negotiated 
and not just a simple communication of pre-existing meanings.^
5.2. Law
The essentialist concepts of the state and law should be equally 
rejected. To be sure, the state exercises an ever-increasing inter­
ventionist role in contemporary society (see above §3) and its
67institutional "materiality" is only too well known. But instead of
being a unitary locus of power or agent, the modem state is a "realm
of institutions and arenas of struggle subject to internal connections
*68and relations to other institutions and forces". Neither law nor the 
legal system can be conceptualized as a unitary whole transverse! by 
principles or expressing the values of social consensus. Law must be 
examined as a social process: comprised of divergent and inconsistent
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legislative enactments, administrative decrees and judicial decisions,
couched in terms of a specific technical discourse gnd emanating from
diverse institutions and agencies within the state on which various
and conflicting determinations and pressures are brought to bear, A
social process that translates these pressures and determinations in its
own language and, on its own part, influences and reproduces the social
and political order on which it is based. Law defines reality and backs
up this definition with the force of the repressive apparatus of the
state. As such, law is the privileged social discourse par excellence:
its descriptions (obscure as they sometimes are) and prescriptions shape
reality to a greater extent and more directly than any other discourse.
Legal concepts are not lenses "through which to observe a process that
is independent of them". They participate in the construction of
social and political life - as the second part of this work will
attempt to show for one specific part of it, the "public sphere" -
they "make it what it is";^ the law accepts or rejects political
claims of groups or individuals and by subsuming them under generalizable
legal rights and duties conceals the existence of social conflict; it
sanctions certain values as those of the community or the "reasonable
man" and thus participates in the process of production and mobilization
of normative consent toward the established order, a process called by
70A. Hunt as "ideological domination".
But, at the same time, law organizes and contains real concessions
that dominated groups and classes have achieved - a clear example being
trade union protective legislation. Its formalities and technical
requirements impose some constraints on the all intrusive claims of
power. As E.P. Thompson put it "legal rhetoric and rules may disguise
71realities of power but they also check power and its intrusions".
Finally, by protecting civil rights and political freedoms it opens the
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formal possibility that dominated groups could gain access to power.
To be sure, these rights and freedoms are not the object of an 
unquestionable and complete legal protection as traditional constitutional 
theory asserts. They are, too, contested political claims accepted 
or denied, extended or restricted.
5.3» Legitimation
Finally, the concept of legitimacy must be emancipated from its
excessively normative undertones that persist both in traditional
political and in constitutional theory (and in the Marxist theory of
73ideology as "false consciousness" ). Thus, a political order is, 
either legitimate if it materializes certain criteria (freedom, justice,
equality, civil rights etc.); or not and only widespread repression
/ 74can keep it stable (the various theories of totalitarianism are
based on that assumption). Legitimacy and its reverse, political
obligation are treated solely as moral/normative concepts. According
to much empirical political science they have been achieved in
advanced Western societies through the correspondence of the values of
75society and the value-dispositions of its individual members.
The various attempts of constitutional theory to discover the 
ultimate values of the legal system are based on this normative 
concept of legitimacy. It is true that the relative stability of 
Western societies indicates some measure of acceptance of the established 
order on the part of the people. There is no reason, however, to 
attribute this stability solely to a social acceptance of certain values 
or moral principles. Force or the threat of force, amelioration of 
social conditions, positive inducements and material concessions gained 
in political conflicts, as well as resignation and apathy have played an 
equally important role. To be sure, the acceptance of a political and
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social order as morally justified "by a large part of society, plays a
major role toward its stability and ruling groups in every society strive
to attain such legitimacy; but it appears that it is value consensus
among political rulers and dominant social groups that is the most
important factor for social stability. "The level of normative
integration of dominant groups within social systems may be a more
important influence upon the overall continuity of these systems than
76how far the majority have ’internalized' the same value standards".'
The same conclusion can be reached from a reading of H.L.A. Hart's 
analysis of law.
Hart attempts to redress the emphasis put by Austinian theory and 
legal realism on the coercive aspect of law. He underlines what he 
calls the "internal" aspect of rule followings according to it a 
valid law creates a normative obligation to abide by it quite apart 
from the specific threats and punishment in case of law violation.
The internal aspect, which distinguishes rules from habits, consists 
of a "... critical reflective attitude to certain patterns of behaviour 
as a common standard, [which] display[s] itself in criticism... 
demands for conformity, and in acknowledgements that such criticism 
and demands are justified, all of which find their characteristic 
expression in the normative terminology of 'ought', 'must', and 'should', 
'right' and 'w r o n g ' . A s  we have already seen, the validity of a law 
depends on its conformity witn the "rule of recognition" which itself 
is not valid, but merely exists. Thus, the existence of a political- 
legal order, identified by its rule of recognition, is depicted by 
this normative disposition, on the part of its citizens, towards its 
valid legal commands. However, for a legal system to exist, valid rules 
must be generally obeyed "from any motive whatever"; "The law he 
[the ordinary citizen] obeys is something which he knows of only as 
'the law'. He may obey it for a variety of different reasons and
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among them... the knowledge... that there are officials who may arrest
78him and others who will try him and send him to prison..." But the
"officials of the system" must display a normative commitment toward
the fundamental rules conferring authority. A system of political
authority exists if "the common public standards" identified by the
rule of recognition are "effectively accepted" by the courts and the 
79 soother officials. ' And Otto Kirchheimer , a most profound observer 
of the German, and - after his exile in the United States, along with 
other leading figures of the Frankfurt School - American legal systems 
maintains that the officials of the political and legal order are at 
the same time witnesses to and creators of continuity, in the sense 
of legal continuity. And this continuity is a "major certificate" 
toward social continuity.
Thus, although the close link between legality-legal continuity
and legitimacy is a useful hypothesis for the analysis of the 19th
century liberal state (see above §2), it is arguable that it should be
retained, in its strong sense, only in relation to the attitudes and
value-dispositions of officials and dominant groups, in contemporary
Western societies. The role of the Supreme Court in both representing
and constructing this official-dominant group’s value-consensus is
extremely important. Its dogged resistance against welfare measures
in the first quarter of the century and its dramatic volte-face in 
81
1 9 3 7 can, thus, be interpreted as its acceptance - with a time-lag - 
of the new articulation of official-dominant values of the New Deal.
At the same time the Court’s reinterpretation of the 14th Amendment 
provided a "major certificate" of legal continuity.
But for the rest of society, acceptance or assent to power must be 
seen as an ongoing, contested process involving both normative 
(legitimacy in the classical sense) and non-normative elements, like
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repressive sanctions, disciplinary measures, material concessions 
and real social and political gains.
It is to the examination of this process and the Supreme Court's 
role in it, in the field of freedom of expression, that the second part 
of this study addresses itself. The next chapter introduces the 
concept of the "public sphere" according to which the legal material
will be examined.
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CHAPTER 17
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE
1. The "Universe of Discourse" in A.V. Dicey and Zechariah Chafee
"A community is a universe of discourse in which the members
participate by speaking and listening, writing and reading... the
society in a continuous enterprise of inquiry and discussion gropes
its way... the individual even if not free from pressures of his own
circumstances can feel *free* by participating in this enterprise.
The First Amendment takes the universe of discourse for granted"^
wrote in 1947 Chafee the greatest American constitutional author
on matters of freedom of expression. For Chaifee the "universe of
discourse", a public opinion that "grows", is an unquestionable
assumption. The process of growth of opinion is strong in the United
States and the sole concern of the massive report on "Government and
Mass Communications" in which these statements appear is according to
its author Chafee to "preserve the essential conditions of healthy 
2public opinion".
Public opinion, which is also the sovereign opinion, grows in an 
organic way and if its conditions are guaranteed "man^ ultimate ends, 
the standards of their behaviour, and their application to concrete 
issues" will be discovered through human reason the "best guide we- 
have". One of the essential conditions for the "two-way process" in 
which public opinion grows and, by being communicated to government, 
becomes the sovereign opinion, is the rigorous enforcement by the 
courts of the demands of the First Amendment. According to Justice 
Black "[tjhat Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest 
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources is essential to the welfare of the public".^
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Yet, writing some 40 years earlier, Prof. A.V. Dicey had taken a
less sanguine and, arguably, more realistic stance toward public opinion
5in his lectures on "Law and Public Opinion in England".
For Dicey, laws embody the "legislative opinion" as distinct from
the public opinion. The former is created by "statesmen of special
insight" and popular leaders** and has to fight "the dullness and
. 7stupidity of Englishmen", particularly those without the vote, to
become accepted. The legislative opinion, the "reigning or predominant
opinion", which gets translated into legislation incorporates the
8interests of the dominant class. To be sure, Dicey presents those
interests as the common or public interest and understands that
counter-claims and interests must equally try to be presented as
universal ones: when people resist beneficial laws that hurt their
"sinister" interests, they "unconsciously delude" themselves and
claim that the changes are harmful to the interests of the whole 
9society.
By being translated into law, the dominant opinion conditions the 
general, public opinion. Once the truth of an idea has been accepted 
by men of special insight the public usually "accepts it on authority". 
Indeed the true importance of laws "lies less in their direct result
10than in their effect upon the sentiment and convictions of the public".
t
Thus, the Poor Laws impressed upon the poor "pride in independence"
and popularized the faith that "in the battle of life men must rely for
success, not upon the aid of the state, but upon self-help", by
linking "pauperism with disgrace"."'"*
Dicey studies the historical record of 19th century England and
America, and concludes, contrary to the earlier fears expressed by J.S.
Mill and Toqueville about the "tyranny of the majority", that democracy
has shown a singular tolerance and admiration for social inequalities;
12indeed "privileges have been better safeguarded through democracy".
For the politically conservative Dicey, therefore, the future danger
lies not in the extension of democracy, but in the disintegration of the 
belief in laissez-faire and the increasing reliance on state intervention 
that had been adopted by the dominant-legislative opinion of his time. 
Socialism, which he saw as the natural extension of Benthamite 
utilitarianism, was becoming the dominant opinion and would eventually 
destroy social inequalities, with which Dicey*s preferences lay. 
Incidentally, it should be noted here that Chafee shared Dicey's 
opinion - although not the strong distaste - about the socialist 
character of welfare and economic regulation measures. He found it 
incomprehensible that governmentspursuing "socialist" policies were 
at the same time persecuting, through the various sedition laws of the 
20*s and 3 0*s, socialist parties and people.
Thus, Chafee, like his friend . Meiklejohn, presupposes the 
existence of a reasoning and homogeneous public which, through the 
institutional supports of a free press and a judicially enforced right 
to free expression becomes the true sovereign power and dissolves 
political and social domination into an ongoing decision-making process: 
through the institutionally guaranteed discursive construction of the 
will of this homogeneous public, that mediates between society and 
the state, the power of the latter is put at the service of the common 
interest. To be sure, Chafee stresses the need for strengthening these 
institutional guarantees and his passing remark about people "feeling 
free" as against "being free" somewhat qualifies his analysis. However, 
his main thrust remains: the public opinion functions and grows, the 
common interest exists and through free debate the "ultimate ends of 
life" may be discovered and implemented.
But I would like to argue that this presentation of public opinion
I t
and the common interest is one more "naive faith like others encountered 
in constitutional theory (see above, ch.Il). They cannot be assumed or 
taken for granted and then witnessed as unfolding in a teleological way.
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On the contrary, they are in a continuous state of flux, of conflictual 
construction and reproduction. According to Dicey, public opinion is 
created by philosophers and politicians, class interests, the 
dominant legislative opinion and its constructs, the laws. It was 
the social coherence of the 19th century "legislative opinion”, achieved 
mainly through its class exclusivity, which created the greatest and 
noblest liberal fictions that political and social domination can be 
dissolved once political power is made to follow public opinion, thus 
being exercised according to a common interest that exists and can be, 
in principle, discovered.
But after the shattering of the class exclusivity and ideological 
coherence of the "dominant-legislative" opinion, around the turn of the 
century, the fiction could be seen through. Dicey, to his credit, did 
not fully accept it even when it was the received wisdom. Chafee, in 
his New Deal, neoliberal enthusiasm, reiterated it as a faith, at a 
time when his experience with and reaction against the repressive 
legislation of the 20's and the late 40's should have told him otherwise.
2.1. The Concept of the "Public Sphere"
The concept of the "public sphere" is central in Habermas * work^
14and is related to similar concepts used by Sheldon Volin and Hannah 
15Arendt. According to Habermas, the public sphere is "a realm of 
our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be
formed... Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an
16unrestricted fashion... about matters of general interest". A
political public sphere exists when individuals, organized as a body politic
according to legal rules of inclusion-exclusion in citizenship and
political rights, confer, discuss publicly and supervise matters
17connected with the activities of the State. Thus, the political
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public sphere mediates between the society and the state, it is not a 
part of the state. In it, the public organizes itself as the bearer of 
public opinion which state authorities must, in principle, follow and 
execute.
In this sense, the public sphere is a historically demonstrable
social institution which arose in the 18th century in Western Europe
and the United States, along with the concept of the public opinion.
The emergence of the public sphere Is demonstrated by the creation
during the 18th century of numerous fora of public discussion like clubs,
societies, political newspapers and polemical and critical journals.
In the Greek polis, the debate about public affairs took place in a
spatially specified forum, the marketplace or agora. But the formation
and communication of public opinion, or rather of opinions on public
matters in the modem state, requires the existence of a large number
of means of communication which replace the classical marketplace.
The multiplication of these metaphorical fora of opinion formation
and the change in the function of the press indicate an important change
in the organisation of political power. "Newspapers changed from mere
institutions for the publication of news into bearers and leaders of
18public opinion - weapons of party politics". Immediately before 
and after the great revolutions the press became a mediator and 
intensifier of public discussion and joined the struggle for freedom, 
public opinion and the principle of the public sphere.
The principle of the public sphere, as distinct from its 
institutional manifestations, promises the replacement of the older 
rule of tradition by the rule of reason. All consequential political 
and practical - in the sense of action-orientated - decisions should 
be examined in free and public debate and state power should follow 
the discursively arrived at will of the sovereign citizens. Thus,
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the principle of the public sphere presupposes the existence of a 
reasoning public which, through a dialectical, discursive will formation - 
a debate free of constraint - criticizes, and through periodic elections 
supervises and controls state power. This principle is, therefore, a 
critical one. It subjects "persons or affairs to public reason and makes 
political decisions subject to appeal before the court of public 
opinion".^
The emergence of the first institutions of the public sphere and 
the fight for its principle is related to the gradual separation of 
political power and civil society and the need for mediation between the 
two realms. Its social basis lay in the creation of an expanding free 
market economy. Bourgeois private individuals (merchants, professionals 
etc.) were excluded from the exercise of political power and the political 
institutions, although they occupied an increasingly important role in 
the privatised realm of societal transactions. The prerevolutionary 
bourgeoisie stood in opposition and contrast to the traditional, 
hierarchized forms of state authority; but at the same time, civil 
society became increasingly an area of public concern as the "reproduction
of life in the wake of the developing market economy had grown beyond
20the bound of private domestic authority".
The revolutionary documents and constitutions encapsulated the formal 
victory of the liberal model of the public sphere. They ensured the final 
separation between state and society and the restriction of public 
authority to a few central tasks, thus opening up society to the 
instrumental calculations of private individuals freed from the personal, 
social and political bonds of feudal authority. At the same time they 
guaranteed institutionally the mediation of the two separated domains. 
Freedom of speech and of the press, freedom of assembly and of petition, 
the right to form and join political parties and the right to vote -
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albeit restricted - were the legal-institutional guarantees of the
principle of the public sphere and the means through which society
could form and communicate its opinions on matters of common interest
to the competent state authorities, leading thus ideally to the
rationalisation of the state machinery and the transformation of
political into rational authority. "The general interest, which was
the measure of such a rationality, was then guaranteed... when the
activities of private individuals were freed from social compulsion in
21the marketplace and from political pressure in the public sphere."
The promise of the rationalisation of power through the medium of 
constraint-free public debate implies the existence of a community of 
interests among all those entitled to participate in the public sphere, 
the bearers of public opinion which, by being transmitted to and executed 
by the public authorities, becomes the sovereign opinion. The principle 
of the public sphere is universalistics access to it should be open 
to all citizens. However, the dissolution of power into a discursive 
will formation is predicated on the acceptance of certain basic
background assumptions by those eligible to participate in the debate.
22It was argued above, that the American revolutionaries believed that 
there existed in society a small number of principles which had the 
character of laws of nature. They were the principles of "trade and 
commerce" and were universally adhered to because it was "in the interest 
of the parties to do so" and not because of external compulsion. While 
Paine and Jefferson accepted that the background assumptions of market 
society were shared by all citizens and would eventually lead to a fully 
harmonious society, others like Madison, Tocqueville and J.S. Mill 
understood that those principles would not be necessarily accepted by 
the working class and the poorer sections of the population and warned 
against a. levelling extension of democracy, which could lead to the tyranny
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of a majority hostile to the social laws of trade and commerce. J.J.
Rousseau, the founder of the modem democratic tradition, was equally-
concerned with the establishment of a polity in which the volonte 
/ /generale - the will of the community qua community - would he best 
articulated and would become the sovereign will. Rousseau’s 
understanding of the general will bears similarity to the principle 
of the public sphere. However, Rousseau predicates his utopian 
political system on two requirements. First, on the creation of small 
states like the classical polls, in which all citizens would be able to 
assemble in the same forum to debate and decide the public affairs 
avoiding thus the distortions of all systems of representation. His 
second requirement refers to the social basis of the ideal city-state.
The common interest which the general will expresses exists only if 
property is distributed equally and there are no differences in 
economic power and privilege, distinctions between rich and poor. "Do 
you want coherence in the state? Then bring the two extremes as 
close together as possible; have neither very rich men nor beggars,
for those two estates, naturally inseparable, are equally fatal to
23 ^the common good."
Thus, the principle of the public sphere is based on the 
existence of an overriding common interest which allows the resolution 
of secondary, sectional conflicts of interest through civil and free 
public debate and social compromises. The bourgeoisie, which fought for 
that principle and created the first institutions and media for 
debate, initially as oppositional fora and after the victory of the 
revolutions as the means of transmission of the needs of society, 
shared the background assumptions of an overriding common economic-class- 
interest. However, the universalistic character of the principle 
meant that full participation in debate and decision-making would be
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claimed by social classes and strata that did not share the same
assumptions. The eruption of the masses in politics around the turn
of the 20th century shattered the homogeneity of the hitherto politically
active classes. According to Habermas, "the liberal model of the public
sphere... cannot be applied to the actual conditions of an industrially
advanced mass democracy.. .[T] he public body expanded beyond the bounds
of the bourgeoisie. The public body lost not only its social exclusivity;
it lost in addition its coherence created by bourgeois social institutions
and a relatively high standard of education. Conflicts hitherto restricted
to the private sphere now intrude into the public sphere." 4
The loss of the social exclusivity and ideological coherence of
the participants in the public sphere, through the extension of the
vote and of political rights and the creation of working class parties
and institutions, led to a radical transformation in its function and
institutions. The press became commercialized and gradually abandoned
its role as forum of debate on the practical and political questions of
the day, as the representative of political commitments and the
articulator of norms for political action. Social and economic conflicts
erupted into the public sphere and antagonistic private interests and
demands were recognized as calling for state intervention and regulation.
"The public sphere, which must now mediate these demands, 
becomes a field for the competition of interests, competition 
which assumes the form of violent conflict. Laws which 
obviously have come about under *the pressure of the street* 
can scarcely still be understood as arising from the 
consensus of private individuals engaged in public discussion...
With the interweaving of the public and private realms, 
not only do the political authorities assume certain 
functions in the sphere of commodity exchange and social 
labour, but conversely social powers now assume political 
functions. This leads to a kind of 'refeudalization' 
of the public sphere, large organizations strive for 
political compromises with the state and with one another, 
excluding the public whenever possible. But at the same 
time they must secure at least a plebiscitary support 
among the mass of the population through the development 
of demonstrative publicity (demonstrative Publizität)."25
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The public sphere as a political institution starts declining.
This analysis is shared by two other major political philosophers in
26the Aristotelian tradition, Arendt and Volin. The "political" loses
gradually its specificity as a dimension of human existence of free
debate and participation in practical and communicative action and is
replaced by the instrumental logic of the supposedly value-free ends
of efficiency and security. The Aristotelian concept of politics which
was related to the attainment of the "good life" is reduced to a new
politics "which is adapted to technical problems and brackets out
27practical questions". While the principle of the public sphere 
remains as a main legitimatory theme in late capitalism, its institutions 
lose their previous function and a general trend toward the 
depoliticization of the public sets in.
The principle of the public sphere was therefore mitigated once 
its social basis and requirements were gradually transformed. While 
the means and media of communication multiplied, the importance of 
"publicity", of debating and deciding publicly issues and affairs was 
reduced. The concept of an organically growing public opinion, as 
exemplified by Chafee, remained dominant in American constitutional 
theory on freedom of expression, but Dicey's belief that the opinions 
of ruling political and social elites help shape public opinion seems 
to correspond more to the realities of the 20th century. Thus, one 
is presented with two concepts of public opinion and of politics more 
generally, one in which its formation and communication is understood 
as a consensual process the other as a conflictual one involving power 
relations and asymmetries.
2.2. The "Public Sphere" as a Methodological Hypothesis
The attempt to draw a clear dividing line between freedom and 
repression, based on theoretical Justification of free speech, oh the
language of the constitutional text or on the institutional decisions 
of the courts and the legal doctrines that evolved there, is related 
to the concept of a consensual public opinion which, if institutionally- 
guaranteed, may discover and elaborate the common good and through 
rational debate and decision-making dissolve the relations of power and 
domination. These demands give a sense of continuity and homogeneity 
to legal interventions in the field of freedom of expression and cannot 
be dismissed as irrelevant. But on the other hand, the basic conflicts 
of interest and the antagonistic political claims put forward by 
individuals and groups, wishing to exercise expressive activities and 
participate thus in the process of formation of public opinion and 
the exercise of political power, make the task of extracting singular 
principles from the legal material, which both describe and prescribe 
the legal intervention, extremely difficult. According to Professor 
Griffith "all I can see in the community in which I live is a 
considerable disagreement about the controversial issues of the day 
and this is not surprising as those issues would not be controversial 
if there were agreement... [A] society is endemically in a state of 
conflict between warring interest groups, having no consensus or 
unifying principles sufficiently precise to be the basis of a theory of 
legislation [or adjudication]." Thus, once the assumption of a 
homogenized, harmonious public that strives discursively to discover 
the common good or common interest has been qualified, the search for 
the dividing line between freedom and repression is replaced by an 
open field of institutional decisions and legal materials which may be 
examined under the methodological hypothesis of the public sphere, a 
hypothesis broader and more open and political than that of the public 
opinion.
In the way used here, the public sphere hypothesis is a tool for 
the examination of the legal material that has come to be examined
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since the 1910s, in the United States, under the general heading of 
freedom of expression. It is broader than the concept of public 
opinion, because the latter is formed within the confines of the public 
sphere. However, the public sphere involves elements like legal and 
material procedures, institutions and practices which although relevant 
to the process of opinion formation cannot be reduced to it. Control 
of and access to the mass media or other fora of public discussion, for
i
example, influence the views and ideas admitted into public debate 
but are determined by legal and economic factors which are distinct from 
a theory of free expression. Equally, individuals and groups may be 
admitted or excluded from the public sphere and from the process of 
opinion formation on the basis of factors other than their beliefs and 
ideologies. Thus, while the process of opinion formation on public 
issues constitutes the core of the public sphere, the hypothesis allows 
us to examine the conditions of creation, existence and sanctioning of 
such opinions.
On the other hand, the public sphere hypothesis is an open one.
It rejects the claim that public opinion develops in a teleological 
fashion and realizes the common good as well as the claim advanced by 
many radicals, that it is the object of continuous manipulation.
Instead of being the realm of an evolving freedom or of an all-encompassing 
repression the public sphere must be seen as an ongoing process (as 
Chafee does) but a contentious one (as Dicey sees it), in which certain 
groups and interests are better placed and equipped in the fight for the 
definition of its parameters and substance. In this antagonistic process, 
legitimate subjects of discourse and of political ri^its, objects of 
discourse, ideologies and beliefs and the means and media of 
communication are continuously constituted, demarcated, sanctioned and 
distributed. Drawing from the legal material related to expressive
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activities, the public sphere hypothesis may be formulated as follows: 
The public sphere is constituted by the combination of a number of 
elements: the formal conditions of participation in it; the issues 
that are raised and the alternative solutions admitted as legitimate and 
open to debate and decision (and negatively the "unspeakable" issues 
and alternatives); the individuals and groups admitted or excluded 
from it; the spatial and temporal context of legitimate discourse 
(these aspects are usually examined under the heading of the "public 
forum"); finally the distribution of control and access, to the means 
of communication necessary for participation in the public sphere.
Each of these constitutive elements involves competing claims and 
interests of a political character which strive to obtain admission and 
legitimacy and/or to negate them to others. In each society and 
historical period these contradictory claims are resolved - permanently 
or temporarily - by authorized institutions entitled to sanction them. 
Legal institutions are major fora for the resolution of such disputes. 
To the extent, therefore, that certain of these claims end up and are 
decided by courts, the latter play a significant role in the process of 
construction of the public sphere.
Thus, if one rejects the naturalistic concepts of freedom as
something intrinsic in, social arrangements or of fundamental and
inalienable rights inherent in human nature, the legal right to free
expression may be defined as those political claims related to
expressive activity (and thus to the construction of the public sphere)
that have been effectively upheld by the designated state institutions.
As Professor Griffith put it, "as an individual (or a group I may add)
I make claims on the authorities who control the society in which I
live. If I am strong enough my claim may be recognized within certain
29limits. It may even be given legal status". It is through the 
granting/denying of legal status to such claims related to expressive
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activities that courts participate in the construction of the public 
sphere.
According to an American author the underlying philosophy of
democratic America is encapsulated in the popular saying "it's a free
30country, isn't it? - so I can d a m  well say what I please”. If the 
equation is accepted the question then becomes ”vho” can say "what” and 
"when”, and ”what" one pleases to say at a particular time and place and 
is free to say it. Thus, the public sphere hypothesis is used as a 
methodological tool for the examination of the laws and judicial decisions 
that deal with expressive activities, their context and conditions of 
existence. Legal decisions with their own determinations and procedural 
and substantive guarantees participate in the constitution, legitimation 
and sanctioning of the discursive practices of the society at large.
Their intervention is historically specific and often politically 
contentious. The attempt to present them as following some central 
unifying principle is related to the principle of the public sphere, 
as described above. However, as the theorist of the public sphere 
have argued, this principle was transformed into an ideal once its 
social basis radically changed. Legal doctrines, justificatory 
theories, the "clear” meaning of the constitutional text give to 
the legal intervention • its consistent character; but at the same 
time, the conflicting nature of the claims that brings about this 
intervention means that the latter continuously introduces differentiations 
and distinctions among subjects, objects and contexts of legitimate 
discourse. The public sphere hypothesis, related to the case-study at 
the end of each chapter, is an attempt to study the dialectic between 
the continuity and coherence in legal discourse and the distinctions 
constituted by its interventions.
Although such questions are not decided, solely or even mainly, 
in court chambers, the examination of the cases that reached the courts
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and the legal doctrines that emerged there shows how the judiciary 
under guidance from the Supreme Court answered them when asked.
However, the limited role of jurisprudence, precedent or legal doctrine 
in the determination of expression claims must he emphasized against the 
tendency of many constitutional authors, whose writings imply that 
freedom depends solely on the way that Supreme Court jurisprudence 
develops. If, for example, a demonstration is stopped by a local 
police officer, the reversal of that decision several months or even 
years later by a court does not help much the original protestors.
On the other hand, the procedural requirements that restrict the judicial 
process to the facts of the case at bar, allow the police authority 
of a different state or locality at a later date to ban a similar 
demonstration by using a different statute or regulation or by 
asserting that the circumstances of the new case are different from those 
to which the courts addressed themselves. Legal procedures and 
formalities, whose protective role must be emphasized (see below 
Chapter V) contribute ironically to the limited import of the judicial 
enterprise. As Otto Kirchheimer has forcefully argued, ^  the amount of 
freedom does not depend on the formal existence of legal remedies or 
even of clear liberal legal precedents. The interstitial character of 
criminal justice as well as its focussing on the factual details of a 
particular past event reduce the obligatoriness of legal precedent and 
doctrine for enforcement officers.
"I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon
constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes;
32believe me these are false hopes” wrote Judge Learned Hand in 
1944. For Hand freedom lies "in the hearts of men and women”.
One may disagree with the second part of Hand's statement. Yet his 
admonition about "false hopes" being put on the courts, coming from
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the judge who sent to long imprisonment the entire national leadership
33of the Communist Party, has a curious truth about it. Freedom, under 
any definition of it, does not indeed depend mainly on courts and 
judges. But when expression claims take on legal form the courts have 
an important role to play: in sanctioning them, courts participate in 
the construction of the public sphere, and in that case the ’'amount” 
of freedom, and freedom itself, becomes a function - along with many 
other factors - of their intervention.
3. The Supreme Court. Legal Doctrines and the Construction of the 
Public Sphere
Thus, the cases involving expression claims and the doctrines 
developed and applied by the Supreme Court may be examined, as the 
specific judicial participation, in the process of constitution and 
sanctioning of the public sphere. Such approach would have several 
implications.
(a) It denies the essentialist approaches that postulate freedom 
either as the spirit of the law supervised by the Supreme Court, or as 
the evolving principle of the public r^lm which the law is made to 
serve. Laws, judicial decisions and the "universe of discourse” must
be examined in their historical specificity, and their "reality" is a 
contradictory one. The official-constitutional discourse, determined by 
the "dominant opinion” which it helps articulate, determines in its own
part the public sphere. In this sense, the constitution and freedom of
34 *expression is no more than "what exists” in each historical
conjuncture.
(b) It draws attention to the fact that there does not exist any 
a priori distinction between some parts of the state (the legislature 
or the executive as the case may be) necessarily or habitually inclined
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toward restricting expression, while the judiciary stands in its
defence. Most constitutional literature overflows with the assumption
(even in its most critical and liberal parts) that, in the perennial
freedom/coercion divide, the courts are the protectors of freedom and
the individual against the all-intrusive claims of power. To be sure,
the function, procedural conditions and specific character of judicial
action (interstitial and externally initiated, oriented toward past
events) differentiate it from thé legislative and executive ones.
However, by construing criminal laws and the constitution, by interpreting
the facts of cases before them and giving them their official
signification against possible alternative ones, courts participate both
35in the creation of sanctioned codes of meaning and in the shaping of 
the future. In that, the outcome of their intervention does not differ 
much from that of other state institutions.
(c) The Supreme Court, in particular, as the head of the judicial
machinery is neither a tool of suppression (as some radicals and
36"Marxists" have claimed^ ) nor the paragon of freedom. It is a political 
actor, in its own right, within a complex institutional structure; its 
decisions in First Amendment cases may be seen as political interventions 
which, under specific procedural requirements, translate historical 
events in the terms of legal discourse and thus uphold and make legally 
enforceable the claims and interests of one of the parties in situations 
of social and political conflict. One could say that in First Amendment 
cases, a specific discourse, that of laws, legal decisions and doctrines, 
which among all social discourses is privileged with the backing of 
the repressive apparatus of the state, seizes and attempts to constract, 
regularize and sanction the social universe • of discourse.
(d) It rejects the notion of the legal doctrine as a uniform 
formula that gives, or can in principle give, simple answers to complex
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socio-political situations. However quickly and with whatever conviction 
one utters, for example, the words "clear and present danger" no 
unequivocal answer to a new and unique situation arises. To be sure, 
legal doctrines give the Supreme Court jurisprudence an element of 
continuity. However, instead of being mutually exclusive and applicable 
in all kinds of expression cases, legal doctrines may be seen as 
complementing each other, as each of them emphasizes and deals with 
different aspects of expression claims and, thus, as providing the 
courts with a panoply of approaches. Additionally, as both the 
academic controversy over the meaning of the danger test (below Ch.V) 
and the varying and even conflicting results that accompany its use in 
case law clearly show, the outcome of the particular case (conviction 
or acquittal) is as important as the verbal or conceptual formulation 
utilized to reach it.
The case-study in the second part of the thesis is, therefore, 
dealt with in two ways. Legal discourse is first examined as regards 
its internal dynamic and development according to theoretical 
justifications and legal doctrines; then, the effects of legal 
intervention on the universe of social discourse are addressed to at 
the end of each chapter.
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P A R T  II
A N  E X A M I N A T I O N  O F  T H E  
A M E R I C A N  J U R I S P R U D E N C E  O N  
F R E E D O M  O F  E X P R E S S I O N :  L A V  A N D
T H E  C O N S T R U C T I O N  O F  T H E
" P U B L I C  S P H E R E "
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CHAPTER V
ON LEGAL DOCTRINE IN GENERAL
All theories on the justification of freedom of expression can he 
seen as answering the question: why should communicative activity, i.e. 
activity involving as one or its main aspect an intent on the part of its 
actor to communicate with other people, be afforded a greater legal 
protection than other human conduct? Hut wnen one moves from abstract 
justificatory theories to the concrete legal material included in 
legislative acts, administrative and judicial decisions, the question 
changes to one about the limits of such protection. Drawing the line 
between protected and prohibited expression depends, to be sure, on 
the specific justificatory theory that each constitutional author 
or judge holds, as well as on the respective position on the role of 
the judicial process and the Supreme Court. Those writers who subscribe 
to a clearly defined theory of expression are often prone to draw 
the protected/prohibited line accordingly and then criticize the 
legal material. Equally those preoccupied with judicial review and 
the function of the Supreme Court draw the line in accordance with 
their attitudes on judicial activism or restraint. As a result, 
explicit or implicit theoretical differences enter the discussion of 
the various legal doctrines and lead to opposing attitudes toward 
particular decisions of the Supreme Court and lines of precedent (legal 
doctrines) extracted from such decisions.
The profoundly conflicting views of constitutional authors on the 
most famous legal doctrine on freedom of expression, the "clear and 
present danger" test, may be seen as an indicative example. The danger 
test (for an analysis see below, Chapter Vi) has been so excessively 
praised by some authors that "one would think that it had taken its
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place alongside the writ of habeas corpus*•• Thus, according to
Professor Chafee one of the most prolific writers in the area of freedom
of expression,,,Holmes' inestimable service to free speech consisted in
2his getting a unanimous Supreme Court to accept his test of guilt" 
which placed a great area of discussion beyond the reach of 
government.
Yet, for others the test is either too strong: "The clear and
present danger requirement... is’improper not... because it provides a
subjective and an inadequate safeguard against the regulation of speech,
but rather because it erects a barrier to legislative rule where none
exists";' or too weak: The danger test "stands on the record of the
Court as a peculiarly inept and unsuccessful attempt to formulate an
exception to the principle of freedom of speech"^ and "with rare
5exceptions the doctrine hss been used to deny free speech";' or simply 
useless because indeterminate and vague: to use the danger test as 
the touchstone of constitutional adjudication is "to take a felicitous 
phrase out of the context where it arose and for which it was adapted".^ 
And for Kalven its alleged repudiation by the Supreme Court was a great
7victory for intellectual clarity.
But more recent writers find that the test has still some teeth in
it and is still used by the Supreme Court. Thus, Professor Wellington
writing in 1979 concludes that "if there is no time for dissuasion
0
through talk, a clear and present danger test... is appropriate" and
Professor Ely that in certain cases "courts... should employ the
strictest available sort of specific harm test, one that seriously
oinsists on a clear and present danger of a serious evil". Both believe
10
that the resurrection of the test in a 19^9 sedition case was a great
11advance in the judicial protection of expression; but Professor 
Linde registers a "dissent" as he puts it to the "Brandenburg concerto" 
and concludes that the danger test "is no help with the constitutionality
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of laws directed against words."
Thus, the danger test has been praised and derided, proclaimed 
extinct to rise again in order to be praised and condemned ad infinitum. 
Although this particular test has provoked most controversy, the same 
pattern of criticism and praise appears in the treatment of all other 
judicial doctrines, that have been used by the Supreme Court as line­
drawing tools in the adjudication of cases involving free expression 
claims.
A review of the academic literature on the various, legal doctrines
reveals similar characteristics to those encountered above in the
analysis of the constitutional clauses. The Justices' opinions and
intentions are substituted for those of the Framers and the search is
on, again, for the meaning of this or that test. Thus Professor Cushman
in one of the most well received reviews of the danger test distinguishes
three meanings: the meaning that it carried for its originator Justice
Holmes, a different one held by Holmes' fellow Justices and a third one
13attributed to later Justices. ' The same ambiguities and controversies
are found in the reviews of the other main tests: There are "as many
15'balancing' approaches as Justices" ^ concludes one author, while the
absolute test is found to have different meanings even for its two main
16proponents Meiklejohn and Justice H. Black.
t
Thus, there is no generally agreed upon opinion on the meaning,
usefulness or even the existence of any one doctrine, to be found in
the literature. One writer maintains that no judicial rule on free
expression has succeeded in surviving for more than a decade, ' and Thomas
Emerson introduces his attempt to formulate a general doctrine on
freedom of expression by stressing that "no one concerned with freedom
of expression in the United States today can fail to be alarmed by the
18unsatisfactory state of the First Amendment doctrine". Emerson
1 2
believes that this lack of a coherent legal doctrine, the "sharp conflict"
in the courts and the legal profession and the resulting serious
confusion of the public "threaten the First Amendment with disintegration
To help prevent this "disintegration" (whatever that means) Emerson
undertakes the onerous task of building a legal doctrine, general
enough, in order to account for the function of expression in a
democratic society and specific enough to provide courts with the
guidelines necessary to perform their judicial function, in a uniform
20way, in all possible cases involving free expression claims. Emerson’s
fears can be explained by his liberal ideology: according to his
doctrine (almost all expression should be protected - only action is
punishable) the bulk of constitutional adjudication is found dangerously
conservative. But his concern to build a general theory, a "system1 of
freedom of expression, as he calls it, is widely shared by the American
academic community. Faced with an ever increasing body of laws and
decisions dealing with expression issues, the search of constitutional
authors for a small number of principles and standards, either
theoretically formulated or extracted from case law and precedents,
which would guarantee and certify the coherence of this particular area
21of law, has been going on for 60-odd years.
To the extent that this concern of constitutional authors
22resembles similar trends (described and criticized above) inhering in j
j
general theories of constitutionalism, analogous criticisms apply also 
to these "applied", so to speak, efforts of "system building". At this 
point, however, I would like to refer to a different aspect of those 
theoretical and methodological attitudes in constitutional theory, 
which relates to the question of legal doctrine. It may be called, 
following the interesting analysis of Professor Campbell,^ the 
subordination of legal and constitutional theory (or science as it has 
been recently named) to law-as-art, or the law as understood by judges 
and practising lawyers.
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Practising lawyers and Judges deal with the legal system as a
meaningful “scheme of interpretation of reality applicable to fact
situations“« Legal language and concepts are such an artificial
scheme of construction and interpretation, and legal officials
participate in their creation and administration« But at the same time,
they treat their constructs as given and real, as something that exists
and develops on its own, as it were. Thus, a profound difference exists
between legal thought and the modes of thought and analysis employed
in other social sciences stemming from the Judge's obligation to “make
a decision, to state reasons for it, to pay attention to the internal
coherence of the law and to protect his decision and reasoning from
attack". ^ M. Cain similarly argues that one of the prime
characteristics of legal ideology is the tension facing Judges and
lawyers who themselves create legal categories and concepts but treat
them at the same time as having an independent life of their own within
25the total object of law. ^
Thus, for the Judge, the ambiguity between a notion of law, as
something he construes and creates which must, in principle, be
capable to translate all social practices in its own technical language,
and law as a given and real entity deserving reverence, is a permanent
characteristic or, even, a professional hazard. However, for the
common-law Judge, in particular, the obligation “to make a decision"
once a case has been properly brought before him is the paramount one
and necessarily takes "priority over fidelity to any particular rules
26of proof, deduction or interpretation". The sovereign prerogative 
of choice often defies the ideological demand to present the Law as a 
coherent body of rules or principles. At this point, the legal theorist 
steps in and undertakes to normalize the legal material. One could 
argue that he often sees his role as that of a Judge or advocate in an 
ideal, super-Supreme Court, which must iron out the inefficient or
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inconsistent rulings of the real-lower courts and make good the claim 
that the prescriptions of law are the sole descriptions of the real world 
and that they always follow some common evolving standards. However, in 
accepting "the legitimacy as prius. in seeking for the validity of legal 
norms, jurisprudence defines out of its remit some important questions...
27Law is accepted as a cohesive force... an impartial resolver of disputes."
In a similar fashion, the part of constitutional theory that deals
with freedom of expression tries to present judicial intervention as a
unified, or in principle unifiable whole. An interesting illustration
of this point occurred in an exchange between a constitutional author
and a Supreme Court Justice in the mid-60's. Harry Kelven, commenting
28on the Supreme Court Times v. Sullivan decision, suggested that in it
the Court repudiated earlier legal doctrines (particularly the danger
and balancing tests) and fully accepted the Meiklejohn doctrine of
absolute protection of freedom of expression, as applicable across the
29board in all expression cases. But Justice Brennan, who was the
author of the decision and was himself sympathetic to the Meiklejohn
30thesis, retorted that Kalven's reading was unrealistic and mis­
represented the judicial process. Radical shifts, as that suggested 
by Kalven, rarely occur in judicial practice, said the Justice, and
anyway the Court was utilizing at least four different doctrines in
'  31dealing with expression cases.
The critique of the way in which constitutional theory has
generally treated legal doctrines, constructed and utilized by the
Supreme Court in its involvement with expression cases, does not
intend to underplay the relevance or even the importance of legal
doctrine and precedent in constitutional adjudication. To be sure,
legal realists in their valid attempt to reject the exaggerated
assumptions of formal jurisprudence have proposed the "predictive" or
"bad-man" theory of law, according to which, law is merely a prediction
32of what a Court will decide in a particular case. In its most extreme
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form, legal rules and precedents are treated as entirely irrelevant to 
the operation of the judicial function. Judges decide the issue at 
stake on the basis of intuitions or "hunches" and only afterwards 
dress their decisions in legal language and refer them to some authority, 
easily discovered in the mass of precedents. Although this approach 
might explain a few sudden and dramatic reversals of a previous line 
of precedents, such changes are rather rare. The need to present the 
Law as a unified whole, that contains within itself the conditions of 
its growth and change, would be completely undermined by such an 
unprincipled approach to adjudication. Moreover the reverent attitudes 
of judges toward the construct-and-given law cannot be explained away 
as a mere "hypocrisy" of people who know that "in reality" their work 
fundamentally differs from its official presentation and understanding.
On the other hand, there is not, nor can there be easily discovered, a 
single or a small number of principles and standards that can dispose 
in a facile and homogenous way, the various situations involving 
expression claims that reach the courts. It is, therefore, suggested 
that legal doctrines must be seen as mediating between the need for 
uniform and principled adjudication and the difficulty in subjecting 
social and political situations extracted from a changing and conflictual 
reality to the vagaries of simple, sovereign principles. As such, the 
legal doctrines on freedom of expression will be examined in their 
specificity as indicators of those aspects of an expression claim that 
are treated by the courts and the Supreme Court as the relevant or 
decisive ones, in determining the outcome of concrete cases. But as the 
dialectical-adversary character of the common law judicial system and 
the numerous dissenting opinions in Supreme Court decisions clearly 
show, neither the approach to be adopted nor its linguistic formulation 
(clear and present danger or clear and probable danger etc.), nor the
outcome of any case are solely predetermined by precedent, legal
doctrine, the constitutional command or some strict rules of legal
logic "the ultimate in human rationality". All these elements are
themselves contested claims and as such they become an intricate part
of the main substantive claim in the case at hand. It is this
characteristic that gives the Western liberal system of adjudication
its main protective role as against the systems of fascist states or the
states of "existing socialism". The moulding of technical, procedural
and substantive elements makes it possible that "the forms and rhetoric
of law acquire a distinct identity which may, on occasion, inhibit
power and afford some protection to the powerless".Contrary to the
34-assertions of some orthodox Marxists and the radical New Left, 
political justice and the involvement of courts in political cases is 
not a mere sham or facade: its importance lies in the fact that legal 
doctrines and procedural formalities, with all their ambiguities, are 
there, and that the courts are asked to participate in a process that 
has serious political repercussions.
These suggestions and their relevance to the field of freedom of 
expression will be further elaborated after the examination of the first 
cases involving expression claims that reached the Supreme Court and the 
doctrines that emerged in its case law.
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CHAPTER VI
THE FIRST PERIOD OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION CASES: WORLD VAR I AM) AFTER
The Supreme Court dealt for the first time with expression cases, 
in a systematic way, in 1919* The development of jurisprudence and 
legal doctrine is, therefore, relatively recent. What is, however,
i  '
startling is the expansion and reach of cases dealing with First 
Amendment issues in the intervening 60-odd years. Most constitutional 
authors agree that the starting point of this expansion, which has been 
welcomed as libertarian both in intention and in result, was Justice 
Holmes* opinion in Schenck v. TJ.S. in which he enunciated the "clear 
and present danger" test, which is still today "object of much liberal 
nostalgia".^
It would be helpful before examining the first cases and doctrines, 
to place them within the historical background in which they arose, 
an exercise necessary in order to understand the import and 
significance of the. legal material in its specific historical 
setting.
1. The Historical Background
In the aftermath of the 189>*96 Depression various trends and 
tendencies in the American labour movement started to converge toward a 
common political identity of a populist and socialist inspiration.
The American Federation of Labour (A.F.L.) adopted, in its 1893 
convention, a programme closely resembling that of the British Independent 
Labour Party including in "plank ten" a policy of "collectivization 
of industry" in similar lines to Clause 4 of the British Labour 
Party’s 1918 Constitution. The American Railroad Union under the socialist 
leader Eugene Debs led the Pullman strike in 1894» "one of the three or 
four most climactic labor battles in American history". And the
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Fanners Alliance which in 1892 became the People*s Party united black and 
white tenants in the South in an unprecedented surge of agrarian 
radicalism. The purported unification of the trade union movement and 
the socialist political tendencies around the People's Party in the lines 
of the British I.L.P. did not materialize. However, a new wave of 
industrial mass strikes erupted between 1909 and 1913» the Marxist inspired 
Socialist Party under Debs became the third largest national political 
force replacing the Populists; and the Industrial Workers of the World 
(the famous Wobblies), a union that managed to organize migrant workers 
and farmers and which was widely accused for anarchistic tendencies and 
for the sabotage of crops and agricultural machinery in California, grew 
in strength. The passage to corporative capitalism, advocated by Henry Ford 
and Frederick Taylor' in the early 20th century, was facing serious 
resistance. "Arising from the deprived condition of large numbers of 
people who were left behind in the rushing advance of industrial society 
or in the agrarian backwashes was a challenge to free enterprise and in 
part to democracy".^
The outbreak of the War and later the victory of the Bolsheviks in 
Russia gave federal and state governments the opportunity to mount a 
concerted attack against the labour and socialist movements. "The 
govemmnnt encouraged people to identify Germany and Communist Russia 
as common enemies. It also identified the American socialist party with 
these enemies".' The Federal Espionage Act was passed in a hurry and 
was implemented with ferocity by the courts. The Postmaster-General 
. Burleson declared that he would exclude, under the Act, from the 
mails all written material which claimed "that this Government got in the 
war wrong, that it is in it for the wrong purposes, or anything that will 
impugn the motives of the Government for going into the war. They 
cannot say that this Government is the tool of Wall Street or the 
munition-makers. That kind of thing makes for insubordination in the
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Army and Navy and breeds a spirit of disloyalty through the country".
The end of the War did not result in a relaxation of repressive
7measures. The "Red Scare"; intensified by the consolidation of Soviet
8power and the watershed steel strike in 1919» set in. Raids into
private houses and union meetings led to the arrest of thousands. "The
accused were held without bail, denied lawyers, and often beaten after
gbeing chained and marched through the streets". These raids were organized and 
led by the Attorney-General Palmer who set himself the task to halt "the 
continual spread of the seeds of evil thought, the continual inoculation 
of poison virus of social sedition, poisonous... to the very heart and 
soul of all that by our standards is integrity or citizenship or personsl 
character".^ To accomplish it, he set up a special "antiradical 
division" in the Department of Justice headed by J. Edgar Hoover.
The New York Assembly expelled 5 duly elected socialist members 
stating that the Socialist Party is "an antinational party whose 
allegiance is given to the Internationale and not the United States",^ 
and its leader Debs fought the 1921 presidential election from the 
prison but still polled the highest return that any socialist has 
managed in American history. The same state had passed in 1902, 
following the assassination of President McKinley, the New York Criminal
12 17Anarchy Act which outlawed the advocacy of anarchy but was never used. J 
But, between 1917 and 1921, two-thirds of the states adopted similar 
criminal anarchy and criminal syndicalism laws which were used not 
against "19th century bearded bomb throwers" but left wing socialists 
who is no way adhered to anarchistic methods (see below § 5).
The novel character of these laws and the resulting prosecutions 
cannot be overemphasized. Today, laws against subversives and political 
dissenters, mental hospitals and archipelaga have become quite common 
phenomena. Ruling elites, both in the East and the West, convinced about 
the righteousness of their respective socio-political set-up^ tend to
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view radical dissent as common crime. The alternatives have been "tried", 
allegedly, and they are "exhausted" and a feeling of universal insecurity 
has set in. ^
This was not the case, however, during the 19th century. The
political dissenter was assumed to be sincere^ and an effort was made "to
harmonize the need to defend the established order with the recognition of
its historical relativity and the political offender's ill-guided but
15well-intentioned claims were respected". The separation between
legality and morality meant that, to a certain degree, the duty to accept
the established order was not perceived as the paramount moral duty. In
the U.S. the Alien and Sedition Act lapsed in 1801 and the next sedition
laws were enacted in the 1910's. In the latter part of the 19th century
the main preoccupation in the area of expression was with obscenity and
pornography.^ "Real or imagined threats to national existence, of the
17kind that were to follow world war in the 20th century, were lacking".
This belief in historical and political relativity is still encountered
in Justice fiolmes' aphorism that proletarian dictatorship ideas should be
18given a fair chance and be enforced if the majority accepted them,
although his decisions did not always match the rhetoric.
However, the entry of the masses in mainstream political life, and
the increasing strength of trade union and socialist activities around
<  .
the turn of the century, completely changed the scene. The "threat to 
national existence" identified with free enterprise became the paramount 
concern of ruling elites and the panoply of the law and the repressive 
apparatus of the state was fully mobilized to meet it. The Espionage 
Act and the anarcho-syndicalism laws were the first signs of the new 
era. It was in cases arising out of the implementation of those laws 
that the first judicial involvement in expression cases took place.
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2. The Espionage Act (1917)
The Espionage Act of 1917» as amended in 1918» was the major
federal legislative attempt aimed at curbing pacifist, pro-German,
19anti-war and socialist ideas during World War I. The Act, the 
first sedition law since the 1799 Alien and Sedition Laws, 
incorporated a wide-ranging variety of anti-subversion measures, 
but it was the third section of Title I of the Act that was mainly 
used in order to punish undesirable political beliefs and 
communications. It introduced three new classes of criminal 
offences:
"Sec. 3* Whoever, when the United States is at war, 
shall wilfully make or convey false reports or false 
statements with intent to interfere with the operation 
or success of the military or naval forces of the 
United States or to promote the success of its enemies,
and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall 
willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, 
disloyalty, mutiny or refusal of duty, in the military 
or naval forces of the United States,
or shall wilfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment 
service of the United States, to the injury of the service 
or of the United States,
shall be punished by a fine of not more than #10,000 or 
imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both."20
Section 4 of the same Title punishes conspiracies to violate
Section 3» and Title XII provided:
"Every letter, writing, circular, postal card, picture, 
print, engraving, photograph, newspaper, pamphlet, book 
or other publication, matter or thing of any kind in 
violation of any of the provisions of this Act is hereby 
declared to be non-mailable matter and shall not be... 
delivered from any post office."21
This formidable armoury at the disposal of local prosecuting
officers, trial judges and juries was not considered sufficient by
Attorney-General Gregory. He was worried by the "narrow" construction
given by some District Courts to the term "obstruct" in clause IJl which,
He alsoallegedly, removed "most of the teeth we tried to put in", 
thought that individual casual anti-war utterances were not satisfactorily 
covered by the original version of the Espionage Act. Thus he proposed 
that "attempts" to obstruct the recruiting service should become 
punishable alongside actual obstruction, as well as any effort to 
hamper the flotation of war loans.
The challenge was taken up by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
promptly, and on May 16 , 1918 the amendment was passed inserting 
"attempts to obstruct" in the third clause and adding nine new 
offences.
[4 ] saying or doing anything with intent to obstruct the 
sale of United States bonds, except by way of bona fide 
and not disloyal advice;
[5 ] uttering, printing, writing or publishing any disloyal, 
profane, scurrilous, or abusive language, or language 
intended to cause contempt, scorn, contumely or disrepute 
as regards the form of government of the United States;
[6] or the Constitution;
[7 ] or the flag;
[8 ] or the uniform of the Army or Navy;
[9 ] or any language intended to incite resistance to the 
United States or promote the cause of its enemies;
[1 0 ] urging any curtailment of production of any things 
necessary to the prosecution of the war with intent to 
hinder its prosecution;
[1 1 ] advocating, teaching, defending, or suggesting the 
doing of any of these acts; and
[1 2 ] words or acts supporting or favoring the cause of any 
country at war with us, or opposing the cause of the United 
States therein. 23
The 1918 Amendment came too late in the War and it became known 
as the "Sedition Act". Only a few major cases were brought under it.
It was repealed in 1921.
22
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Attorney-General Gregory, a key figure in the passing of the Act 
and its Amendment was not slow to launch and supervise personally a wide 
range of prosecutions under it. 4 Most of the prosecutions involved 
expression of opinions critical to America's entry and conduct of the 
War. It is noticeable, however, from the Text of Title I of the original 
Act, above, Tinder which most prosecutions were launched, that with the 
exception of its first clause, the Act was directed against certain 
consequences, or "substantive evils" as Holmes put it (insubordination,
i
mutiny or obstruction of recruitment) and not against any specified 
categories of expression. Even its first clause proscribes "false 
reports and statements” a term which can be easily construed as referring 
to statements of fact (for example false reporting of war operations) 
and not to political doctrines, pacifist, socialist or whatever else.
It was, therefore, through the specific judicial construction of the 
key terms of the Act, that certain categories of expression came 
under its measures and the parameters for the creation and 
development of the legal doctrine of freedom of expression were 
established.
It would be instructive, accordingly, to examine the legal 
problems posed by those key terms and the considerable ingenuity of the 
various federal courts in construing them.
3. The Espionage Act and the Federal Judiciary 
3.1. The Problem Posed
The offences created by Title I of the Espionage Act included two 
common elements.
(a). An objective element (actus reus) of the offence. It 
postulates certain undesirable results (interference, insubordination, 
mutiny or.refusal of duty; obstruction of the recruiting and 
enlistment services) and severely punishes whoever brings about through
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intentional conduct such effects. These prohibited effects may come about 
through a variety of means. For example enlistment may be obstructed by 
destroying draft cards sent out to conscripts or by preventing a person 
called up for enlistment from joining the services. In both cases, 
however, according to ordinary notions of criminal liability conviction 
can be secured if a causal relation is established between the conduct of 
the offender and the proscribed consequences.
(b) A subjective element (mens rea) or intent.
Intent (or wilful intent) denotes a certain mental and psychological 
attitude on the part of the actor: he should know what he is doing; he 
acts voluntarily, i.e. he wishes to carry out the criminal conduct; in 
cases where the criminal offence prescribes certain specified consequences 
he must desire to bring them about or expect them to occur.
The wrongdoer’s intent defined as knowledge and expectation of the 
criminal consequences (subjective element), plus the employment of 
adequate means which may effectively bring about the proscribed effects 
(objective element),are, therefore, the decisive elements of Section 3 
offences. If the consequences have come about as a result of the 
defendant's conduct and intent has been found, then guilt is proven.
But when such consequences have not actually occurred or cannot be 
proven to be a direct result of the conduct, then the construction 
of "intent1*, of the requirement of causal link (or proximate causation) 
between conduct and consequences and of their relationship becomes the 
crucial factor in determining guilt. These problems are usually treated 
in the theory of criminal attempts.
If, however, the conduct is solely oral or written communications, 
in which case the proscribed results come about through the activities of 
a third person who is persuaded to act by means of such communications, 
the already difficult problems involved in the theory of criminal 
attempts and other inchoate crimes become even more daunting.
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According to an early Espionage Act case:
"Words are not only the keys of persuasion, hut the 
triggers of action, and those who have no purport hut 
to counsel violation of law cannot hy any latitude of 
interpretation he a part of that public opinion which 
is the finest source of government in a democratic 
state.»25
Thus, the problem was posed in the following terms: Words may he 
"triggers of criminal action" and the punishable means of violation 
of the Espionage Act. The line drawing between permitted expression 
and criminal offence depended heavily upon the construction of such 
formidable legal subtleties as "intent" and "proximate causation".
3.2. The Construction of the Espionage Act by the Lower Federal Courts
(a) Intent
"Intent in doing an act, speaking words or writing them... 
is made up, among other things, of what a person thinks 
and desires and wishes to accomplish or to bring about by 
means of the doing of the act, or the speaking of the 
words, or the writing of them." 26
Under this, mainstream, definition of intent, the actual 
consciousness of the defendant seems to be an independent element in 
determining guilt. It may well be that somebody did not desire or 
wish the possible, probable or even direct consequences which, arguably, 
emanated from the conduct. Intent, therefore, cannot be simply implied 
from the effects or tendency of the conduct, but calls for some 
independent corroboratory evidence.
Some of the district court judges asked the jury in their 
instructions to examine the element of intent independently from the 
natural, possible or probable consequences of the utterances of the 
defendants. Thus, Judge Wolverton in U.S. v. Ramp:
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"Upon the question of intent you are instructed that 
the law presumes that every person intends the natural 
consequences of his act knowingly done; and in a case 
like the present case, in which a specific intent 
accompanying the act is a necessary element of the 
offence charged, the presumption is not conclusive, but 
is probatory in character. It is to be considered by 
you in connection with all the evidence given in the 
case, considering all of the circumstances... including 
the kind of person who made the declaration, the person 
or persons who were present and all the circumstances 
attending it, to the end that you may judge the real 
intent with which these statements were made." 27
In a case brought against the socialist editor of the journal
"Masses" Max Eastman, for an article he had written expressing
admiration for the courage of those who had resisted conscription
on moral grounds, Judge Augustus Hand placed great emphasis on the
proper construction of the element of wilful intent. He insisted
that the jury should be satisfied that the purpose of the statements
was specifically to obstruct the recruitment services and obstruct
the war effort; in the absence of such a clear determination Eastman
would be convicted for the expression of political opinions which,
although contrary to the war policy, were perfectly legitimate:
"Every citizen has a right, without intent to obstruct 
the recruiting or enlistment service, to think, feel, 
and express disapproval or abhorrence of any law or 
policy or proposed law or policy, including the 
Declaration of War, the Conscription Act, and the so- 
called sedition clauses of the Espionage Act;... The 
word 1wilful* denotes the will or desire on the part 
of the doer of an act that it shall have a certain 
effect or effects - in this case, the effect of 
obstructing the recruiting or enlistment service...
It excludes carelessness or indifference to prohibited 
or illegal result. It excludes unconsciousness of 
the possibility or likelihood of prohibited or illegal 
results. It excludes inattention... If it was the 
conscious purpose of the defendants to state truth as 
they say it; to do this clearly and persuasively in 
order to lead others to see things in the same way, 
with the object to bring about modification, recon­
struction or reshaping of national policy in
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accordance with what they believed right and true, 
and obstruction of the recruiting and enlistment 
service was not their object, the jury cannot find 
them guilty." 28
Judge Hand's emphasis on the proof of specific intent was, 
therefore, the means for drawing a distinction between those 
statements which directly urged the obstruction of the war effort 
and those honest dissident opinions which attempted to influence 
public opinion and thus change the government's policy. Following 
these instructions the jury was unable to reach a verdict, with 
eight jurors voting for acquittal and the case against Eastman 
was not pursued further. A similar construction of the Espionage 
Act was proposed by Judge Learned Hand in his Masses opinion (see 
the next part).
However, under the dominant construction of the Act "a man is
presumed to intend the reasonable and natural consequences of his
29acts, and... he cannot say he did not intend them". Statements
to this effect can be found in many of the judges* instructions to
Espionage Act juries. Thus, Judge Elliott in TT.S. v. Wolff:
"The color of the act determines the complexion of the 
intent. The intent to injure is presumed when the 
unlawful act, which results in the thing prohibited 
by the terms of this statute, is proved to have been 
knowingly committed. If, therefore, you find... that 
the language used... had the natural and necessary 
tendency to do the things prohibited in this Section 
3,.. then you have found the intent as the Court has 
attempted to define it to you." JO
Judge Buffington in U.S. v. Krafft:
"...[A] man who undertakes to lead his hearers to adopt his 
spoken views must, in reason, be held to have intended 
that his words should have, if followed, the effect in 
action which his counsel in words advised... A man who 
has thus spoken with deliberation must be held to have 
intended the natural and probable consequences of his 
words." 31
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Judge Dayton in TJ.S. v. Kirchner:
'•The law presumes that a man intends that which he does, 
and it is from statements made and the acts done that 
his intent is to be determined. It is not material 
that his declarations may not have accomplished the 
purpose designed - may not have actually interfered 
with the operation and success of the military and 
naval forces of the United States..." 32
In the line of cases decided under this construction of intent,
the important element of the theory of criminal attempts, that the
unsuccessful effort must come close to success, was not emphasized.
The intent of the defendants to bring about the prohibited
consequences became the main test of guilt. But as it may be
argued that all dissident opinions could persuade someone in the
future to obstruct or resist the war effort and thus bring about
the harmful effects, the distinction between urging the violation
of the law and criticizing the war policy was somehow blurred.
According to Chafee "[i]ntention thus became the crucial test of
guilt in any prosecution of opposition to the government's war
policies, and the requirement of intention became a mere form since
it could be inferred from the existence of the indirect injurious
effect... The District Court test left [the jurors] nothing but
speculation upon the remote political and economic effect of words
and the probable condition of mind of a person whose ideas were
33entirely different from their own". Thus, under this construction, 
all those who expressed pacifist or socialist ideas could be prosecuted 
and convicted if found to have intended to obstruct the war. As 
actual obstruction was not, and in most cases could not be proven, 
the judicial understanding of the - causal and chronological - link 
between the statements and the prohibited effects became extremely 
important. The question was in what cases the literal or metaphorical 
expression of opposition to the war could be construed as leading 
naturally and reasonably to its obstruction.
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(b) Proximate causation. A few leading cases can provide an~.. i
insight of the judicial approach to the question of causality.
The Socialist leader Pastor Stokes had sent a letter to a newspaper 
with wide and general circulation stating that "she is for the people 
while the government is for profiteers". Judge Van Valkenburgh 
instructed the jury as to the tendency or sufficiency of the letter to 
cause insubordination, disloyalty or mutiny and refusal of duty in the 
forces in these terms: i  . '
"You are to judge what the possible, if not the probable 
effect would be of communicating to these men... of 
informing and advising them that the government at whose 
behest they were fighting, or about to fight... was not... 
but for the profiteers - a term of reproach... Anything 
that lowers the morale and spirit of our forces, which 
serves to depress, to damper the ardor, to chill enthusiasm, 
extinguish confidence and retard cooperation, may very 
well cause insubordination." 34
35
In U.S. v. Motion Picture Film "The Spirit of 76". the Stokes
construction of proximate causation went even further, bordering on
absurdity. The film attempted to portray some of the more important
phases of the American war of independence, and special scenes, like
Paul Severe's ride .and the signing of the Declaration of Independence were
given particular mention and prominence. But in addition atrocities
committed by the British army were realistically presented. Judge
Bledso first praised the historical and artistic merits of the film
and went on to state: '
"We are engaged in a war in which Great Britain is an ally 
of the United States. It is a fact that we were at war with 
Great Britain during the Revolutionary times, and whatever 
occurred there is written upon the page of history and will 
have to stand, whomsoever may be injured or hurt by the 
recital of it. But... whatever may be the excuse... this 
is no time... for the exploitation of those things that 
may have a tendency or effect of sowing dissension among 
our people and of creating animosity or want of confidence 
between us and our allies." (Underlinings mine)
The film was seized and the producer Robert Goldstein was convicted
to 10 years' imprisonment for attempting to cause insubordination etc.
36in the armed forces
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The same approach was used in the construction of other key terms 
of the Act.
(c) Thus, obstructing recruitment was defined as impeding, hindering, 
retarding, restraining or putting an obstacle in the way of recruiting.
It was not necessary to prove physical obstruction. That "one may willfully 
obstruct the enlistment service without advising in direct language against 
enlistments, and without stating that to refrain from enlistment is a duty 
or is in one's interest seems to us too plain for controversy". ^  Under 
this sweeping interpretation any pacifist or socialist idea addressed to 
one or a number of potential volunteers, in private or in public, 
became punishable.
(d) The military and naval forces of the U.S. were declared to consist
of the actual members of the army and navy plus those who had registered
and received their serial numbers. Walter Nelles, anxious to push
forward a more liberal interpretation of the Act, rejected this
38definition as too broad. But even wilder interpretations were on 
offer: "The military forces of the U.S. means all the able-bodied men 
of the U.S."i! 59
Finally, (e) the false reports and statements of clause 1 were
ingeniously construed to cover all socialist and pacifist ideas.
Nelles, a civil rights lawyer and active member of the National Civil
Liberties Bureau, was insisting in 1918 that a statement of opinion as to
a matter resting upon a value-judgment cannot possibly be a false report
or statement. "To be criminal a false statement must be of facts as to
40which truth is ascertainable." But Nelles* interpretation was not 
accepted by the courts.
41Thus, in Pierce v. U.S. et al. a socialist pamphlet was repeating 
the clainv common among the left about the capitalist nature of the war in 
these words: "Our entry into it was determined by the certainty that if 
the Allies do not win, J.P. Morgan's loans to the Allies will be repudiated,
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and those American investors who bit on his promises will be hooked." 
Citing this passage the Court said:
'•That is a falsehood and its falsity is shown absolutely 
by the address made by the President to Congress, in 
which... he declared the purposes, and the necessities, 
and the reasons why we entered the war..." 42
The pamphlet's assertions were an allegorical statement of the 
socialist thesis on the ultimate determination of wars by economic 
factors and as such were closer to value judgments than to statements 
of fact. Any attempt to show them as factually wrong would have to 
discuss and repudiate the tenets of a complex economic and political 
theory. But the court, in the facile way indicated, found that such 
assertions were simply "false statements and reports" and duly convicted.
. One important case of that period illustrates the construction of 
the Act by the lower federal courts and points towards a more liberal 
construction, the main thrust of which was later to be adopted by the 
Supreme Court.
It came under the provisions of the Espionage Act that declared 
non-mailable any publication which violated the substantive provisions 
of section 3 of the Act. The August 1917 issue of "The Masses", a 
montly socialist journal, was excluded from the mails after a decision 
of the New York Postmaster. The editor asked the Postmaster to specify
t -
the offensive contents of the issue in order to delete them, to no
avail. Following a civil suit brought for a mandatory injunction
requesting that the Postmaster accepts and transports the copies, he
specified four cartoons, a poem and three articles admiring the
sacrifices of conscientious objectors. He argued that they tended to
encourage the enemies of the United States and hamper the conduct of
the War. Judge Learned Hand for the District Court of New York granted
43the injunction.
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On the first cotint (false statements), Hand relied on the distinction
between statements of fact and opinions or criticisms. Although he
recognised the constitutionality and the necessity of the Act he
concluded that "the right to criticize either by temperate reasoning, or
by immoderate and indecent invective which is normally the privilege of the
individual in countries dependent upon the free expression of opinion as
to the ultimate source of authority" had not been curtailed or modified
by the provisions of the Act. The scope of the Act was to hinder
interference with the conduct of military affairs and not to prevent
every kind of propaganda "honest or vicious".
The most important contribution of Judge Hand's came on the second
count of the indictment. The socialist ideas expressed on the specific
passages of "The Masses" selected by the Postmaster, Hand argued, may
lessen the enthusiasm of their readers. Nevertheless "to interpret the
word 'cause1 (insubordination ec.) so broadly would, as before, involve
necessarily as a consequence the suppression of all hostile criticism,
and of all opinion except what encouraged and supported the existing
policies, or which fell within the range of temperate argument", a
power which so far Congress had not decided to exercise. The original
Act did not have such a "revolutionary" intention.^
Judge Hand's criteria were simple: advising or counselling others
to violate the law is punishable, this is a long established principle
of common law (the law of incitement); but if one stops short of such
advice, then the need to protect freedom of egression , the ultimate
source of authority , requires that a very strict test be applied to
determine the workings.of causality. In Hand's words:
"Detestation of existing policies is easily transferred 
into forcible resistance of the authority which puts them 
in execution, and it would be folly to disregard the 
causal relation between the two. Yet to assimilate 
agitation, legitimate as such, with direct incitement to 
violent resistance, is to disregard the tolerance of all 
methods of political agitation which in normal times is 
a safeguard of free government. The distinction is not
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a scholastic subterfuge, but a hard-bought acquisition 
in the fight for freedom. If one stops short of urging upon 
others that it is their duty to resist the law, it seems 
to me one should not be held to have attempted to cause its 
violations.” 45
A test relying on the "general tendency” of words, is for Hand, 
therefore, clearly wrong. He would replace it with what he thought was 
an "objective test”. The decisive element was the dangerous nature of the 
utterance and not its political non-conformism. He did not accept, as 
the majority of judges, that insubordination in the forces or obstruction 
of the recruiting services is the natural and probable consequence of 
the communication of "unpopular” beliefs, nor did he identify the 
adoption by Americans of pacifist or socialist ideas with direct 
violation of the law. On the contrary such occurrence is rather 
unnatural and improbable.^
For Learned Hand, the determination of guilt cannot rely on the 
effects of the expression, an approach that necessarily leads to 
difficult questions of causality, aggrevated by the fact that these 
effects did not actually occur. He, instead, believed that his doctrine 
provided an "absolute and objective test”, "a qualitative formula, hard, 
convenient, difficult to evade”. ^  It focussed on the language, the 
content of the expression: if it directly incites or advocates illegal 
action, it is punishable. The anticipated effects (possible, probable 
or whatever) being a quantitative, subjective element should not become 
the ultimate test of guilt.
Winding up his opinion, Judge Learned Hand replied to the 
Government’s assertion that "the general tenor and animus of the paper 
as a whole were subversive to authority and seditious in effect” with a 
statement coming from the best tradition of English-speaking legal 
theory:
"The tradition of freedom has depended in no small part 
upon.the merely procedural requirement that the state 
point with exactness to just that conduct which violates 
the law. It is difficult and often impossible to meet the 
charge that one’s general ethos is treasonable; such a
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latitude for construction implies a personal latitude 
in administration which contradicts the normal assumption 
that law should be embodied in general proportions capable 
of some measure of definition.”
Judge Hand was reversed, however, by the Circuit Court of Appeals
48with Judge Hogers speaking for the Court and refuting one after the 
other all conclusions reached by Judge Hand.
To the thesis that one should not be held to have attempted to 
cause a violation of the law, if one stops short of urging upon others 
that it is their duty or their interest to resist the law, Bogers 
replied;
”If the natural and reasonable effect of what is said is to 
encourage resistance to law, and the words are used in an 
endeavour to persuade to resistance, it is immaterial that 
the DUTY to resist is not mentioned or the INTEREST, of 
the persons addressed, in resistance is not suggested.
That one may wilfully obstruct the enlistment service 
without advising in direct language against enlistments, 
and without stating that to refrain from enlistment is a 
duty or in one's interest seems to us too plain for 
controversy.”
Thus what seemed to Judge Hand to be an unusual exception seemed
to Judge Rogers to be the rule, i.e. that communication of non-conformist
ideas and beliefs would lead to violations of the law. While the former.
would have approved of the Postmaster's action only if there were
strong evidence to the effect that the matter excluded from the mail
was criminal, the latter would have enjoined the Postmaster only if
his decision was ''clearly wrong”.
"Indeed the Court does not hesitate to say that considering 
the natural and reasonable effect of the publication it 
was intended wilfully to obstruct recruiting. And even 
though we were not convinced that any such intent existed, 
and were in doubt concerning it, the case would be governed 
by the principle that the head of a department of the 
Government in a doubtful case will not be overruled by 
the courts in a matter which involves his judgment and 
discretion and which is within his jurisdiction.” 49.
But before the Supreme Court's involvement in Espionage Act cases
(see below §4), the majority of federal judges adopted Judge Rogers'
construction of the Act.
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3.3. The Espionage Act and Constitutional Objections
Many Espionage Act defendants raised the objection that the Act or
its judicial construction was in clear conflict with the constitutional
command of the First Amendment. At a period during which the judiciary
was all too ready to invalidate federal or state welfare and labour
legislation on grounds of unconstitutionality, the question of the
conformity of the Act with the First Amendment was both logical and t
topical since most prosecutions related to expression.
Many Judges sidestepped the issue, but quite a few felt obliged
to dispense with the objection, by trying to demarcate the line between
constitutionally protected speech and unprotected punishable
expression. The image emerging from the brief and scattered judicial
statements amounts to no more than the declaration that the Constitution
protects solely lawful expression, i.e. that Congress may render
criminal any sort of expression it thinks fit. Explicit statements
to this effect are not lacking:
"This is not a question of free speech. Free speech is 
guaranteed to us under the Constitution. No American 
worthy of the name believes in anything else than free 
speech; but free speech means not license, not counselling 
disobedience of the law." 50
"In this country it is one of our foundation stones of 
liberty that we may freely discuss anything we please, 
provided that that discussion is in conformity with 
law, or at least not in violation of it." 51
"Congress felt that in order that we might prosecute this 
war properly and with honour that there must be some law... 
prohibiting anyone, who for any reason or motive, no 
matter what, from in any manner attempting to weaken the 
thing (sic) the forces upon which the Government has to 
rely..." 52
One Judge distinguished between "constructive" and "non­
constructive criticism". The latter may be constitutionally curtailed, 
but he did not explain the criteria of this, original, distinction.
"In fact it is a matter of common knowledge that every 
newspaper in this country today and all along... have been 
indulging in criticisms of men in Congress... Nobody 
interferes with them because their criticism appears to
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be intended to help... The government never (sic) passed 
any law with that sort of criticism, but, being at war and 
it being the experience... of this government... that... 
there are few people who will not submit to lawful 
authority in this country... passed... the Act not intended 
and not necessary for 9596 of the American people, but 
necessary for the few who will not heed the judgment of 
the 9596." 53
Thus, the federal judges anxious to dress criminal convictions 
in constitutional gloss were not prepared to discuss the meaning or 
legal import of the First Amendment.
i
One Judge Lewis, who reflected on the problem is reported as saying, 
in his instructions to the jury:
"Your attention has been called in the argument to the 
constitutional guarantee of free speech, but you are 
instructed that this guarantee cannot be successfully 
invoked where the honor and safety of the nation is 
involved. And this statute... is a constitutional and 
proper enactment to safeguard the national honor and 
safety."
and in broader terms:
"The free speech secured federally by the First Amendment 
means complete immunity for the publication by speech 
or print of whatever is not harmful in character when 
tested by such standards as the law affords. "5 4
What such statements actually come to is that the First Amendment 
offers complete protection to expression, except when the law denies 
such protection. In which case the constitutional provision is 
completely undercut as an independent legal provision.
Even Judge Hand's lonely opinion was that Congress had not such 
"revolutionary purpose in mind" to render all agitation illegal. He 
did not say that, even if it had such purpose, it could not be enforced 
for being unconstitutional. He, tnus, implied that Congress was 
entitled to cut back political agitation, if it only framed its 
intentions, in unambiguous language, ^o be sure, the best indication 
of the "mind of the Congress" was the 1918 Amendments which went a 
long - and explicit - way down that road. And the dominant judicial 
interpretation of the Act, as case after case shows, was that of
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Rogers and not of Hand. As Hand himself conceded his Masses opinion
55"seemed to meet with practically no professional approval whatever".
Thus, prior to the Supreme Court involvement with Espionage Act
cases, the Act had been authoritatively interpreted and enforced by
the lower federal courts. Although these courts did not concern
themselves much with First Amendment theory, by rejecting the objection
of unconstitutionality of their construction of the Act, they did draw
a line between protected and punishable expression. The test of
general (or bad) tendency and presumptive intent used to send political
dissenters to prison, was at the same time the first consistent
judicial construction of the First Amendment itself. According to
Professor Chafee "the pre-war courts in construing clauses (related
to expression) did little more than placing obvious cases on this or
that side of the line... But when we asked where the line actually
ran and how they knew on which side of it s given utterance belonged,
56we found little answer in their opinions."^
The Espionage Act gave an opportunity for such line-drawing. The
method followed was to define the area where Congress could abridge
freedom of speech and to delineate the categories of unprotected
expression and, by implication, the area and categories of protected
speech. For Chafee, Nelles and a small number of liberal authors and
lawyers the line was wrong and the result of an atmosphere of hysteria,
which Chafee decried, in 1941» in these terms:
"It became criminal to advocate heavier taxation instead of 
bond issues, to state that conscription was unconstitutional 
though the Supreme Court had not held it yet valid... to 
urge that a referendum should have preceded our declaration 
of war, to say that war was contrary to the teachings of 
Christ. Men have been punished for criticizing the Red Cross 
and the Y.M.C.A... it has been held a crime to discourage 
women from knitting by the remark "No soldier ever sees 
these socks'.'.. One judge even made it criminal to argue to 
women against a war by the words "I am for the people and 
the government is for the profiteers" because what is said 
to mothers, sisters and sweethearts may lessen their 
• enthusiasm for the war, and "our armies in the field and our 
navies upon the seas can operate and succeed only so far as 
they are supported and maintained by the folks at home"." 57
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Although most contemporary liberal writers agree with Chafee * s 
dismissive and lucid description, those early cases set the framework 
within which the legal doctrine of freedom of expression later 
developed.
4* The Espionage Act and the Supreme Court
The Espionage Act reached the Supreme Court in 1919* two months 
after the armistice. It fell to the Court to re-examine the lower 
courts* construction of the Act, amid a more relaxed atmosphere, and to 
embark upon its search for the meaning of the First Amendment for the 
first time in Its history.
The first case decided by the Court was Schenck v. U.S.^ Schenck, 
the then general secretary of the American Socialist Party, and others, 
were indicted for conspiracy to obstruct recruiting and cause 
insubordination in the armed forces and duly convicted. Schenck 
had mailed a leaflet that opposed the war and the draft and some of 
the copies had reached men already drafted.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes speaking for a unanimous court 
described the contents of the leaflet:
"In impassioned language it intimated that conscription 
was despotism in its worst form and a monstrous wrong 
against humanity,, in the interests of the Wall Street’s 
chosen few. It said ’Do not submit to intimidation’, but 
in form at least confined itself to peaceful measures, 
such as a petition for the repeal of the act. The other... 
side... was headed, *A.ssert Your Rights’. It stated... 
that anyone violated the Constitution when he refused 
to recognize *your right to assert your opposition to 
the draft,’ and went on ’If you do not assert and support 
your rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights 
which it is the solemn duty of all citizens and residents 
of the U.S. to retain.’... It denied the power to send 
our citizens away to foreign shores to shoot up the people 
of other lands... winding up, ’You must do your share to 
maintain, support and uphold the rights of the people 
of this country. ’" 58a-
These- statements were but a mild presentation of the unequivocal 
anti-war position of the Socialist Party. Immediately after President
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Wilson's address to the Congress declaring war on Imperial Germany,
the A.S.P. convened an emergency national conference which overwhelmingly
endorsed the Party's full-hearted opposition to the conflict; blamed
America's entry on Wall Street capitalists, and adopted a seven-point
programme of opposition. Point 5 promised "extension of the campaign
of education among the workers to organize them in strong... political
and industrial organisations, to enable them by concerted and harmonious
mass action to shorten this war and,to establish lasting peace". Point
6 resolved that the Party would undertake "wide-spread educational
propaganda to enlighten the masses as to the true relation between
capitalism and war, and to rouse and organise them for action, not
only against present war evils, but for the prevention of future wars
59and for the destruction of the causes of war".
The point at issue at Schenck's trial was the whole anti-war 
policies of a legal political party, whose presidential candidate in 
1912 had polled 6% of the vote (Debs, who was later prosecuted and 
imprisoned under the Act for similar statements).
The objection of unconstitutionality of the prosecution was 
raised by Schenck's counsel but was quickly disposed of by Justice 
Holmes, in language destined to become the most quoted in First
Amendment theory and litigation. It deserves quoting at some length:
*
"We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the 
defendants, in saying all that was said in the circular, would 
have been within their constitutional rights. But the 
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in 
which it is done...The most stringent protection of free 
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire 
in a theatre and causing panic. It does not even protect 
a man from an injunction against uttering words that may 
have all the effect of force...The question in every case 
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and 
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present 
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils 
that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question 
of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many 
things that might be said in time of peace are such a 
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be 
endured so long as men fight and that no court could regard 
them*as protected by any constitutional right. It seems
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to be admitted that if an actual obstruction of the 
recruiting service were proved, liability for words 
that produced that effect might be enforced. The 
Statute of 1917» in §4» punishes conspiracies to obstruct 
as well as actual obstruction. If the act (speaking, or 
circulating a paper), its tendency and the intent with 
which it is done, are the same, we perceive no ground 
for saying that success along warrants making the act a 
crime. Goldman v. U.S., 245 U.S. 474« .. Indeed, that 
case might be said to dispose of the present contention 
if the precedent covers all media concludendi. But as 
the right to free speech was not referred to specially, 
we have thought fit to add a few words.”60
On the question of intent, Holmes stated briefly;
"... [T]he document would not have been sent, unless it had 
been intended to have some effect, and we do not see 
what effect it could be expected to have upon persons 
subject to the draft except to influence them to obstruct 
the carrying of it out.”
Justice Holmes found that the contents of the circular and the 
act of sending it out to men already called up for military service 
were enough evidence of the defendant *s intent to cause insubordination 
and of his part in the conspiracy to cause it. The claims of the 
pamphlet could be construed as a direct interference with the work 
of the recruiting services.
Schenck's conviction for conspiracy was, therefore, affirmed; 
although there was no evidence that actual obstruction had occurred, 
the jury findings, on the defendant*s intent and the tendency of his 
act to influence persons subject to the draft to refuse it, were not 
unreasonable. But in the face of the First Amendment, Justice Holmes 
introduced a further requirement that should be met in cases of 
prosecution of expressive activities; the utterances and the motives 
of the defendants cannot be punished in the abstract, but solely if 
and when they come dangerously close to harming an important governmental 
interest. This constitutional limitation is, in essence, a test of 
proximity between the utterances and the apprehended consequences 
similar to that used in the theory of criminal attempts.
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The week following Schenck. Justice Holmes delivered two more
judgments, for a unanimous Court.
The defendant in the first case was prosecuted for conspiracy to
prepare and publish 12 articles^ in a German-language newspaper
(Missouri Staats-Zeitung), and for attempting to cause disloyalty,
mutiny and refusal of duty in the armed forces by these publications.
Justice Holmes overruled the constitutional objection against Frohwerk*s
conviction citing Schenck. but without reference to the danger test.
",..[T]he 1st Amendment, while prohibiting legislation 
against free speech as such, cannot have been, and 
obviously was not, intended to give immunity for every 
possible use of language... [N]either Hamilton nor 
Madison, nor any other competent person then or later, 
ever supposed that to make criminal the counseling of a 
murder... would be an unconstitutional interference with 
free speech."62
The Justice went on to describe, in some detail thè contents of 
the pro-German articles and concluded that there was not "much to 
choose between expressions to be found in them and these... in 
Schenck". There was no evidence on the record that Frohwerk had made 
any specific efforts to reach men who were subject to the draft nor 
that any hindrance to the war effort had actually occurred. Holmes 
indicated that on a better prepared record Frohwerk*s conviction 
might have been reversed:
"It m%y be that all this might be said or written even in 
time of war in circumstances that would not make it a 
crime. We do not lose our right to condemn either 
measures or men because the country is at war... But 
we must take the case on the record as it is, and on 
that record it is impossible to say that it might not 
have been found that the circulation of the paper was 
in quarters where a little breath would be enough to 
kindle a flame and that the fact was known and relied 
on by those who sent the paper out..."63
Thus, Frohwerk*s obvious intention to obstruct the war with
Germany, ("the fact was known and relied on") and the volatile
environment in which the newspaper was circulating ("a little breath
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was enough to kindle a flame"), sufficed for his conviction even though 
no actual obstruction of the war was shown, on the inadequately 
prepared record.^
On the same day, Justice Holmes handed down judgment in the case 
65of Debs v. U.S. ^ The national prominence of the appellant has made 
Debs one of the most commented upon and controversial early free 
speech cases. Eugene Debs,, the leader of the Railroad Union and of 
the American Socialist Party and its,presidential candidate in the 
1900, 1904, 1908 and 1912 elections, had been staging a national anti­
war campaign in accordance with the official policy of his party. He 
was arrested in June 1918, after he delivered a speech in Canton, Ohio 
in which he made several attacks on war in general, but did not refer 
specifically to the World War. The main part of the speech was a 
defence of socialism and an appeal for unity in the A.S.P. Debs1 most 
offensive statements, according to the record, were the expression of 
sympathy and solidarity with other socialists who had been convicted 
under the Espionage Act for obstructing the war effort. Referring to 
Rose Pastor Stokes, convicted of attempting to cause insubordination 
in the armed forces, Debs stated that "if she was guilty, so was he, 
and that he would not be cowardly enough to plead his innocence".
Debs was charged with inciting and attempting to incite and cause
« « ' j
insubordination in the armed forces and with attempting to obstruct 
the recruiting services.
Debs used his trial as a forum for expressing his anti-war
sentiments; no defence witnesses were called and no arguments were
offered on the evidence. In an impassioned two-hour plea, he declared:
"I have been accused of having obstructed the war. I 
admit it. Gentlemen, I abhor war. I would oppose war 
if I stood alone. When I think of a cold glittering 
steel bayonet being plunged into the white, quivering 
flesh of a human being, I recoil with horror."66
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Judge Westenhaven instructed the jury that, in order to convict, 
they should satisfy themselves that Debs* speech had as its "natural 
tendency and reasonably probable effect" to obstruct the war, and that 
he had "the specific intent to do so in mind". Proof of actual 
obstruction was not deemed necessary. ' He was found guilty as charged 
and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
Debs* appeal to the Supreme Court was based on the ground that the 
section of the amended Act, that limited free speech, was in violation 
of the First Amendment. Justice Holmes, for a unanimous Court, over­
ruled the constitutional objection, citing Schenck but without reference 
to the danger test. He argued that the advocacy of socialism, the main 
theme of the speech, was constitutionally protected. But "if a part 
or the manifest intent of the more general utterances was to encourage 
those present to obstruct the recruitment service, and if in passages 
such encouragement was directly given", then the speech was not covered 
by the constitutional immunity.
Justice Holmes went on to review parts of Deb*s speech, and 
found the expression of sympathy for socialists convicted under the 
Espionage Act its most objectionable part. He concluded that the 
purpose of the speech, "whether incidental or not", was to oppose not 
only war in general but the particular one, and this opposition would 
have as its "natural and intended effect" to obstruct recruiting.
"If that was intended, and if,, in all circumstances, that 
would be its probable effect, it would not be protected 
by reason of its being part of a general program and 
expression of a general and conscientious belief." 68
As Debs had publicly approved the Socialist Party*s "Anti-War
Proclamation and Program", there was enough evidence that if he had
used in his speech "words tending to obstruct the recruiting service,
he meant that they should have that effect". Justice Holmes concluded
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that the jury had been properly instructed and that the requirement of 
specific intent had been explicitly mentioned. Thus, Debs* obvious 
intent to obstruct the war, which he freely admitted during his trial, 
became the most important element for the affirmation of his conviction. 
However, as Justice Holmes* extensive quotations of Debs* speech 
indicate, at no point did Debs urge his audience directly to resist 
the draft. According to the historian David Shannon, Debs' speech 
"does not seem to be a strong criticism of America's role in World 
War I".69
While serving his term, Debs stood again as the A.S.F. presidential
candidate in the 1920 elections and received 920,000 votes. President
Wilson refused repeatedly to pardon him. He was finally released on
Christmas 1921, by President Harding. He was then 65 years old.
According to Chafee, the Schenck trilogy "came as a great shock
to forward-looking men and women, who had consoled themselves through
the war-time trials with the hope that the Espionage Act would be
invalidated when it reached the Supreme Court”. "To know what
you may do and what you may not do, and how far you may go in criticism
is the first condition of political liberty, to be permitted to
agitate at your own peril, subject to a jury's guessing at motive,
tendency and possible effect, makes the right of free speech a
70precarious gift" wrote Ernst Freund. Amos Pinchot remarked that
"if the decision in the Debs' case had been the law in England during
the Boer War, David Lloyd George would about now be getting out of 
71jail". Professor Chafee, a great admirer of Justice Holmes and of 
his Schenck ruling, thought it "regrettable" that the Justice "felt 
unable to go behind the verdict. Judge Westenhaven's charge gave the 
jury such a wide scope that Debs was probably convicted for an
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exposition of socialism merely because the jury thought his speech
72had some tendency to bring about resistance to the draft”. Robert
R. Black labelled the case "a judicial milepost on the road to 
73Absolutism". And Harry Kalven remarked in 1973 that the Debs case
was "somewhat as though George McGovern had been sent to prison for
his criticism of the [Vietnam] War". 4
But despite some contemporary and a great amount of later criticism,
the Debs decision, delivered by the liberal hero of the Supreme Court,
was received favourably by the judiciary and the government. Even
Judge Learned Hand, whose Masses direct incitement test is still
75regarded, by some, as more liberal than Holmes* clear and present
danger, agreed in a letter to Holmes that "Debs was guilty under any
76rule conceivably applicable .
Thus, in the Schenck trilogy, the Supreme Court overruled the 
constitutional objections against the use of the Espionage Act for 
the prosecution of political dissent against the war. To be sure,
Schenck contained a considerable tightening up of the element of 
proximate causation between the utterances and the apprehended evils.
But it was the obvious anti-war intent of the defendants and the 
tendency of their utterances to obstruct the war effort which decided 
the issue in those early cases. Justice Holmes himself referred to 
his ruling in Schenck. in a letter to Sir Frederick Pollock, in 
these words:
"There was a lot of jaw about free speech, which I 
dealt with somewhat summarily in an earlier case 
Schenck V. U.S... As it happens I should go further 
probably than the majority in favour of it, and I 
daresay it was partly on that account that the Chief 
Justice assigned the case to me."77
It was only after some time, when Holmes moved from spokesman of 
the Court to the dissenting position along with Justice Brandeis, 
that he started reflecting publicly on the theoretical rationale of
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freedom of expression and the need for stronger judicial protection 
of political dissent.
78The first famous dissent came 8 months after the Debs case.
Abrams and others were prosecuted under the 1918 Amendments for
printing and circulating - by throwing out of a window - two circulars
attacking American intervention in Soviet Russia. The Supreme Court
judgment revolved mainly around the issue of the intent necessary for
conviction. The Act required a specific intent to cripple or hinder
the United States in the prosecution of the war against Germany.
Abrams1 leaflets were calling for industrial and other protest action
against intervention in the Soviet Union and in support of the
Bolsheviks. His anti-German feelings were made clear.
Justice Clarke for the majority addressed exclusively the question
of the required intent. His main argument was as follows:
"Men must be held to have intended, and to be accountable 
for, the effects which their acts were likely to produce.
Even if their primary purpose and intent was to aid the 
cause of the Russian Revolution, the plan of action which 
they adopted necessarily involved, before it could be 
realised defeat of the war program of the United States... ^
The Justice agreed that the meetings, strikes and other measures
were advocated by the appellants as means of protest against the Russian
expedition; but he insisted that their inevitable result was the
«
frustration of the war with Germany. He argued that this effect must 
have been foreseen by the defendants and was, therefore, intended 
under the traditional view on intent. The findings of the jury to 
that effect were not unreasonable and the convictions were affirmed.
Justice Holmes, joined by Brandeis, rejected this interpretation.
He stated that the 1918 Amendment, under which the case arose, required 
the proof, of specific intent to hinder the prosecution of the war with 
Germany. He then stated his theoretical and doctrinal position.
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"I do not doubt fox a moment that by the same reasoning 
that would justify punishing persuasion to murder, the 
United States constitutionally may punish speech that 
produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent 
danger that it will bring about forthwith certain 
substantive evils that the United States constitutionally 
may seek to prevent... It is only the present danger of 
immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that 
warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression 
of opinion... Congress certainly cannot forbid all 
effort to change the mind of the country. ''80
Thus, according to Justice Holmes, the constitutional command sets
a limit on Congressional power; political dissent can be restricted
in two cases: if there is an immediate danger of substantive harm.to
a societal interest or if there is a specific intent to bring about
such harm.
Justice Holmes then turned to the evidence, construing the statute
in accordance with these limitations allegedly imposed upon the
legislative power of Congress. On the question of the relation between
the leaflets and the apprehended evils, he was characteristically
dismissive. "Now nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing
of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present any
immediate danger...".- But if the publication was accompanied by an
intent to obstruct the war, then the danger would be greater and the
act would amount to an attempt. In that case, the element of the
intent to bring about the illegal result becomes the dominant issue.
The Justice gave a strict definition of intent.
"...[Wjhen words are used exactly, a deed is not done with 
intent to produce a consequence unless that consequence 
is the aim of the deed - unless the aim to produce it is 
the proximate motive of the specific act..." 81
He argued that proof of actual intent becomes even more important
when the success of the attempt depends upon actions performed by
third parties, as was the case in Abrams. But since the defendants1
avowed aim was to protect the young iiussian revolution and their
- 1 7 1 -
hatred for the policies of Imperial Germany was all too evident, the 
subjective element of the offence was lacking. The intent required 
could not be implied by selecting arbitrarily certain phrases of the 
text against the general spirit of the whole. In opposition to Justice 
Clarke, Justice Holmes stated that an intent to aid the Russian Revolution 
could have been satisfied without any interference with the war against 
Germany. Thus, under both tests the convictions should be reversed.
The leaflets created no present danger and the required specific 
intent was lacking. The contrary result meant that the defendants 
were punished not for what the indictment alleges, "but for the 
creed they vow". Justice Holmes concluded with one of his most 
famous passages on free speech arguing that the First Amendment was 
intended to repeal the common law on seditious libel. Thus, for 
the two dissenters, both the subjective and objective elements of the 
offence were lacking. The majority, however, satisfied that the 
required intent was proven returned Abrams to a 20-year term of 
imprisonment.
Following Abrams. Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented in two
82more Espionage Act cases using "danger" language. However, during 
Justice Holmes* term of office, the test never attracted a majority of 
Justices prepared to upset criminal convictions through its use.
Indeed, in the last three Espionage Act cases (Abrams. Schaefer and 
Pierce) the majority did not mention the test at all.
Shaefer and Pierce reached the Supreme Court in early 1920 and 
this time Justice Brandeis was the spokesman of the two dissenters.
In both cases the prosecution came under the first clause of Section 
3, which proscribed "false reports and statements".
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In Shaefer. Justice Brandeis described the test as a “rule of
reason” and stated that its origins may be found in the law of
incitement and criminal attempts.
Pierce was the last Supreme Court judgment under the Espionage 
83Act. As noted above, the main issue in that case was whether the 
assertion, that American*s entry into the war was motivated by the 
desire to protect Morgan*s loans to the allies, could be qualified 
as a "false report or statement” conveyed with the intent to interfere 
with the operation of the American war effort.
Justice Brandeis, joined by Holmes, tried to establish the proper 
construction of the clause in a similar way to Learned Hand* s Masses 
opinion. He distinguished between reports or statements and opinions, 
because the latter cannot easily be proven to be false. He asked for 
specific evidence to the effect that those statements were false in 
fact, and known to be false to the defendant at the time of their 
communication. Although he, personally, disagreed with the socialist 
assertions, he thought that the allegedly criminal statements were 
matters of opinion and judgment and not descriptions of facts to be 
subjected "like a chemical combination in a test tube, to qualitative 
and quantitative analysis”.
"This so called statement of fact... is merely a conclusion or 
deduction from facts... In its essence, it is the expression 
of a judgment - like the statements of many so-called 
historical facts... Historians rarely agree in their judgment 
as to what was thé determining factor in a particular war...
For individuals and classes of individuals, attach significance 
to those things that are significant to them.”
The Justice concluded that the practice of declaring statements of
conclusions or of opinions to be statements of facts and to be false
and punishable, "would practically deny members of small political
parties freedom of criticism and of discussion in times when feelings
84run high and the questions involved are deemed fundamental".
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The majority of the Justices were not impressed by Brandéis* protest. 
Justice Pitney, for the majority, ruled that the reasons of the American 
entry to the war, included in the Presidential Address to Congress in 
1917» were common knowledge; the assertions of the Socialist pamphlet 
distributed by Pierce were, therefore, "grossly false" in fact. Such 
statements could be construed as having a "tendency to cause 
insubordination, disloyalty, and refusal of duty", and furthermore 
were "evidently intended" to bring about these consequences. It is 
one of the ironies of history that during the hearings of. the Nye 
Committee of the Senate in 1934» it was considered almost a crime to
QC
say that America did not enter the war to save Morgan*s loans.
5» The Supreme Court and the Criminal Anarchy and Criminal Syndicalism
Laws
With Pierce the ventures of the Supreme Court in the interpretation 
of the Espionage Act came to an end. The series of expression cases, 
that occupied the Supreme Court in the aftermath of the Great War, were 
related more directly to the protection of the established political 
and social order. The fears and anxieties survived the Armistice and 
were grouped under the paramount threat of the "Red Menace".
The German threat was out of the way and the convenient grouping 
together of socialists, pacifists, trade unionists and other radicals 
under the title of actual or notional German spies could not continue.
In its place the concept of the "internal enemy" inimical to free 
enterprise and democracy (see above §l) took shape. Borrowing the 
notion of the "advocacy of overthrow of the government by force or 
violence" from a disused anti-anarchist state law, two-thirds of the 
states passed various sedition laws. They were directed against 
socialists (and later communists) and radical unionists. They were, 
accordingly, of. two general types.
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(a) Criminal anarchy lavs. Their main provision taken from 
the New York Criminal Anarchy statute punished any person who "by 
word of mouth or writing advocates, advises or teaches the duty, 
necessity or propriety of overthrowing or overturning organised 
government by force or violence, or by assassination of the executive 
head or any of the executive officials of government, or by any 
unlawful means."
(b) Criminal syndicalism laws, exemplified by the California 
Criminal Syndicalism Act, which stipulated criminal syndicalism as 
the doctrine of "advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the 
commission of crime, sabotage... or unlawful acts of force and 
Violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing 
change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political 
change".
Federal deportation laws were also amended to exclude aliens
"advocating" the use of force or violence. Attorney General Palmer
supervised their enforcement vigorously. "We must purify the sources
86of America's population and keep it pure" he declared.
The most conspicuous difference between this type of statute 
and the Espionage Act was that while the latter punished words because 
they might bring about certain undesirable consequences, which the
1 -
Act sought to prevent, the former singled out a certain category of 
speech and punished it without any reference to specific consequences.
j
In the first case, words were proscribed because they were supposed 
to lead to criminal action through the workings of the rules of 
causation. In the second, words per se were classified as criminal 
acts, a certain content of expression was proscribed.
The first case which reached the Supreme Court was Git low v.
New York. ^  The Court dealt in that case with the constitutionality of
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the New York Criminal Anarchy statute, as applied to the facts of the 
case by the lower courts. Gitlow, a leader of the left-wing section 
of the Socialist Party, had been convicted for publishing a "left- 
wing Manifesto" which among its 34 pages included references to the 
"Communist Revolution", the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the 
"imminent" destruction of the bourgeois parliamentary state through 
the evolution of "mass industrial revolts" into "mass industrial and 
revolutionary action". It has been remarked about this long-winded 
revolutionary broadsheet that "any agitator who read these 34 pages 
to a mob would not stir them to violence, except probably against
88himself. The Manifesto would disperse them faster than the Riot Act". 
There was no evidence, according to the record, of any effects 
resulting from the publication and circulation of the Manifesto.
The appeal to the Supreme Court was based on the ground that the 
statute was in violation of the "liberty" clause of the 14th Amendment; 
according to counsel's argument, which heavily relied on Schenck. free 
expression is punishable only "in circumstances involving likelihood 
of substantive evil", while the New York law penalised the mere 
utterance of abstract doctrines, without reference to the context of 
the expression or its caused relation to some evil "consummated, 
attempted, or likely".
Justice Sanford, speaking for the majority, upheld the convictions. 
He held that the Manifesto was not "the expression of philosophical 
abstraction, the mere prediction of future events; it is the language 
of direct incitement". The jury were justified to find that it did not 
advocate abstract doctrine, but violent and illegal action. To be 
guilty under the law, it was not necessary to find that the defendant 
advocated "some definite or immediate act or acts" of violence, the 
immediate execution of such acts, or that the language used was
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Sd€L"reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite certain persons".
Turning to the constitutionality of the Act, the Justice set out in 
some detail the grounds on which free speech may be restricted.
"...[A State] may punish those who abuse this freedom by 
utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to 
corrupt public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the 
public peace... And... a state may punish utterances 
endangering the foundations of orgmised government...
Freedom of speech and press... does not protect publications 
or teachings which tend to subvert or imperil the 
government or to impede or hinder it in the performance 
of its governmental duties..."8$
He went on to say that the legislature had determined that
"... utterances advocating the overthrow of organised government by
force... are so inimical to the general welfare, and involve such danger
of substantive evil, that they may be penalized in the exercise of its
police power". The balance had been struck and "[ t| hat determination
must be given great weight. Every presumption is to be indulged in
89afavor of the validity of the statute." The statute, a legitimate 
exercise of police power, could be declared unconstitutional only if 
it was unreasonable or arbitrary. The Justice then overruled the 
objection, that a close chronological and causal relation should exist 
between the utterances and the apprehended evils. Such utterances by 
their very nature endangered the security of the state.
"[T]he immediate danger is nonetheless real and substantial 
because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately 
foreseen. The state cannot be reasonably required to 
measure the danger from every such utterance in the nice 
balance of a jeweller*s scale. A single revolutionary 
spark may kindle a fire that, smouldering for a time, may 
burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration...
[The state] cannot reasonably be required to defer the 
adoption of measures... until the revolutionary utterances 
lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or imminent 
and immediate danger of its own destruction, but it may 
in the exercise of its judgment, suppress the threatened 
danger in its incipiency..."90
The only question open to consideration was whether the language 
used came under the statutory prohibition. All non-trivial utterances
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made with intent and of a nature that brought them under the statute 
were punishable. There was no need to examine whether they had created 
any clear and present danger.
"... When the legislative body has determined generally... 
that utterances of a certain kind involve such danger 
of substantive evil and they may be punished, the 
question whether any specific utterance coming within 
the prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to 
bring about the substantive evil is not open to 
consideration."
Indeed, the Court distinguished the Espionage Act from the New
York statute and insisted that the danger test was applicable,
solely, to statutes of the former type. The Espionage Act prohibited
certain acts involving danger of substantive evils without reference
to language, and the danger test sought to apply the statute to
language used to bring about the prohibited results. On the other
hand, the test "has no application... where the legislative body
itself has previously determined the danger of substantive evils
91arising from utterances of a specified character". A general 
category of expression had been prohibited statutorily and the 
Manifesto fell within its bounds. The question of any concrete danger 
created by it was, therefore, irrelevant. Thus, the danger test was 
rejected as a test of constitutionality of statutes expressly directed 
against the advocacy of revolutionary doctrine since the latter was 
held dangerous in itself, or as a rule for the examination of evidence 
in cases coming under such statutes.
Justice Holmes, joined by Justice Brandeis, dissented. He 
thought that the danger test was applicable'in the present case.
He conceded that the test had not been relied upon in the Abrams 
and Schaefer cases, but he insisted that those judgments had not 
settled the law. There was only a small minority who agreed with 
Gitlow's views and his "redundant discourse... had no chance of 
starting a present conflagration". As the indictment alleged
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publication and no more, and no evidence was provided that there 
was a present danger of an attempt to overthrow the government by 
force, Gitlow should be acquitted. He answered the assertion that 
the Manifesto was an incitement to revolutionary action, in those 
terms:
"Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself 
for belief, and, if believed, it is acted on unless 
some other belief outweights it, or some failure 
of energy stifles the movement at its birth. The 
only difference between the expression of an 
opinion and an incitement... is the speaker*s 
enthusiasm for the result." 92
If the indictment alleged an attempt to bring about an immediate, 
rather than a future uprising the result could have been different.
But in that case too, the danger would have to be judged as not 
futile or too remote.
Thus, the Supreme Court accepted the validity of the Act, as 
applied, and fully endorsed the antisocialist legislative programme.
It also declared that the danger test could be used to decide 
whether a particular expression could be construed as violating a 
general statute not addressed, in terms, against expression. But 
when a category of expression had been declared criminal, the test 
was of no use. At the same time the Gitlow case initiated a 
doctrinal change of great importance. The Court accepted unanimously 
that it was competent to examine the question of conformity of the
New York Act with the First Amendment
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Now, the First Amendment is directed expressly to the federal and 
not state legislatures (Congress shall make no law). The Court,
0 7therefore, accepted for the first time, and against precedent, J that 
freedom of speech and of the press was one of the "liberties” protected 
by the 14th Amendment against impairment by the States Without due 
process of law". Thus, "liberty" would no more be construed as 
meaning solely economic freedom and freedom of contract. To be sure, 
the Court hastened to add that in cases involving personal freedoms, 
in contrast to laws regulating economic matters, only arbitrary or 
unreasonable statutes would be declared void. "Every presumption is 
to be indulged in favor of the validity of the statute". However, by 
incorporating the First into the 14th, the Supreme Court assumed the 
role of the ultimate referee of both federal and state activities 
related to expression, linking thus questions of First Amendment theory 
and practice with problems of legitimate judicial review (see above 
Ch.Il).
94The last important case of the period was Whitney v. California/
It came under the model California Criminal Syndicalism Act of 1919*
The purpose of the statute and other similar acts was to suppress 
trade ■unionist activities considered inimical to economic growth and 
politically subversive. It was mainly used against the I.W.W.
Miss Annita Whitney was a temporary member of the break-away 
from the A.S.P., Communist Labour Party. She attended a Convention of 
the Party in Oakland, which was held publicly in 1919 and was open 
to the press. At the Convention she fought for the adoption of a 
policy-resolution pledging that the new party should strive to acquire 
political power by constitutional methods. She was defeated, however, 
and after attending a few committee meetings the following month, she 
withdrew from the Party. The indictment was brought under the main 
provision of the statute and another which penalised persons who had
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become members of a criminal syndicalistic organisation, as defined 
by the s t a t u t e T h e  jury had acquitted her on the first count but 
she had been found guilty on the second and convicted to a term of one 
to fourteen years. Thus, the only evidence against her was that she had 
participated in a public political convention and, for a short time, 
in a party while disapproving its adopted programme. The conviction 
was based on her " association" with the party and not on any criminal 
acts or expressions.
Justice Sanford basing himself on his Gitlow reasoning declared that the 
mere membership in an organisation was punishable if a state legislature 
had found that this organisation presented such a danger to state 
security as to warrant its suppression. The legislative determination 
to that effect should be given just weight and it should be declared 
void only if it had been clearly arbitrary or unreasonable. The 
party was a "criminal conspiracy" and as such involved greater 
danger to the "public peace and security" than isolated utterances and 
acts of individuals. Curiously enough, however, the Communist Labour 
Party had not been banned.
Justice Brandéis, joined by Justice Holmes, concurred on procedural 
grounds but his opinion had all the qualities of a dissent. He set 
himself the task to explain the import of the First Amendment 
particularly in relation to political expression.
He started like Sanford with the familiar statement that "although 
the rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental, they are not 
in their nature absolute". But unlike Justice Sanford he thought it 
necessary to analyse why those rights are "fundamental" before 
examining when and how they have to give way, since they are not 
absolute.
It was, therefore, through a theoretical understanding of the 
function of free political speech that the proper limits could be
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drawn. Brandéis attributed the importance of speech protection to 
the successful functioning of democracy, and stated that that was 
the intention of the Constitutional Framers. We have, already, seen 
(above, p.75 ) that constitutional historians have recently questioned 
Brandéis' (and Holmes') theories about the intentions of the Framers 
and the attempts to ascribe a certain meaning to the First Amendment 
that way.
Be that as it may, Brandéis' main argument was the following:
"Those who won our independence believed that the final end 
of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties; and 
that in its government the deliberative forces should 
prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an 
end and as a means... They believed that freedom to think 
as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable 
to the discovery and spread of political truth; that 
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; 
that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate 
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; 
that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; 
that public discussion is a political duty; and that this 
should be a fundamental principle of American government.
They recognised the risks to which all human institutions 
are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured 
merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that 
it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; 
that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; 
that hate menaces stable government; that the path to 
safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed 
grievances and proposed remedies*.. Believing in the power 
of reason as applied through public discussion, they 
eschewed silence coerced by law - the argument of force 
in its worst form. Recognising the occasional tyrannies 
of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so 
that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed. "96
These premises led him to two further conclusions:
(a) The enactment of a certain statute and the inherent in it
conviction of the legislature about the existence of a danger to state
security does not automatically resolve the question of its validity.
"The powers of the courts to strike down as offending a law [because it is
unnecessary] are no less when the interests involved are not property
rights, but the fundamental personal rights of free speech and
assembly."
(b) The courts must, therefore, exercise the power of judicial 
review using the danger test as adopted in Schenck. However, the 
Court had not yet fixed the standards determining when a danger should 
be deemed clear and present and what sort of evil should be considered 
as substantial. Thus, Brandéis thought it necessary to define the 
terms of the tests
a. There must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil 
will in fact result if speech is practised.
b. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger 
apprehended is imminent. *If there be time to expose through 
discussion the falsehood and fallacies... the remedy to be applied is 
more speech, not enforced silence.”
c. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to 
be prevented is a serious one. Trivial or speculative harms cannot 
justify ”a measure so stringent" as prohibition of speech.
Additionally, the difference between advocacy and incitement to 
law violation should be borne in mind (Brandéis agreed in that with 
Learned Hand but see Holmes* opinion, above, p. 17<§). Ineffectual 
advocacy cannot be made criminal.
Brandéis* Whitney opinion remains the most liberal and detailed 
elaboration of the danger test. It differs from the Holmesian 
formulation, in the importance it attributes to the gravity of the 
evil that the government may attempt to prevent and its, not fully 
elaborated, suggestion that the test may be used to decide the 
constitutionality of statutes and not merely their application. Even 
in this, more expansive version, however, the test would not keep 
Whitney out of jail. Brandéis concurred with the conviction-affirming 
majority on procédural grounds.
Later the same year, however, the Supreme Court set aside a
97conviction under a state syndicalism law for the first time/1 The
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only evidence produced in the trial of Fiske, an I.V.W. organizer,
was the Preamble of the I.W.W. constitution, which allegedly proved
the union*s illegal purposes. The conviction was reversed on 14th
Amendment grounds, since no independent evidence was produced to
the effect that the I.W.W. advocated "any crime, violence, or other
unlawful acts or methods as a means of effecting industrial or
98political changes or revolution". The danger test was not 
mentioned, nor was the question of "guilt by association" discussed.
After the examination of the first expression cases, the legal 
doctrines that emerged in Supreme Court case law may now be concretely
examined
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CHAPTER VII
THE FIRST LEGAL DOCTRINES
The social interest that the Espionage Act sought to protect or, 
according to Holmes, the "substantive evil" it meant to prevent was,
t
on its face, the protection of national security during wartime.
Section 3 of the Act did not prohibit any specified political expressions 
opposing the war. The only utterances prohibited were wilful false 
reports and statements made with criminal intent. The rest of the 
section prohibited the intentional obstruction of the war effort and 
attempts at such obstruction. In the conditions of "total mobilization" 
introduced in the Great War for the first time - and since the 
characteristic of most wars - the Act does not appear to be excessively 
repressive. It was the construction of the Act by some federal courts 
which criminalized the expression of dissent to the war and grouped 
together pacifist and socialist opinions in one all-inclusive category 
branded as enemy espionage that turned the Act into an exemplary piece 
of repressive legislation and qualified the justice meted out by the
' icourts as an early precursor of what Kirchheimer has called "political
i
justice".^
As it was described above, the construction of the Act under which 
dissenting expression was admitted as the principal means of its 
violation revolved around the requirements of proximate causation and 
intent. Since no direct link could be established in most cases between 
the concrete expressive activity and the consequences or evils that the 
Act sought to prevent, the court judgments took the character of a 
hypothesis about the probable or possible future consequences of past 
expressions: The expression of certain ideas could lead to violations 
of the Act, presumably through the agency of persons persuaded by
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those ideas to undertake criminal action, although in reality it did not 
lead to such violations. If the violations had taken place, if the 
historical hypothesis was a historical reality home out from the record, 
the political dissenters would have been easily convicted as accomplices 
or associates of the criminal principals.
1. The "Bad Tendency” Doctrine
The Espionage Act, 1917 imposed two requirements for conviction: a
subjective one (intent) and an objective one (some causal connection
between the conduct of the offender and the prohibited consequences,
Ch.VI parts 3.1 and 3*2). In most of the cases brought under it, the
conduct of the defendants consisted of utterances opposing the war,
while there was no evidence that the apprehended effects had actually
come about. According to Chafee "[njoone reading the simple language
of the Espionage Act of 1917 could have anticipated that it would be
rapidly tamed into a law under which opinions hostile to the war had
2practically no protection". The question posed was, therefore, under 
what conditions the expression of opposition to the war qualified as the 
means of violation of the law. Proof of evil intent, without anything 
else, did not suffice for conviction as the criminal law does not punish 
simply for a seditious state of mind. Equally, as intent was specifically 
mentioned in the Act, the existence of some expressive acts, without 
corroboratory evidence of the will or desire on the part of the defendant 
to bring about the consummated offence, should be insufficient for 
conviction.
In the majority of the lower federal cases, which were decided under 
the formula which came to be known in the literature as the "bad tendency" 
test, the two relatively independent elements were collapsed into each 
other. The gist of the test was that it relaxed the requirement of some 
causal and chronological link between the utterances and the apprehended -
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but not materialized - consequences, assuming that all expression of 
opposition to the war could set in motion a chain of causation which would 
result eventually in someone being persuaded to undertake the prohibited 
action. When the element of intent was emphasized, the inquiry had to 
assume the widest scope and to extend to the political and personal beliefs 
of the defendant. In some cases intent was presumed from the mere 
utterance of the dissenting views under the doctrine that "a man is
3presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his speech".
In those extreme cases, the test led to the criminalisation of certain 
political and economic beliefs which dissented from the official 
policies. While pacifism, socialism or opposition to the war were not 
prohibited as such by the Act, they were thus made sui generis crimes 
with little concern about the likelihood in reality that their propagation 
would or could lead to the prohibited results. A certain confusion 
encountered in the early construction of the Act may be attributed to 
the fact that it was meant to prevent serious actual or attempted 
interferences with the operations of the armed forces and the prosecution 
of dissenting views under it created technical difficulties. Under this 
interpretation some concepts used by the district courts in cases 
brought under the Act may be explained.
(a) Intent. If certain political beliefs are prohibited then the 
requirement of specific intent may be either inferred from their mere 
utterance, since one is assumed to hold his beliefs conscientiously and 
intentionally; or alternatively it may become an all-important test of 
guilt, since proof of the remote consequences of the propagation of 
certain beliefs is extremely difficult.
(b) In the case of prosecutions coming under the first clause of 
Section 3 proscribing false reports and statements, the conceptual 
character of a statement internal to the prohibited body of discourse 
becomes secondary. Dissenting beliefs, opinions and value judgments -
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like the assertions about the capitalist nature of the war - may be 
declared to be statements of fact and as such false.
(c) Conspiracy^ and "guilt by association". If certain ideas and 
beliefs are prohibited, any organisation promoting and propagating them 
becomes a criminal conspiracy, much more dangerous than any single 
individual holding them. Membership of such organisation becomes the 
legally relevant proof both of holding the illegal beliefs and of 
participating in the criminal conspiracy to spread them.
It must be noted that the "bad tendency" test was resisted by some 
judges like Augustus and Learned Hand, who asked for independent 
evidence of the required intent and for proof that the utterances had 
come dangerously close to becoming criminal acts. These were the elements 
most emphasized by Justice Holmes1 "clear and present danger" test. On 
the other hand, the 1918 Amendments to the Espionage Act and the various 
anarcho-syndicalist statutes prohibited expressly certain specified 
categories of political expression. In these cases the determination 
of guilt was made independent from the examination of the consequences - 
imminent or remote - of the utterances. In Gitlow. against Justice 
Holmes1 dissent, the Supreme Court adopted the most restrictive 
construction of those statutes, ruling that if the defendant had 
intentionally uttered the "unspeakable" he had no defence under the 
First Amendment. This interpretation was short-lived, however. In the 
30s, the danger test and the preferred position of freedom of speech 
came to replace the older interpretation and thus afford much greater 
protection to political dissent.
2. The "Clear and Present Danger" Test
The clear and present danger test was enunciated in the same period 
as the bad tendency one. Its adoption by the Supreme Court was a clear 
advance from the lower courts* position, but during that period its use
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did not lead to the reversal of any convictions for political dissent. 
Its fame outlasted the tenure of its initiators and, during the 30*s 
and 40*s, it was widely used in First Amendment litigation. It would be, 
therefore, instructive to compare the approach advocated by Holmes and 
Brandeis in dissent with that consistently adopted by the majority of 
the Court.
According to the original formulation of the test:
"The question in every case is whether the words used are 
used in such circumstances and are of such nature as 
to create a clear and present danger that they will 
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has 
a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and 
degree..."
The danger test, therefore, determines - as the bad tendency does 
too - when "words" become prohibited and punishable. The method 
followed for the drawing of the line between prohibited and protected 
expression is the same: the test demarcates the conditions that make 
expression criminal and by implication the protected area. These 
conditions are the following.
2.1. The Existence of a Clear and Present Banger
The first element of "clarity" was never defined in the opinions.
It presumably means that the expression must be prima facie capable 
to bring about the evil. It must be examined in the concrete 
situation of each case. When, for example, some "puny anonymities" 
are communicated to elderly people not subject to the draft, then 
a clear danger of obstructions of the recruiting services cannot 
be reasonably said to exist. The receivers of the communication 
oust be capable physically and legally to perform the criminal 
acts.'*
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The second element of a "present" danger which introduces an
element of chronological link, became the yardstick of the test
in those early years. In Abrams "immediate" was substituted for
"present", and in Whitney Brandeis explained that "there must be
reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is
imminent". And he went ons
"[n ]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear 
and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended 
is so imminent that it may befall before there is 
opportunity for full discussion. If there be time 
to expose through discussion the falsehoods and 
fallacies, to avert the evils by the processes of 
education the remedy to be applied is more speech 
not enforced silence."
Similarly Holmes in Abrams stated:
"We should be eternally vigilant against attempts to 
check the expressions of opinions... unless they so 
imminently threaten immediate interference with the 
lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an 
immediate check is required to save the country."
In accordance with Homles* belief in the "market place of ideas"
the process of free debate can be trusted to lead to the right
answers in all the pressing problems of the day. However, on some
occasions the process itself comes under strain and cannot be left
unregulated.
Holmes implied that such malfunctioning of the market that makes 
the danger "present" and intervention necessary is more likely during 
emergencies.
"...Only the emergency that makes it immediately 
dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels 
to time warrants any exception to the sweeping 
command (of the First)... The power (to suppress 
expression) is undoubtedly greater in time of war 
than in time of peace.
... Only an emergency can justify suppression."6
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2.2. The Requirement of Specific Intent
The second element of the test is the requirement of proof of
specific intent.' The had tendency test made proof of intent an
important element for the determination of guilt hut, somehow,
underplayed its specificity. In a number of cases the line of
reasoning was that "men must he held to have intended, and to he
accountable for the effects which their acts were likely to 
8produce"; as socialist and pacifist utterances were held to have 
a tendency to obstruct the war effort, the element of intent was 
linked more with the defendants1 general opposition to the war 
policy than with their specific will to bring about the prohibited 
effects. In the Schenck trilogy, Justice Holmes reviewed the record 
and found that the requisite intent for conviction had been proven, 
but he did not discuss at length the question.
However, in the Abrams case, the question of intent became one 
of the main issues. The statute required intent to cripple or hinder 
the war effort against Germany, while the defendants wanted to 
frustrate the expedition against Soviet Russia. The majority
fully accepted the notion of presumptive intent. Holmes in his
*
dissent thought that it was a great stretch of imagination to 
accept that the defendants intended to hinder the war with Germany 
because "every imaginable interference with the production of 
ammunition had such an effect". As Chafee remarked, under the 
Abrams majority "Irish munition workers could not have been urged 
to strike had the American government been sending arms to Dublin 
Castle, because this would have lessened munitions for France,
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since a machinist could not be sure that any particular shell or
9gun was going to Ireland".
2.3. The Banger Test and the Theory of Criminal Attempts
The insistence of Justice Holmes on the proximity of the 
danger and on the proof of specific intent indicates the immediate 
source of the danger test. It lies in the law of criminal attempts. 
Holmes was interested in this part of criminal law both as a 
scholar and as a judge* He had devoted a considerable part of 
his lectures on common law to the law of attempts and introduced 
criminal attempt concepts in several non-attempt cases.^
Forty years before Schenck. Holmes had argued in his lectures 
on "Common Law" that intent actual or imputed cannot be punished 
by criminal law if it is not materialized through an overt act. 
Nevertheless, intent constitutes a substantial element in cases 
of criminal attempts. Some acts may be attempts of substantive 
crimes, although they could not have brought about the crime, 
unless followed by more acts. In such cases, proof of specific 
intent to commit the substantive crime becomes necessary in order 
to show that those other acts indispensable for the harmful effect 
would have followed, but for some break in the chain of causation.^
The second element of the Holmesian theory of attempts is based on 
his understanding of the general function of criminal law. He subscribed 
to the utilitarian school, according to which criminal punishment is 
meant to protect valid social objectives, endangered by certain action, 
and is not based on any notion of moral guilt or retribution. The
purpose of criminal law is, therefore, to deter harmful behaviour and 
until behaviour becomes sufficiently dangerous there is no adequate 
reason for its suppression. Thus the degree of the actual injury or 
danger of a social interest will determine the scope of prohibitive and 
punitive intervention.
Among the many theoretical endeavours to establish an acceptable
criterion for the distinction between a harmless preparatory act and
a dangerous attempt, Justice Holmes1 doctrine is an empirical one,
relying heavily on the concrete circumstances of each case.
"That an overt act, although coupled with an intent to 
commit the crime, commonly is not punishable if further 
acts are contemplated as needful, is expressed in the 
familiar rule that preparation is not attempt. !iu.t some 
preparations may amount to an attempt. It is a question 
of degree. If the preparation comes very near to the 
accomplishment of the act, the intent to complete it 
renders the crime so probable that the act will be a 
misdemeanour, although there is still a locus poenitentiae, 
in the need for a further exertion of the will to 
complete the crime."12
In another opinion, Holmes summarized all the elements of his
criminal attempts doctrine.
"An act may be done which is expected and intended to 
accomplish a crime, which is not near enought o the 
result to constitute an attempt to commit it, as in the 
classic instance of shooting at a post supposed to be a 
man. As the aim of the law is not to punish sins, but 
is to prevent certain external results the act done must 
come pretty near to accomplishing that result before the 
law will notice it. But on the other hand, irrespective 
of the statute, it is not necessary that the act should 
be such as inevitably to accomplish the crime by the 
operation of the natural forces but for some casual and 
unexpected interference... Every question of proximity 
must be determined by its own circumstances and analogy 
is too imperfect to give much help. Any unlawful 
application of poison is an evil which threatens death 
according to common apprehension, and the gravity of the 
crime, the uncertainty of the results, and the seriousness 
of apprehension coupled with the great harm likely to 
result... would warrant holding the liability for an 
attempt to begin at a point more remote from the possibility 
of accomplishing what is expected that might be the case 
with lighter crimes... In the case of crimes exceptionally 
dealt with or greatly feared, acts have been punished which 
were not even expected to effect the- substantive evil 
unless followed by other criminal acts;... the considerations 
being... the nearness of the danger, the greatness of 
the harm and the degree of apprehension felt'.'1 3
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The elements of the English theory of criminal attempts are 
therefore the following:
(a) An overt act. An attempt may be described as an act regarded as
1 4a step towards another proscribed act.
(b) A specific intent to perform the consummated criminal act. Neither 
a mere preparatory act nor an evil intent per se may be punished
1 5as a criminal attempt.
(c) The attempt must come sufficiently near completion before the 
law steps in.
(d) The act performed must stop short of accomplishing the allegedly 
attempted crime.
1 6All four elements are present in the danger test. Justice Holmes
asks, therefore, the trial courts to treat criminal expression defendants
in the same manner they treat other criminal attempts defendants. If
certain conditions must be satisfied for a criminal attempt conviction,
the same conditions need be proven, when a person is charged with
uttering words intended to effect harmful action which however was not
performed. In the face of the First Amendment, the criteria for
regulation of expression must not be harsher, at least, than those
established for similar cases involving criminal action.
Thus, the test places expression within the structure of mainstream 
* ■criminal law.
2.4. A "Substantive Evil11 that the State may Prevent
The final element of the test refers to the objectives to be 
protected from expression, or the evils to be-prevented. Justice 
Holmes spoke initially of "substantive evils"and repeated the phrase 
verbatim in all later cases. But he did not elaborate on the obvious 
question: how substantive is substantive and what evils may be 
deemed so substantive as to justify a wholesale suppression of 
expression? Although the early cases came under statutes purportedly
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protecting national security, Holmes did not indicate that the test he
17enunciated was applicable, solely, to such cases. The evil was any 
that "Congress has a right to prevent". Congress had expressed its 
value-judgment, by passing the restrictive legislation, which was not 
to be questioned. Its use was to aid juries and judges to bring
expressive activities under the general terms of the relevant statute.
18Thus, the test embodied a strong presumption of constitutionality 
in favour of the legislative enactment, and in that it did not differ 
from the bad tendency test.
Such an approach is in accord with Holmes' general attitude 
toward judicial review. He fought against extensive judicial 
invalidation of legislative enactments through the 14th Amendment.
He stated, in one case, that:
"This case is decided upon an economic theory which a 
large part of the country does not entertain. If it 
were a decision whether I agreed with that theory, I 
should desire to study it further and long before making 
up my mind. .But I do not conceive that to be my duty, 
because I strongly believe that my agreement or dis­
agreement has nothing to do with the right of the 
majority to embody their opinions in law."19
Thus, Congress and state legislatures may prohibit and punish any 
expression they think fit, in the exercise of their powers. The courts 
under the guidance of the Supreme Court must restrain themselves to 
finding, whether the facts of the case before them reveal, that 
harmful consequences could be attributed to expressive acts.
It must be noted, however, that the Holmesian test constituted 
something of a departure from the accepted procedure of Supreme Court 
adjudication. Fact-finding rests with the trial court,while the 
Supreme Court may upset such findings, only if they cannot be reasonably 
supported by the evidence in record. But the danger test dispenses 
with this requirement. Its predominantly evidentiary character narrows 
the gap between questions of fact and law, enabling thus the Supreme
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Court to examine the record independently and reach its own conclusions
20on a new appraisal of the facts.
The danger test, therefore, combined Holmes’ theory of criminal 
attempts, his distaste for what he thought of as abuse of judicial power 
by the Supreme Court, in cases involving economic regulation, and his 
stronger liberal inclinations than the majority of the Court. The 
Gitlow case indicated the limitations of the mixture. As described 
above, it involved a statute that had fully accepted the bad tendency 
logic, by outlawing a specified category (or content) of expression.
As such, it did not require any link between the expression and 
subsequent criminal action. The role of the courts was limited to the 
examination of the facts in order to decide whether the prohibited 
expression had been uttered. The only conceivable method open to a 
court willing to uphold the rights of a particular speaker to utter the 
"unspeakable”, was to challenge the validity of the statute and, 
subsequently, of the concrete prosecution under it. But Holmes 
disliked judicial activism and did not intend his test to go this far. 
Thus Sanford's opinion and his refusal to use the test in Gitlow seems 
more justified than Holmes' insistence on using it. Caught between his 
tendency for judicial restraint and his greater liberalism, which 
motivated him against Gitlow*s conviction, Holmes attempted to apply
*  • f
the test to the facts of the case. He found that there was no danger 
of illegal acts and asked for the reversal of the conviction. However, 
the prosecution had not argued that any such danger existed nor needed 
any such argument. The defendants were charged with uttering forbidden 
words and the Supreme Court majority, quite consistently with Holmes* 
original danger test, duly obliged.
Justice Brandeis, in his Whitney dissent cast in danger terms, 
indicated a way out of this logical difficulty. In a passage which 
passed unnoticed at the time, Brandeis stated:
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"The legislature must obviously decide, in the first 
instance, whether a danger exists which calls for a 
particular protection measure. But where a statute 
is valid only in case certain conditions exist, the 
enactment of the statute cannot alone establish the 
facts which are essential to its validity.'21
This statement strikes at the heart of the assumption of validity
of legislation on which the danger test is based. Where the legislature
directly prohibits acts of expression, the Court is not obliged to
accept this determination as conclusive. On the contrary, it is implied
that the Supreme Court must content itself, through an independent
examination, that the necesary conditions for such a measure exist.
Thus, Brandéis suggests that a statute may be held unconstitutional by
the Court for incompatibility with the First Amendment. To be sure,
in cases of Whitney-type statutes, the Court has to assess general
historical, economic, social and political facts as well as the full
import of the prohibited expression, usually a political doctrine, in
order to perform the task of independent examination of the conditions
justifying the statute. The Court undertook this task in the 30's and
40's and in the Communist cases after the Second World War.
Justice Brandéis* advocacy of a more activist approach is also
indicated in his attempt to define more precisely the terms of the test.
"Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to 
prohibition of these functions essential to effective 
democracy unless the aril apprehended is serious. Prohibition 
of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent, 
that it would be inappropriate as a means for averting a 
relatively trivial harm to society. A police measure 
may be unconstitutional merely because the remedy, although 
effective as means of protection, is unduly harsh, or 
oppressive... There must be the probability of serious 
injury to the state."22
The "substantive" evil is transformed into a "serious" one. If 
the social interest sought to be protected is not important per se then 
anv compromise of the interest in free expression maybe unconstitutional 
on its face. This approach implies some sort of ranking of the social 
interests claiming protection in important and secondary ones,
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altematively of the social harms apprehended in serious and trivial. 
Brandéis did not attempt to make such a classification himself, but he 
gave an example of his approach. The social interesis he employed were 
those of public order and private property. If a statute punished 
trespass on private land, any enactment prohibiting advocacy of such 
trespass would be clearly unconstitutional "even if there was 
imminent danger that such advocacy would lead to trespass".
It was, after Brandéis',ideas had been accepted by the majority of 
the Court, that the latter started working out a hierarchy of interests 
and values, that it would protect against governmental encroachment.
3. The Legal Doctrine and the Quest for Judicial Neutrality
The danger test involves the same sort of speculative historical 
hypothesis about future consequences of past expression, that in 
reality did not materialize,as the bad tendency one. However, in 
contrast to the latter test, which tends to underplay the element of 
causation between expression and its evil consequences, the danger 
test purports to re-establish it and to examine expression in the specific 
context (the circumstances) of its appearance. A strict causal link 
(clear danger) and a chronological proximity (present, imminent danger) 
in the sequence expression-subsequent criminal activity must be 
extracted from the circumstances in which the expression took place.
The character of this link is based on the assumption that the 
audience of the spoken or written "words" may be persuaded by it and 
led to undertake some prohibited action. The danger, therefore, must 
be in fact and always linked with some undesirable or criminal conduct.
The idea behind the test is not original. J.S. Mill, in his tract
"On Liberty", had stated that even opinions lose their immunity,
when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to make
23their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act.
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And again ’’instigation to [tyrannicide], in a specific case, may be a
proper subject of punishment, but only if an overt act has followed,
and at least a probable connection can be established between the act
24and the instigation". Mill accepted the suppression of the opinion 
that "comdealers are starvers of the poor" from being delivered to a 
crowd assembled in front of a comdealer's house, an example that 
strongly resembles those used by Holmes and Brandeis.
The applicability of the danger test in the comdealer's house 
example and other similar face-to-face situations, where the apprehended 
harm is serious criminal offences (like physical injuries and destruction 
of property) seems unproblematic. Yet, beyond these rather simple 
cases, the construction of the concepts of "danger" and "substantive 
evil" become the determining factors for criminal conviction.
"Once you admit that the matter is one of degree, while you 
may put it where it genuinely belongs, you so obviously 
make it a matter of administration, i.e. you give to 
Tomdickandharxy, D.J., so much latitude [as his own fears 
may require] that the jig is at once up. Besides even 
their Xneffabilities, the Nine Elder Statesmen, have not 
shown themselves wholly immune from the 'herd instinct' 
and what seems 'immediate and direct* today may seem very 
remote next year even though the circumstances surrounding 
the utterance be unchanged"25
wrote Judge Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee in 1921. Hand's criticism 
indicates that a widely accepted communal standard of danger which judges 
could ascertain and enforce does not exist. If such a standard could be 
discovered, a detailed analysis of the factual evidence, of the sort 
suggested by Holmes, would yield the degree of the danger's Imminence 
and justify suppression. It would, equally, bestow the judge with 
the legitimacy of an impartial arbiter.
But in cases involving political and social conflict, as all cases 
dealing with political expression claims necessarily are, the judge must
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take parts: not because he is already and always in favour of the
status quo and/or biased, but because there is not any commonly
accepted standard to guide him. The standards themselves are at
issue. Thus, in deciding what expression is dangerous, or what
evil is a serious one the judge upholds one of two or more
conflicting claims. If the conflict has already run its course, the
judge merely adds on a posteriorifootnote on history. If it is still
going on he throws his weight - a quite considerable one - on the side
of one claim, thus participating in the further unfolding of the
historical course. "All impersonal ethical theories derived from
2 6general principles exist in a social and psychological vacuum" writes 
Cambridge philosopher Bernard Williams. The same applies, one could 
argue for those impersonal, neutral legal doctrines. They leave out 
the question of who is laying down the principles for whom and when.
Even Judge Learned Hand’s "objective" test between incitement to 
criminal action or revolution (the Holmesian "counselling of murder") 
and mere abstract advocacy, which he proposed instead of the "subjective" 
danger test and has recently enjoyed something of a revival, in no way 
resolves the problem and bestows the criminal officer or judge the much 
sought-after,' but elusive prize of impartiality. It refutes the
assertion that the judge can play the role of the objective observer
!
and interpreter of the social consensus, which however is assumed as 
existing in the text of the criminal law that, allegedly, embodies it. 
However: where the criminal law is in itself a politically contentious 
one, and most laws Tinder examination are such, suppression of propaganda 
against them puts the judge on the side, of those groups and interests 
that have transformed their claims into law.
Consider the danger test’s claim to provide a strict notion 
of causality lacking in the bad tendency one. The problem of causation 
in history and the social sciences is a highly contentious one in
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itself. The existence of rigid laws in social relations, resembling 
the laws of nature, has been generally rejected and social phenomena 
and processes are attributed to a variety of multiform causes both 
intentional (brought about through human agency) and unintended or 
structural. Causal analysis must, therefore, tread a narrow path between 
two unacceptable courses: the first leads to analytical indeterminacy 
(each effect has various causes and each cause in turn is the effect 
of various others and so on); the second attributes a notional causal 
primacy to a single social phenomenon and virtualizes all others, laying 
itself open to criticisms of arbitrariness. The former creates 
analytical-logical problems; the latter does injustice to the complex 
empirical reality.
The danger test or any other doctrine that purportedly determines 
in a uniform way the causal primacy or relevance of expression in any 
chain of events can be accused of conceptual arbitrariness and 
empirical reductionism. Even in the simple comdealer’s house example 
one may imagine many situations in which the incitement or advocacy or 
plain statement that the "comdealers are starvers of the poor" is 
neither the main nor a cause of the ensuing ransacking of the house.
It is again the duty to decide which the judge cannot easily avoid, 
the sovereign prerogative and demand of choice, that takes precedence.
By interpreting what is a danger or an evil, for legal purposes, the 
judge both chooses one of more competing claims and presents it as the 
"common good" or "public interest", and participates in its fight to be 
presented as such. Equally by insisting that, in the circumstances, 
a particular event is or could have been the primary cause of a certain 
effect he, sometimes, violates history conceptually and, at the same 
time, leaves a yardstick for the future. As an official observer of 
the historical past and as a participant in the creation of the official 
present and future, the judge must always claim neutrality and remoteness 
but in cases of political conflict the result of judging is not neutral.
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4. The 11 Bad Tendency" and Danger Tests and the Public Sphere
As we saw, at the end of the first period of consistent judicial 
involvement in expression cases two legal doctrines had emerged. The 
bad tendency one used by many district courts in Espionage Act cases 
and the clear and present danger test enunciated by Holmes in Schenck 
for a unanimous Court and further elaborated by Holmes and Brandeis in 
dissent. The Supreme Court agreed to the danger test only when its 
use led to affirmation of convictions and solidly rejected its later 
interpretation which would have led to some reversals of lower courts 
and acquittals.
Although questions of free expression either as an individual 
constitutional right or as a constitutional limitation upon the 
legislative and executive branches, imposed by the First Amendment to 
the Constitution, were not extensively discussed (with the exception of 
the dissents), the Supreme Court undertook in earnest the task of drawing 
the line between unprotected and punishable and legally immune expression. 
Thus, by construing the Espionage Act and the various state anarcho- 
syndicalist statutes, in cases involving expression claims, the Court 
construed the First Amendment as well, which in its "absolute11 language 
imposes strict limitations on federal and (from Gitlow) state power and, 
accordingly, confers a constitutional right to expression.
These early cases indicate a typical manner in which claims to free 
expression arise and are legally sanctioned (affirmed or denied) or, 
in other words, the existence and degree of a constitutional right to 
free expression is determined. In the Espionage Act cases, the question 
asked was whether and under what conditions political dissent could be 
construed as the means for the violation of the Act; in the later 
cases, when did certain concrete statements come under the blanket 
criminal prohibition of a general category of expression.
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In both cases, the question was under what conditions human conduct 
which has as its main aspect a communicative intent may be prohibited 
or punished and, by implication, when it is allowed. The public sphere 
was demarcated, in a negative way, through the placing of certain groups, 
interests and ideologies outside its legal-legitimate bounds.
The bad tendency test seizes a certain category or content of
expression and declares it unprotected. The judicial and legislative
intervention seeks to ban a sort of idea in toto from the political
public sphere. They are declared criminal and punishable, but at the
same time, they are identified with commonly accepted moral evils
(socialists are spies, they adopt force and violence as political
methods), and are thus presented as morally suspect. The legal ban
and moral opprobrium cast upon political doctrines results in their
complete identification with those invividuals and groups who,
allegedly, hold and propagandize them (thus "guilt by association" and
the emphasis on presumed intent). Thus, through the prohibition of
political doctrines, the punishment of those who hold them, and finally
the intrinsic linking of the two, the modem notions of heresy and the
heretic take shape. The heretic is "excommunicated" and repressed,
the all-contaminating character of heresy is reaffirmed and the outer
limits of permissible ideology are constituted. Both functions of
political justice, that of defining and repressing political deviation
27and of "implanting desirable ideologies" are exemplarily served.
Against that approach, the danter test draws attention to the fact
28that'political egression and activity, as all expressive activity, 
is temporally and spatially - contextually - situated. It is the 
reaction of the audience to the "message", in its specific context, 
that constitutes the danger. Thus, regulation of the time, the manner 
or the place where the expression takes place or is received, can 
neutralize its content without an outright ban of the latter. Once
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the danger-in-context approach is accepted the determination of what _is 
or niight be endangered becomes the paramount concern.
It was after the Supreme Court’s adoption of the danger approach 
and, at the same time, of the democratic justification theories of 
expression, that it started dealing, positively, with the determination 
of the specific social interests that are threatened by expression, and 
of the social value expression itself carries. It, thus, embarked upon 
a more independent and positive demarcation of the public sphere. This 
change coincided, roughly, with the second Roosevelt administration 
and the launching of the New Real.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE PUBLIC SPHERE UNDER THE HEW HEAL: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
PROM 1950-1950
1. Introduction
In February 1930, after the resignation of Chief Justice Taft, 
President Hoover appointed Charles Evan Hughes, as the new Chief Justice. 
The period between 1930 and 1941» when Harlan Stone was appointed by 
President Roosevelt as Chief Justice, was one of the most dramatic in 
the history of the Supreme Court. The Great Depression, which Brandeis 
had called an emergency "more serious than war", had created a sense of 
national catastrophe; Roosevelt's early New Deal measures meant that 
the welfare-interventionist state which judges like Field and 
constitutional authors like Cooley and Dicey had dreaded was hesitantly 
becoming a federally administered political reality. In the two 
judicial terms of 1933 and 193^ the Supreme Court in a series of 
cases attempted to frustrate the New Deal programme: in Schechter 
Poultry Corn, v. U.S.  ^it declared the National Industrial Recovery 
Act unconstitutional for improper delegation of legislative power to 
the executive; for the same reason a federal act regulating coal
production was equally invalidated (Carter v. Carter Coal Co. ); the
* *5Agricultural Adjustment Act was annulled in 193^ (H.S. v . Butler*7);
and in Morehead v. New York ex rel.Tfpaldo^ a New York statute providing
for minimum wages for women was invalidated: "The state is without .
power by any form of legislation to prohibit, change or nullify
contracts between employers and adult women workers as to the amount
of wages paid". According to R. Jackson, one of the Roosevelt Supreme
Court appointees, in those decisions "the Court allowed its language
to run riot... (it) cast doubt upon all federal aid to agriculture...
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(it) struck at all national effort to maintain fair labor standards...
and deliberately attempted to outlaw any form of state legislation to
5protect minimum wage standards".
But in November 1936» Roosevelt was re-elected in a landslide 
victory with a clear promise to press on with the New Neal measures. In 
February 1937* he announced a plan that would give him the opportunity 
to appoint six new Supreme Court Justices and thus create a pro-New 
Neal majority. I^wever, this "court-packing" plan, as it became known 
did not have to go through.** In a single judicial term (1937)» the 
Court in a dramatic change - brought about by an unexplained switching 
of vote by Justice Roberts - overruled comprehensively its few months 
old decisions and upheld in succession a Washington minimum wage law 
(West Coast Bo tel Co. v. Parrish^): the new National Labor Relations 
Act and the Social Security Act (Steward Machine Co. v. Navis ). Thus, 
the New Neal and the power of the executive to regulate the economy was 
reluctantly accepted by the judiciary. The Court indicated that it 
would not use the weapon of extensive judicial review any longer to 
challenge regulatory and welfare measures. This volte-face was called 
the "judicial revolution".
But, at the same tin», another change had started taking shape.
In the late 30s and early 40s, the Court under Chief Justices Stonei
and Vinson (appointed in 1946) embarked on a new activist line in the 
* :
field of personal and political rights. Its involvement in free 
expression cases multiplied in an unprecedented way. References to 
the "preferred position" of personal and political freedoms and the 
democratic justification of expression became standard parts of its 
opinions and "danger test" phraseology was often used to reverse lower 
court decisions and uphold expression claims. All clauses of the 
First Amendment were gradually incorporated in the 14th and in this 
way the Court asserted the power to review all kinds of state action
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related to expression. It started, thus, to participate actively and 
positively in the construction of the public sphere.
It is to these cases that this chapter turns. The period covered 
in it spans from 1930 until the early 50s. With the exception of laws and case: 
dealing specifically with communism the Communist Party, communists and 
related topics which started appearing during that period, but are 
examined in the next chapter, all other important cases of these two 
decades are dealt with below. However, the proliferation of cases 
related to the various aspects of expressive activities is such that 
instead of examining them in strict chronological order an approach 
based on thematic unity is preferred. Thus the legal material will be 
classified in the following ways
(a) Cases coming under various federal and state sedition laws 
similar to those that preoccupied the Court in the previous period.
(b) Cases related to the promotion and implantation of desirable 
ideologies and the identification, discouragement and weeding out of 
alien, hostile or Un-American ones.
(c) Cases related to the various aspects of the Constitution and 
regulation of the ''public forum".
(d) Finally cases dealing with press freedom.
In conclusion the cases and legal doctrines discussed will be
related to the public sphere hypothesis advanced above.
«  *
2. The Sedition Cases
The first expression case (Stromberg v. California^) reached the 
Hughes Court in 1931«
The Stromberg case involved the California "red flag" statute. Under 
its provisions it was a felony to display a red flag in a public assembly 
"(l) as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organised government,
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or (2) as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action, or (3) as 
an aid of propaganda that is of a seditious character".
Yetta Stromberg was a Communist supervisor of a summer camp for 
children. Every morning she was running up a red flag with the hammer 
and sickle, while the children were saluting and reciting an oath of 
allegiance to the working-class cause. No other evidence was produced 
against her. She was charged and convicted, however, under all three 
clauses of the statute.
Chief Justice Hughes focussed his attention on the first clause 
of the statute, refusing expressly to examine the constitutionality of 
its two other clauses. "Opposition to organised government" is a 
perfectly legal attitude, the gist of the democratic state, if confined 
to peaceful methods. The first and most vulnerable clause of the 
statute was declared void, because it deprived Stromberg of her 
Fourteenth Amendment rights:
"The maintenance of the opportunity for free political 
discussion to the end that government may be responsive 
to the will of the people and changes may be obtained by 
lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security 
of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our 
constitutional system. A statute which upon its face, 
and as authoritatively construed, is so vague and 
indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use 
of this opportunity is repugnant to the guarantee of 
liberty contained in the 14th Amendment." 10
No direct link between the expressive act and subsequent criminal 
conduct was required by the statute. Nevertheless, the statute was 
found "vague and indefinite"^ as regards its first clause which did 
not distinguish between peaceful (legal) means of political opposition 
and violent (illegal) opposition. Thus, for the first time,part of a 
statute was declared void for abridging "free political discussion".
The decision clearly implied, however, that the two other clauses could 
be construed within the limits of the First Amendment (if the flag was 
displayed as a symbol of anarchy or sedition).
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To be sure, a flag is not speech as one of the dissenting Justices 
remarked. But the Court extended to the act of raising a falg the 
protection afforded by the First Amendment to speech. It indicated, 
thus, that it was prepared to examine conduct of a symbolic character 
as expressive activity that could, in principle, claim the protection 
of the First. In so doing, it embarked on a still continuing attempt
to define the parameters of "speech" for legal purposes.
12The two other important cases of this period in relation to 
freedom of political expression involved members of the Communist 
Party, and came under old sedition statutes.
Be Jonge had presided at a meeting of the Communist Party called in 
solidarity to a current longshoremen*s strike. The meeting was orderly 
and no evidence was produced to the effect that criminal syndicalism 
was advocated by Be Jonge. Nevertheless he was convicted and 
sentenced to 7 years* imprisonment, under the Oregon Criminal Syndicalism 
Act which made it an offence to preside at or assist in conducting a 
meeting of an organisation that advocated "crime, physical violence... 
as a means of accomplishing... industrial or political change or 
revolution". The Supreme Court of Oregon held that the actual purposes 
or conduct of the meeting were immaterial. The fact that the meeting 
was called by the Communist Party sufficed for conviction. Thus, Be 
Jonge was convicted for participation in a meeting called by the
i
Communist Party, a fully legal party, regardless of what had occurred 
at that meeting.
The case resembled strongly the earlier Whitney one, but this
time the Court adopted, unanimously, the theoretical rationale and
legal approach advocated by Justice Brandeis in dissent.
"The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to 
those of free speech and free press and is equally 
fundamental... These rights may be abused by using speech 
or press or assembly in order to incite to violence or 
crime. The people through their legislatures may 
protect themselves against that abuse. But the
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legislative intervention can find constitutional 
justification only by dealing with the abuse. The 
rights themselves must not be curtailed. The greater 
the importance of safeguarding the community from 
incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by 
force and violence, the more imperative is the need to 
preserve iavl®late the constitutional rights... in 
order to maintain the opportunity for free political 
discussion, to the end that government may be responsive 
to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, 
may be obtained by peaceful means.»»It follows from 
these considerations that consistently with the
Federal Constitution peaceable assembly for lawful 
discussion cannot be made a crime..." 1 3
Chief Justice Hughes condemned the application of the statute by 
the state courts in terms which disapproved strongly the theory of 
"guilt by association".
"The broad reach of the statute as thus applied is plain...
A like fate [conviction!! might have attended any speaker, 
although not a member [of the Communist Party], who 
*assisted in the conduct* of the meeting. However 
innocuous the object of the meeting, however lawful the 
subjects and tenor of the addresses, however reasonable 
and timely the discussion, all those assisting in the 
conduct of the meeting would be subject to imprisonment 
as felons if the meeting were held by the Communist 
Party." 1 4
The Court did not invalidate the Criminal Syndicalism statute (it 
did so for the first time in 1968),^ but condemned its application to 
the case at bar. Chief Justice Hughes argued that if De Jonge had 
committed some other crime he should have been indicted accordingly. 
His sole participation in a meeting organised by the Communist Party 
was not a crime. "The question... is not as to the auspices under 
which the meeting is held but as to its purpose." Even if it was 
assumed that the Communist Party advocated criminal syndicalism, the 
Party*s illegal activities did not automatically incriminate members 
who had not advocated crime or violence.
Thus, the broad reach of the construction below and the complete 
lack of evidence of any illegal acts, utterances or intentions by De 
Jonge led to a unanimous reversal of his conviction. At the same time,
- 210 -
the process initiated with Gitlow was further extended: the right to 
peaceful assembly was incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment and was 
thus made applicable as against both Federal and State governments.
The next major syndicalism case,^ decided in 1937» was the
first in which the danger test, expressly adopted by the majority of
the Justices, led to the acquittal of the defendant. The first
successful claimant under the test, Herndon, was a black communist
who had tried to organise the Communist Party and campaign for civil
rights in Georgia. When arrested in Atlanta, he carried on him a
number of Communist Party membership blanks and pamphlets. One of
the pamphlets was entitled "The Communist position on the Negro
question", and argued for a semi-independent black state extending
across several southern states. There was no evidence that he had
distributed any of these pamphlets or that he had advocated criminal
17anarchy or illegal resistance to the authorities. '
18However, under the clause of a pre-civil war Georgia statute , 
punishing insurrection,which postulated that "any attempt, by persuasion 
or otherwise, to induce others to join in any combined resistance to 
the lawful authority of the state shall constitute an attempt to 
incite insurrection", Herndon was convicted and sentenced to 18 years* 
imprisonment. Under the statutory construction by the Georgia Supreme 
Court, the defendant should have contemplated the use of force but
f  9
its imminence or likelihood were held to be immaterial. On the question 
of the required intent, the Court had held that proof that the 
defendant intended to bring about an insurrection "instantly or at 
any given time" was not necessary for conviction; it was sufficient 
that "he intended it to happen at any time, as a result of influence, 
by those whom he sought to incite". Herndon*s pamphlets were found to 
be sufficient evidence of his intent to stir up a future revolution.
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The case was brought to the Supreme Court on a writ of habeas
corpus. The State argued in court that the statutory construction by
the Georgia courts was in accordance with Gitlow which, allegedly,
had upheld "state statutes making criminal utterances which have a
•dangerous tendency* towards the subversion of governments".^
Justice Roberts, for a 5-4 majority, reversed. He accepted that the
14th Amendment allows the punishment of incitement to violent and illegal
action and other legislative measures which do not go beyond "forefending
against * clear and present danger'...". But he distinguished the Georgia
statute from the Espionage Act, (the statute "...does not deal with a
wilful attempt to obstruct a described and defined activity of the
government") and from the criminal anarchy act involved in Gitlow. which
punishes "...utterances advocating the overthrow of organized government 
19aby force..." The Justice rejected the contention of the state that 
the applicable standard of guilt was the "dangerous tendency" of words and 
went on to state the "preferred position" doctrine and the related 
prohibition of vague and indefinite statutes, in the area of First 
Amendment rights.
"The power of a state to abridge freedom of speech and of 
assembly is the exception rather than the rule and the 
penalizing even of utterances of a defined character must 
find its justification in a reasonable apprehension of 
danger to organised government. The judgement of the 
legislature is not unfettered... And where a statute is 1
so vague and uncertain as to make criminal an utterance or |
an act which may be innocently said or done with no intent 
to induce resort to violence or on the other hand may be said 
or done with a purpose violently to subvert government, a 
conviction under such a law cannot be sustained.. ."20
Justice Roberts examined next the evidence on the record. He found
that, in the circumstances, Herndon's solicitation of members for the
Communist Party and the pamphlets he carried on him, but had not
distributed, failed to "establish an attempt to incite others to
insurrection". Having found that the conviction was not supported by
the evidence, Justice Roberts turned to the statutory construction by
the Georgia courts. He held that under the Georgia doctrine, the jury
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and judge could not appraise the circumstances and the character of the 
defendant *s utterances as begetting a clear and present danger of 
forcible obstruction of a particular state function, and no ascertainable 
standard of guilt was provided. He objected particularly to the 
dissolution of the requirement of some direct causal and chronological 
link between the utterances and the apprehended consequences.
"To be guilty under the law as construed, a defendant need 
not advocate resort to force... If by the exercise of 
prophecy, he can forecast that, as a result of a chain of 
causation, following his proposed action a group may arise 
at some future date which will resort to force, he is 
bound to make the prophecy and abstain, under pain of 
punishment... Proof that the accused in fact believedthat 
his effort would cause a violent assault upon the state 
would not be necessary to conviction... The question thus 
proposed to a jury involves pure speculation as to future 
trends of thought and action... The law as thus construed, 
licenses the jury to create its own standard in each case...
The statute, as construed and applied, amounts merely to a 
dragnet which may enmesh anyone who agitates for a change 
of government if a jury can be persuaded that he ought to 
have foreseen that his words would have some effect in the 
future conduct of others." 21
Thus in Herndon the main elements of the danger test were linked 
with the preferred position of political freedoms. To be sure, the
Georgia statute was not invalidated. In this linkage, the strong assumption 
of constitutionality of legislative acts, an integral part of the Holmesian 
test, was eroded. The danger test was confirmed both as a rule for the 
examination of the evidence and as a potential test determining the 
constitutionality of statutes prohibiting specified categories of 
expression.
* -
During World War II, suppression of anti-war dissent in no way
resembled the Great War situation. The main left-wing groups and in
particular the Communist Party fully participated in the war effort in
accordance with the policy of the Third International. A typical Communist
Party leaflet ran: "Advocates of strike threats or strike actions in
America in 1945 are SCABS in the war against Hitlerism, they are SCABS
22against our .firmed Forces, they are SCABS against the labor movement".
Thus, during the War, the draconian provisions of the 1940 anti-communist
Smith Act were invoked only twice against a pro-Nazi group and the
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Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party in Minneapolis. The former
prosecution was eventually dropped, J while in the latter 18 leaders
of that party were convicted and certiorari was denied hy the
Supreme Court. ^  It was a tragic irony and a text-book example of
intra-left fratricide that the Communist Party which was later to
receive the full Smith Act treatment, supported in its newly-found
25loyalty, the anti-Trotskyite application of the Act.
In the two war-time sedition cases which the Court agreed to
review, the lower courts were reversed and the defendants acquitted.
26The first came under the 1917 Espionage Act (Hartzel v. U.S.).
Hartzel was convicted, under the second and third clauses of §3 
of the Act, for distributing three pro-German racialist articles, 
critical of American participation in the war. Justice Murphy, for 
the Supreme Court, held that under the Act two elements were necessary 
for conviction. The subjective of "a specific intent or evil purpose... 
to do the acts proscribed by Congress", and the objective of "a 
clear and present danger that the activities in question will bring
2&£labout the substantive evils which Congress has a right to prevent".
The Justice then examined the record, in some detail, for evidence 
of the required intent, and concluded that neither the contents of 
the articles nor the circumstances of their distribution provided 
proof beyond reasonable doubt on the requisite "narrow intent".
The conviction was reversed and the question whether the publications 
had created any danger to the war effort was not examined.
The second case (Taylor v. Mississippi) ' came under a 
Mississippi anti-sedition statute which prohibited the teaching 
of doctrines "designed and calculated to encourage violence, 
sabotage or disloyalty to the Government of the United States or
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the State of Mississippi". Two Jehovah*s Witnesses had been 
convicted under it for expressing their anti-war sentiments. The 
Supreme Court, per Justice Roberts, unanimously reversed.
"The statute as construed in these cases makes it 
a criminal offence to communicate to others views 
and opinions respecting government policies, 
and prophecies concerning the future of our own 
and other nations. As applied to the appellants, 
it punishes them although what they communicated 
is not claimed or shown to have been done with 
an evil or sinister purpose, to have advocated or 
incited subversive action against the nation or 
state, or to have threatened any clear and present 
danger to our institutions or our Government. What 
these appellants communicated were their beliefs 
and opinions concerning domestic measures and 
trends in national and world affairs."28
The rationale of the decision is not very clear. Justice 
Roberts found errors in the broad construction and application of 
the act by the lower courts; he held that the Witnesses were 
entitled to preach what they did, that they lacked the required 
specific intent for conviction, and that they did not create a 
clear and present danger. Thus, all the major doctrines used until 
that time in order to reverse convictions for expressive activities 
were referred to in Taylor. However the Court refrained again 
from using the preferred position rationale to invalidate the 
sedition law.
It is reasonable to conclude, nevertheless, that the Second War 
was fought in a more relaxed internal atmosphere than the First.
The scarcity of prosecutions initiated indicates that contingent 
political circumstances were the causes of that fact as much as 
the newly found liberalism of the Supreme Court and the federal
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and state judiciary which often receive all the praise in
29constitutional writings.
3. The Establishment of Loyal/Undesirable Ideologies. The First 
Cases
The obvious front-runner in the field of alien and hostile
ideologies, in the period under examination, was communism and assorted!
related beliefs. Cases dealing with communists are not lacking 
particularly towards the end of that period. However, the communist 
related legal material will be dealt with in the next chapter. Here, 
earlier Supreme Court interventions in the area of ideology-planning will 
be examined.
30While the "red flag" statutes encountered above, identified a
particular symbol with a subversive or disloyal ideology, another series
of statutes passed after the Great War demanded the symbolic public proclamation
of adherence to ideologies stipulated as patriotic and American. A
1919 pamphlet of the National Civil Liberties Bureau on "War-time
Prosecutions and Mob Violence" included, as one of the recurring
categories of mob violence, the listing "forced by mobs to kiss the 
31flag". This practice was after the War turned into a statutory
requirement of various forms: public oaths, gestures and salutes and
other such symbolic public affirmations of loyalty were introduced by
various states. The commonest type of statute made the ceremony of
32flag salute compulsory for all school children and teachers. A number 
of such statutes came up for review by the Supreme, Court in the 1940s.
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In Minersvllle School District v. Gobitis, ^  the local Board of
Education had compelled students and teachers to salute daily the 
flag proclaiming that "I pledge allegiance to my flag» and to the 
Republic for which it stands; one nation indivisible, with liberty 
and Justice for all". A Jehovah*s Witness family objected to the 
ceremony on religious grounds and their children were accordingly 
expelled from the School.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice Frankfurter 
writing for the majority, with only Justice Stone dissenting, treated the 
case as related solely to the religious freedom of the pupils which had 
to be "balanced" against the interests that the ordinance, supposedly, 
promoted.
" The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding 
tie of cohesive sentiment. Such a sentiment is fostered 
by all those agencies of the mind and spirit which may 
serve to gather up the traditions of a people, transmit 
than From generation to generation, and thereby create 
that continuity of a treasured common life which constitutes 
a civilization... The influences which help toward a common 
feeling for the common country are manifold. Some may 
seem harsh and others no doubt are foolish. Surely, however, 
the end is legitimate."34
National unity is "an interest inferior to none in the hierarchy
of legal values" and clearly outweighed the social interest in the
religious freedom of a few schoolchildren. The demand of the local
educational authorities was a reasonable one and the Court should
refrain from invalidating such a reasonable measure furthering the * -
paramount social interest. The injunction requested was refused.
By 1942, however Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy had Joined 
Stone in dissent (Jones v. Opelika^ )  and had indicated that their 
concurrence in Gobitis and the principle of Judicial deference 
expressed there by Frankfurter were erroneous. In 1943 Gobitis was 
explicitly overruled.
33
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The Vest Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette^ case that 
reversed Gobitis is often presented as one of the most important in 
Supreme Court Jurisprudence. The case deserves a detailed examination 
because it presents the two lines developing on expression theory and 
doctrine as well as on the role of Judicial review.
Justice Jackson wrote the prevailing opinion, while Eoberts, Eeed 
and Frankfurter dissented and retained their Gobitis position. Jackson 
relied on the free expression issues involved rahter than on religious 
freedom. The case was treated as the reverse equivalent of the 
earlier Stromberg case. As in that case the fundamental question was 
whether the government and its officials are permitted to coerce upon 
the people a uniform attitude towards all the important political and 
social matters and suppress non-conformist opinions.
The majority of the Court answered in the negative:
"We set up government by consent of the governed, and the 
Bill of Bights denies those in power any legal opportunity 
to coerce that consent. Authority here is to be controlled 
by public opinion, not public opinion by authority... [We] 
apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear 
that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse 
or even contrary will disintegrate the social organisation...
Ve can have intellectual individualism and the rich 
cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional minds 
only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal 
attitudes... Freedom to differ is not limited to things 
that do not matter much... If there is any fixed star in 
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their 
faith therein. If there are any circumstances which 
permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.*' (U.m.) 36a
A substantive part of the opinion is therefore devoted in discussing 
the Justification of free expression: it is the basis of democratic 
government and of the development and flourishing of individual personality. 
To this extent, it may be regarded as the Judicial pronouncement best 
encapsulating the tenets of J.S. Mill's individualism and of democratic 
humanism. Expression claims start their contest with other social 
interests in a "preferred position". The existence of a mere link of 
"reasonableness" between the legal restriction and a social interest
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will not suffice when the paramount interests in an "open society" are 
endangered.
"...[Fjreedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship 
may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are 
susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate 
danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect." 3&b
National unity may be fostered by persuasion and example but not by 
coercion. In the Barnette ordinance the power of compulsion was invoked 
without any allegation that remaining passive during the ceremony created 
a clear and present danger, a necessary requirement for any effort to 
muffle expression:
"To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say 
that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual*s right to 
speak his own mind, left it open to public authorities to 
compel him to utter what is not in his mind."37
Justice Frankfurter filed a lengthy and impassioned dissent. He wrote 
one of his typically well researched expositions on the virtues of Judicial 
self-restraint. Judicial review "prevent[s] the full play of the democratic 
process" and must be used with the "greatest caution"; he repudiated the 
rationale of the preferred position doctrine: "...even though legislation 
relates to civil liberties, our duty of deference to [the legislature] is 
no less relevant or less exacting"; and he complained that the danger test 
led the Court to assume "a legislative responsibility", and in any case the 
test was applicable solely to situations similar to that in Schenck. Its 
use in Barnette was "to take a felicitous phrase out of the context of the
i 37aparticular situation in which it arose". Judges may deem the compulsory
flag salute a foolish measure, but their task is not to pass on its wisdom
or its capacity to "inculcate concededly indispensable feelings". By
invalidating it, the Court abused the rules of democracy and declared
the "consciences of a minority [as] more sacred and more enshrined in
38the Constitution than the consciences of ,a majority".
Finally, an interesting wartime case related to the - now infamous - 
compulsory relocation of Japanese-Americans and their internment should 
be included within this category. Although it did not refer exclusively
to First Amendment issues, the wholesale loyalty of a large group of 
ueoule and their freedom were «.+. o+niro.
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Following Pearl Harbor the Roosevelt administration was alerted
to the existence of some 110,000 people of Japanese extraction in the
West Coast, any number or all of whom seemed to loyal, white Americans to
be an actual or potential fifth column. Under the promptings of
various military and political figures, Roosevelt initiated the
relocation programme in 1942. The American-Japanese were forcibly
uprooted from their homes and land which they had to sell cheaply and
were transferred to inland refugee camps and internment centres where
39they stayed throughout the war. Earl Warren who became later the 
celebrated liberal Chief Justice, was instrumental in the affair: 
testifying, as the California Attorney-General, to a Congressional 
Committee he declared that all West Coast strategic locations and 
installations had Japanese-Americans in their vicinity. "It is a 
situation fraught with the greatest danger and tinder no circumstances 
should it even be permitted to exist." And after the relocation, the 
then California Governor, Warren insisted that "if the Japs are 
released, no-one will be able to tell a saboteur from any other Jap".^®
In Korematsu v. U.S.^ a Japanese liable to relocation had 
remained in the restricted area and was accordingly criminally 
prosecuted and convicted. When his conviction came up for review by 
the Supreme Court the constitutionality of the whole programme became 
the prominent issue of the case.
The Court affirmed in a 6-3 decision written by its leading liberal 
Justice H. Black. Black examined the rationale of the whole programme 
and found it commensurate to the "gravest Imminent danger to public 
safety" posed by the potential espionage and sabotage activities of 
the interned Japanese. To the accusation that the measure was a racist 
imprisonment of a whole group without any evidence concerning the 
disloyalty of the individuals concerned, Black answered that the military 
authorities considered "the danger great and the time short for
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individual inquiries". The gravity of the danger disposed of any 
objections of harshness or violation of individual rights.
Frankfurter concurred but thought that Black*s exercise in 
examining the merits of the programme was unjustified. This was the 
"business [of the executive and military authorities] not ours".
The dissenters Murphy and Jackson stressed that not even one 
prosecution for espionage or sabotage had been brought against any 
Japanese-American before the relocation. They objected to the granting 
of constitutional legitimacy to military orders which involved a subtle 
construction of the due process clause according to which the 
Constitution "for all time validated the principle of racial 
discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting Americans".
Whatever the military considerations on the necessity of the measure, 
the importance of the Korematsu case for the evolution of the judicial 
notions of loyalty and personal freedom cannot be underestimated. A 
whole group of people, in this case racially demarcated, was accepted 
as inherently dangerous and consequently deprived of all the normal 
guarantees of criminal law and procedure. Dangerousness, in this case 
racially construed, becomes an inheritable vice. This principle of 
intrinsic dangerousness attributed to a certain social group "lies 
about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can 
bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need", to quote Justice 
Jackson*s dissent. Thus, while in earlier cases people were punished 
for advocating certain dangerous ideologies, here a whole group 
is exorcised, as such, irrespective of any specific ideology.
Dangerousness gets transformed, from being predominantly a function of 
a certain*1 subversive" ideology, to a function of the mere membership 
of a group and all the more repressive since such membership is 
involuntary. The construction of a notion of "universal guilt" that 
follows either adherence to a specific ideology or/and social belonging '
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irrespecrive of specific individual beliefs, received in Korematsu 
its first judicial approval. In the 50s the "loaded weapon" was used 
in much more extensive, pervasive and subtle ways. Jackson, too, would 
enthusiastically approve its use against communists and others. To 
that extent Korematsu may be seen as a crucial link connecting the 
pre- and post-War notions of guilt.
4. Aspects of the "Public Forum".
4.1. On the "Public Forum" in General
Public meetings, marches, demonstrations, picketing, canvassing 
and leafleting are kinds of expressive activity in which the "market 
place of ideas" is encountered in its most direct and less metaphorical 
form. Equally the intervention of state or local-administrative and 
police-authorities to prohibit or permit the event a priori, to halt 
or protect it on the spot, or to prosecute and punish participants 
after its occurrence - usually under the rubrics of public peace and 
order or simply law and order - is one of the most direct ways in 
which the public realm is officially constituted and sanctioned.
Professor H. Kalven has introduced in the examination of cases 
related to such problems the concept of the "public forum". According 
to it "in an open democratic society the streets, the parks and other 
public places are an important facility for public discussion and 
political process; they are in brief a public forum that the citizens 
can commandeer; the generosity and empathy with which such facilities 
are made available is an index of freedom".^2
The same concept has been utilized by other constitutional 
47authors. Although it is more limited than that of the public sphere 
introduced here, it may be profitably used as one important element or 
component of the latter, referring to the regulation of its spatial
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and temporal context.^ But as with the "broader concept, that of the 
public forum and its judicial construction cannot be seen as involving 
certain common principles actually applied or applicable across-the- 
board and for all times. As Emerson admits "the formulation of legal 
doctrine on this subject presents some special difficulties".^ However, 
both Kalven and Qnerson attempt again to construe such commonly 
applicable principles and doctrines, with liberal intentions admittedly 
and an eye at the mid-60s' use of the public forum by the various 
protest movements.
If one agrees with Professor Kalven's statement that the use of 
the facilities of the public forum is an "index of freedom", here 
again questions like "what" citizens, when and how have been actually 
allowed to "commandeer" them, may give an insight into the dynamic 
historical constitution of the public forum and the role of the 
judiciary and the Supreme Court in this process.
j
j
4.2. Jehovah's Witnesses in the public forum
The Supreme Court started dealing in earnest with cases, which
may be conveniently brought under the concept of the public forum, in
the late 30s. Until the early 50s, some 30 cases of that kind had
been decided. The majority of them involved activities of the
millenarian religious sect of Jehovah's Witnesses "distinguished by
great religious zeal and astonishing powers of annoyance" according
to Chafee.^ Indeed a great number of all cases related to expression
claims during that period involved the Witnesses, so that the 30s and
40s have been called the Jehovah's Witnesses period of constitutional 
47adjudi cation. '
I will examine some of the most characteristic cases of that period 
in chronological order, indicating the issues tackled and approaches
used in them
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The first two cases (Lovell v. Griffin and Schneider v. State)^  
involved the use of city ordinances and regulations which, in order to 
restrict religious canvassing and distribution of leaflets, required the 
prior licensing of such activities by the police authorities.
In Lovell, a municipal »rdinance required the permission of the city man­
ager for the distribution of any kind of literature in the streets. In 
Schneider, the ordinances involved required a similar police permission 
in order to canvass or distribute literature from house to house. Both 
Lovell and Schneider performed their religious duty to recruit new 
members for the Church with great zeal but without the required licence.
The two cases reached the Supreme Court within one year's time.
The city of Griffin's main arguments was that Lovell's right to speak 
freely had not been affected. The permission was required only for the 
public distribution of printed matter which, arguably, was not covered 
by the First Amendment.
Chief Justice Hughes writing for a unanimous Court, found the 
ordinance unconstitutional:
" The ordinance is not limited to 'literature' that is 
obscure or offensive to public morals or that advocates 
unlawful conduct... The ordinance embraces 'literature' 
in the widest sense.
...We think that the ordinance is invalid on its face.
Whatever the motive which induced its adoption, its 
character is such that it strikes at the very foundation 
of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to licence and 
censorship."
Freedom of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals.
It includes every sort of publication that is used as a medium of
information and the communication of opinions. As to the last defence
of the city of Griffin, Hughes stated:
"The ordinance cannot be saved because it relates to 
distribution and not to publication. 'Liberty of circulating 
is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing; 
indeed without the circulation, the publication would be 
of little value.* Ex parte Jackson 96 TJ.S. 727» 733« 49
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The ordinance was invalidated as an overbroad and total prior 
restraint on freedom of the press.
In Schneider, the cities argued that the licensing systems involved, 
intended to prevent the littering of the streets and fraudulent collections 
of money. A stringent police examination of the applicants - including 
the taking of photographs and fingerprinting - was required in order to 
ascertain their "good character".
Justice Roberts, accepted that such objectives were valuable but that
the courts should independently "weigh the circumstances and appraise the
50substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation".
There were alternative, less radical, means available to the local
authorities: they could increase their budgets for cleaning the streets
and prosecute littering, fraudulent solicitations and trespasses. But
the request that "all who wish to disseminate ideas must present them first
to police authorities for consideration and approval", was a measure that
allowed police to discriminate against groups and ideas and was
disproportionate to the objectives sought. The preferred freedoms of
speech and press and their exercise in "the streets [which] are natural
51and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion""^
were violated by the ordinances, which were accordingly annulled.
52In Cantwell v. Connecticut-; decided in 1940, a state law 
postulated that groups wishing to solicit money for "religious,
« i
charitable or philanthropic causes" should obtain the previous approval 
of a state official.
Again, Roberts stated that "the state may by general and non- 
discriminatory legislation regulate the times, places and manner of 
solicitation upon its streets, and of holding meetings thereon" but
the "determination by state authority as to what is a religious cause 
was an unwarranted incursion upon constitutional liberties.
55
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Cantwell had been also convicted under common law for inciting a
breach of the peace. He had played to two Catholics in the street a
record that attacked the Catholic religion and church. No fight had
followed and Cantwell was arrested afterwards.
Roberts reversed the conviction. There were two interests involved
that had to be balanced: that in public order and tranquility, which
the state should uphold when "clear and present danger of riot, disorder,
interference with traffic, or other immediate threats to public safety,
peace or order occurred"; and that in the "free communication of
54views, religious or others". The common law offence was not a
"narrowly drawn" statute and left an unacceptably wide discretion to
administrative and police authorities; anyway Cantwell*s utterances
did not create a clear and present danger to public peace and order.
Here a parenthesis should be opened. When 2 years later another
Witness was convicted for calling the Rochester, New Hampshire, city
marshall and council "racketeers" and "fascists" the Supreme Court
affirmed unanimously. In this case the indictment was brought under
a statute punishing any "offensive, derisive or annoying word to any
other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place".
The Court ruled that the statute was not vague and in language much
repeated and extended to other situations later it said:
"There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes 
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have 
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the 
libelous, and the insulting or »fighting* words - those 
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to 
incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well 
observed that such utterances are no essential part of 
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality."55
The term "fighting words" resembled the Holmesian expression about
"words that have all the effect of force" (Schenck) which are not
entitled to the stricter protection afforded by the danger test. The
Court indicated, thus, in Chaplinsky,that certain categories of 
expression, certain "messages" have no "social value" and cannot be 
accorded the status of "preferred freedom", the assumption from which 
most decisions of the period started. To be sure "lewd", "obscene" 
or "fighting words" axe not self-interpreting terms as the different 
results of Cantwell and Chaplinsky indicate. In Cantwell the 
prosecution can» under the common law crime of inciting a breach of 
the peace which was found too vague and indefinite, unlike the 
Chaplinski statute. But beyond the statutory differences, Chaplinski 
contained an important doctrinal point. Certain well and narrowly 
defined categories of speech - the lewd, profane, libelous and 
"fighting" words - were excluded from constitutional protection, since 
they do not appeal to reason and cannot be deemed as essential in the 
market place of ideas.
Thus, with the exception of Chaplinsky. most Jehovah*s Witnesses 
cases of the period were related to the definition of forms of public 
conduct that could qualify as protected expressive activity; and to 
the Supreme Court*s supervision of state regulation of its contextual 
(tin», place and manner) characteristics^ initiated in Cantwell and 
Schneider.
57In Cox v. New Hampshire^' a city ordinance that required a police
permit for any public parade or procession was found unobjectionable,
if it was granted with regard solely to "considerations of time,
place and manner so as to conserve the public convenience... and afford 
«
opportunity for proper policing". If the police authorities were not 
discriminating against some particular group but exercised "uniformity 
of method of treatment upon the facts of each application"'*® - a dictum 
which, to be sure, left open the door for a wholesale, non-discriminatory 
banning of all marches - then, the Court would uphold them.
- 226 -
- 227 -
In a later case, the licensing system was found lacking standards 
and narrowly drawn limitations and was declared an unacceptable prior 
restraint on expression and a denial of equal protection. The 
convictions following an unlicensed meeting after "a completely arbitrary 
and discriminatory refusal to grant the permits" were reversed.
In Martin v. Struthers^ a city ordinance prohibited persons 
distributing leaflets, circulars, or other advertisements to ring the 
door bells or otherwise to summon the occupants of houses. Justice 
Black speaking for the Court invalidated the ordinance. He thought 
that normal police and health regulations were sufficient and a general 
proscription of the kind involved, ran counter to the constitutional 
command that freedom to distribute information "must be fully 
preserved".
Expressing an idea that was repeatedly echoed in the Witnesses
cases, Black stated that "door to door distribution of circulars is
essential to the poorly financed causes of little people". The
conflicting interests for Black were those of privacy and of prevention
of health hazards. But as "freedom to distribute information... is
so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society" it may be
restricted only by reasonable regulation of its time and manner.
"The dangers of distribution can so easily be controlled 
by traditional legal methods, leaving to each householder 
the full right to decide whether he will receive strangers 
as visitors,.that stringent prohibitions can serve no 
purpose but that forbidden by the Constitution, the 
naked restriction of the dissemination of ideas."61
62In Murdock v. Pennsylvania the city had imposed a licence tax 
upon persons canvassing orders for goods or merchandise. Members of 
the Jehovah's Witnesses again, whq were selling religious literature, 
attacked the ordinance. With four Justices dissenting, Douglas spoke 
for the Court. The activities of the Witnesses were not of a 
commercial advertising character, which had been already excluded from
59
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preferred freedom status.^ The statute was therefore infringing 
freedom of speech and of the press hy imposing the so-called "taxes on 
knowledge":
"[This tax] restrains in advance those constitutional 
liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to 
suppress their exercise... it may not be said that proof 
is lacking that these license taxes... have restricted or are 
likely to restrict petitioners* religious activities. On 
their face they are a restriction of the free exercise 
of those freedoms which are protected by the First 
Amendment." 64
65The four dissenters in Murdoch and a follow-up case, argued
that a flat non-discriminatory levy for all publications, of the sort
envisaged in Cox for licensing demonstrations, would be intact. But
the "poor man's medium" argument won the day - albeit precariously.
By 1951* a similar ordinance was upheld in relation to solicitation of
subscriptions for a weekly journal.^
67Finally, in Marsh v. Alabama ' the Witnesses* evangelical forays
led to violationsof the regulations of that all-American institution
the privately owned company town. Many of these towns were run by
local company bosses as feudal demesnes; an American historian has
remarked that many of the industrial struggles of the *30s and *40s
involved demands for "democratization at the work-place and civil
68liberties in company towns".
The ordinances of such a town prohibited all solicitations in its 
streets, and the Witnesses were accordingly prosecuted and convicted 
under a general Alabama criminal trespass law. Justice Black for 
the Supreme Court, with only Justice Beed dissenting, reversed the 
conviction. He argued that had the town not been privately owned, 
the expressive rights of the Witnesses would have been indisputable. 
Bit Chicasaw, the town in question, functioned like any other
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municipality; its public function, therefore, determined the 
extent of state regulation, and private ownership did not entitle 
the company to insulate the town inhabitants from all public debate. 
Alabama had argued that the company1 s powers were coextensive to 
those of a homeowner regulating the conduct of his guests. But
"Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The 
more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property 
for use by the public in general, the more do his 
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and 
constitutional rights of those who use it." 69i
Justice Black resolved this early conflict between freedom of 
expression and private property in favour of the former: "When we 
balance the constitutional rights of owners of property against 
those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we 
must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a 
preferred position".
Marsh introduced a radically novel principle; it was accepted 
that a person could remain on private property against the wishes of 
the owner for the purpose of exercising First Amendment freedoms.
Thus, for First and Fourteenth Amendment purposes, the company 
town was found to be equal to any state municipality; the determining 
factor was its public function rather than its private title. The 
ramifications of this rule were further explored, in the 60s and 
70s, in cases involving the admission of trade unions and protest 
movements in the public forum.
4»3» Trade-unions in the public forum 
4.3.1» Historical background
The *30s were, arguably, one of the most important periods in the
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history of the American Labour movement for various reasons. Between
1 9 3 3 and 1 9 3 7 - a great upsurge of spontaneous strike action, unauthorized
by the official American Federation of Labor (the "wildcat strikes")
engulfed America. A series of mass picketings (symbolized by the
11-mile long picket line of the Goodyear plant in 1936), factory
occupations and "sitdowns", unheard of before either in scale or
inventiveness of method, culminated in the "spring fever" of 1 9 3 7 in
70which 477 factories were occupied.
A number of radical labour leaders, led by John Lewis of the
Mineworkers, broke away from the A.F.L. in 1935 and launched the
Committee for Industrial Organisation (C.I.O.), a federation committed
to industrial unionization. The C.I.O. put a strong challenge to the
71old, corrupt and collaborationist leadership of the A.F.L. By 
1941» the C.I.O. had attracted some 3 million members against 4>5 
million of the A . F . L . T h r o u g h  its political organization (the 
Labor*s Nonpartisan League), the C.I.O. helped Roosevelt win the 1936 
election and consolidate his position against the Southern "Dixiecrats" 
and right-wing opposition within the Democratic Party. Roosevelt, on 
his part, pressed by the strikes and the effects of the Depression 
introduced a series of measures - against strong corporate reaction - 
intended to provide some minimum security for workers and old people
and a junior-partner negotiating position for the unions.
* •>
In 1935» Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act, which
established a National Labor Relations Board with some uninn participation
in it, the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Social Security Act, all
three of which were ultimately and painfully upheld by the Supreme
Court after the "judicial revolution"; The N.L.R.A. in N.L.R.B. v.
Jones and Laughlin Steel Cor. the F.L.S.A. in XT.S, v. Darby‘S  and
75the S.S.A. in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis.
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While in the previous period the Court had declared that workers
were "in no sense words of the state" and that trade unions were
covered by the anti-trust provisions of the Sherman Act but not the
76manufacturing monopolies, official attitudes toward them changed in 
the »30s and '40s and the Court, hesitantly, followed them.
4*3*2. The trade-union cases
This change was echoed in Supreme Court decisions related to the 
trade unions* position in the public forum. In 1911» the Court had 
said in a case involving the publication of the name of an anti-union 
company, in the official A.F.L. journal, under the headings "Unfair" 
and "We don*t patronize", that:
"In the case of an unlawful conspiracy, the agreement to act 
in concert when the signal is published, gives the words 
•unfair', 'don't patronize* or similar expressions, a force 
not adhering in the words themselves, and therefore exceeding 
any possible right of speech... Under such circumstances they 
become what have been called 'verbal acts' and as such 
subject to injunction as the use of any other force whereby 
property is unlawfully damaged".77
Ironically, the losing appellant in that case was Gompers the
early right-wing leader of the A.P.L., who was instrumental in the
eventual failure of left-wing unions and Debs' attempts to build a nationally
78based socialist party. Por the old Court all unions - whatever their 
political complexion - were equally reprehensible conspiracies.
But in 1937» the Supreme Court examining the constitutionality of 
a state statute authorizing union picketing of a non-unionized 
establishment, in an attempt to create a union branch, found that 
picketing was a 14th Amendment protected freedom.
"Members of a union might, without special statutory 
authorization by a state make known the facts of a labor 
dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal 
Constitution. The state may in the exercise of its police 
power, regulate the methods and means of publicity as well 
as the use of public streets."79
Following that case, the Court started reviewing a series of legal 
measures used by various states, to halt organisational and other
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trade union activities. To be sure, "physical harassment" as Emerson
80euphemistically calls it was also extensively used by local
authorities to that effect. The National Guard and private police
forces were repeatedly brought out to break strike action (for example
in the Memorial Day massacre of the striking Chicago steel workers in
1938) particularly after the cooling of the Boosevelt-Lewis relationship
81in 1937 and the pro-A.F.L. turn of the President.
Be that as it may, the Supreme Court started defining the union 
activities which could be, construed as protected freedoms of speech
and assembly and ■those which could be constitutionally suppressed.
82In Hague v. C.I.O., a New Jersey ordinance required that all
public meetings should be licensed by the Director of Safety who could
turn down any application if there were fears of "riots, disturbances
or disorderly conduct". Mayor Hague had consistently used the
ordinance to prevent public C.I.O. recruitment meetings.
Justice Roberts, overruling an earlier decision, rejected the
claim that the city authorities, as the owners of streets and parks,
could exclude therefrom activities deemed undesirable. In a much
quoted phrase, referred to above,^ he stated that public places were
"immemorially" used for assembly, communication and public discussion.
The ordinance was held "void on its face" for being a vague instrument
of "arbitrary" and "uncontrolled official suppression" of an ancient
privilege and immunity. The city's duty was to maintain order but
not through the prohibition of all public speech.
84■The 1940 case of Thornhill v. Alabama ^ marked the high water 
point of judicial protection of public union activities, although 
against a rather simple background.
An Alabama statute proscribed all going near to, loitering about 
or picketing "the works or place of a business... for the purpose of 
hindering, delaying or interfering with or injurihg ■ such business".
Thornhill, the president of a union striking against a no-union company, 
was convicted by the state courts under the law, for forming a one-man 
picket line outside the factory. There was no question of any 
violence and only one employee had been persuaded not to enter the 
premises.
Justice Morphy reversed the conviction, speaking for the Court 
with only one Justice dissenting,and declared the statute unconstitutional. 
All the constitutional standards devised and employed until that time 
were mentioned in his opinion.
He first stated that the substantiality of reasons advanced in 
support of the challenged regulations must be independently appraised 
by the courts. Then, he mentioned the principle of "voidness for 
overreach". A statute must aim specifically at evils within the 
allowable area of state control and not sweep within its ambit other 
activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute as exercise of 
freedom of speech or of the press. Having thus declared his premises,
iI
he went on to examine concretely the statute in question.
He started by saying that the dissemination of information 
concerning the facts of a labour dispute is an exercise of expression 
guaranteed by the First Amendment. And picketing is a mode of 
expression within this protected area of expression. While the state 
cannot abridge the right by proscribing altogether a certain class of 
expression - for example expression related to industrial disputes - 
it may nevertheless regulate the forms which this expression may take.
He indicated that such regulation should take into account the number 
of pickets, the peaceful or violent character of the activity, the 
nature of the dispute and the accuracy of the assertions made. But 
the Alabama statute prohibited all picketing without any specific
considerations
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"It does not follow that the S tate in dealing with the 
evils arising from industrial disputes may impair the 
effective exercise of the right to discuss freely 
industrial relations which are matters of public concern... 
Every expression of opinion on matters that are important 
has the potentiality of inducing action in the interests 
of one rather than another group in society. But the 
group in power at any moment may not impose penal 
sanctions on peaceful and truthful discussion of matters 
of public interest merely on a showing that others may thereby 
be persuaded to take action inconsistent with its 
interests... We hold that the danger of injury to an 
industrial concern is neither so serious nor so imminent 
as to justify the sweep* ... » freedom
The Thornhill rhetoric reminds one of the contemporary Jehovah* s 
Witnesses cases, although the enumeration of the relevant considerations 
to be taken into account sounded more menacing than corresponding 
statements in Witnesses* decisions. When more complicated industrial 
disputes started reaching the Supreme Court, the liberal-democratic 
rhetoric and the expanding protection afforded to the sect was not 
forthcoming.
86In a 1941 case, the Drivers* Union was involved in extensive 
peaceful picketing of shops trading in cut-price milk distributed by 
non-unionised drivers. There was some violence against the dairies . 
and shops but as Justice Black remarked, in his dissenting opinion, 
there was no evidence whatsoever connecting the picketing with any 
violence. But frankfurter found, for the majority, that a court
injunction against the continuation of picketing was valid:
*
"Acts of picketing in themselves peaceful [can be enjoined] 
when they are enmeshed with contemporaneously violent 
conduct.•• [A]cts which in isolation are peaceful may be 
part of a coercive thrust when entangled with acts of 
violence. The picketing in this case was set in a background 
of violence. In such a setting it could justifiably be 
concluded that the momentum of fear generated by past 
violence would survive even though future picketing might 
be wholly peaceful."87
• Justice frankfurter held that an individual injunction against 
future picketing and communication of industrial grievances based on
of discussion embodied
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the evidence of past violence connected with the dispute was within 
State power; in accordance with his theory of judicial deference, he 
argued that a reversal of the injunction would be an intrusion “into 
the realm of policy-making by reading our own notions into the 
Cnns ti tution".
Justice Black, dissenting, thought that the injunction, which 
prohibited all future union communications on the subject of cut-price 
milk deliveries, was an overbroad restriction of free speech in violation 
of the First Amendment; from his reading of the reocrd, he insisted 
that the violence was not related to the picketing and in any case it 
was not the reason for which the injunction was issued by the State 
courts.
88In Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl. a union had picketed some 
bakeries which sold products to two non-unionised peddlers, in an 
attempt to convince them either to join up or to employ an unemployed 
relief driver for one day in a week. The New York courts granted an 
injunction against the picketing which was reversed by the Supreme 
Court. Justice Jackson held that a "state is not required to tolerate
in all places and all circumstances even peaceful picketing by an
88stindividual"; in the case at bar however, the union was communicating
' ' ■ fits legitimate grievances to the public, no violence or coercion was 
involved and the means used - only two pickets at a time - had slight 
repercussions only on third parties not involved in the dispute.
Justice Douglas, concurring in the result, felt that the list of 
the occasions, in which picketing could be constitutionally enjoined 
under the majority ruling, constituted a drastic departure from 
Thornhill. Under these rules only ineffective picketing was allowed.
He went on to state that picketing was something more than pure
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expression, "speech pins", or "speech brigaded with action" as the 
idea became known later:
'Ticketing by an organised group is more than free speech, 
since it involves patrol of a particular locality and 
since the very presence of a picket line may induce 
action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of 
the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated."
Those aspects of picketing which involved action were subject to
regulation under the normal police powers of the state, but such
regulation touching on the expressive aspects of the activity should
be "narrowly drawn, of general application and regulating the use of
89the streets by all picketeers."
The last case in which union rights in the public forum were upheld,
90in the period Tinder examination, came in 1945» Justice Rutledge's 
opinion, however, that found for the union attracted only three more 
votes (Slack, Douglas, Murphy) and the necessary fifth was given on 
different grounds by Jackson while the rest of the Justices dissented.
The case cams under a Texas law which stipulated that all trade 
union officials should apply for an "organiser's licence" before 
soliciting members for their union. Thomas, a C.I.O. president,defied 
an injunction and addressed a workers' meeting where he asked the 
audience to join the union.
Rutledge's prevailing opinion combined "danger" phraseology with
the preferred position of expression claims.
"/I7ny attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified 
by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or 
remotely, but, by clear and present danger. The rational 
connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be 
curbed, which in other contexts might support legislation 
against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice.
These rights rest on firmer foundation."91
The danger test in this construction is no more a vehicle for the
scrutiny of the particular circumstances (the context) of the expression
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claim but a yardstick for a judicial evaluation of the legislative 
determination of the conflicting interests. In every case of conflict 
between the interest in expression and some other social interest, the 
balance struck by legislatures must be examined by the court in general 
in order to determine whether a high degree of necessity links the 
restriction and the state concern.
"That judgment in the first instance is for the legislative 
body® But in our system where the line cam constitutionally 
be placed presents a question this Court cannot escape 
answering independently. whatever the legislative judgment, 
in the light of our constitutional tradition. And the 
answer, under that tradition, can be affirmative, to 
support an intrusion upon this domain, only if grave and 
impending public danger requires this'.1. (U.m.)
In this judicial evaluation the interest in expression starts from 
a favoured position.
"Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is perhaps 
more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation 
is balanced by the preferred place given in our system to 
the great, the indispensable freedoms secured by the First 
Amendment. That priority gives these liberties a sanctity 
and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. And 
it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, 
which determines what standard governs the choice." (U.m.) 92
Four Justices dissented from this opinion, in which a uninn came 
closest at receiving the full protective treatment of the religious 
sects. They included the Chief Justice and Frankfurter who rejected 
both the rationale and the reversal of conviction. It was their line 
that soon prevailed, making, thus, the admission of unions in the 
public forum a chequered one.
In the aftermath of the War, a relative industrial peace was 
superseded by a strike wave in 1945-6 which "surpassed anything of its
gzkind in any capitalist country, including the British General Strike".
On the other hand, the Congress fell to the Republicans in 1946 and the 
left-wing New Dealers were on the defensive. The Taft-Hartley Act,
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passed in 1947» combined measures for the purging of communists from 
the unions (examined in the next chapter) and a frontal attack on 
unionism, as such, by outlawing solidarity strikes and boycotts as 
well as uninn contributions to political campaigns.
Following these developments, the Supreme Court, in a series of 
cases under the intellectual leadership of Justice Frankfurter, 
reassessed its definition of picketing as a constitutionally protected 
expressive activity, which had emerged in the Thornhill to Thomas line 
of decisions. ,
94In Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co.. a .Union had launched 
an organisational drive trying to attract a number of non-unionised 
ice peddlers. To achieve its objective it obtained agreement from 
all wholesale ice distributors, but the appellee, that they would sell 
ice exclusively to union members. The Empire Company refused to agree 
and the union started picketing its premises causing a 8596 reduction 
in Empire's trade. The company obtained an injunction under Missouri's 
anti-trust law which the Supreme Court affirmed unanimously.
Justice Black started by rejecting the union's argument that 
anti-trust laws are not applicable to trade unions. He argued that 
the power to regulate trade and commerce rests with the legislatures 
and Missouri's decision to apply its anti-trust laws to all combinations 
in restraint of trade, including those in which unions are parties, 
could not be challenged under idle scheme of the separation of powers.
He then examined the union's objection that the injunction was an 
unconstitutional prohibition of the peaceful communication of truthful 
facts about a labour dispute. But as all activities of the appellants 
were intended to compel the company to stop selling its goods to non- 
unionised peddlers, thus entering into an illegal combination, they 
"constituted a single, integrated course of conduct, which was in
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95violation of Missouri’s valid law". The fact that the main means of 
the union’s action was the carrying of placards did not immunise 
the otherwise illegal conduct from state control* The power of the 
labour union and its allies was "irresistible" and would render the 
state's anti-trust law into a "dead letter". Thus, in the special 
circumstances of Giboney. the picketing was enjoined for putting 
unwarranted economic pressure on a company which could lead to the 
violation of a valid law. Picketing in order to achieve an illegal 
objective was not constitutionally protected.
The Giboney ruling was relied upon in three more cases, all 
decided on the same day in 1950»
97In the first (Hughes v. Superior Court). ' which was to be
repeated in the ’60s in various forms, the Supreme Court upheld an
injunction by the California Supreme Judicial Court which enjoined
picketing by a black organisation of a shop that employed less black
people than the proportion of black customers. For Frankfurter, the
defender of legislative supremacy, the fact that the court injunction
was not based on any clear statutory provisions did not matter.
The "policy of California" was validly expressed by the judiciary
and the difference between judicial and legislative determination was
"immaterial". Industrial picketing is more than "free speech" and
the 14th Amendment cannot be construed "as prohibiting California
from securing respect for its policy against involuntary employment
on racial lines by prohibiting systematic picketing that would subvert 
98such policy".7
99In the other two cases, picketing of a non-unionised business 
and of a hotel, whose owner refused to sign a contract with the union 
as the recognised representative of the staff, were prohibited. In
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the first case, the owner of a garage had refused to abide by the union 
demand to close his business at nights and during weekends. The local 
branch of the Teamsters sent a single picket to patrol outside the 
garage, and as a result unionised drivers refused to deliver goods 
to the business. The owner obtained an injunction, which the Supreme 
Court upheld.
Justice Frankfurter, for the majority, opened his opinion by 
stating that picketing "cannot dogmatically be equated with the 
constitutionally protected freedom of speech". He approached the case 
as one involving a conflict between two competing interests: the 
interest of the union not to have working conditions undermined by 
non-union shops and that "of a democratic society of encouraging self­
employer economic units as a counter-movement to the dangers inherent in 
excessive concentration of economic power". Thus, the admittedly 
iruthful and peaceful character of the picketing was not given any 
special consideration. Picketing may by allowed or prohibited by a 
state, the Justice insisted, as a matter of policy, and not because of 
the constitutional demands of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
In accordance with his views on judicial restraint, the Justice 
concluded that it was not for the Court to question the balance struck 
by the state. "[T]he solution of these perplexities is a challenge to 
wisdom and not a command of the Constitution..."
Justice Minton, dissenting, wrote that the majority^ approach
was a departure from the earlier picketing cases which "were rooted
99ain the free speech doctrine". The accepted doctrine,which protected 
"peaceful picketing and truthful publicity",was seriously undermined, 
and the states were notified that they could outlaw all picketing and 
not solely the abuse of picketing.
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In the second case, the picketing was found to have an unlawful 
objective, namely, "coercion by the employer of the employees* 
selection of a bargaining representative" which violated the 
"statutory policy against employer coercion of employees’ choice". 
Thus, in accordance with Giboney. picketing for the purpose of 
forcing an employer to violate state law or policy, could be 
enjoined.
The line of decisions which had started with Thornhill came to 
100an end in a 1957 case, involving picketing by the Teamsters
Union of a non-unionised gravel pit in Wisconsin. Justice
Frankfurter upheld an injunction against the picketing, after
reviewing some of the cases examined above. The Justice made clear
his disenchantment with the Thornhill ruling that picketing was a
constitutionally protected expressive activity. "[T]he broad
pronouncements... of Thornhill had to yield *to the impact of
facts unforeseen', or at least not sufficiently appreciated".
The picketing disputes involved not so much a question of free
speech, but a review of the balance of the competing interests of
the unions and. the states. He concluded his review of the cases,
by stating what he thought as the applicable doctrines
"This series of cases, then, established a broad field 
in which a State, in enforcing some public policy, 
whether of its criminal or its civil law, and whether 
pronounced by its legislature or its courts, could 
constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing, aimed at 
preventing effectuation of that policy." 101
Justices Douglas, Black and the Chief Justice dissented. They
protested that the decision was overruling an established principle,
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and was taking the Court back to its position before Thornhill.
’’Today the Court signs the formal surrender... State courts and 
state legislatures are free to decide whether to permit or suppress 
any particular picket line for any reason other than a blanket 
policy against all p i c k e t i n g " . U n d e r  the majority’s doctrine, 
all picketing could now be enjoined, if a court found its purpose 
to be contrary to some state policy, without more. Justice Douglas 
insisted that solely the conduct involved in picketing could be 
controlled or prohibited, and as no evidence of violence or coercion 
existed in the present case the injunction should be reversed. He 
relied on his Wohl "speech plus" and Black’s Giboney "single and 
integrated course of conduct" definitions of picketing. However, 
these were.two of the main authorities,used by Frankfurter too, in 
order to uphold the injunction.
Finally, an important union rights case of that period should 
be mentioned. It does not relate strictly to public forum aspects 
but to more general considerations of the political sphere. It
came under section 9(a) of the Hatch Act passed by Congress in
1021939« Its second sentence provided that:
I I"No officer or employee in the executive branch of the 
Federal Government, or any agency or department thereof, 
shall take any active part in political management or 
political campaigns. All such persons shall retain the 
right to vote... and to express their opinion."
The Act was extended in 1940 to all state or local government 
employees. According to its rigorous enforcement by the Civil Service 
Commission,the Act "operates as a broad prior control, cutting off
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beforehand political* conduct of almost every description except 
voting”.
A number of federal employees, joined by a Civil Service Union, 
asked the Supreme Court to reverse a Federal Court injunction enjoining 
them from undertaking political activities and to declare the relevant 
clause of the Act unconstitutional for violating among other 
constitutional provisions the First Amendment. In United Public 
Workers of America v. Mitchell^^  the Court declined the request 
for a declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality and examined the 
merits in relation to the sole appellant, a roller at the federal 
mint, who had violated the Act by engaging in political activities 
during the 1946 Congressional elections.
Justice Reed,for the majority,balanced the interests purportedly 
protected by the prohibition. He speculated on the various reasons that 
Congress might have considered in passing the Act and found that these 
could have been the need for service efficiency or for political neutrality. 
Answering the obvious objection that neutrality is not a necessary 
requirement for a good engineer - if possible at all, for anyone, one 
could add - Reed stated that "if in free time [the appellant] is engaged 
in political activity, Congress may have concluded that the activity may 
promote or retard his advancement or preferment with his superiors". All 
these reasons made the Act nothing more than "reasonably deemed by 
Congress", which, to be sure, begs the question: if the judicial function 
is to judge the "reasonableness" of a legislative measure, this task 
cannot be fulfilled through mere speculation about the possible or probable 
reasons that Congress could have had in mind. One "reasonably" assumes 
that every legislature has son» reason or other for passing that or any 
other Act. In this sort of approach the question surely is, whether the
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reasons were sufficient, not whether any reason at all could he found 
to fit into the Act.
In any case, according to the majority, the loss in expression 
rights was minimal since "expressions, public or private, on public 
affairs, personalities and matters of public interest... are 
unrestricted".
Black, Ruthledge and Douglas dissented. For Black, the Act deprived 
all civil servants of their right to bring about "changes in their 
lives, their fortunes, their happiness". He disputed the "reasonableness"i
(in the sense of sufficiency) of all the possible reasons advanced and 
thought that they could have been served by other less drastic means.
"It makes honest participation in essential political 
activities an offense punishable by proscription from 
public employment. It endows a governmental board with 
the awesome power to censor the thoughts, expressions, 
and activities of law-abiding citizens in the field of 
free expression, from which no person should be barred by 
a government which boasts that it is a government of, for 
and by the people - all the people. Laudable as its 
purpose may be, it seems to me to hack the roots of a 
Government by the people themselves; and consequently I 
cannot agree to sustain its validity. " 1 0 5
Douglas would have found the Act constitutional, if it was construed
to cover solely administrative employees, leaving blue-collar government
workers free to engage in politics. It has been estimated that by
1061966 the number of people affected by the Act was 8 million.
4.4« The problem of the "hostile audiences"
Towards the end of the period under consideration, the Supreme 
Court dealt with cases relating to the use of the public forum for 
political expression by groups and individuals at the margins of the 
spectrum of "party politics". According to the Court's Mitchell 
decision, above, "party politics" has been construed as the legitimate 
definition of politics, tout court.
107Two cases (Terminiello v. Chicago and Feiner v. New York) ' were 
decided in a span of two years and make an interesting comparison. They
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relate to questions of public order and police involvement in "face-to- 
face" situations where public speeches arouse immediate animosity from 
parts of the audience and, thus, lead to actual or potential breaches
* ik 108of the peace.
In the first case, Terminiello, an ex-priest, had held a meeting’ 
in a Chicago Hall where he "vigorously, if not viciously" attacked 
Communists, Jews, Negroes and liberals alike and called a hostile crowd 
gathered outside the hall "slime", "scum", "snakes", "bedbugs" and 
similar niceties. There was evidence of some ensuing violence 
described by Douglas as "several disturbances" and by Jackson as a 
"riot", a not-inconsiderable difference that underlines the problems of 
attributing a self-evident or self-interpreting character to the facts 
of a criminal case.
Terminiello was convicted for breach of the peace construed, by 
the trial court, to include among other elements "speech that stirs the 
public to anger and invites dispute".
The circumstances of Terminiello (a derogatory speech, hostile 
groups facing each other, some violence) made it a good case for the 
use of the danger test, as applied to face-to-face situations.
Douglas, however, writing for a 5-4 majority reversed the conviction 
without even considering whether public disturbances were likely to 
occur because of Terminiello1s speech - although they did actually 
occur. He would have done that only if he was satisfied that the 
statute, as construed, fulfilled the stringent standards set out by the 
preferred position attributed to expression in the scale of social 
values. But the construction of the statute which, according to him, 
would silence expression, as soon as it promoted "diversity of ideas" 
and hostile reaction, was defying one of the main functions of expressions
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"...[A] function of free speech under our system of government 
is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high 
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates 
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs 
people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging.
It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have 
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance 
of an idea. That is why freedom of speech though not 
absolute... is nevertheless protected against censorship 
or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear 
and present danger of a serious substantive evil that 
rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance,or unrest...
There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive 
view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of 
ideas either by legislatures, courts or dominant political 
or community groups. " 109
Justice Jackson, in his dissent reiterated the Schenck formula and 
accused the court for silently abandoning the "long-standing" test and 
substituting it with a "dogma" of absolute freedom for irresponsible 
and provocative utterances. In a somewhat exaggerated language, if one 
takes into account the trade union decisions, he decried the fact that
the Court had gone "far toward accepting the doctrine that civil liberty
|
means the removal of all restraints from these crowds and that all 
local attempts to maintain order are impairments of the liberty of the 
citizen. The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between 
liberty with order and anarchy without either. There is danger that, 
if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little 
practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights 
into a suicide pact"!^®
In the second case, Feiner, a member of the left-wing Young 
Progressives had made a speech in a street corner of Syracuse, a 
predominantly black area in New York. In it, he publicised a meeting 
of his group and protested the revocation of a permit to use the hall 
of a local school for it. He attacked President Truman (the Young 
Progressives were the youth organisation of the presidential candidate 
H. Wallace1 Progressive Party), called the American legion a "Nazi 
Gestapo" and denounced the Mayor of Syracuse who "does not speak for
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Negro population”. There was a ”little excitement” in the audience but 
the majority of 80 onlookers were sympathetic and no disturbances were 
reported. One bystander threatened that he would remove Feiner himself, 
if the police did not intervene. Two attending policemen asked Feiner 
twice to stop speaking, to no avail, and then arrested him without 
giving him, however, any reasons for the. arrest. He was later tried 
and convicted for disorderly conduct.
Chief Justice Vinson, for the majority, did not find any reason 
in the record to reverse the conviction. He referred to the danger test 
but concluded that Feiner's arrest was not the result of over-zealous 
police efforts to silence a particular speaker and halt an otherwise 
lawful meeting:
"It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as 
an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views, and 
another to say that, when as here the speaker passes the 
bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement 
to riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of the 
peace (sic)... The findings of the state courts as to the 
existing situation and the imminence of greater disorder 
coupled with petitioner^ deliberate defiance of the police 
officers convince us that we should not reverse this 
conviction in the name of free speech."111
Black*s dissent points again to the impossibility of any "innocent”,
so to speak, reading of the facts. For him the evidence showed no
"imminent threat of riot or uncontrollable disorder". The policeman
should have protected the speaker, if there were any threats against
him, and should have explained the reasons for his demand that Feiner
stops his speech. In doing neither he had created his own law "on the
spot" and deliberately defied "ordinary official duty as well as the
112constitutional right of free speech".
The contrast between Terminiello and Feiner becomes even more
pronounced if one takes into account a case decided the same day as
113Feiner. Kunz v. New York involved the conviction of a Baptist 
minister who had held a public religious meeting without a permit from
police commissioner, required under a New York ordinance. Kunz, a
fascist, was frequently preaching in public and was given to such
statements as "Jews are Christ killers" and "all the garbage that didn't
believe in Christ should have been burnt in the incinerators. It's a
shame they all weren't", which had led to repeated disturbances and
scuffles. The police finally denied the required statutory licence and
his arrest and conviction followed an unlicensed meeting.
The Court found the ordinance invalid as a blanket prior
prohibition on expression and for lacking the necessary administrative
standards that would have made the licensing system a non-discriminatory
exercise of police discretion. Jackson, the most consistent Justice in
all these cases, was the sole dissenter. Kunz, as indeed Terminiello,
11AFeiner, Niemotko (another case decided on the same day too J and
Saia and Kovacs (see below), were not exercising constitutional rights
but the "consecrated hatreds of sect". Interestingly, Jackson was the
author of one of the most praised judicial exposes on the meaning of
115free speech, only a few years previously in the Barnette case.
4.5« The "Poor Man's" Media
Finally, two cases of the period in which the regulation of the 
tenor of speech, in the public forum, was at stake should be included 
in the list. They both related to the use of loudspeakers in public 
places (a park and a street) to communicate messages to passers-by.
The first (Saia v. New York ) decided in 1948 involved the 
conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who had preached in a park using 
sound amplification devices, after the police denied him a permit 
required by a New York ordinance. The ordinance was meant to protect 
people in public places from undue annoyances.
Douglas found the regulation "invalid on its face, for it 
establishes a previous restraint on the right of free speech". The
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licensing system gave wide discretion to the police to ban all 
communications "because some persons were said to have found the sound 
annoying". But "annoyance in ideas can be cloaked in annoyance at 
sound". The decibels, hours and place of speech could be regulated, 
but an outright ban-defied the fact that "loud speakers are today 
indispensable instruments of effective public speech".
The following year, however, the Court reversed its position
117completely. Interestingly, in Kovacs v . Cooper. the New Jersey 
ordinance was must harsher than the New York one. It imposed a complete 
ban on the "use or operation... of any device known as sound truck, 
loud speaker or sound amplifier... or instrument... which emits 
therefrom loud and raucous noises". Predictably, Kovacs, the losing 
appellant, was a trade unionist who had been publicising an industrial 
dispute using a sound truck. His conviction, in a police court, was 
affirmed by the New Jersey courts and was based on the undisputed fact 
that he had used the proscribed sound amplifying device.
The Supreme Court's eagerness to uphold the ordinance (and
conviction) against its recent invalidation of a much more lenient one
while at the same time affirming its faithfulness to the doctrine
enunciated in Saia. makes the Kovacs prevailing opinion a piece of
judicial reasoning bordering closer to sophistry and "language games"
rather than any acknowledged method of logical deduction. It also 
■ 118illustrates the point advanced above, about the ambiguous character 
of precedent and legal doctrine.
For Justice Heed, Saia should decide the present case, as well.
That decision allowed state regulation of the tone, hours and places of 
amplified speech. The New Jersey ordinance was a good example of such 
valid regulation since it dissallowed only "loud and raucous" noises 
in the streets. "The right of free speech is guaranteed every citizen 
that he may reach the minds of willing listeners, and to do so there
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mast be opportunity to win their attention. [But] it is an extravagant
extension... to say that because of it a city cannot forbid talking on
the streets through a loudspeaker in a loud and raucous tone". One
wonders what sort of noises a "loud" speaker can emit other than loud.
As the dissenting Justice Black put it, "The record reflects not even a
shadow of. evidence to prove that the noise was either "loud or raucous"
unless these words of the ordinance refer to any noise coming from an
119amplifier whatever its volume or tone".
For Black, public meetings which necessitate the use of sound 
amplifiers, are the "poor man*s press". Their prohibition discriminates 
against a medium . of communication predominantly utilised by under­
privileged groups: "There are many people who have ideas that they 
wish to disseminate but who do not have enough money to own or control 
publishing plants, newspapers, radios, moving picture studios or chains 
of show places". The fact that these powerful channels of communication 
(and television was not, as yet, one of them) must be under the 
"control and guidance of comparatively few people" was an unobjectionable 
consequence of "our economic system*'. But, as long as the poor were 
allowed their loudspeakers, they could compete with the organised 
media and redress the imbalance created by the fact that the "press, 
the radio and the moving pictures owners have their favorites... [and 
are not] at sill times fair" 11
5. The Supreme Court and the Press
To close this period of constitutional adjudication, a look at the 
Court*s treatment of the "organized media" and, in particular, the 
press, is necessary.
It should be noted at the outset that during that period a growing 
awareness of the power of the print and electronic media, and of the
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effects of the trends towards concentration and monopolization in their
ownership, started developing in the Ü.S. Lack of competition and hence
uniformity of information available, likemindedness of the media barons
and near-unanimous support of the established order, excessive
commercialism and poverty of debate on public issues, themes that were
later to become standard criticisms of the modern media, were aired
publicly for the first time. In 1947» the media sponsored Commission
on Freedom of Press published its report on "A Free and Responsible 
121Press" and sparked off a still continuing debate. The Commission,
mainly academic, included among other well-known figures, Chafee,
Niebuhr and Schlesinger and by no means could it be described
as a radical one. It found, however, that "the press has become big
business with its policies directed by owners as owners...; that much
important and relevant information is suppressed by the press itself;
and that the vehicles of information have changed for the most part into
vehicles of entertainment. It is because the number of owners has
decreased in fewer and fewer hands, that competition in the presentation
of news has broken down, and the worst of all monopolies - a monopoly of
information - has been effectively established... in numerous and
122extended areas across the country", and all this before the
importance and reach of the - privately owned - TV networks was
reckoned with. The report called for greater responsibility from the
owners and some mild governmental regulation - mainly through the
sparing! use of anti-trust legislation. Any more extensive regulatdo n
would imply that "present owners of the press [would cease] to be
owners - or at least... owners at the existing level" a prospect
completely repugnant to the Commission. However, the report "was
attacked heavily by the press as unfair, badly informed, and unfriendly
123to freedom of the press" '  and none of its mild recommendations was 
acted upon.
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The Court's involvement in freedom of the press cases must be 
placed against this background. Starting in 1931» it consistently- 
removed or relaxed all sorts of legal impediments or regulations of 
the press.
The 1931 case (Near v. Minnesota j has been universally and 
deservedly assessed as a "milestone decision" and a "major breakthrough". 
It came under a Minnesota press law, according to which a newspaper could 
be labelled "a public nuisance" for being of a "malicious, scandalous 
and defamatory" character. A suit could be brought by the state or a 
private citizen "to enjoin perpetually the persons committing or 
maintaining any such nuisance". Upon such evidence as the court 
thought sufficient, a temporary or permanent injunction could be 
granted against the publication.
The "Saturday Press" of Minneapolis had run a series of articles
that had charged in substance that a Jewish gangster was in control of
gambling, bootlegging and racketeering, and most importantly that law
enforcing officers were ix collusion with the gangsters. The county
attorney, himself, had been accused for failure to take adequate
measures and in reply he obtained a permanent injunction against
continuation of publication of the paper.
When the case reached the Supreme Court Chief Justice Hughes spoke
for the 5-4 majority, which included both Holmes and Brandeis. He
examined in detail the statute and the way it worked and concluded
that it was "of the essence of censorship" and not - as alleged -
justifiable subsequent punishment. Then he went on to review the
history of English licensing laws and of the First Amendment, quoting
from Blackstone, Madison and Cooley's "Constitutional Limitations".
Concluding his historical survey he said:
"The importance of this immunity (from previous restraints 
and censorship) has not lessened... The fact that the 
liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors 
of scandal does not make any less necessary the immunity
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of the press from previous restraint in dealing with 
official misconduct. Subsequent punishment for such 
abuses as may exist is the appropriate remedy consistent 
with constitutional privileges. ” 1 2 5
He added that in some exceptional cases previous restraints may be 
permitted to prevent obstructions to the conduct of a war, obscenity 
and incitement to crime. He finally declared the Minnesota statute 
void on the additional ground that it was designed to prevent scandal, 
breaches of the peace etc. while the theory of the constitutional 
guarantee is that "even a more serious public evil would be caused by 
authority to prevent publication,,.
1 26In Gros.lean v. American Press Co. a tax imposed upon the larger 
Louisiana newspapers was declared void as a "tax on knowledge" designed 
to "suppress the publication of comments and criticisms objectionable" 
to the government, and "to prevent, or curtail the opportunity for the 
acquisition of knowledge by the people in respect of their governmental 
affairs". Interestingly enough, the unanimous opinion was written by 
Justice Sutherland, one of the archenemies of the New Deal and one of the 
four dissenters of the Near decision, which had been denounced as 
declaring "Minnesota and every other state powerless to restrain... 
periodicals... that have been adjudged to be a public nuisance" and as 
giving to "freedom of the press a meaning and scope not heretofore 
recognized" (per J. Butler dissenting in Near v. Minnesota. Sutherland 
concurring in dissent).
In the present case, however, Sutherland found that the First 
Amendment "was meant to preclude the national government, and by the 
14th the states, from adopting any form of previous restraint upon 
printed publications".
This sudden change and rather rare accord between anti- and pro- 
New Deal Justices should be put into perspective. The statute at issue 
had been sponsored by the radical Louisiana senator Huey Long, a
- 254 -
politician who had consistently attacked President Roosevelt's lack of
concern for the poor and through his 27»000 "Sbare-Our-Wealtb" clubs had
demanded minimum wage legislation and pensions for all retired to be
financed by heavy income taxation. The larger Louisiana newspapers,
affected by the tax, had organized a sustained campaign against Long
and his policies and their contention was that the statute intended to
127cripple that campaign. It may be argued, therefore, that in
joining forces the two camps of the Supreme Court were combatting a
common enemy: Roosevelt himself had once declared "I am fighting
Communism, Huey Longism, Coughlinism, Townsendism. I want to save our
128system, the Capitalist system", and had joined together as enemies 
of capitalism , communists, radicals and fascists. (Father Coughlin 
was a fascist priest and agitator.) Appropriately, Father Coughlin's 
magazine "Social Justice" was the only one to be excluded from the 
mails during the Second World War under the procedure provided in 
the 1917 Espionage Act.^2^
Following the Near decision, the Court in a series of cases in the 
'40s seriously undermined the applicability of contempt citations against 
press comment on pending judicial proceedings and the administration of 
justice in general.
The authority in the field (Bridges v. California) involved
contempt citations against three Los Angeles Times leading articles
and a union leader's telegram to the Secretary of Labor, all related to
a pending trial of several trade unionists.
Justice Black, speaking for a 5-4 majority, started his opinion
with an approving review of the majority and minority opinions, which
had employed the danger test. He summed up his review stating that:
"[W]hat finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger* 
cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must 
be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely 
high before utterances can be punished..."(U.m.),
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and that
’•Those cases do not purport to mark the furthermost 
constitutional boundaries of protected expression, nor 
do we here. They do no more than recognise a minimum 
compulsion of the Bill of Rights"131
a conclusion closer to the Brandeis formulation of the test in Whitney.
Baying, thus, stated his own version of the danger test, he proceeded
to apply it, by considering how much these contempt citations would
affect freedom of expression "as a practical matter". The social
harms apprehended in contempt cases are possibly two: firstly, out-of-
court criticisms may bring the judiciary into disrepute and secondly,
they may lead to disorderly and unfair administration of justice by
putting pressure on one of the parties to the case and leading to a
prejudiced and partial determination of his rights. But since the
contempt powers curtail freedom of expression significantly, the danger
test comes into operation. Its main requirement is the "extreme
seriousness" of the social harm apprehended.
The first social harm is evidently not serious, according to Black.
An enforced silence intended to preserve the dignity of the bench, would
create greater evils than those averted - "resentment, suspicion and
132contempt much more than it would enhance respect"..
The second was more serious, however, because it could lead toi I
unfair action. In that case, the second requirement of the test must 
be shown to exist, i.e. a strict proximate causation between the act of 
expression and the likely result. It has to be examined in the light 
of the concrete content of the act of expression and all other relevant 
circumstances. Accordingly, Justice Black went on to examine the 
statements of the newspaper and the labour leader concretely. He found 
that neither created an "extremely high" degree of imminence of the 
substantive evil. Both convictions were reversed.
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Justice Black’s formulation of the test retained much of its 
original evidentiary flavour. But this aspect was relegated to a 
secondary position. The test was employed to examine the concrete 
facts, once the Court had been satisfied that the conflicting social 
interests could be put on an equal footing, and freedom of the press 
should start from a preferred position.
Pour Justices under Frankfurter dissented, but in a later case 
(Pennekamp v. Florida). two editorials of a Florida newspaper
criticizing the local court and judges in general were found by 
a unanimous Court not to have the clearness and immediacy necessary 
for closing the door of- permissible public comment. Similar 
language was used by Justice Douglas in a later case (Craig v.
Harney)^ ^  concerning several articles and a newspaper editorial 
on a pending civil suit:
"Giving the editorial all the vehemence which the court 
below found in it, we fail to see how it could in any 
realistic sense create an imminent and serious threat 
to the ability of the court to give fair consideration 
to the motion of rehearing."
The question of compatibility of contempt convictions with
the free speech guarantee came back to the Supreme Court 15 years
155later. The case of Vood v. Georgia arose out of the contempt 
conviction of Wood, an elected sheriff, who had issued to the
t -
local press three statements accusing the judges of the county 
court of "race agitation" and "judicial intimidation" of blacks.
The judges had publicised, during an election campaign, their instructions 
to a grand jury concerning the conduct of an investigation into 
alleged black "bloc voting" and other corrupt electoral practices.
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The Supreme Court,per Chief Justice Warren,reversed, Warren
started by reviewing the cases of Bridges. Pennekamp and Craig.
and concluded that tinder these rulings contempt convictions could
be upheld, if it was shown that the utterances in question created
a clear and present danger for the administration of Justice, No
evidence of such danger could found on the record. On the contrary,
"[t]he type of »danger* evidenced... is precisely one of the types
of activity envisioned by... the First Amendment”. The Chief
Justice, seemingly, approached the controversy between the -
elected - judges and the sheriff as political rather than judicial.
He emphasised that the case did not involve an individual on trial,
nor a petit jury, but a grand jury investigating "into a matter
touching each member of the community". In the circumstances,
there was no "showing of a substantive evil designed to impede
135athe course of justice".
Thus the applicability of the danger test in contempt of court 
cases became firmly established during the period and, according 
to various commentators, this is the main area in which it has 
been consistently utilized since ¿^5b
Those early decisions set in a trend in constitutional 
adjudication which, according to Justice Black, gave "an over­
powering influence to views of owners of legally favored instruments 
136of communication" among which the press ranked first. And
according to a contemporary media lawyer and personality, the
Supreme Court has extended such protection to editorial autonomy,
1that the press has been virtually placed "outside the law". 0 
The same author argues that this attitude is in accordance with J.S. 
Mill*s and the classical liberals* defence of individual autonomy.
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However, the equalization of the protection of the eccentric individual or of 
the persecuted, minority social group with that of the Hearsts, Murdochs 
and Rowlands is a far-fetched proposition and the attempt to Justify the 
latter, in terms of the former, is somewhat less than intellectually 
honest. But, whatever the Justifications, the zealous Judicial 
protection of the mainstream media has been one of the main features 
of the American legal system and this is probably the main reason why 
the latter has been generally praised as the most liberal, in relation 
to free expression claims!. To be sure, all constitutional commentators
1 V7 1 Xflcall for a commensurate "responsibility” or "self-discipline"
on the part of the press, in the use of the near carte-blanche delivered
them by the courts. According to one of them, who quotes B. Dylan,
139"to be outside the law you must be honest".
Of course, the question of "honesty" or "responsibility" of the 
media cannot be answered in an objective, non-partisan way. The 
commentators referred to above usually find a high degree of them in the 
American press, while those on the left denounce the system of "distorted 
communication" ^ and its effects in modem societies. As Marcuse put 
it "under the rule of monopolistic media - themselves the mere 
instrument of economic and political power - a mentality is created 
for which right and wrong are pre-defined wherever they affect the vital
interests of society".^ To be sure, even mainstream political
« '
scientists have moved some considerable way from the most exuberant
claims of the constitutionalists. Thus, the pluralist Professors
Lazarsfeld and Merton: "Increasingly the chief power groups, among which
organized business occupies the most spectacular place, have come to
adopt techniques for manipulating mass publics through propaganda in
place of more direct means of control... through the mass media of
communication... These media have taken on the Job of rendering mass
142publics confoxmative to the social and economic status quo."
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These are open questions and cannot be tackled here. What is of 
great interest for our purposes, however, is the differentiated 
attitude adopted by the Supreme Court when dealing with expression 
claims, advanced by the established mass media, as against those of 
other groups and interests claiming analogous rights. It would not be 
inaccurate to suggest, that the press has been consistently adopted 
as the most prominent constituency and clientele of the Supreme Court 
in the area of expression since the '30s; on its own part, the press 
has not wasted any occasion to take its grievances to the courts and 
to popularize and publicly commend, in return, the liberal role of 
the Supreme Court.
6. Legal Doctrines and the Construction of the Public Sphere
6.1. The Preferred Position of Freedom
The proliferation of cases dealing with expression claims is
perhaps the most striking characteristic of the period under
consideration. According to the received opinion, the second
characteristic is that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence was •'clearly
143libertarian in spirit and effect" ' and heralded "a period of 
achievement" for freedom of expression.
' The liberal and democratic tenor of many of the opinions and 
decisions examined is an indisputable fact. It is, indeed, one of 
the major differences of the case-law as compared with that of the 
previous period. The discussion of the meaning and history of freedom 
of the press in Near, of the grounding of freedom of expression in 
democratic theory and the exercise of power by the consent of the 
people in Barnette, of the need for protection of minority and eccentric 
ideas in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases clearly distinguish this period 
from earlier and later ones as well as from the jurisprudence of similar
- 2^0 _
courts of last instance of other Western states. The Supreme Court 
became something of a popular philosophe and its reports remind one more of 
textbooks on civic education rather than of the dry, legalistic 
pronouncements of the French Conseil d’Etat or the British House of 
Lords.
The legal doctrines and tests utilised multiplied accordingly as 
well. The bad tendency test that dominated the previous period 
disappeared almost completely. The clear and present danger was gradually 
expanded from a rule of evidence (or reason) for the examination of 
factual evidence in simple face-to-face situations, into a full-fledged 
constitutional standard: it became a requirement of existence of a 
high degree of necessity linking an apprehended serious evil and an 
expression-restricting law, if the latter were to pass successfully 
constitutional muster (Cantwell. Thornhill. Taylor). It also retained 
its early evidentiary flavour but could not be seen any longer as a 
mere "rationalisation for putting people in jail"^** (Bridges.
Terminiello). The proscription of prior restraints on expression was 
extended from the press, with which it was traditionally linked since 
Blackstone, to cover indiscriminate, vague and overbroad licensing 
systems related to public parading and canvassing (among others Martin).
The use of alternative means, less drastic than blanket prohibitions of 
all expressive activities, was indicated as a valid exercise of 
legislative and police power in support of social interests like public 
cleanliness and health, privacy and repose or even public order and 
peace (Schneider. Saia). Statutes and ordinances were struck down as 
"void on their face", although for many petitioners a mere reversal of 
conviction would have been as good. The doctrine of "absolute" 
protection of expression was canvassed even though it never achieved 
judicial endorsement.
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On the other hand the concepts of "speech" and the "press" were 
expansively defined to include a greater number of expressive 
activities: the use of symbolic objects and gestures (Stromberg, Barnette), 
all sorts of activities in the public forum, the circulation and 
distribution as well as the publication of printed material. The whole 
First Amendment was incorporated in the 14th "due process" clause and 
was accordingly declared as limiting state as well as federal power.
The common denominator of all these developments can be traced to 
the "preferred position" of freedom of expression doctrine, the "firstness 
of the first"^^ as one author put it, that was adopted by an - 
admittedly fluctuating - number of Justices. It called for - at the 
least - an increased judicial vigilance in cases involving expression 
claims, and - at the most - an assumption of invalidity of all measures 
touching on First Amendment issues, the burden of which was to be borne 
by the prosecuting authorities.
To be sure, as the multiplication of dissenting opinions, of 3-4 
decisions and of dramatic reversals of recent precedents showed, the 
trend was not evolving in a unanimous or uncontroversial manner - [for 
examples of reversals see Near - Gros,jean (unexplained change of four 
Justices), Gobitis - Barnette. Saia - Kovacsl. In some cases a single 
vote gave the victory to one side, thus making it precarious.
It cannot be denied, however, that a change took place; an 
increasing number of expression claims ended up in the courts; the 
Supreme Court was more willing to review such cases and a number of 
claims were vindicated and sanctioned. What must be critically examined, 
nevertheless, is the frequently recurring assertion that "for thirty-five 
years (i.e. 1930-1965) it (the Supreme Court) had proved to be the 
nation's foremost agency of the furtherance of freedom".
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6.2. The Supreme Court and the Construction of the Public Sphere
A profound change took place, therefore, in the period under 
consideration. It was hinted at, in a programmatic way, in Justice 
Jackson's opinion in the important Barnette case:
'•The principles (of the Bill of Eights) grew in soil 
which also produced a philosophy that the individual was 
the center of society, that his liberty was attainable 
through mere absence of governmental restraints and that 
government should be content with few controls and only 
the mildest supervision over man's affairs. We must 
transplant these rights to a soil in which the laissez- 
faire concept or principle of non-interference has 
withered at least as to economic affairs and social 
advancements are increasingly sought through closer 
integration of society and strengthened governmental 
controls."148
It is recalled that in that case, Jackson went on to argue for 
intellectual individualism, cultural diversity and the abolition of 
orthodoxies in "politics, nationality, religion or other matters of 
opinion"; the principles of laissez-faire should guide the intellectualiiand political markets once their reign in the economic market had,!
allegedly, "withered away". To be sure, the degree of acceptance of 
Keynesian principles of economic regulation by the Eoosevelt and later
149administrations has been a matter of some controversy among economists 
and, in any case, economic laissez-faire has withered away in the U.S. 
much less than in any other advanced Western country.
Be that as it may, it can be argued that contrary to Jackson's 
assertions, the evidence of the cases examined points towards a 
strengthening of governmental controls over the operation of the
150intellectual and political markets. Indeed, Jackson's later opinions - 
notwithstanding his Barnette one - were instrumental in that process 
both in general and in helping to demarcate the Supreme Court's role 
in it. Bearing in mind the public sphere hypothesis advanced above, it 
would be helpful to re-examine briefly the cases reviewed.
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(a) While the formal enfranchisement of black people was much less 
than complete during that period, groups of people formerly admitted to 
the fall status of citizenship were to varying degrees deprived of it.
Federal and state civil servants as well as local government employees
/
and their families were excluded from all political activities except 
the vote. The much smaller group of Japanese Americans were excluded 
completely - albeit temporarily - from all political rights and 
procedural guarantees and were equalized to hostile aliens or to persons 
with no formal citizenship, who since the rise of the modem nation­
state are not covered by any state protective jurisdiction. The 
modem equivalent of the ,,barbarians,, or the aliens of ancient Greece 
are fair game for the "Hellenes”, the inhabitants of the polis.
The formal admission of individuals and groups to the status of 
full political subjects/citizens with all the relevant rights and 
procedural guarantees (vote, other political rights, criminal law 
guarantees) cannot be, therefore, seen as a teleologically evolving 
and irreversible process leading to the continuous extension and 
equalization of such rights for the whole social body (the "body 
politic"). Even this most commonsensical assumption of constitutional 
theory must be examined concretely in each historical period. To be 
sure, a wholesale exclusion of a group from the most rudimentary 
formal guarantees - as was the case with the Japanese-Americans and 
later with the communists - is a rare and exceptional occurrence. 
Interestingly enough, however, a conservative constitutional author 
has recently gone to great lengths to prove that the concept of
"citizenship" was never a part of American law nor should it become in 
the future.^
(b) On the other hand, the dicta on the importance of public 
debate on all issues affecting the welfare of the state, moved from the 
dissenting opinions of Holmes and Brandéis to the majority opinions of
the Court during that period. The social interest in free speech, 
described as the communication to others of views and opinions "respecting 
governmental policies" and "trends in national and international affairs", 
was highly valued and favourably handicapped in its competition with 
other social interests. Yet, it was the freedom to differ in religious 
matters and express publicly sectarian religious views that got the full 
treatment and was presented as the case of allowable public controversy 
par excellence.
The conclusive destruction of the notion of religious heresy and
the heretic is not an insignificant achievement. As one of the most
important, although relatively neglected historians of freedom of
speech, J.B. Bury remarked in 1913 in hi0 "History of Freedom of Thought":
"I have been considering, almost exclusively, freedom of thought in
religion, because it may be taken as the thermometer for freedom of
152thought in general". J If his diagnosis was still correct in the *40s 
and after, then freedom of thought "in general" had finally won. Indeed, 
the complete reversal in the field of religious tolerance is highlighted 
by the frequency with which fringe religious sects have been turning 
to the judiciary for protection (some recent examples include the 
Scientology Church, the Unification Church (the "Moonies") and 
Reverend Jones' Church); the Jehovah's Witnesses - this most 
litigious sect - were instrumental in this development.
Yet, the identification of public/political speech with freedom of 
speech on religious matters, the amalgamation of political and religious 
speech, in which all arguments used for the democratic justification of 
freedom of expression were mobilized in order to protect religious 
eccentricity, in no way meant that political speech propre received 
the same treatment. At about the same time a new secular orthodoxy had
started to establish itself
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(c) "National unity", an "interest second to none", was substituted 
for religious unity. Professor Chafee calls this new orthodoxy an 
"American party-line" and observes that since 1945 a tendency to
153establish and promote it was gaining strength in the United States.
It included its hard-core dogma - the Constitution "contemplates a free
154enterprise system" - its high priests and its heretics. Arthur Miller*s 
play "The Crucible" effectively and dramatically drew the parallel 
between McCarthy!sm and 18th century witch hunting. As every quasi­
religious dogma it carried strong moral undertones: "Honest differences 
of [political] opinion are treated like moral differences". The 
participation of the Supreme Court in the establishment of this 
"American party-line" is examined in the next chapter which deals with 
the various aspects of McCarthyism. But the trend toward balancing of 
social interests and group claims, already established in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence in the period under examination bore the seeds of 
later developments.
Balancing interests, either in general - the so-called "definitional" 
balancing of Black and Douglas which was coupled with the preferred 
position doctrine - to which the more liberal Justices were given, or 
in the context of the particular claim - the "ad hoc balancing" of 
Frankfurter - meant that the Justices undertook to work out for 
themselves a hierarchy of social values and political claims. For a 
brief period around the *40s, the preferred position majority opinions 
gave the Court both the appearance and the reality of the protector of 
minority claims. The liberal-democratic rhetoric accompanied all 
opinions, equally those about the right of a few schoolchildren to 
refrain from saluting the flag on religious grounds, of religious sects 
and clerics to preach their millenarian messages and those about the 
rights of trade unionists to organize and picket or of political groups 
to campaign and criticize the powers that be. However, two qualifications 
of the Court*s libertarian attitudes should be entered.
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Firstly, the new activism poorly resembled that of the old, 
property-minded Court. The proponents of judicial restraint tended 
to identify the two and to remind the new activists of the old Court*s 
debacle, but the differences were not insignificant. While the old 
Court consistently frustrated federal policies, the new Court never 
challenged a federal measure. Its forays were directed at local 
ordinances and some state statutes, dealing in the main with various 
licensing systems and other aspects of local regulation of activities 
in the public forum. However, as the diversity of the relevant cases 
reviewed shows, local authorities possess a formidable arsenal of 
legal weapons: criminal prosecutions for common law or statutory 
offences after the event, police intervention and halting of a public 
manifestation while in progress or the various licensing systems may 
all be used interchangeably toward the same effect of frustrating a 
particular group or message. Consequently, however swift and drastic 
the later judicial intervention was, in no way could it guarantee the 
unhindered or equal use of the public forum, as some other equally 
effective avenue could be explored. It may be argued, indeed, that 
the Court activism manifested in invalidations of local measures, 
however liberal, it was merely cosmetic if compared with its earlier 
manifestations.
Secondly, the differentiated status attributed to the various groups
1: ■
claiming a position in the public sphere was equally characteristic.
Thus, all Jehovah’s Witnesses* activities were gradually equated with 
public debate and given full protection. On the other hand trade union 
claims were treated with greater caution. H. Kalven, in his review of 
the early cases related to the public forum referred to above, 
concentrated on the Jehovah’s Witnesses ones and added in a footnote:
"I am, perhaps somewhat cavalierly, putting the complex story of the 
labor picketing cases to one side... since there is no argument here
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that speech in public places is beyond the reach of any regulation,
it is not clear what the picketing cases would add”. ^  However, it is
the Supreme Court*s differential endorsement of the religious and union
claims to "commandeer" the public forum that, arguably, colours its
intervention. Eclecticism is a method frequently used in order to
present complex social situations as following single principles and
157as such, it is a recurring phenomenon in constitutional theory.
The problem with Kalven*s eclectisism - cavalier or not, and admittedly
liberal in purpose - is that it presents a distorted image by implying
that union cases were ruled by the same - liberal - principles as the
religious ones. This wrong implication, however, seriously undermines
the theoretical interest of the concept of the public forum.
To be sure, during the period under examination, unions were for
the first time admitted as legitimate bodies that have a role to play
in the pluralistic process, as the cases reviewed clearly indicate.
But as the influential constitutional author P. Freund warned, public
union activities should not be transformed into "rights of free
expression". Religious speech, "righteous peaceful aggression", was
public speech but communication of union grievances was "economic 
158pressure". ^  Thus, while all sorts of public activities were construed 
as speech, it was industrial picketing that was found to be "speech
plus", a consistently used phrase that allowed the Court to differentiate among
*  .
the means of publicity utilized and accordingly among the social groups that
habitually use the differentiated means.
The protection extended to right and left wing political groups
was somewhat differentiated, too. The cases of Terminiello and Feiner
may be taken as an example. In the former a fascist was freed, in the
159latter a radical jailed. According to a commentator, the difference 
in result, although the circumstances were broadly similar, was due to 
the demise of the clear and present danger test. In Terminiello the
fascist was freed although there was some danger of violence, in 
Feiner the radical was jailed although there was no such danger. The 
final victory of Frankfurter's line of judicial deference to state 
authorities was, allegedly, instrumental to the inconsistent outcome 
of the two cases. However, on the same day as Feiner. the Court 
decided Kunz. in which a New York licensing system was voided as applied 
to a right wing Baptist minister and Frankfurter concurred in the result. 
It is reasonable to suggest that such differences cannot be attributed, 
exclusively, to the different understanding of the danger test or of the 
role of judicial review. Even if the argument of our author was 
accepted, the reasoning that the Justices have consistently applied 
to everybody else's actions, namely that "one is responsible for the 
reasonable and probable consequences of one’s actions", could be 
equally applied to their own actions as well: the "reasonable and 
probable" consequence of, among others, the Terminiello - Feiner and
Saja - Kovacs duets of cases, was the introduction of an effective
|
differentiation - irrespective of its specific motivations - among 
the various groups of the political spectrum.
(d) Finally, as regards the distribution and control of the 
means of communication, it may be observed that Jackson's exhortation 
of the principles of intellectual laissez-faire was best approximated 
in the Court's attitude toward the ownership and control of the 
established, mass media. However, as Adam Smith, the greatest exponent 
of the free market^ had found a long time ago, the application of 
laissez-faire principles to monopolistic or oligopolistic markets leads 
to the stifling of competition and the complete extinction or 
administered sharing-out of the market. The preaching and application 
of classical political and economic liberalism and of the principles of 
individualism, in the socio-economic realities of modem media, surely 
differs from their original conception and application or their most 
perfect expression by J.S. Mill.
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(e) In conclusion, two remarks should be made in relation to the 
public sphere hypothesis advanced above, borne out by the reviewed case 
law.
First, as far as the discourse of the Supreme Court is concerned, 
it appears that the construction for legal purposes, of such simple 
sounding terms as "speech" or "the press" is far from a self-evident 
enterprise: it involves contending claims and the power of the courts 
and the Supreme Court, in particular, to subsume some and not others of 
them under their elastic definitions, is one of the major ways in 
which they participate in the regulation of the public sphere.
Irrespective of the method followed, either that of the a priori theoretical 
understanding according to which some expressive activities are construed 
in definition as "non-speech", "speech plus", "fighting words" etc. 
or "public speech", protected speech or simply speech; or that of the balancing 
technique, according to which some social interest is ranked higher or 
lower than that in free expression, the outcome is similar: certain 
expressive activities are declared protected conduct or speech, certain 
others non-protected action.
As an English constitutional author has remarked of the Supreme 
Court's definition of certain categories of expressive activities 
(the "fighting words", libels and obscenity) as not "constitutionally 
protected forms of speech", if such conclusions "figure as arguments 
[which they do], they [are] obviously question-begging". It is 
exactly this fact, i.e. that "question-begging" definitions acquire immediate 
normative consequences and are backed by sanctions, in other words, that 
what is defined as speech becomes also a protected activity and vice 
versa, that gives to the legal-constitutional discourse its privileged 
position within the "universe of social discourses": its definitions 
and conclusions, even if "question-begging",become prescriptions backed 
by sanctions and thus help shape social reality.
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Secondly, the constitution and regulation of that aspect of social 
reality that has been defined as the public sphere must be seen as a 
process involving continuous differentiations and distinctions as much 
as uniformities and analogies. Its formal conditions, the issues and 
alternatives admitted or proscribed, the groups and individuals protected 
or punished, its contextual regulation and the distribution of the 
means of communication in it, are continuously contested and 
differentially demarcated. It was the increasingly active participation 
of the courts and the Supreme Court among them, in this demaraction, 
that gave this period of constitutional adjudication its radically 
new character.
Thus, it may be concluded that in the Jacksonian Mnew soil" of 
closer economic integration of the society and of strengthened economic 
controls, the principles of laissez-faire were in retreat in the 
process of constitution of the public sphere as well. The Supreme 
Court involvement may be seen as active participation both in the 
process of the restructuring and regimentation of the extended public 
sphere; and - through its persistent liberal and democratic rhetoric - 
in the effort to mobilize popular assent towards the new economic and 
political structures, a process defined a b o v e ^  as the nationalization 
of legitimation.
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CHAPTER IX
POLITICAL JUSTICE IN THE FIFTIES
1. Introduction
During the First War and in the "Red Scare" that followed it, the federal 
Government refrained from passing a federal sedition law "banning the 
advocacy of "subversive" ideologies or punishing membership in allegedly 
subversive organisations. The Espionage Act 1917 was concerned, in thei
main, with subversive action rather than utterances. It was its broad 
"bad tendency" construction, by the federal courts, that made the 
actual operation of the Act resemble that of a sedition law. On the 
other hand, the various State criminal anarchy and syndicalism Acts 
were clear-cut sedition laws and were, accordingly, administered by 
the courts.
By 1940, however, this pattern had started to change. While the 
Supreme Court late 30s and early 40s decisions went a long way towards 
incorporating the First Amendment into the Fourteenth, thus making it 
applicable to the States, a parallel process involving the federal 
government was under way: a series of federal laws and executive 
decrees adopted and extended the sedition rationale of the earlier 
State laws and started building up a formidable arsenal of federal 
anti-sedition measures. Indeed, if the process of judicial 
incorporation of the First into the 14th was meant to extend to the 
States federally administered standards of free public debate against 
particularistic state and local repressive measures, this second process 
of "reverse incorporation" was giving the federal Government an 
increasingly strategic role in delineating those standards by 
incorporating in federal laws and policies earlier state measures and 
imposing them in a uniform fashion across the country.
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Thus, since 1940, the "protection of the Republic" has been 
undertaken, in the main, by federal authorities - legislative, executive 
and Judicial - either directly; or indirectly, through the passing and 
enforcement of some federal measure, which state and local authorities 
were quick to repeat and implement within their respective Jurisdictions. 
Indeed, in one mid-50s case,the Supreme Court declared that once a 
particular anti-sedition measure had been adopted by the federal 
authorities, the field had been pre-empted and analogous State measures 
were redundant.
The process of breaking down of State barriers on federal economic
regulation, initiated by the New Real, was repeated in the field of
political discourse and in the constitution of the public sphere. If
the former measures brought home to the States that Americans were
2"industrially, commercially, economically... one people" and 
nationalised the regulation of the economy, the latter emphasized that 
they were - or should become - one people in the realm of politics and 
ideology, too.
This chapter examines the wide variety of federal and state laws, 
policies and measures through which an "American party-line" was 
developed, propagated and imposed, between 1940 and i960, and the 
Judicial attitudes toward them. The main body is divided in three 
parts. Each of them starts with the examination of a different aspect 
of the laws or policies of the period, which are put within their 
historical perspective. It then goes on to review the main test- 
cases in the field, with particular emphasis on the Jurisprudence of 
the Supreme Court.
The first part sets out the general historical background of the 
period, and examines in an indicative way some of the causes and effects 
of the phenomenon that became known as "McCarthyism"; the main 
federal sedition laws directed against the Communist Party and committed
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Communists and their application by the federal courts are then reviewed.
The second part examines the federal and state loyalty programmes and 
the third the practices and activities of legislative committees investigating 
subversive activities. A detailed and critical review of the case-law, 
arising from the activities of this loyalty-security complex, follows the 
description of its respective components.
I would like to emphasize at this point that the critical examination of 
the anti-communist laws and cases does not imply support for the practices of 
American communists. Its main purpose is to indicate how the official - legal 
and constitutional - discourse, articulated around the concept of the 
»communist danger", participated in the radical reconstitution of the public 
sphere and of the "universe of discourse" in the post-War period.
A. The Sedition Laws and the Communists
2.1. The Smith Act
The first federal sedition law, since the Alien and Sedition Acts, was
passed in 1940. Its official name was the Alien Registration Act, but it
xbecame known as the Smith Act. Its provisions outlawed incitement of 
disloyalty in the armed forces; added new grounds of deportation among 
which violation of the Act and past subversive beliefs and associations of 
the alien, even when subsequently repudiated; and section 2(a) of the Act 
introduced a new federal crime.
Section 2(a) stipulated that:
"...it shall be unlawful for any person
(1) to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach 
the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing 
or destroying any Government in the United States by force or 
violence or by the assassination of any officer of any such 
Government;...
(3) to organize or help or attempt to organize any society, group, 
or assembly of persons, who teach, advocate, or encourage the 
overthrow or destruction of any government in the U.S. by force 
or violence, or to be or become a member of. or affiliate with, 
any such society, group or assembly of persons, knowing the 
purposes thereof;..."
an offence punishable with a maximum of 20 years imprisonment.
The Act was passed, by Congress, without any substantive debate 
with a vote of 328-4» According to one Representative "any bill
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containing dreadful provisions against the alien would pass the House... 
Hire a dose of salts" and another stated in the debate that "the mood 
of the House is such that if you brought in the Ten Commandments today 
and asked for their repeal and attached to that request an alien law, 
you could get it".^
The language of the Act (advocacy of forcible overthrow of the 
Government or of the assassination of governmental officials) indicates 
its parentage in the earlier anti-anarchy laws. Although the main 
target of the Act was the Communist Party, which in the wake of the 
German-Soviet pact was following an active line of neutralism, its 
formulation was rather inept. The Communist Party constitution, 
following the "popular front" tactics of the Third International, 
launched at its 1937 7th Congress, was threatening with expulsion 
any member who conspired to subvert or overthrow American democratic 
institutions.^ The bomb-throwing and political assassinations of the 
early anarchists had no plaoe in the strategy of Western Communists.
The Smith Act was followed in 1940 and 1941» by other federal
anti-communist measures included in the Selective Services Act, ' the
Nationality Act (1940), the Voorhia Act (1940) - providing for the
registration of subversive organisations - and in acts regulating the 
8War Industries.
By the end of 1941» however, after the German attack on the Soviet
«
Union, the Communist Party became one of the staunchest supporters of 
American participation in the War and lost no opportunity to exhibit 
its newly-found support for all federal policies. "When rank and file 
workers struck for higher wages or against inhuman conditions on the 
assembly-line, the party was the first to defend the [WWII union 
leadership] no strike pledge".^ The Party supported the use of the 
Smith Act against pro-Nazi and Trotskyite groups and in 1944»
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following the Teheran Conference, its leader Earl Browder announced
the voluntary dissolution of the party and the creation in its place
of a Communist Political Association. "We are ready to co-operate in
making capitalism work effectively in the post-war period" Browder is
10reported as stating, expressing the pious hopes, that existed both
in the West and the East, for the continuation of the Alliance, both
internationally and internally, beyond the Armistice.
As a result of these developments, «the Communist Party became,
during the War, a somewhat tolerable political organisation, for the
first time in its history. Browder, who had been imprisoned in 1940
for an earlier "passport fraud",was pardoned by Roosevelt in 1942.
An attempt to have the California Party secretary denaturalised for
having taken his 1927 naturalisation oath in "bad faith" was quashed
11by the Supreme Court. The investigation into communist activities,
conducted in earnest by the special Bouse Committee on un-American
i
Activities (H.U.A.C.) which was established in 1933» lost its intensity
I
12and publicity. The Soviet Union and Stalin - "the heart and soul of
13Russia" according to Roosevelt in 1943 - were portrayed in a more 
favourable light. By 1945» the C.P. membership reached its peak of 
between 75,000 and 83,000, with analogous gains within the C.I.O. 
affiliated unions. 4 But as Chafee dryly remarked, even in their
peak, the communists were "less than one-twentieth of one per cent"
* 1 5  of the American population.
This interlude, however, was not to last for long. In 1950, both 
Houses passed easily, against the veto of President Truman, the 
Subversive Activities Control Act (the McCarran Act) which according 
to one historian was "one of the most massive onslaughts against
16freedom of speech and association ever launched in American history". 
The Act is often taken as the official starting point of the McCarthy
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era, and under its terms the C.F. was, virtually, outlawed. The process 
of the change and of the establishment of the ’’McCarthyite hysteria" as 
well as some of its main characteristics are examined in the next part.
2.2 The causes and effects of McCarthyism
The causes and effects of McCarthyism are still a matter of
17
historical investigation. The remarks that follow, therefore, are 
not meant as an exhaustive description of the phenomenon. The indicative 
reference to some of the contributing factors and to the manifestations 
and effects of McCarthyism is undertaken in order to place the extensive 
review of the legal material of the period that follows, within its 
proper historical perspective. Consequently, the repercussions of the 
growing atmosphere of repression for the legal system and constitutional 
freedoms are particularly emphasized.
t
(a) The initial cooling and subsequent complete breakdown in
American-Soviet relations is generally accepted as one of the main
causes of internal repression. The Truman and Marshall doctrines, the
Chinese revolution, the Berlin blockade, the events in Gi»ece and
Czechoslovakia and the Korean War were some of the crucial factors
that led to the Cold War. On the other hand, the massive economic aid,
given to Westerm Democracies by the U.S., was instrumental to the
American plan of post-war economic and military hegemony. General
Marshall stated, in 1948» that "it is idle to think that a Europe left
to its own efforts... would remain open to American business in the
18same way that we have known in the past".
Thus, the establishment and stabilisation of two military blocks, 
demarcated along ideological lines, facilitated the perception of 
American Communists and radicals as parts of an international 
conspiracy, threatening the vital interests and security of the United 
States.
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(b) Following the Yalta Conference, the Communist Party U.S.A. 
was reconstituted in 1945» allegedly under instructions from the French 
Communist leader Jacques Duclos. The party purged Browder from its 
leadership - he was later expelled from the party altogether - and the 
short-lived policy of accommodation with capitalism was over. It 
increasingly concentrated on a propaganda.campaign against Truman*s 
foreign policy, which put it in an extremely vulnerable and isolated 
position. This fact, coupled with the frequently recurring revelations 
of Soviet espionage, made anti-communism a cause out of which 
considerable political mileage could be made again.
(c) The continuing right-wing attack on New Deal measures never
stopped using the communist card. Accusations of communist infiltration
of the New Deal Young Turks were often made by Eepublicans and right-
wing Democrats in the 30s. Thus, a Republican member of the H.TJ.A.C.
had claimed, in 1938» that "the many steps taken by our Government in
19recent years constitute a prelude to dictatorship"; Dies, the first
chairman of the H.U.A.C. had called Roosevelt*s Secretaries of Interior
and Labour and their associates "socialists", "communists" and
"crackpot radicals", and had accused Eleanor Roosevelt as "one of the
most valuable assets which the Trojan Horse organisations of the C.P.
20possess". Dies* linking of Communism and the New Deal had enamoured
him to big business and, in 1941, Henry Ford offered him corporate
’ 21 financial support to "wage an all-out patriotic campaign".
The identification of the New Deal and Communism gained new
currency after 1945» "How much more are we going to have to take?
Fuchs and Acheson and Hiss and Hydrogen bombs threatening outside and
New Dealism eating away the vitals of the nation" exclaimed an enraged
22Republican Senator in 1950. After that year, "most new federal 
economic programmes were gradually abandoned, as the administrative
23agencies feared to "push plans that might be damned as socialistic". '
(d) The other great Republican fear, the trade unions, came under
increasing attack, particularly after the 1946 landslide Republican 
victory in the Congressional elections. The big 1945-6 strike wave had 
moved the Truman administration - never a great friend of unions - 
closer to the Republican anti-union sentiments. The Taft-Hartley Act 
(1947) joined the evils of communism and union power and "sought 
generally to curb the power of labor and specifically to eliminate 
communist influence from the labor movement". 4 It contained 
provisions banning the closed shop, secondary boycotts and mass 
picketing; imposing long "cooling-off" periods in industrial disputes; 
and prohibiting union - but not management - contributions to political 
campaigns. Furthermore, the benefits extended by the National Labor 
Relations Act to unions - in relation to organisational and bargaining 
activities - were restricted to those unions that would file an annual 
affidavit from each of their officers stating "that he is not a member 
of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does 
not believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization 
that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States
25Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods".
The National Labor Relations Board (N.L.R.B.) Immediately announced that 
it would not deal with cases brought to it by non-complying unions. In
all, the Taft-Hartley Act has been called "the most important
' 26conservative triumph of the post-war era".
The anti-union provisions of the Act met with strong reaction from
the two federations, particularly the C.I.O. The prohibition of union-
funded political campaigns was particularly resisted and challenged in
the courts. Two cases reached the Supreme Court, a test case in 1948 
2*7(U.S. v. C.I.O.) and another in 1957 (U.S. v. International Union of
28United Automobile Workers), as an outcome of which a precarious and
Judicially supervised union right to participate in political campaigns 
29was recognised. The anti-communist provisions, however, were not
resisted. On the contrary, the C.I.O. leadership launched in 1949 its
own mini loyalty programme of its affiliated unions, which led to the
expulsion of 11 left-wing unions. Thus the unions, weary of their
identification with communism, which was used to erode their newly-
found role of junior partner in national economic life, became anxious
to show themselves ready to cleanse, as drastically as any, their own
house. "I think we can all freely confess a bias against communism as
such, just as we are biased against murder, arson or rape" declared a
31C.I.O. official, while conducting a hearing against a radical union.'
Thus, in relation to the New Leal measures and union power, the 
communist issue proved an expedient weapon at the hands of right-wing 
politicians and business circles wishing to contain and roll back the 
reforms initiated in the 30s.
(e) Finally, the increasing ambiguity - or complete capitulation -
with which the identifiable liberal institutions reacted toward the
onsetting climate of repression contributed, in a negative way, to its
consolidation in the decade of the 30s.
1. Although President Truman vetoed the Taft-Hartley and McCarran
Acts, he himself used extensively the red-baiting tactic. In 1947» he
launched by executive order the first loyalty programme of all federal
32Government employees.y And in his effort to contain Henry Wallace*s 
campaign to build a third radical party and contest the 1948 
presidential elections, he followed the tactic of identifying the 
Progressive Party with the Communists. He thus "stole the thunder of 
the Republicans on the communist issue"yy and defeated Wallace1s 
challenge. Thus, while the various sedition laws and loyalty programmes 
were introducing the concept of "guilt by association", their enactment
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was often related to what may be called as "guilt for political 
convenience".
2. The American Civil Liberties Union, a frequent object of attack 
of the Lies Committee on Un-American Activities, passed in 1940 a 
resolution banning "supporters of totalitarian dictatorships" from its 
staff and immediately expelled from its Board Elizabeth Flynn, a 
communist founding member of the Union. Following that, the A.C.L.U. 
support of persons accusedof _ communist sympathies became reluctant 
and all legal briefs were followed by a statement of the Union*s 
opposition to communism. In 1953 the A.C.L.U. leadership tried, 
unsuccessfully, to amend its constitution in order to expel from 
membership all those "whose devotion to civil liberties is qualified by 
adherence to Communist, Fascist, K.K.K. or other totalitarian doctrine". 
Qn one bizarre occasion, in 1955 too, the Union declined to take up
the case of C. Lamont, a Board member and known non-communist, who was 
subpoenaed by McCarthy*s Senate Committee on Government Operations, 
after his books were found in overseas American libraries.^
3. The House of Lelegates of the American Bar Association passed
a resolution in 1950 asking the legislatures, courts or other appropriate 
authorities of each state to require all members of the Bar to file 
"within a reasonable time and periodically thereafter", affidavits 
stating "whether he is or ever has been a member of the C.P... or a 
member or supporter of any organisation that espouses the overthrow by 
force, or by any illegal or unconstitutional means... of the U.S. 
Government". If the lawyer refused to take the oath or answered 
positively, the A.B.A. called for his disbarment. If he answered in 
the negative and "at any time later" was established that he had 
"wilfully sworn falsely to the facts" he should be the "subject of 
immediate disbarment proceedings".
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Many local authorities adopted the A.B.A.*s suggestions and the
resulting court cases will be examined later. Following these
developments political dissenters met serious problems in finding
lawyers to defend them in courts or committee rooms. In one Smith Act
case, 30 lawyers refused to defend a communist and in a state case the
defendant had to represent himself after 700 lawyers were approached in 
36vain. The National Lawyers Guild, a small group of radical lawyers,
was investigated in the 50s for inclusion in the Attorney-General*s
list of subversive organisations, a fact that "stigmatized the body
37sufficiently to destroy its further respectability". And accord­
ing to Chafee, behind the various loyalty oaths required from 
lawyers lay "the notion, now rather prevalent among lawyers, that it is 
one of the primary functions of the legal profession to be teachers of 
the community about political and economic doctrines which happen to 
be favoured by an influential portion of the Bar... lawyers ought to beli
drastically sifted out so that they will pour only the pure milk of
38 ^the Gospel down the throats of American citizens".
4* Self-purging operations took place in other institutions and 
groups, too. Thus, following the 1947 H.U.A.C. investigation of the 
film industry, 50 leading film executives dismissed ten employees who 
had refused to cooperate with the Committee, and declared that "no-one would 
be rehired until he had purged himself of contempt (of the Committee) 
or been acquitted or declared under oath that he was not a communist".
A blacklist of communists in the film industry was compiled in 1947 and 
was supezseded in 1950 by "Red Channels", a renewable list of show 
business people with left-wing affiliations, which "quickly became a 
*bible* to the broadcasting industry".^® And in his effort to clear 
himself from suspicion of left-wing sympathies, characteristic of all 
public personalities during that period, the well-known actor Jose
Ferer asked the Justice Department to "set up a warning service to keep 
people like him out of trouble
5. Universities and other colleges did their own housecleaning 
too. The first famous cases were those of the California University 
loyalty oath, required from all members of the staff by the Board of 
Regents in 1949» and the dismissal of two professors from the University 
of Washington, which sparked off a long series of internal loyalty 
investigations of the staff and numerous firings. Following these 
incidents, universities and colleges across the country tried to outdo 
each other in ensuring and proclaiming their loyalty.
Thus, the President of Southern Illinois University declared that
"the advantages of our way of life ought to be set forth so persuasively
that only the keenest minded students would be thinking over and above 
•j AO
what they were taught about government". Norman Thomas, the leader 
of the Socialist Party and a prominent member of the A.C.L.U. Board 
stated, in 1 9 5 3 » that "the right of the communist to teach should be 
denied because he has given away his freedom in the quest of the 
truth". v And, in March of the same year the Association of American 
Universities resolved that communists have no right to a university 
position and that a professor who invokes the Fifth Amendment (against 
self-incrimination) in loyalty hearings puts a "heavy burden of proof 
[on his] fitness to hold a teaching position and lays upon his 
university an obligation to re-examine his qualification for membership 
in its society".^
Thousands of public school and university teachers were dismissed 
throughout the period for alleged subversive affiliations and beliefs, 
and bizarre cases were not lacking. A professor was dismissed from 
Oregon University, because he had supported the views of the Soviet 
biologist Lysenko. In California, a history textbook was condemned
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because it stated that the Supreme Court*s eventual upholding of the
New Seal measures was prompted by the wishes of the people, a statement
45which was "subtly hidden communist propaganda". The California
University regents stated that no one of the 56 members of staff who
were dismissed or forced to resign was a communist, and when they
discovered they had not themselves taken the oath required from their
staff, "they immediately made a gala event of the sign-in and the
46society pages soon reported oath-signing parties as the rage".
The publishing industry and the press responded in a similar 
fashion. Most of the loyalty committees were interested in maximum 
publicity of their activities, and the popular press, in particular, was 
their best ally. The Hearst press empire - "ever partial to the 
Committee" - commented of the Hollywood investigations, characteristically, 
in the editorial of one of its leading newspapers: "The need is for 
FEDERAL CENSORSHIP OP MOTION PICTURES. The Constitution PERMITS it.
The law SANCTIONS it. The safety and welfare of the Republic DEMAND
Thus, a combination of federally initiated repressive measures 
and a hesitant - at the best - reaction of the liberal constituencies 
led to a spiral of new more repressive measures followed by further 
capitulations and so on. The hope that the spiral would be broken by 
the courts, to which many victims of the loyalty practices resorted for
t
protection, did not materialise. The judicial reaction and the legal 
doctrines which were developed in these cases, the main subjects of 
this chapter, will be extensively reviewed and commented, upon later.
We now turn to the other federal sedition laws that completed and 
extended the anti-subversive armoury launched by the Smith Act.
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2.3. The Internal Security Act
The second major federal sedition law was the Internal Security 
ASAct, 1950.^ It owes its parentage to the so-called C. Mundt-E. Nixon 
Bill of 1949» which was amended and extended by Senator McCarran, and 
enacted by Congress against President Truman^ veto. It remains the 
sole legislative measure that resulted from the work of the H.U.A.C., 
allegedly a legislative committee, which however never successfully 
proposed any other legislative measure.
A striking feature of the McCarran Act was its long preamble.
It consisted of a long series of “legislative findings“ purporting to 
describe the history, aims and function of the international communist 
movement. It was stated, in a simplistic but solemn language, that the 
movement was controlled by the government of the Soviet Union and its 
aim was to establish the communist totalitarian dictatorship “by 
treachery, deceit, infiltration, espionage, sabotage, terrorism and 
other means“, in countries all over the world. The American members 
of the movement had repudiated their allegiance to the United States, 
and transferred it to the Soviet Union.
It concluded:
“The recent successes of Communist methods in other 
countries and the nature and control of the world 
Communist movement itself present a clear and present 
danger to the security of the United States and to 
the existence of American institutions"
and added that “nothing in this Act shall be construed... in any way
to infringe upon freedom of press or of speech as guaranteed by the
Constitution".
The procedure set up by the Act was complicated and cumbersome.
The Act itself occupies 26 pages of the U.S. Code Annotated. Its 
main feature was the establishment of a 5-man Subversive Activities 
Control Board. That Board was authorized to conduct administrative
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proceedings, upon petition by the Attorney-General, to determine 
whether an organisation was a "Communist-action" or a "Communist- 
front" one. If the Board so found, it would order the organisation to 
register with it.
A "Communist-action" organisation was any organisation in the 
United States which
(i) is substantially directed, dominated or controlled by the 
foreign government or foreign organisation controlling the 
World Communist movement and (ii) operates primarily to advance 
the objectives of such World Communist movement, 
while an organisation is a "Communist-front" if it 
(i) is substantially directed, dominated or controlled by a
Communist-action organisation, and (ii) is primarily operated 
for the purpose of giving aid and support to a Communist-action 
organisation, a Communist foreign government, or the world 
Communist movement.
Upon the order becoming final, the registration statement should
include detailed lists of the officers and members, the finances and
printing facilities of the organisation. The repercussions of such a
registration for both the organisation concerned and its members were
49so severe that one author likened them to a death sentence. The
members of a registered organisation could not apply for passports;
they were not eligible for employment in Federal Government posts
or defence facilities; all usual tax benefits were denied to the
organisation and its members; forbidding barriers were put upon the
use of the mail or the mass media by such an organisation. Those
severe restrictions were imposed under the threat of heavy criminal 
50punishment.
Section 4(a) of the Act created a new political crime, independent 
of the registration mechanism:
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"It shall he unlawful for any person knowingly to 
combine, conspire or agree with any other person to 
perform any act which could contribute to the 
establishment within the United States of a totalitarian 
dictatorship... the direction and control of which is 
to be vested in, or exercised by or under the dominion 
or control of, any foreign government, foreign 
organisation ac foreign individual."
According to other provisions, the Attorney-General was authorized 
in case of emergency to detain without judicial supervision persons 
who "probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others 
to engage in acts of espionage, or of sabotage". Six internment
i
camps were set up in 1952, among which the California one had been 
previously used for the detention of the West Coast Japanese Americans 
during the Second World War.
Finally, the immigration regulations were tightened up by the 
Act. Persons who had, at any time, been members of a Communist Party 
anywhere in the world, or who advocated "any form of totalitarianism," 
or whose entry would endanger the "public interest, welfare, safety 
or security of the U.S." were barred from entry and made deportable.
The Magnusson Act of the same year, 1950» barred all seagoing 
employment, unless the Coast Guard was satisfied "that the character 
and habits of life of the applicant are such as to authorize the 
belief that the presence of such individual on board a vessel or 
within a waterfront facility would not be inimical to the security 
of the U.S.".5?
2.4. The Communist Control Act
The final major federal sedition law of the 50s was the
52Communist Control Act, 1954. The Act started its career as the 
Republican Butler Bill which created the new category of "Communist 
infiltrated organisations" directed against the few remaining radical 
trade unions. Once a union was declared "infiltrated" by the
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S.A.C.B., it lost all rights under labour law and 2($ of its
membership could start a process to remove its leadership.
A number of "liberal" Democrats, led by H. Humphrey,proposed
instead a Communist Control Bill, which would outlaw the C.P. and
make membership an indictable offence punished with a 5-*year
53imprisonment. According to the varying recollections of its
sponsors, the Humphrey Bill had three main objectives: a liberal one ,
to fight off the new anti-union legislation, and by making communism
a straightforward criminal offence to place anti-communist
persecution under judicial supervision; a "political convenience"
one: Humphrey had stated while introducing the Bill "I am tired of
reading headlines about being * soft * on communism. What is sought...
is to remove any doubt in the Senate as to where we stand on the
issue of communism". And, in 1959» he admitted that the Bill had
saved several "liberal" senators who would have been, otherwise,
54defeated in the 1954 elections; finally, the obvious repressive one
of completely outlawing the Communist Party.
The Humphrey proposal set off an extraordinary course of events.
The Eisenhower administration, through its Attorney-General, and the
F.B.I., through Hoover, objected to the banning of the C.P.
Interestingly, an earlier Attorney-General had stated, in 1950, that the
55F.B.I. "knew every communist in the U.S.". ^ And Hoover, who used to
t
provide the various investigating committees with the "exact" number
of C.P. members - 21,500 in 1955^ - had consistently rejected
similar proposals throughout the period. In 1947» he had stated to
57the H.TJ.A.C. that outlawry would make martyrs out of communists, 
and similar sentiments were expressed by Senator McCarran, who was 
afraid that the Humphrey Bill would emasculate the Smith Act and his 
own Internal Security Act.
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The final compromise, which was enacted by a unanimous vote, was 
unique. The Act did not ban the Communist Party, but declared that, 
as a matter of policy, it "should be outlawed". Instead, it deprived 
it of "the rights, privileges and immunities attendant upon legal 
bodies". It did not make C.P. membership a crime, but stipulated, 
rather redundantly, that all communists and members of subversive 
organisations "shall be subject to all the provisions and penalties 
of the Internal Security Act of 1950". The Act also contained 14 
criteria, to be used as evidence of subversive affiliations, one of 
which was whether the accused "had conferred with officers or other 
members of the (subversive) organisation in behalf of any plan or 
enterprise". It finally incorporated the whole anti-union Butler 
Bill, as a reaction to which Humphrey had, allegedly, proposed his 
own act. The administration used those provisions in 1955 in order 
to destroy the two remaining big radical unions.
According to T. Emerson, the Act, which was minimally invoked
in judicial proceedings, "remains on the books as a monument to the
incompetence, irresponsibility, and hysteria of the Eighty-third 
58Congress". Furthermore, it was a perfect example of what we called
"guilt for political convenience". The saga of its enactment, in
which liberal Democrats were boasting that they were the staunchest
anti-communists; while the C.I.A.-funded American Committee of • *
Cultural Freedom was joining forces with the remnants of the radical 
civil liberties groups, in opposition to it, indicates that the 
threat from the Communist Party itself was perceived as minimal. 
Indeed, one may argue that the rationale behind thè widespread anti­
communist measures must be sought, only secondarily, in any real or 
honestly apprehended fear of a violent communist revolution. Equally, 
their function and effects - even though instrumental to the permanent
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incapacitation of the Communist Party - were much more crucial for 
mainstream social and political life. The tendency of liberal 
constitutional authors and historians to view the period as a short 
illiberal "spasm" or as the effect of an irrational '•hysteria” 
arguably misses the much wider the subtler consequences of that period 
for all aspects of post-war American society. It is not unreasonable 
to suggest that the anti-subversive measures of the period involved 
an attempt at restructuring and regulating the public sphere,which was as 
fundamental and radical as the New Deal measures were for the economy.
2.5* State sedition laws
Following the federal lead, many states and localities started
enacting sedition laws, which imitated, combined and extended the
Federal ones. Forty-five states, in all, put various sedition laws
in their statute books between 1947 and 1954* Some states passed
registration laws, like the Internal Security Act and set up their
local Subversive Activities Boards. A Texas law required the officers
of listed organisations to provide the names of "any person who has
attended its meetings in the State of Texas”. Eight states banned
the Communist Party and, by 1958, thirty-five states barred advocates
of violent overthrow of the government from the ballot, while
59eighteen barred the C.P. by name. A Tennessee law threatened 
"subversives” with the capital punishment. S. Cushman remarks that 
"a sort of competition" was going on among the states for the passing 
of the toughest legislation against communism.
Two of the most famous and widely imitated laws, which became 
involved in Supreme Court litigation, were the 1949 New York Feinberg 
Law, which required local education boards to compile their own lists 
of subversive organisations, membership in which meant automatic 
disqualification from "appointment or retention in any office or
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position in the public schools'1, and to draft annual loyalty reports 
on all public school members of staff; and the 1949 Maryland Ober 
Act which combined provisions from the Smith Act, the Internal 
Security Act and the federal loyalty programmes, and was copied by 
eleven states.
Cities and localities participated in the hunt for subversives
with equal fervour. 150 municipal ordinances, many of them enacted
after the outbreak of the Korea War, dealt with various aspects of
subversive activities. Some of them, finding the field pre-empted
by federal and state measures, attempted to keep their geographical
perimeters free from infection, by banning the physical presence of
subversives within their jurisdictions, imitating thus
in a way the Middle Ages efforts to keep the plague outside the
bounds of the City. Communists and other subversives were asked to
register with the authorities or. leave the towns involved or both. A
New Rochelle, New York ordinance required registration with the police
of any member of a communist organisation who "resides in, is
employed in, has a regular place of business in or who regularly
enters or travels through any part of the city"; and a, widely
imitated, Birmingham, Alabama ordinance punished Communists with
fines and 160 days imprisonment for each day they remained within
61the "corporate limits of the town".
Thus, a series of sedition laws - federal, state, and local - 
sometimes overlapping and sometimes complementing each other created 
a formidable and intricate net, which could trap all those, even 
remotely, connected with the Communist Party. However, these 
laws were not compatible with the constitutionally protected freedoms 
of expression and association, as they-were construed by the Supreme 
Court in its 30s and 40s decisions. When, therefore, the main test
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cases of the anti-communist programme reached the Supreme Court, the 
latter had to take a close look at both the sedition laws and its 
earlier liberal legal doctrines. To these cases and the legal doctrines 
that resulted from them, we now turn.
3. Political Justice and the Communists
3.1. The Case of Dennis v. TJ.S.
As mentioned above, the Communist Party re-established itself
1
in 1945 under the leadership of William Poster. The short truce 
- between the party and the federal authorities came to an abrupt end. 
During the same year the Criminal Division of the Department of 
Justice started building a Smith Act case against the C.P.U.S.A., 
while the F.S.I. intensified its investigations of communist 
activities.
However, it was only in July 1948 that the Attorney-General,
Tom Clark, obtained an indictment in New York against 12 members of
the C.P.TJ.S.A. top committee, the National Board. The timing of the
prosecution was connected with the mounting Republican national
security campaign led by Republican Congressmen Mundt, Nixon,
McCarran and McCarthy. The Democratic administration felt politically
threatened by the repeated Republican accusations that it had shown
62an unacceptable and suspicious leniency towards domestic communism.
The indictment charged the 12 conmunist leaders with conspiracy
to organize the C.P.U.S.A., and conspiracy to knowingly and willfully
•
advocate and teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing and 
destroying the Government of the U.S. by force and violence. The 
trial lasted for 9 months, and the record extended to 20,000 pages.
The "Newsweek” journal called it "the longest, dreariest and most
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controversialM proceeding in the history of criminal law. The 
publicity which surrounded the trial both in America and abroad was 
enormous. One of the trial’s main characteristics was the continuous 
confrontation between the trial judge Harold Medina and the defence 
attorneys which finished with severe contempt citations for all 
attorneys. All defendants were found guilty. The convictions were
63 64upheld by the Court of Appeals ' and the Supreme Court.
The case of Dennis v. U.S. was of great importance for the 
further development of the theory and practice of freedom of expression 
in the U.S. It involved the centrepiece of the federal anti-communist 
armoury, the Smith Act. Questions of its proper construction and 
constitutionality were fully addressed to by the courts for the first 
time. Additionally, although the defendants were twelve well known 
communists, the construction of the Smith Act was of direct relevance 
to the whole expanding field of loyalty-security legislation. As 
one of the most important cases ever decided by the Supreme Court, 
Dennis requires a detailed examination.
3.1.1. The legal problems of the communist -prosecution
The m i n  problems that all three judicial instances were called 
upon to confront were the following.
(a) The communist leaders were not charged with any overt
!
criminal act, nor with an attempt or conspiracy to commit any criminal
act. If the authorities had evidence on any communist plan to engage
in illegal activities, they would have prosecuted under the relevant
65statutes, primarily for seditious conspiracy. ' The indictment 
charged the communists merely with acts of expression - teaching and 
advocating the violent overthrow of the government - under the 
Smith Act.
(b) The defendants admitted that they were leaders of the
Communist Party and that they propagated "the
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principles of Marxism-Leninism." The prosecution therefore embarked 
in an arduous endeavour to prove that the basic tenet of "Marxism- 
Leninism" is the violent overthrow of capitalist government and the 
setting up in its place of an alternative dictatorial regime; and 
that the "teaching and advocacy" of Marxism-Leninism by the 
communists, far from being the innocuous expositions of a political 
doctrine, was preparation for illegal and violent action, that it was 
criminal action rather than protected expression.
To achieve its purpose the prosecution introduced and attempted 
to interpret a number of books: The Communist Manifesto (by Marx and 
Engels,written in 1848); State and Revolution (by Lenin, 1917);
The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (by Stalin,
1925); Foundations of Leninism (by Stalin, 1924)* and other similarly 
dated works from the vast bibliography which may be vaguely defined 
as the "Marxist-Leninist" theoretical corpus.
The record showed complete lack of any evidence that revolutionary 
theory was about to be transformed into violent action.
The government concentrated on the interpretation of the nature of 
the works of Marxist classics, but it could not produce analogous 
"inflammatory" material emanating directly from the defendants or 
the C.P.TJ.S.A. literature.
A typical exchange in the trial court between a defence attorney
and a prosecution witness ran as follows:
"Defense attorney: Did [the defendants] ever openly 
come out in so many words that they wanted to advocate 
overthrowing the government?
Witness: No - the Marxist-Leninist implication was 
there."66
Thus, most of the evidence was given by "expert witnesses" 
(ex-communists and F.B.I. agents) purporting to interpret, authoritatively,
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the classics of Marxism, and prove the existence of specific 
statements advocating future violent action by the defendants. It 
should be noted in passing, however, that in an earlier case the 
Supreme Court had confronted the same line of argument. After it had 
considered The Communist Manifesto. State and Bevolution and The 
Foundations of Leninism, all introduced by the prosecution, it had 
stated:
•'A tenable conclusion from the foregoing is that 
the Party in 1927 desired to achieve its purpose 
by peaceful and democratic means, and as a theoretical 
matter justified the use of force and violence only 
as a method of preventing an attempted forcible 
counter-overthrow once the Party had obtained control 
in a peaceful manner..."
and furthermore as to the validity of evidence derived solely from 
theoretical works:
" Political writings are often over-exaggerated 
polemics bearing the imprint of the period and the 
place in which written. Philosophies cannot generally 
be studied in vacuo. Meaning may be wholly distorted 
by lifting sentences out of context, instead of 
construing them as part of an organic whole. "6 7
(c) A further problem was created by the use of the conspiracy 
provisions of the Smith Act and not of the substantive ones. In 
that way, the prosecution absolved itself from the need to prove 
that the individual defendants advocated, specifically, the violent 
overthrow of the TJ.S. Government. It sufficed that any of them had 
engaged in conduct which aided the proscribed act (in that case the 
.teaching and advocacy) or had somehow indicated his agreement with 
the aim of the conspiracy. Thus, the balance of evidence was 
removed from the specific acts and words of the defendants and 
placed upon the activities of the C.P.U.S.A., as a whole. Although 
the party remained formally legal, its nature, as the tool of the 
alleged conspiracy, became the prominent issue of the trial. Belknap 
remarks that 9006 of the prosecution*s attention was devoted to
building a case against the C.P. and only the remaining 10^ to
establishing the defendants' specific guilt in the conspiracy.
The line of illegality was therefore pushed a further step backs 
the defendants were not charged with the actual teaching of Marxism- 
Leninism (taken to mean violent overthrow) but with conspiracy to 
teach and advocate that theory at a later date.
The judicial answers to the extraordinary circumstances of the 
communist prosecution should be reconciled, additionally, with such a 
reading of the First Amendment, that would exonerate the Act and the 
prosecution under it, from suspicions of unconstitutionality.
3.1.2. The lower federal courts
The judicial consideration of the case started with the charge to the
69jury, by the trial judge, Judge Medina. The judge interpreted the 
Act, and posed three necessary conditions for conviction under it:
(a) intent on the part of the defendants to overthrow the government 
•'as speedily as circumstances would permit"; (b) a finding of 
"teaching or advocacy" of violent overthrow, as "a rule or principle 
of action" rather than as an "abstract doctrine"; and (c) use of 
language "reasonably and ordinarily" calculated to incite persons to 
such action. Medina went on to reject the defence request for a 
specific jury determination of the. existence of a clear and present 
danger of violent overthrow of the government, arguably a 
constitutional requirement. The judge ruled that it was for him, 
and not the jury, to decide whether a danger existed and he added 
that "as a matter of law" if the statute, as construed, was found to 
have been violated, then "there was sufficient danger of a 
substantive evil that Congress [had] a right to prevent to justify 
the application of the statute under the First Amendment of the 
Constitution".
68
Thus, since the judge precluded any independent factual 
examination of the existence of a danger of revolution, the causal 
and chronological elements inherent in the danger test were reduced 
to the requirement of overthrow nas speedily as circumstances would 
permit". Such a yardstick dispensed with the element of chronological 
closeness completely, and transformed the causal link into a 
requirement of intent. The bridge between advocacy and revolution 
was built on the fact that the defendants intended to change the 
government forcibly. A seditious "state of mind" became the 
determinant of causality and guilt, irrespective of any consequences.
The trial ended with the conviction of all defendants and the 
imposition of the maximum penalties, provided for in the law.* The 
convictions were upheld by the Court of Appeals in a unanimous 
decision written by Judge Learned Hand.
Learned Hand made a determined effort to tackle the problems 
created by the continuous reference of the defence to the danger
itest, which by that time had acquired the status and prestige' of a
constitutional provision. He had followed the evolution of the test
since its launching by Holmes, and had attempted in the 20s and 50s
to promote his own test of advocacy/incitement in the place of the
70Holmesian formulation. Thus, he dismissed all procedural objections 
and reached the constitutional issues, where his most important 
contribution was the redefinition of the danger test:
"In each case courts must ask whether the gravity 
of the "evil", discounted by its improbability, 
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary 
to avoid the danger. We have purposedly substituted 
1improbability• for ‘remoteness1 because that must 
be the right interpretation. Given the same 
probability, it would be wholly irrational to condone 
future evils which we should prevent if they were 
immediate; that could be reconciled only by an 
indifference to those who come after us . . . "7 1
* Only 11 defendants were tried. The case of W. Poster was severed on 
health grounds.
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Hand declared that that revision of the danger test was in 
accordance with its nature as a ’'comparison between interests which 
are to be appraised qualitatively”. He went on to apply his test 
to the facts of the case. The main factual problem was the relation 
between the "Marxist-Leninist” teaching and the violent overthrow of 
government requirement of the Smith Act. According to Hand the 
proper meaning of "Marxism-Leninism” was that:
"Capitalism rests upon... oppression...; that t> it in 
time there will succeed a classless society...; but 
there must be an intermediate and transitional period 
of ^ dictatorship of the proletariat* which can be 
established only by the violent overthrow of the 
existing government; the transition period involves 
the use of Violence and force*,temporary it is true, 
but inescapable; and although it is impossible to 
predict when a propitious occasion will arise, one 
certainly will arise”. (u.M.)
All these were extremely serious evils and the probability of 
their occurrence, even if slight, should be completely precluded.
To be sure, the logistics of the comparison between gravity and 
probability, are not as easy as Hand thought. Indeed his protest 
that the danger test was "not a slogan or shibboleth to be applied 
as though it carried its own meaning” could be levelled against 
Hand*s formulation, too.
Hand completed his version of the danger test by borrowing and 
elaborating on the two elements which Judge Medina had relied upon: 
external circumstances and intent.
These circumstances consisted of (a) the international tensions 
since 1945* Since any border incident,, diplomatic misunderstanding, 
or difference in the interpretation of treaties could start a war, 
the probability of danger was taken to be fully established. The 
link between the bleak international situation and the 11 defendants 
was presumably their alleged complete dependence on Moscow; and
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(b) the character of the C.P.U.S.A. as a rigidly organized and 
disciplined group which conducted many of its activities in a semi- 
secretive way.
Those two factors plus the intent of the defendants
to overthrow the government at the •'propitious" moment - something 
which the defendants had vehemently denied - made their conspiracy 
to teach Marxism a punishable offence.
Thus, the communists were convicted not for what they did, not 
even for what they said. They were punished because the Soviet 
Union was an aggressive power, which abolished democracy in countries 
under its influence. The American authorities could not punish 
communists in Czechoslovakia for overthrowing the legal democratic 
government of that country, so they convicted American communists 
in their place.
3.1.3. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. but limit ed its review 
to constitutional questions.
Chief Justice Vinson wrote the majority opinion for the Court, 
joined by Justices Heed, Burton and Minton.
Vinson started with an examination of the previous expression 
cases, which had been decided upon by the Supreme Court. He endeavoured 
to show the differences existing between Dennis and those earlier 
cases in which the danger test had been b o m  and developed. He 
focussed on the social interest involved in the Dennis prosecution 
(internal security) and stated that the threat to the nation from 
communist activities was of a novel kind and gravity not encountered 
before to such an extent. He agreed that these activities did not 
result in an attempt to overthrow the government, nor was there any 
proof that the defendants prepared for or advocated any specific
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unlawful or violent act. The danger lay in the external circumstances
" ; The formation by petitioners of such a highly
organised conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined 
members subject to call when the leaders, these 
petitioners, felt that the time had come for action, 
coupled with the inflammable nature of world conditions, 
similar uprisings in other countries, and the touch- 
and-go nature of our relations with countries with 
whom petitioners were in the very least ideologically 
attuned, convince us that their convictions were 
justified on this score. ” 72
He quoted approvingly the Hand version of "clear and probable 
danger" test adding that "more we cannot expect from words". Thus, 
it was the world crisis and the highly disciplined nature of the 
Communist Party that created the extreme "gravity" of the evil and 
dispensed with the need to measure the probability of its occurrence. 
Indeed, an examination of the second part of the equation was deemed 
unnecessary. The Government need not "wait until the putsch is about 
to be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited... 
We must, therefore, reject the contention that success or probability 
of success is the criterion".
The only conclusion that could be drawn from those statements 
was that the danger lay in the "contamination of subversive ideas", 
something that could be perceived as a slow process in time and which 
could not be, adequately, controlled by legal doctrines emphasizing 
the chronological link between the expression and the illegal 
consequences. Significantly, Chafee had agreed, in 1947» that
1 «
the "principal worry is that the traditional American way of life 
will be undermined by the infection of public opinion. Although
there may be no clear and present danger of violent revolution...
73the threat of a diseased morale is immediate". J He, accordingly, 
proposed the substitution of a clear and probable danger test for 
the clear and present one, a suggestion fully endorsed by Learned 
Hand and the Chief Justice in 1951»
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The "Vinson opinion was joined by three more Justices. Frankfurter 
and Jackson filed concurring opinions. Black and Douglas dissented.
Justice Frankfurter^ opinion was an elegant essay on the 
virtues of judicial restraint and on the relevance of the balancing 
process in First Amendment cases as well as an d;tempt to apply both 
in the communist case.
According to Frankfurter, every social situation which asks for 
some sort of assessment or regulation involves conflicting interests. 
These interests axe not quantitatively comparable. The question, 
therefore, of who is going to do the balancing and reconciliation is 
more important than the method of balancing or any of its particular 
outcomes. In a democracy this task has been assigned to the 
legislature and the courts should respect the results "unless outside 
the pale of fair judgment". The problem with formulas, like the 
"preferred freedoms" or the danger test, is that they ascribe an 
inflated role to the judiciary and "convey a delusion of certitude 
when what is most certain is the complexity".
The judicial role in the area of expression consists of a 
"careful weighing of conflicting interests". But certain categories 
of speech "rank low in any scale of social values". The Supreme Court 
had already included in the list "the lewd, the obscene, the profane, 
the libellous and the fighting words". Frankfurter added to the 
list the advocacy of force and violence.
Following these principles, Justice Frankfurter set off to apply 
his balancing formula to the situation before him. The conflicting 
interests were those in national security and in free speech. Be, 
first, enumerated the factors on the side of security in which he 
included jury findings, judicial notice, common knowledge and 
"whatever is relevant to a legislative judgment". These factors were
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that “communist doctrines... are in the ascendancy in powerful nations 
who cannot be acquitted of unfriendliness (sic) to the institutions of 
this country"; that the C.P. had 60,000 members; and that, according 
to a Canadian Boyal Commission, the communist movement was the basis 
of an espionage network.
On the other hand the second basket included the fact that 
communists had made some criticisms of actual defects of American 
society; that "there may be a grain of truth in the most uncouth 
doctrine"; that suppressing advocates of overthrow inevitably will 
silence critics who do not advocate overthrow but fear that their 
criticism may be so construed; that liberty of thought "soon 
shrivels without freedom of expression".
But when he came to the promised balancing of the two sets,
he had drawn up, he declined the prospect of re-weighing these
legislative considerations:
"It is not for us to decide how we would adjust the 
clash of interests which this case presents were the 
primary responsibility for reconciling it ours.
Congress has determined that the danger created by 
advocacy of overthrow justifies the ensuing restriction 
on freedom of speech. The determination was made 
after due deliberation, and the seriousness of the 
congressional purpose is attested by the volume of 
legislation passed to effectuate the same ends. Can we then 
say that the judgment Congress exercised was denied 
it by the Constitution? Can we establish a 
constitutional doctrine which forbids the elected 
representatives of the people to make this choice?*74
The only consolation he offered to the communists was that they 
could still take their case to the people with which "power and 
responsibility remained". The democratic process remained unimpaired 
for Frankfurter, despite the fact that the Court fully upheld the 
political excommunication of the C.P. Indeed the "propensity" of the 
communists for clandestine activities could only be enhanced by that 
decision.
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Jackson’s concurring opinion was, arguably, the most interesting,
75although it received, generally, a "bad press" for its illiberalism. 
He expressed in a most accurate way the intellectual problems posed 
by the application of any legal doctrine based on some notion of 
pending dangerous consequences (be they present, probable or remote). 
The anticipation of future consequences in a highly complex national 
and international political situation was idle speculation. 
Consequential!st doctrines were relevant to trivial cases only, or
those cases which had run their course before ending up in the courts.
!
He gave his Barnette decision as an example of the latter case. But,
in the case of communists all consequentialist arguments were
prophesies "in the guise of legal decision", and if honestly applied
they should lead to their acquittal, something clearly undesirable.
For Jackson the way out lay in the law of conspiracy: "A conspiracy
may be an evil in itself independently of any other evil it seeks to
accomplish... Congress may make it a crime to conspire with other to
76do what an individual may lawfully do on his own".
It is interesting to recall that Justice Jackson had protested
77against the majority in Korematsu , that they had created a "loaded 
weapon ready for the hand of any authority". In his Dennis opinion 
he proposed the adoption of the conspiracy provisions against the 
communists, even though they were, admittedly, "a dragnet device 
capable of perversion into an instrument of injustice in the hands 
of a partisan or complacent judiciary".
One could argue that Jackson was not less liberal than the rest 
of the majority; but that he was more honest, intellectually: 
although the Communist Party was effectively designated as a 
conspiracy, the Justices seemed to him "to discuss anything under the 
sun except the law of conspiracy". The question, far from the verbal
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pyrotechnics of present or probable consequences and the suspect
attempt to link remoteness with success was much simpler. A declared
conspiracy incriminates all conspirators. Thus, once the C.P. had
been so declared, all normal procedural guarantees could be relaxed
78and the need to prove the existence of danger would resign.'
Equally, the need to attribute specific acts to the conspirators would 
vanish. A situation of total danger called for a total reaction. 
Jackson's opinion was the closest to the way in which the German
79Constitutional Court dealt with the C.P. of that country in 1956.
!
Justices Douglas and Black joined in dissent, as they were to 
do in many of the cases against subversives.
Douglas was the only Justice who applied the danger test as a 
rule of evidence and a constitutional principle to the facts of the 
case. He relied heavily on the expression/action distinction and the 
principle that "free speech is the rule not the exception", which 
could be reversed only in cases of a clear and present danger. He, 
accordingly, attacked the fact that the prosecution had charged the 
communists with conspiracy to organise and teach Marxism-Leninism 
and not with conspiracy to overthrow the government; and he was 
distressed by the fact that no evidence was presented of any acts, 
attempts or even preparations for a revolution. He went on to draw 
a somewhat tenuous distinction between teaching and indoctrination, and 
to suggest - correctly - that since the teaching of Marxism was 
allowed in universities but not in Party offices, the crucial element 
lay not on what was taught but on who taught it. Douglas' remark 
was supported by the elevation of the element of intent as the basic 
requirement of guilt.
On the question of the existence of a-danger of violent revolution 
because of communist activities, Douglas was unequivocal: no such
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danger existed. The political and organisational strength of the
C.P. was minimal, equally its ideological appeal. The economic
depression had been overcome, successfully, and "the country is not
in a despair... the doctrine of Soviet revolution is exposed in all
80of its ugliness and the American people want none of it”.
Thus, Douglas made the only effort to apply the danger test in 
its original form to the facts of the case. He did not question the 
constitutionality of the Smith Act but found its concrete application 
a clear abridgement of freedom of speech and association. To be sure 
it was exactly that fact, i.e. that theapplication of the danger test 
would lead, inescapably, to acquittals, that had led to its 
reformulation by Learned Hand and Vinson.
Justice Black's short dissent was the only one that questioned 
the constitutionality of the conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act. 
He found them a kind of prior restraint on freedom of speech, like 
those annulled by the Court in the 30s and 40s. He indicated that he 
did not consider the danger test, even in its original form, the 
"furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression in 
the realm of public matters, but just a minimum guarantee", and he 
concluded:
" There is hope, however, that, in calmer times, when 
present pressures, passions and fears subside, this 
or some later Court will restore ilrst Amendment 
liberties to the high preferred place where they 
, belong in a free society. "80a
Thus, at the end of one of the most important court cases in 
American history, the Smith Act was accepted as consitutionally valid, 
the Communist Party was declared a conspiracy but was not fully 
banned and its entire national leadership was sent to prison for 
terms of up to twenty years.
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3.2. The Case of Yates v. U«S.
The Dennis decision paved the way for a long series of prosecutions 
against second-string state leaders of the C.P.U.S.A., under the Smith 
Act. By 1957» 15 prosecutions had been brought under the conspiracy 
provisions of the Act, involving 121 defendants; additionally eight 
prosecutions had been brought tinder the membership provisions of the 
Act which resulted in the acquittal of 10 defendants and the conviction 
of 4* In all 96 defendants were convicted under the various provisions 
of the Smith Act.*^
1 82This drive came to an end with the Supreme Court Yates decision. 
The Yates case involved 14 leaders of the California Communist Party. 
They had been convicted by the state courts under the same provisions 
as Dennis: conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the Government 
by force and violence and conspiracy to organize the Communist Party.
The Supreme Court reversed the convictions. Justice Harlan, who 
wrote the majority opinion, avoided phrasing it in constitutional 
terms. He based his opinion on three grounds:
(a) A limited construction of the "organizing" charge. He 
argued that this term refers, solely, to the process of the initial 
setting up of an organization. Accordingly, the three-year statute
of limitations required the withdrawal of that part of the indictment
!
from the jury's consideration, since the "organization" of the C.P. 
had started in 19 4 5 with its reconstitution.
(b) The trial judge’s instructions to the jury as to the proper 
interpretation of the "advocacy" provisions, and
(c) the sufficiency of the evidence for conviction of the 
defendants under the Act.
The Court’s opinion on the second count was a masterly exercise 
in judicial semantics. Harlan insisted that his opinion was a mere
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construction of the statute, in accordance with Dennis, and not a 
constitutional decision. He found the trial court instructions to 
the jury inconsistent with the instructions in Dennis, as upheld by 
the appellate courts.
Trial Judge Mathes had charged the jury that in order to find 
the defendants guilty under the Smith Act "advocacy and teaching" 
provisions, they should be satisfied that they had urged the 
"necessity and duty" to overthrow forcibly the government, and not 
merely the "desirability or propriety" of such act; he had not 
added, however, the proviso that there should have been "advocacy 
of action by the use of language reasonably and ordinarily calculated 
to incite persons to such action". To be sure, the difference between 
an "advocacy of the action of violent overthrow" and an "advocacy of 
its duty and necessity" is not immediately apparent. On the other 
hand, the Dennis decision had already removed the element of 
"presence", or of the direct and immediate chronological relationship 
between speech and subsequent action, of the danger test, and had 
substituted it for a mere causal relationship between the communication 
of opinions and beliefs and the creation of a "state of mind" by 
the receiver of such communications. As Justice Clark said, in 
dissent, "the trial judge charged in essence all that was required 
under the Dennis opinions... the charges... axe without material 
difference... the distinctions [between them] are too'subtle and 
difficult to grasp"'. ^
For Harlan, however, the difference in the verbal formulation 
was one of substance. The terms "teaching" and "advocacy" were used 
by Congress as "terms of art"(l), not in their "ordinary dictionary 
meaning". These terms proscribed expressive activities if (a) they 
advocated "Presently, the taking of forcible action in the future"
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not merely "the abstract doctrine of overthrow”, and (b) if the tenor 
of the language was such that people could have been moved to action 
by it:
” The essential distinction is that those to whom 
the advocacy is addressed must be urged to do something, 
now or in the future,rather than to believe in 
something ”84
To be sure, as Holmes had observed in the 20s "every idea is 
an incitement”. The addition of an incomprehensible distinction 
between "abstract" and "concrete” ideas - the gist of Harlan's
85opinion - further underlined the accuracy of the Hblmesian pragmatism.
Having reversed the decision on two grounds, Justice Harlan went 
on to examine whether a new trial was called for each of the 14 
defendants, on the basis of the evidence on record. Dennis had 
established two propositions, as to the appraisal of the facts:
(a) that the Communist Party in itself constituted a continuous 
conspiracy; active membership in the Party had been relied upon, 
without more, as the sufficient nexus between the activities of the 
various defendants and the alleged Smith Act conspiracy; and
(b) that Marxism-Leninism - the Party's ideology - was equal to 
the teaching and advocacy of the violent overthrow of Government.
On the first point, Harlan stated that if "advocacy” and "teaching” 
were correctly constructed to mean "a call to forcible action at some 
future point", then the record would have appeared to be "strikingly 
deficient" as proof of the nature of the Conauunist Party as a 
purveyor of such a conspiracy. Thus, the Government could not rely 
any longer, in its effort to obtain convictions of individual defendants 
for conspiracy, upon the assumption of the conspiratorial character 
of the Party. This approach placed much greater importance on the 
specific evidence against each one of the defendants.
Turaing to the specific evidence against the defendants, Harlan 
rejected the second equation, too. Although all 14 were leaders of 
the California C.P. he found that for 5 of them there was neither 
sufficient evidence that they were parts of the alleged conspiracy
nor proof of the requisite intent,and acquitted them outright. He
86then ordered a new trial for the remaining $.
Justice Black, joined by Douglas, stated that all defendants
should have been acquitted on First Amendment grounds. The Smith
Act was unconstitutional on its fane; and the trials under it were
openly political trials which would eventually lead to a similar kind
of society as the one the Smith Act had been allegedly drawn up to
prevent. The only dissenter in Yates was Justice Clark, the man who
nine years earlier as the then Attorney-General had launched the
87Smith Act prosecutions.
Behind the verbal pyrotechnics, the "terms of art" and the
subtle distinction, the fact remained that Yates placed an enormous
burden on prosecutions under the Smith Act advocacy and conspiracy
provisions. The indictment against the ^ Yates defendants who had
88been remanded for retrial was dismissed in December 1957» The
outcome of the pending cases against various leading communists was
similars either the judges acquitted the defendants, or the prosecution
moved for dismissal for lack of evidence which could satisfy the
89Yates requirements.
3.3. The Smith Act and Membership of the Communist Party
The two last cases under the Smith Act that reached the Supreme 
Court related to its membership clause and were decided in 1961.
Under this clause 4(f)» it was an offence to knowingly become or be 
a member of any organization that teaches or advocates the forcible 
overthrow of the government.
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In Scales v. U.S. a 6-year imprisonment for violation of the
91clause was affirmed, while in Noto v. U.S., decided on the same 
day, the conviction was reversed. Both Scales and Noto had been 
indicted in 1954.
The questions raised by the "membership" prosecutions were 
crucial in relation to both expression and association rights. Under 
section 4(f)» conviction was based not on any wrongful activities or 
even illegal advocacy - as interpreted by Dennis and Yates - but on 
the mere fact of membership in an organization which remained technically 
legal. It was the best example of the "guilt by association" 
doctrine.
Justice Harlan wrote the majority opinion for a 5-4 split Court 
and affirmed Scales conviction. He upheld the constitutionality of 
the clause and laid down guidelines for its interpretation and 
application. |
I
According to Harlan’s opinion, the clause should apply to
"active" members of the Party only and not to merely "nominal, passive,
inactive or purely technical" ones. A defendant qualifies as an
"active" member if he is proven (a) to have knowledge of the proscribed
advocacy and (b) to specifically intend to accomplish the aims of the
92organization as speedily as circumstances permit. Harlan then turned 
to the evidence produced in the trial related to the nature of the 
Communist Party as an organization, membership of which was punishable 
under the clause. He found that the standards he himself had set up 
in Yates were satisfied. The Party had been engaged in illegal 
advocacy of future violent action and in present legal activities 
which would facilitate the future illegal undertakings; and that 
that advocacy was not "sporadic" but broadly based and attributable 
to the Party as a whole. Thus, as he had already found that Scales
90
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possessed the required knowledge and intent, he upheld his conviction.
On the same day, Harlan reversed the conviction of Noto, based 
on the same membership clause. No to was as high-ranking an officer 
of. the Communist Party as Scales (curiously Scales had left the 
Party in 1 9 6 1). Hie presumably had the knowledge and intent required 
for conviction. However, the Court found that the Noto evidence 
failed "to establish that the Communist Party was an organization 
which presently advocated violent overthrow of the government now or 
in the future" That holding referred to the very same organization 
which had just been declared to be "as a whole" seditious. According 
to Justice Black, the difference in the outcome of the two cases was caused 
by the professional incompetence of the informers who gave evidence 
in Noto.
The ambiguous character of Communist Party membership was further
93evidenced in another case decided in 1961. Killian v. TJ.S. J came 
under the "non-communist" labour affidavit provisions of the Taft- 
Hartley Act. Killian, a left-wing union official had been convicted 
for per jury in taking the oath. The activities that had led the 
jury to find him guilty of swearing falsely that he was not a 
communist were, according to Justice Douglas' opinion, his opposition 
to American foreign policy in Indo-China, to colonialism and war and 
his support for some C.P. functions.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on technical grounds, 
but went on to consider substantive questions on the elusive notion 
of C.P. membership. Counsel for the defence had asked the Court to 
rule that membership required "a definite objective factual phenomenon" 
or "a formal act of joining". The majority, per Justice Whittaker, 
rejected the request.
According to the decision, membership "connotes a status of 
mutuality between the individual and the organisation. That is to
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say, there must be present the desire on the part of the individual
to belong to the Communist Party and the recognition by that Party that it
considers him a member". Proof of this "ultimate subjective fact
94of membership" was all that was required. This subjective fact
could be proven from "statements and acts" that were "wholly innocent
in themselves and even protected by the First Amendment". It would
be a strange doctrine, the Court held, to say that C.P. membership
"a lawful status - cannot be proven by evidence of lawful acts and 
95statements". ■' Affiliation with the C.P. existed "when there is 
shown to be a close working alliance or association between [an 
individual] and the organisation, together with a mutual understanding 
or recognition that the organisation can rely and depend upon him 
to cooperate with it, and to work for its benefits, for an indefinite 
future period upon a fairly permanent basis" Thus, according to 
Killian, every cause, idea or statement, however legal or innocuous 
in itself, was tainted if it was supported by the Communist Party.
The opinions of Justice Harlan, examined above, and the decision 
in Killian were characteristic of the general approach toward 
communists, throughout the 50s. The C.P. was perceived as a 
conspiratorial vehicle of seditious propaganda but it was not banned, 
in which case membership ofit would be made a straightforward crime.
!
Instead of such a frontal attack - adopted by many other countries, 
and by some opinions in Dennis - a war of attrition was preferred, 
waged against individual communists, sympathisers and fellow-travellers, 
other non-communist radicals and directed, ultimately, at the hearts 
and minds of all Americans. In Scales, this tactic led to the full 
legalisation of the "guilt by association concept,” and as Douglas 
protested: "Nothing but beliefs are on trial in this case"; and 
Killian authorised a notion of "guilt for proximity of ideas".
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But, at the same time, this approach permitted a certain flexibility 
to the Justices.: They could, within the parameters of the repressive 
legislation never challenged for unconstitutionality, reconstrue a 
"term of art"; distinguish away the facts of a case from those of 
an authority; or insist on some procedural nicety (as in Killian) 
not fully adhered to by the lower courts, and thus reverse some 
convictions. This particularistic approach, which required some 
specific evidence for conviction - even if it were mere beliefs, 
expressions or past associations - enlarged the space of judicial 
intervention. Yates. Scales and Noto were the contradictory results 
of a similar attitude. The trials of the period, conducted in a 
flurry of publicity, had as their target not only those immediately 
involved, but more importantly all the others, the "audience" of the 
dramatic acts.
3.4. The Communist Party Registration Case
The last major political trial of the period was appropriately
the case of the Communist Party v^ The Subversive Activities Control 
96Board. The case came under the registration provisions of the 
Internal Security Act. The petition requiring the registration of 
the Communist Party as a "communist action" organization had been 
filed with the Subversive Activities Control Board in 1950. The 
Board ordered the Party to register in 1955* After prolonged judicial
t •
proceedings which involved two trips to the Supreme Court, the latter 
rendered its final judgment in 1961. The Court upheld the Board's 
finding, validating the order for the registration of the Party.
The Supreme Court opinion was written by Justice Frankfurter, 
the leading member in the camp of judicial modesty and the main 
exponent of the balancing technique throughout the 50s.
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The Party had attacked the order on six constitutional grounds, 
but the Court pronounced only on two of them, dismissing the 
remaining, including the important objections of self-incrimination 
and bill of attainder, without discussion. The most important part 
of the decision was that which dealt with the compatibility of the 
Act and its application with the constitutional guarantees of freedom 
of speech and association. Frankfurter accepted that freedom of 
expression could be jeopardized by the registration provisions of 
the Act. But he added swiftly that this requirement was not attached 
to the incident of speech but "to the incidents of foreign domination 
and of operation to advance the objectives of the world communist 
movement". This brief sentence constitutes the gist of the Court's 
majority opinion. Frankfurter reiterated the same point some 
paragraphs later while rejecting the objection that if the Act, as 
constructed, passed the constitutional test, then Congress would be 
given a free hand to impose similar restrictionson any other political 
group it saw fit:
"Nothing which we decide here remotely carries such an 
implication. The Subversive Activities Control Act 
applies only to foreign-dominated organizations which 
work primarily to advance the objectives of a world 
movement controlled by the government of a foreign 
country."97
The only real problem, according to Frankfurther worthy of the 
Court's scrutiny, was the restriction of associational rights of Partyi i
members caused by the ordered disclosure of the names of such members. 
Having posed the question as one of disclosure, the Justice went 
on to resolve it employing predictably his balancing technique.
He agreed that the disclosure might entail certain restraints 
on speech and associational rights; he listed the public opprobrium 
and obloquy that disclosure would attach to Party members; the angry
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public opinion and the evils which it might spawn, the existence of 
an ugly public temper.
On the other hand the social interest endangered was paramount: 
the very existence of the United States as a "sovereign independent 
nation". Hie listed the various Congressional findings about the 
threat that the international and native communists posed to the U.S. 
The outcome of such a weighing was a foregone conclusion. Congress 
had exercised its power to reconcile these "competing" interests, by 
passing the Act. According to frankfurter, the courts should not 
re-examine the validity of these legislative findings - the "product 
of extensive investigations over more than a decade and a half" - and 
reject them.
The Party was, thus, finally ordered to register, a half-way 
measure between legality and illegality. However, the registration 
order was never enforced. All administrative and judicial attempts 
to force members of the Party either to register it or to be registered 
themselves according to the provisions of the Act failed on self­
incrimination grounds. Equally ill-fated were the attempts to force 
"Communist-Front" organizations to register.7 Out of 2 3 applications 
which were filed with the Board under the front provisions only two
reached the Supreme Court; in both cases the orders were reversed
99in 19 6 5 on the ground that the records were "stale"; First 
Amendment questions were not dealt with by the Court.
Thus, no organisation ever registered with the Board. However, 
the prosecutions under the Smith Act, the proceedings under the 
Internal Security Act and the persecutions under the various loyalty- 
security measures had a devastating effect on the organisation involved. 
The Communist Party "collapsed into a tiny sect of a few thousand 
members", but the efforts against it did not subside. An extensive
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"counter-intelligence” programme was launched by the F.B.I. in 1956, 
purporting - according to Department of Justice revelations in 1974 -
I
to create acrimonious debates", "suspicions", "jealousies" and lead
to "disillusionment and defection among Party members and increased
100factionalism on all levels".
Anti-communist hearings went on, too, in the various
investigating committees. Against the clear signs of the communist
collapse, the anti-communist impetus was maintained by the invention
of a new theory. In the 40s and early 50s, the threat from the Party
lay in its alleged strength and influence. "It*s a lot better to
wrongly accuse one person of being a communist than to allow so many
to get away with such communist acts, as those that have brought us
to the brink of World War Three", H.U.A.C. chairman Velde had stated
in 1 9 5 3 * But, by 1956, the communist danger lay in the small
number of communists: "A conspiratorial force may actually weaken
102itself when it increases in size" warned the H.U.A.C., and in 1958 
Hoover, who had always resisted the banning of the C.P. declared that 
the Party was "well on its way of achieving its current objective, 
which is to make you [the H.U.A.C.] believe that it is shattered, 
ineffective and dying. When it has fully achieved its first 
objective, it will then proceed inflexibly toward the final goal'O®^ 
There is a curious logic behind this argument: the best proof
of guilt is the lack of evidence; if there is no evidence at all, 
that means that the suspects hid it and, therefore, they are both 
guilty and dangerous.
On the other hand, out of the twenty-four organisations whose 
registration was sought by the Attorney-General, nineteen ceased 
functioning at some stage of the proceedings. The death sentence 
imposed by the Internal Security Act on "communist fronts" was fully
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successful) although it was not the formal punishment itself 
(registration - it was never achieved), but the proceedings leading 
to it that had achieved it. By the early 60s, the formidable anti­
subversive arsenal was used by the Southern states, to curb the 
growing new danger, the civil rights movement.
3.5. The State Sedition Cases
104As it was mentioned above, states and municipalities followed
and sometimes surpassed in ingenuity the federal lead by passing
various anti-sedition measures. The Supreme Court dealt with a state
105sedition law, for the first time, in Pennsylvania v . Kelson in 
1956.
The Pennsylvania law, involved in that case, resembled the
Maryland Ober Law and both were modelled after the Smith Act. Nelson,
a leading local communist, had been convicted under the law for
alleged seditious propaganda against the U.S. Government. The Supreme
court, affirming the State Supreme Court, reversed the conviction.
Chief Justice Warren found that the state law had been superseded
by the federal legislation, and listed three reasons for the federal
pre-emption in the field, (a) "Federal regulation was so pervasive...
that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it"; (b)
The federal interest involved was so dominant that precluded enforcement
of similar state laws. The federal anti-sedition measures covered
all American authorities and such regulation was not "a local
enforcement problem". Finally, "enforcement of state sedition acts
presents a serious danger of conflict with the administration of the
106federal program" and could also create double jeopardy problems.
As a result of Nelson, several prosecutions under state sedition
laws were abandoned, since the court had included in the field pre-
107empted by the federal authorities all major loyalty measures. 1 But 
in a 1959 case, the Nelson ruling was partially overruled.
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Uphaus v. Wyman involved the one-man legislative committee 
of New Hampshire, conducted by Attorney-General Wyman. Wyman asked 
Dr. Uphaus, the director of the World Fellowship Inc., a much 
persecuted organisation, to produce a record of all those who had 
attended a summer camp organised in the state. The official reason 
for the request was that the state legislature wanted to inform 
itself on the presence of subversives within its boundaries and, 
possibly, to enact relevant laws. Uphaus objected on First Amendment 
grounds, was convicted for contempt and committed to prison until he 
complied.
Justice Clark, for the majority, upheld the conviction. He 
stated that Nelson had not stripped the states of the right to protect 
themselves, and that the state had the power "to proceed with 
prosecutions for sedition against the state itself" and "internal 
civil disturbances". According to Clark, Nelson's meaning was to 
prevent "a race between federal and state prosecutors to the court­
house".^
Following Uphaus. Southern state authorities started using again 
local sedition laws - of the earlier criminal anarchy and criminal 
syndicalism variety or the more recent anti-communist ones - against 
black and civil rights organisations. Institutionalised racism and 
the black reaction to it were localised geographically, and the 
reference to "internal civil disturbances" in Uphaus pinpointed at the 
new danger that had succeeded the communists.
The Supreme Court's intervention, however, in state sedition 
cases in the 60s was cautiously in favour of federal regulation of 
the civil rights issues involved. In the few cases it agreed to 
review, parts of state laws were struck down as unconstitutional and 
various doctrines were used to that effect.
108
-318
In Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. N.A.A.C.P.. a statute 
intending to harass the N.A.A.C.P., the moderate black rights 
organization, provided that "non-trading" associations could not 
function in Louisiana if they were affiliated with "out-of state" 
associations which had as officers or board members communists or 
other members of subversive organisations. This part of the statute 
was declared void for vagueness, since the local N.A.A.C.P. branch 
was not in the position to ensure that none of the officers of the
federal or state N.A.A.C.P. branches was covered by the blanket
!
prohibition.
111In Dombrowski v. Pfister a Louisiana anti-communist statute
was used against another civil rights association, the Southern
Conference Education Fund. The Supreme Court voided, as
unconstitutionally vague, the statute's definition of a "subversive
organisation". It also struck down another provision of the statute,
according to which, once an organization had been cited by the Attorney-
General, the S.A.C.B. or any Congressional committee, it was assumed
as a "communist front" without any further evidence.
112In another 1965 case (Stanford v. Texas ), the Court invalidated 
a blanket Texas warrant under the Texas Suppression Act that allowed 
the seizure of all "written instruments concerning the C.P. of Texas, 
and the operations of the C.P. in Texas". Among the items seized were
117books by Sartre, the Pope and Supreme Court Justice H. Black.
B. The Loyalty Programmes and the Loyalty Tests
4.1. Federal and State Loyalty Programmes
Loyalty programmes link the acquisition or retention of a position, 
right, benefit or privilege by an individual or a group, to a loyalty
110
- 319 -
qualification. The existence of this qualification is either affirmed 
by the individual or group concerned, through oath-taking, signing 
of affidavits etc., or is investigated and decided upon by an 
official - mainly administrative - body designated by the programme.
Thus, loyalty programmes involve the following elements:
(a) A specified position or status that depends on a loyalty 
qualification; (b) a yardstick according to which the loyalty of the 
individuals concerned can be measured: such yardsticks are, usually, 
comprised of the affirmative holding of specified beliefs, and/or 
the disclaiming and repudiation of others; (c) finally, a procedure 
for the corroboration of the presence or lack of the qualification.
The procedure oft®takes one of two forms, and sometimes combines 
both: it is either an individual statement affirming the presence 
or lack of the loyalty standards or an investigating procedure 
pronre. in which the individual concerned may act as witness before 
a designated body which decides upon the existence or lack of the 
required qualification. In the case of a negative finding, the 
consequences provided for in the programme take effect automatically.
The most common loyalty programmes are those related to public 
employees. They were not unknown in the U.S. before the 1940s, but 
it was President Truman’s Executive Order 9835 of 1947 that launched 
the first comprehensive loyalty programme for all federal employees. 
Under the order a loyalty investigation, of all present and prospective 
employees, was to be conducted by the P.B.I. and the Civil Service 
Commission. In certain cases hearings were to be conducted by loyalty 
boards established within each governmental department. "Disloyalty", 
the ground of a dismissal or denial of employment, was not defined 
exactly, but six relevant areas of investigation were set out by the 
order. The first five referred to already existing criminal offences
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(sabotage, espionage, treason, advocacy of illegal overthrow of 
government etc.) which were grounds of dismissal under the ordinary 
disciplinary procedures. The sixth, under which the majority of 
investigations were conducted, introduced a new ground of disloyalty:
"(f) Membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic 
association with any foreign or domestic organisation... 
designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian,
Fascist, Communist or subversive, or as having adopted 
a policy of advocating or approving the commission of 
acts of force or violence... or as seeking to alter 
the form of Government of the TJ.S. by unconstitutional 
means."
The standard of proof required was whether "on all evidence,
personable grounds exist for the belief that the person involved is
disloyal". In 1951* however, the Truman administration again changed
the standard from "reasonable grounds", as to an employee's
disloyalty, to "reasonable doubts" as to his loyalty. Following
the change all cases that had led to a favourable outcome for the
employee were reopened and persons who had been repeatedly cleared
under the previous standard were dismissed. Finally, President
Eisenhower's order 10450 of 1953 changed the standard again, and led
to a new reopening of all cases, now, examined under the old ones.
Employment or its retention should now be "clearly consistent with
the interests of national security". "Nobody is ever really cleared
115under the security programs" Chafee commented. The heads of all 
agencies and departments were given the power of summary dismissal. 
"Disloyalty" was joined with "security risks" in an all-inclusive 
category, which demanded dismissal, among other grounds, for lack of 
reliability, excessive use of intoxicants, sexual perversions and 
mental disorders. Following that order, all dismissals were ordered 
on "security grounds", but the public saw little difference between a 
dismissal on security or loyalty grounds.
- 3 2 1
In 1949» the loyalty programme was extended to all private
employees of Defense Department contractors, affecting some five
million non-government employees. The total number of persons whose
employment depended on a loyalty clearance, at any one time, has been
estimated at some thirteen and a half million people, excluding the
116armed forces personnel. The number of employees actually dismissed
was rather small: 11,000 in the period 1947-1957» and according to
Bontecue not one prosecution for an indictable offence, uncovered
117through the various programmes, was initiated.
The hearings, whenever they took place, were based on the past
and present beliefs and associations of the persons investigated,
rather than on criminally punishable conduct. Thus, some of the
formal charges issued were: "You have during most of your life been
under the influence of your father, who was an active member of the
C . P . " C o m m u n i s t  literature was observed in the book shelves and
118communist art was seen on the walls of your residence".
The notification of specific charges could be omitted, altogether,
as well as the names of the accusing "confidential informants", on
security grounds. One such informant stated that he was present
when the employee "advocated the Communist Party line, such as
favouring peace and civil rights". Another was of the opinion that
the employee's convictions "concerning equal rights for all races
and classes extend slightly beyond the normal feeling of the average 
119individual". y_ Chafee reports a case in which the F.B.I. interviewed
a Pentagon shoeblack 70 times, because his mother had contributed ten
120dollars to the Scottsboro Defense Fund before he was bom.
In accordance with the requirement of the loyalty programme, the
Attorney-General started publicising, in 1947» a list of subversive 
121organizations. The organizations entered the list without any
previous notice or hearing. One organisation is reported as trying
for six years, unsuccessfully, to have a hearing on its listing
122which, however, remained valid. Entry in the list meant certain
destruction for the organisation^ and serious disabilities for their
members since membership in a listed organisation was used as evidence
in all public and private security programmes. Such members were
excluded from public housing and war veterans members lost their
benefits; the mass media terminated all contracts of employment of
such people; and the question of membership in any listed organisation
was a standard part of all loyalty oaths and affidavits, and created
a perjury trap: the rapidly expanding number of the listed groups -
1 2 387 in 1948, 197 in 1950, 62 new were added in 1953 alone - included
extinct and small ad hoc organizations, and "membership or support"
was often identified with the mere inclusion in a group's mailing
list. Such "membership" was deemed incriminating irrespective of
the time it had occurred, or of how long it had lasted. As Chafee put
it, the oathtaker "has to try to remember every peaceable group with
which he had any conceivable connection since he was old enough to
be a cub scout, and decide for himself which he has to mention to
124escape a charge of perjury".
All in all, as one early study of the loyalty programmes
125concluded "the only safe course is to refrain from joining" J all 
organizations but the most innocuous or right-wing ones. Thus, the 
Attorney-General was given "the most arbitrary and far reaching power
*1 26ever exercised by a single public official in the history of the TJ.S.".
Be could blacklist, at his discretion, any organisation for its "bad 
ideas" and force it out of existence; at the same time, the most 
diverse activities of people who had the slightest connection with 
that organization, were adversely affected.
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While such wide ranging and expensive loyalty programmes were
undertaken by the federal government, state and local authorities as
well as non-governmental organisations relied heavily on affirmatory
or exculpatory oaths. The loyalty oaths and affidavits requested
from trade unionists, lawyers, academics and school teachers have
127been referred to above. Virtually no aspect of human activity
remained free from their reach.
In order of severity, some state and local loyalty programmes
requiring oath-taking may be enumerated in an indicative and
impressionistic manner. Some sort of loyalty oath was required
from: candidates for elections (among others by Maryland); voters
(Alabama); non-elective local employees (Los Angeles); unemployment
benefit claimants (Ohio); jurors (New York); college and university
students (Texas); applicants for tax exemptions (California and Los
Angeles where the oath was inserted in the standard tax form);
applicants for supplementary benefits (New York); insurance and
piano salesmen (Washington); schoolboys (Louisiana); accountants
(New York); boxers, barbers, wrestlers (Indiana); fishermen in
public reservoirs (New York). Texas demanded the taking of loyalty
oaths by the authors of all books used in public schools, to be taken
by the publisher when the author was dead, and Alabama extended the
oath to the authors of all works cited in textbook bibliographiesl
By l956, forty-two state and two thousand municipalities required
128some kind of loyalty oath.
4.2. Subversive Aliens and the Insulation of American Space
Finally, the insulation of the physical American space from 
subversive infection was intensified throughout the period, by means 
of denaturalisations of naturalised Americans, deportation of aliens 
and refusals of visas to visiting "subversives'*.
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The McCarran-Walter Immigration Act 1952, which extended the
relevant provisions of the Internal Security Act, provided that the
President could ban the entry of any alien, whose entry was
129"detrimental to the interests of the U.S." Under this and similar
provisions entry was denied among others to Picasso, Chaplin, a
famous Austrian conductor - because he had conducted in Moscow and
Leningrad - M. Polanyi and various famous physicists who had been
invited to an International Conference organized by the American
1 30Atomic Energy Commission.
!
In 1953 it was announced that 10,000 citizens were investigated
131for denaturalisation and 12,000 aliens for deportation. Two of
the most famous cases involved a Greek, who had left the C.P. in
19 29 and was deported in 1952, and the indefinite consignment in the
Ellis Island detention camp of a Hungarian who on returning to the
Ü.S., where he had lived since 1929, from a brief travel in Europe,
132was refused entry and no country could be found to accept him.
Subversive beliefs and associations became a ground for refusal 
of passports to Americans wishing to travel abroad. Passports were 
denied by the State Department if it had reasons to believe that the 
applicant was a communist or "his conduct abroad is likely to. be 
contrary to the best interests of the Ü.S.". In the 1952 passport 
regulations, issued by the State Department, various loyalty grounds 
were set out for denial of passport and the taking of a non­
communist oath could be required from the applicants. And according 
to the Internal Security Act, members of organisations registered as 
"communist-action" or "communist fronts" could not apply for or use 
a passport. Several well-known personalities were caught by these 
provisions and denied passports: among others, the black singer Paul 
Robeson, the Nobel price winner L. Pauling and the economist
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P. Nathan. As Chafee put it, the granting of passports has been
treated as a "gracious favour frcsn the State Department, to be
133withheld whenever it did not like the cut of a man’s mind".
Printed matter, coming into the TJ.S. from abroad, became the
subject of the most stringent tests carried out by customs, postal
and P.B.I. officers, who excluded all books and magazines which
134contained undesirable "political propaganda".
Thus, while the sedition laws, examined above, dealt with the 
activities of the C.P., communists and other avowed radicals, the 
loyalty-security complex permeated all areas of life, and affected 
people belonging to a much wider political spectrum. The next part 
will examine the judicial reaction to the various loyalty oaths, 
loyalty tests and loyalty-security investigations.
5. The loyalty Programmes in the Courts
5.1. Loyalty Programmes and the Trade Unions
The purification of all areas of civil society from subversive 
individuals and subversive ideas, started with the unions. The 
identification of union power and communism had been a permanent
theme in Republican propaganda since the New Deal; right-wing! -
opinion could not as yet be reconciled with the - limited - rights
that the Vagner Act and other labour legislation had given to the
135unions. The Taft-Hartley Act, combined measures curbing union 
power with others intending to purge all communist and subversive 
influence from the unions. The second objective was mainly served 
by the annual nonr-communist affidavit required from all union officers 
before any union claim could be dealt with by the National Labour 
Relations Board.
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The constitutionality of the oath came up for review by the
Supreme Court in the important 1950 case of American Communications
136Association v. Douds. ^  The Court, per Chief Justice Vinson, upheld 
the affidavits constitutional validity and opened, thus, the way 
for the imposition and judicial acceptance of similar measures in 
all walks of life.
The National Labor Relations Board, expressing the paternalistic 
outlook of many New Dealers, argued in court that the facilities it 
provided to the unions were a "privilege" gratuitously granted; 
they could be, accordingly, made dependent upon any conditions the 
Government saw fit. The unions argued that the oath was an 
unacceptable violation of the First Amendment rights of freedom of 
belief of the officers involved and freedom of association of the 
unions.
For Vinson, however, the oath was intended to prevent political 
strikes, and other kinds of direct action designed to interrupt 
interstate commerce. The Communist Party was using its influence 
within unions to exert political pressure.
Raving said that, Vinson went on to recognize that some incidental 
problems concerning First Amendment rights were created by the 
provision, but declined to use the danger test, as suggested by 
appellants. The evils guarded against by the oath were not the 
products of speech at all. The measure: of section 9(h)"... does.not 
interfere with speech; it regulates harmful conduct which Congress 
has determined is carried on by persons who may be identified by 
their political affiliations and beliefs.. fwjoxce may and must be met 
with force. Section 9(h) is designed to protect the public not 
against what Communists and others identified therein advocate or 
believe, but against what Congress has concluded they have done and
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are likely to do again. " Instead of the danger test, Vinson*s 
approach was to weigh the substantial public interest, created by the 
fact that ■unions were given by government power which is "never without 
responsibility” against a "relatively small" incursion in First 
Amendment rights: the oath touches "a handful of persons" and, 
moreover, "leaves those who are'affected free to maintain their affiliations 
and beliefs subject only to possible loss of p o s i t i o n s . A s  
in all cases of the period, where the balancing test was utilized, 
the outcome was inherent in the way in which the relative weights
t
were eet up.
The second part of the oath, that required an affirmation that 
the union officers did not believe in the overthrow of the U.S.
Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods, 
created more problems for the Court. The 5-1 majority on the 
constitutionality of its anti-communist part broke down into a split 
3-3 vote. For Vinson, this provision could be construed, in an 
unconstitutionally broad way - if it were read "very literally" - 
but it need not be. If it was construed to refer to those persons 
and organisations who believed in the violent overthrow of the 
government "as it presently exists under the constitution and laws 
thereof"; and who advocated this belief as an objective, and not merely, 
as a prophesy, then the oath was constitutional.
* Frankfurter and Jackson joined Black in dissent on that point.
They thought that the authorization of the probing in personal 
beliefs - other than C.P. membership - was going too far toward an 
authoritarian regime. Frankfurter, always mindful and apprehensive 
about the role of the Supreme Court, found that asking people whether 
they favoured illegal or unconstitutional means was opening "the door 
too wide to mere speculation or uncertainty", considering that
137
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"constitutionality or legality is frequently determined by this Court
139by the chance of a single vote".
Douds fully endorsed the federal loyalty programme for the unions.
The effort of the Court to present the issue, as one related to the
prevention of political strikes, was somewhat hollow since no evidence
was produced or reference made to any past political strikes -
communist-led or not. Indeed, the climate of hostility that American
labour had to face throughout its history helped make the "political
strike" a phenomenon almost totally unknown in the U.S. It seems
that the attempt was related more to the Court's - rapidly retreating -
wish to present its decision in terms that could be reconciled with
the action/expression distinction, rather than to any existing
evidence. Within a year's time, however, even the . rhetorical
140reference to the earlier doctrines had faded away.
Following Souds. a few casts of perjury convictions of union 
officers taking the oath were reported. In a 1957 case (jencks v.
AAA
U.S. 4 ) a perjury conviction was reversed. C. Jencks' perjury 
conviction was based on "classified" F.B.I. information which was 
not communicated to the defendant, a usual practice in similar 
cases. In the Jencks case, one of the paid informants was H. Matusow, 
who had publicly admitted in 1955 that he had lied in a series of
«4 Jft
cases in which he had appeared as government witness. 4 In the 
trial court, counsel for the defendant had requested the judge to 
examine the informer's reports, and give to the defence those that 
were relevant and material, but the request was overruled.
Justice’ Brennan reversed the conviction and stated that in the 
future witnesses and defendants should be granted the right to 
examine the charges against them. Justice Clark, the ex-Attorney- 
General was furious: "Unless the Congress changes the rule announced
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by the Court today, those intelligence agencies... may as well close 
up shop» for the Court has opened their files to the criminal and 
thus afforded him a Roman holiday for rummaging through
143confidential information as well as vital national secrets”, /  a 
suggestion that the Congress took up by passing a so-called ”Jencks 
law”.144
A further perjury case (Killian v. tT.S.) that reached the Supreme
145Court in 1961, was examined above. J In the meantime, however, 
section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act had been repealed in 1959« A 
new provision was passed that made it a direct criminal offence for 
any person who was or had been a member of the Communist Party during 
the previous 5 years to serve as an officer or employee of a trade 
union.14®
This provision was found an unconstitutional bill of attainder 
in a 19 6 5 5-4 Supreme Court decision (U.S. v. Brown14^). Chief 
Justice Warren partially overruled both Douds and Killian. For 
Warren, incitement of political strikes and Communist Party membership 
were not “semantically equivalent phrases”. The suggestion that 
membership in the C.P. ”can be regarded an alternative, but equivalent 
expression for a list of undesirable characteristics” was fallacious. 
Members of a Party do not "subscribe unqualifiedly to all of its 
platforms or asserted principles”.14® The fact that the Communist 
Party was specifically named, made the section ak-in to a bill of 
attainder and closer to the judicial rather than legislative functions.
Following Brown, government efforts to prosecute and purge 
unions from communists came to an end. However, the combined efforts 
of government and union leaderships had driven radicals from the 
unions. As a neo-conservative writer lamented in 1980 in a somewhat 
exaggerated fashion: "with the exception of the labour movement, it
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is no longer considered respectable to use the term communist as a
149term of opprobrium".
5.2. Loyalty Programmes and Lawyers
Law was the other profession in which loyalty tests and
qualifications became an almost universal practice.. These loyalty
programmes were imposed by state or professional authorities, and
were of two kinds. According to the first, lawyers admitted to the
Bax were later liable to disbarment if found, by the designated
bodies, to advocate the forcible overthrow of the government or
simply to be "subversive", a practice fully endorsed by the
i 50American Bar Association, in 1953» The most common practice, 
however, was the investigation of the loyalty of all applicants for 
admission to the Bar. The loyal disposition of the applicants had 
to be proven either through the taking of an oath, or in front of 
some committee investigating the "morality of their character". A 
denial to take the oath or a negative committee finding automatically 
barred admission.
The Supreme Court in a series of cases throughout the 50s dealt 
with such proceedings extensively.
1 *51The first case (in Re Summers J ) involved a Quaker who was a 
conscientious objector to military service, and would not take the 
required oath to support the constitution of Illinois. The Supreme 
Court found that admission to the Bar was a privilege and therefore 
"the responsibility for choice as to the personnel of its bar rests 
with Illinois". This responsibility had not been exercised in a 
discriminatory way. The refusal of the state authorities to admit 
the Quaker was upheld.
Ia 1957» however, the Court upheld two applicants who had been 
turned down by the local Bar Committees.
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152In the first case (Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners J ) the New
Mexico Bar had turned down an application in 1953 because, among other reasons
the applicant had been a communist from 1932 to 1940, although his
record since 1940 had been found "exemplary1'. The Court found that
past radical activities could not "justify an inference that
[Schware] has bad moral character" fifteen years later. The case
was greeted as a "high water mark of official forgiveness for former 
153communists". ^
In the first Königsberg Case, the applicant had been turned down 
by the California Bar after he had refused to answer questions 
relating to his past beliefs and associations, on First Amendment 
grounds. The Supreme Court, per Justice Black, in a 4-3 decision 
reversed the California S.C., on the same grounds as Schware.
On remand, the California Court returned the case to the Bar 
Committee which held further hearings. Königsberg introduced new 
evidence as to his good moral character, but again refused to answer 
questions about his political beliefs. He stated, however, that he 
did not and would never advocate the violent overthrow of the 
government. His application was again turned down on the ground 
that he "had obstructed a proper and complete investigation of his 
qualifications" and this time the Bar Committee decision was upheld 
by the Supreme Court (Königsberg v. State Bar of Califomia^ ^ ) .
’* Justice Harlan, writing for a 5-4 majority, stated that freedom 
of speech and association are not "absolutes". The state interest 
in the character qualifications of applicants for admission to the 
bar should be balanced against the degree of the deterrence on 
speech and association, brought about by their compulsory disclosure.
Similar problems were addressed in the various cases involving
legislative investigating committees
Harlan found that the state interest "in having lawyers who are
devoted to the law in its broadest sense including not only its
substantive provisions, but also its procedures for orderly change"
was clearly the heavier. The effects on speech and association were
"minimal" because the interrogations were conducted in closed
session, and the applicant was, therefore, shielded from further
private action against him; additionally, the Bar decision was
subject to judicial review, a fact that, allegedly, precluded
arbitrary executive persecutions. The disclosure of "prior speech
or association" was instrumental for an investigation "on such items
156as character, purpose, credibility or intent".
Black’s dissent was a powerful attack on the "penurious" 
balancing test, in general, and its application in the present case. 
The only state interest involved was the satisfaction of the 
committee’s "curiosity with respect to Konigsberg’s ’possible* 
membership in the Communist Party two decades ago" while the effects 
on association rights were understated. The Bar Committee was not 
required to treat the information given to it as confidential, and 
the possible judicial hearings would further widen the publicity of 
the proceedings."/r7he only safe course for those desiring admission", 
Black concluded, "would seem to be scrupulously to avoid association 
with any organisation that advocates anything at all somebody might 
possibly be against. . . ^
On the same day as Königsberg II. the Supreme Court upheld another 
rejection of admission to the Bar (Re Anastaplo1 8^ ). Anastaplo was 
a strange case in that the applicant had refused to answer questions 
about his political and religious beliefs ("Bo you believe in a 
Supreme Being?"), on the sole ground that they violated his conscience 
and constitutional rights. All the witnesses had testified about
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Anastaplo's "exemplary" character and the Supreme Court accepted that
no suspicion whatever existed about any possible subversive beliefs.
However, Justice Harlan again stated that the applicant’s refusal
placed the Bar Committee in the untenable position "of having to
certify an applicant without assurance as to & significant aspect of
his qualifications which the applicant himself is best circumstanced
to supply". He went on to assure Anastaplo that he did not find
anything "to suggest that he would not be admitted now, if he decides
to answer... In short ¡Y&J holds the key to admission in his own
hands." To be sure, that was a somewhat strange assurance, since the
majority of the Bar Committee had stated that Anastaplo’s answers
159raised "serious questions" as to his fitness to practice law.
Anastaplo’s application was turned down by the Bar Committee 
in 1951» and the Supreme Court rendered its final judgment in 1 9 6 1.
In 1979 he was awarded by the Chicago Council of Lawyers for "commitment 
to ideals in both word and deed" and was commended by the General 
Assembly of Illinois, but he was still not admitted to the Bar.^^
5.3« Loyalty Programmes and Public Employment
The pervasive character of the loyalty-security programmes, on the 
prospects of appointment or continuation of employment in the federal, 
state or local sector has been already noted.^ The loyalty standards 
stipulated in these programmes, and the procedures followed for their 
corroboration, were highly questionable as regards the constitutional 
rights of expression and association and the normal procedures of
criminal justice. It was reasonable, therefore, that the courts
\
were, from an early date, called upon to pass judgment upon the
various aspects of such programmes.
The first case in which the courts dealt with the federal loyalty
1 62programme was Bailey v. Richardson. D. Bailey, a training officer, 
had been accused of being a communist and dismissed from the Federal
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Security Agency. The names of the F.B.I. informers who had testified 
and the evidence offered against her were not disclosed at the 
hearings; Bailey challenged the Loyalty Board’s decision on procedural 
and constitutional grounds. The Court of Appeals held that 
Government employment is not "property" or "liberty" and the "due 
process" clause does not apply; nor does the First Amendment since 
the Constitution does not prohibit "the dismissal of government 
employees because of their political belief, activities or affiliations... 
The situation of the government employee is not different in this 
respect from that of private employees". 5 The Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision without writing an opinion.
But in two other cases, one immediately before and one after 
Bailey, involving loyalty programmes of state employees, the Supreme 
Court clarified its position. The first case, Gamer v. Board of 
Public Works of Los Angeles. involved a Los Angeles ordinance that
required all city employees to take an oath to the effect that they 
had not advocated or taught the forcible overthrow of the government, 
or belonged to or were affiliated with any subversive organization 
within a period of five years before 1949» and further to execute 
an affidavit stating their relation to the Communist Party.
Justice Clark upheld the dismissals of seventeen employees who
refused to sign the affidavit or take the oath. He found the
affidavit constitutional since '^?ast conduct may well relate to
presBnt fitness; past loyalty may have a reasonable relationship
to present and future trust. Both are commonly inquired into in
determining fitness for both high and low positions in private
165industry and are not less relevant in public employment". As to 
the oath, it was "reasonably designed to protect the integrity and 
competency of the service". He further rejected the appellants’
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objections that the ordinance was an ex post facto law and a bill
of attainder: “standards of qualification and eligibility for
employment" do not impose punishments and there was no difference
between this oath requirement and a statute "forbidding the practice
of medicine by any person who had been convicted of felony".
Justice Frankfurter thought that the oath requirement was over-broad
and Black, Douglas and Burton would have invalidated the whole
ordinance as a bill of attainder. "Petitioners were disqualified
from office... for what they nnce advocated. They are deprived of
their basic livelihood by legislative act, not by judicial process".^
1 67In the second case, Adler v. Board of Education. the Supreme
Court upheld the New York Peinberg law, the centrepiece in a series
of nationwide measures designed to eliminate "subversive persons from
168the public school system".
Monton for the majority found that the "guilt-by-association"
principle that the law was introducing was unobjectionable, as applied,
in particular, to such a sensitive area as the schoolroom, which
"shapes the attitude of young minds toward the society in which they
live". The school authorities had a duty to ensure the fitness of
schoolteachers and "one's associates, past and present, as well as
one's conduct, may properly be considered in determining fitness and
loyalty. From time immemorial one's reputation has been determined
in part by the company he keeps". For Minton, disqualification from
employment, based on membership in one of the organisations listed by
the school authorities, was not a denial of freedom of speech. The
teacher's "freedom of choice between membership in the organization
and employment in the school system might be limited, but not his
freedom of speech or assembly, except in the remote sense that
169limitation is inherent in every choice". ' Black and Douglas
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dissented again. They castigated the principle of "guilt by
association" introduced, the power vested on government officials to
decide the acceptable ideas of people, and the procedural irregularities
of the loyalty programmes. "The very threat of such a procedure is
certain to raise havoc with academic freedom. Youthful indiscretions,
mistaken causes, misguided enthusiasms - all long forgotten - beoome
170the ghost of a harrowing present".
Despite their elegance, the essays of the two Justices throughout 
the period were completely ineffective. It is characteristic that 
they are stili much more frequently and extensively quoted, in 
constitutional treatises, than the more dry legalistic opinions of 
the majority. By 1952, however, the various loyalty programmes had 
been fully authorized by the courts. A virtual carte blanche was 
given to the various legislatures to extend their hunting of subversives 
in all fields of public employment. Only in two early cases did the 
court overrule some of the most exaggerated characteristics of these
171programmes. In Joint .Anti-Fascist and Refugee Committee v. McGrath. '
it ruled that the Attorney-General could not place an organization in
the "subversive" list without a prior hearing. However, according
to Pritchett, "the list continued to be used during the Truman
172administration and no procedural reforms were instituted". And
173in Wieman v. Undegraff. ^ the Court invalidated an Oklahoma oath for 
all state employees. According to the Supreme Court of that state, 
dismissals should follow the oath taking "solely on the bases of 
organisational membership, regardless of the employees* knowledge 
concerning the organizations to which they belonged". This blurring of 
the distinction between "innocent and knowing" association, a 
distinction that, as we saw, was used for various purposes and 
received as many interpretations during the period, led the court
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in a rare unanimous decision, to declare the oath as offensive to the 
due process of law and as stifling "the flow of democratic expression 
and controversy".
The Bailey problems of loyalty dismissals, without the normal
guarantees of criminal procedure, came up for Supreme Court consideration
174in the 1955 case of Peters v. Hobby. Dr. Peters of the Yale
Medical School, had been removed from his position as Special
Consultant to the TJ.S. Public Health Service. Peters* appeal was
based on the Loyalty Board’s refusal to disclose the evidence presented
against him. The Attorney-General supported the practice: "A large
area of vital government intelligence depends on undercover agents,
paid informers and casual informers who must be guaranteed anonymity.
Thus, evidence which would be rejected in a criminal proceeding
could well be the compelling reason for dismissal of an employee on 
175loyalty grounds". The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal on
technical grounds (lack of jurisdiction of the Board) but did not
rule on the constitutionality of the secret witness procedure, which
went on unchallenged. "The operations of the loyalty programe are
shrouded in obscurity. Proceedings are not made public. Decisions,
containing findings of fact and reasons, are not available. There is
no way of knowing... what is going on. Even [employees who have been
through the process] do not usually know the full story". ' And
Edgar Hoover defended the widespread practice of use of secret
witnesses and informers in those terms: "It is through the efforts
of confidential informants that we have been able to expose the
communist conspiracy in the past, and through which we must stake
177much of our future security of the United States". 11
While Peters was dismissed under the federal loyalty programme,
178
two 1958 decisions dealt with state programmes. In Beilan v. Board 
179of Education the Court upheld the dismissal of a Philadelphia school 
teacher who had refused to answer questions about his possible
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communist affiliations, first to the Superintendent of Schools and later
180to the H.U.A.C., relying on the Fifth Amendment. In Lemer v. Casey.
a New York subway conductor had refused to answer similar questions
before the City Commissioner for Investigations. The Court found
that the teacher was validly dismissed on grounds of "incompetency";
and the conductor for being a person "of doubtful trust and
reliability", which, as the dissenters argued, was a mere euphemism
for suspected disloyalty and the invocation of the self-incrimination
181Amendment. Similar decisions were rendered in two more i960 cases 
involving a Los Angeles social worker and a temporary employee of the 
city. They were both dismissed after invoking the First and Fifth 
Amendments before the HH.A.C.
Finally two further cases of that period should be mentioned, 
relating to the industrial security programmes, under which
the private employees of government contractors were vetted.
182In Greene v. McElroy the security clearance of an aeronautical 
engineer, employed by a private manufacturer specializing in defence 
projects, had been revoked by the Personnel Security Board which had 
relied on unrevealed confidential information. The revocation meant, 
according to the Court, that "for all practical purposes the field of 
aeronautical engineering was now closed to Greene". The Court reversed 
the decision in an opinion written by Chief Justice Warren. His 
dislike of the proceedings in which a decision of such great 
importance for the applicant was taken without the safeguards of 
"confrontation and cross-examination" coloured the opinion. However, 
the reversal could attract the necessary support on the technical 
ground that the procedure had not been explicitly authorized by the 
President or the Congress. Justice Clark, in dissent, found the 
Court action against all precedent and "indeed strange... at this 
critical time of national emergency".
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But in the next case (Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. 
McElroy ■') no technical fault could be found and the substantive 
validity of the procedure was upheld by the Court. In this case, the 
identification badge of a short-order cook, at a privately operated 
cafeteria on the premises of the Naval Gun Factory, had been suddenly 
revoked by a security officer. No notice was given and no hearing ever 
took place; the only explanation given was that she had failed to 
meet "the security requirements of the activity". The Court found 
that the private interest involved was "a mere privilege subject to 
the Executive's plenary power", the revocation of which need not conform 
with due process requirements; any way, the cook's interests were not 
seriously impaired. "Security requirements" cover many matters other 
than loyalty, according to the court, and one could assume that the 
cook's pass was revoked because "she was garrulous, or careless with 
her identification badge" and not disloyal. Thus, the Court accepted 
that, if the officials assert a "valid" security requirement without 
further elaboration or hearing, all employment could be immediately 
terminated, leaving the person concerned liable to prove to future 
employers the difference between "security risk" and disloyalty.
In the early 60s, the Supreme Court started, cautiously, to 
restrain the worst excesses of the state loyalty programmes, in a
series of cases brought by teachers and academics.
184.The first case (Shelton v. Tucker involved an Arkansas
statute, which compelled all teachers and professors in state
colleges to sign an annual affidavit listing all organisations they
belonged or had contributed to, within the preceding five years. The
statute was used to harass and expose Southern "advocates and supporters 
185of civil rights" and, in particular, members of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Coloured People. Shelton, a teacher,
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refused to file the affidavit and was dismissed. The state courts 
upheld the dismissal, when they found that he was a member of the 
N.A.A.C.P.
The Supreme Court, per Justice Stewart for a 5-4 majority
invalidated the statute as over-broad. The state had a vital interest
in the fitness of its teachers and could investigate or force disclosure
of their associational ties. It could ask certain teachers about all
their affiliations} all teachers about certain organisations or about
the number of organisations they belong to and the time they spend in
similar activities. But to ask "everyone of its teachers to disclose
every single organization... every conceivable kind of associational
tie - social, professional, political, avocational or religious", was
a demand of "unlimited and indiscriminate sweep" and had "no possible
186bearing upon the teacher's occupational competence or fitness".
The Court's rationale for reaching this decision was not fully
clear. It held that the state could enquire about any organisation,
but not in the broad terms of the Arkansas statute. Nevertheless,
as Justice Harlan objected, it was impossible for the school
authorities "to fix in advance the terms of their inquiry that it will
187yield only relevant information". The decision can be seen only as
an attempt by the Court to protect the N.A.A.C.P. from Southern
harassment, by excluding it from the wide-ranging anti-communist
measures, while the latter were kept intact. As such, it "lacked
188meutral principles because it lacked intellectual coherence".
The next case (Cramp v. Board of Public instruction^^) involved 
a Florida statute, according to which all public employees were 
required to take an oath stating that "I have not and will not lend 
my aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the C.P.". The 
oath was found, again, over broad. Justice Stewart suggested that
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under its terms, no-one could ever be sure about his "purity" and
take the oath without fear of a later perjury conviction. All causes
that had been espoused by the C.P. were declared contaminated, and the
burden placed upon the oathtakers was unreasonable. Interestingly
enough, a similar perjury conviction of a trade unionist was not
190found substantively offensive by the Court in Killian. decided 
in 1961 too.
The next loyalty oaths struck down by the Court, as overbroad,
191were imposed by two Washington statutes. 64 members of the 
University of Washington attacked a 1951 oath required from all 
teachers, according to which they swore to promote respect for the 
flag and the institution of the U.S. "by precept and example", and a 
19 5 5 one required from all state employees, who should swear that 
they were not "subversive pereons". In one of the numerous attempts 
at an all-inclusive definition of subversion, the statute provided 
that a subversive person is "anyone who commits, attempts to commit 
or aids in the commission, or advocates, abets, advises or teaches by 
any means any person to commit etc. any act intended to overthrow, 
destroy, or alter, or to assist in the overthrow etc. of the 
constitutional form of the Government of the United States... by 
revolution, force or violence".
The Court cited various absurd examples of "guiltless knowing 
behaviour" that could come under the terms of the oath: a professor 
teaching a communist student, another participating in an international 
conference along with scholars from communist countries, etc. It 
ooncluded that under any construction of its provisions "consistent 
with a proper respect for the English language" the oaths were 
unconstitutionally vague.
192In Elfbrandt v. Bussell an Arizona oath was statutorily 
interpreted in such a way so as to avoid the deficiencies found by
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the Supreme Court, in the cases above. Dismissal was threatened for
oathtakers who were "knowing" members of the C.P. or any other
organization that had as "one of its purposes" the overthrow of the
Government. Justice Douglas invalidated the oath because of its
membership provisions, which, allegedly, violated the requirements
193imposed on such provisions by Scales and Noto. Membership in an
organisation could become a ground for dismissal, only if it was 
active and followed by knowledge of the illegal purposes of the 
organisation and "specific intent" to carry them out. Thus, for the 
first timé, the Court indicated that loss of employment should be 
imposed under the same conditions that were necessary for criminal 
punishment.
194In geyishian v. Board of Regents. four provisions of the New 
York Feinberg law, which had been upheld in Adler fifteen years ago,
were voided for vagueness. These provisions set out various grounds for
!
the dismissal of school teachers suspected of subversive beliefs and acts.
t
f
The first required removal for "treasonable or seditious" utterances. 
The term "seditious" was found excessively vague, even under the Penal 
law definition. The second clause barred employment to persons who 
advocated or advised the doctrine of forceful overthrow of the government. 
It was found susceptible of sweeping and improper application, since it 
did not distinguish between advocacy of doctrine in the abstract and 
incitement to action. The third required the removal of all those who 
distributed written material advising the doctrine of forceful overthrow. 
Justice Brennan, for the majority, offered the examples of a history 
teacher speaking on Marxism or the French and Russian revolutions and 
of the college librarian advising on books on similar subjects, who 
could both be prosecuted under this clause.
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The Justice remarked that these clauses had not been challenged 
in the Adler case for vagueness; however, his dislike for the earlier 
judgment and the anti-subversive programme of the Feinberg law was 
evident. He emphasized the importance of academic freedom, "... a 
special concern for the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws 
that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom", and stated that 
keeping teachers guessing what conduct or utterance might lose them 
their position created a "chilling effect" on the exercise of vital 
rights.
i
The fourth challenged clause made Community Party membership 
prima facie evidence for disqualification. Justice Brennan 
expressly overruled Adler on that count, remarking that the 
"constitutional doctrine which has emerged since that decision has 
rejected its major premise". Building upon the recent doctrinal 
developments, the Justice stated that freedom of expression could 
be infringed by the denial of positions and benefits or the placing 
of conditions for their attainment, a theory explicitly repudiated 
in the 50s. The clause under consideration failed to stipulate 
that the suspect should have knowledge of the Party*s unlawful 
purpose and a specific intent to carry them out - the conditions 
necessary for criminal conviction since Scales - and had, accordingly, 
an overbroad sweep even as a condition for employment. It "... 
baa[ s] employment both for association which legitimately may be 
proscribed and for association which may not... consistently with 
First Amendment rights".
For the four dissenters '[ n] o court has ever reached out so far 
to destroy so much with so little". Justice Clarke protested that
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the majority was overruling, without saying so, not only Adler 
but a long series of precedents like Gamer. Beilan. Nelson and 
Königsberg which had upheld identical or similar procedures and 
programmes. The majority had "by its broadside swept away one 
of our most precious rights, namely, the right of self- 
preservation".
196In Whitehlll v. Elkins. 7 the Maryland Ober law oath, upheld 
197in Gerende. was invalidated for similar reasons as those used 
in Elfbrandt and Keyishian. The oath requested teachers to 
state that they were not engaged "in one way or another" in an 
attempt to overthrow the Government. The provision was 
invalidated by Justice Douglas for having "an overbreadth that 
makes possible oppressive or capricious applications as regimes 
change".
Throughout the line of cases examined above, Justices Clark, 
Harlan, White and Stewart dissented consistently and denounced 
the attempts of the majority to restrict state loyalty programmes, 
without explicitly overruling the decisions of the 50s that had 
upheld them. As Harlan stated in Whitehill "the only thing that 
does shine through the opinion of the majority is that its 
members do not like loyalty oaths", and repeating the 50s theme 
of judicial restraint, "it is not within the province of this 
Court to pass upon the wisdom and unwisdom of Maryland's policy 
in this regard". 7 By 1 9 6 7, hov/ever, when Whitehill was decided, 
the fear of the communist danger had receded, and new threats 
had captured the limelight which will be examined in the next 
chapter.
- 345 -
5.4» Loyalty and Other Activities
Beyond public employment, the loyalty programmes pervaded 
other areas of life. Some of the most important cases, examined 
in chronological order, were the following.
The much imitated Maryland Ober law required that all
candidates for public office should file with their nomination
certificates, affidavits that they were not "subversive persons",
and barred the candidature of subversives in all elections. In
199Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore. a 
candidate for a municipal election had refused to sign the 
affidavit, and was accordingly denied a place on the ballot. The 
Maryland Court of Appeal affirmed, and construed the term 
"subversive" to mean any person engaged "in one way or another 
in the attempt to overthrow the government by force or violence", 
or who was "knowingly a member of an organisation engaged in 
such attempt". The Supreme Court, as well as most commentators 
on the case, found that the state Court's definition was 
quite precise and affirmed in a unanimous per curiam decision.
Of much greater importance was the trend, increasing 
throughout the period, to deny tax and welfare benefits to 
"subversive persons", and to link such benefits to various "non­
subversive" oaths and affidavits. Thus, a federal housing law 
denied accommodation in housing estates to members of subversive 
organisations, a federal veteran's law denied veteran benefits
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to subversives, and the Ohio unemployment law denied subversives 
"  201unemployment benefits. The Supreme Court dealt with similar 
laws in two cases.
202The first (Sueiser v. Randall) involved a California 
law which denied subversives a property tax exemption for 
honourably discharged veterans. According to the tax regulations, 
all claimants of the exemption should take a "non-subversive" 
oath; the tax assessor was empowered to deny the exemption, in 
which case the claimant could take his decision to the courts.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, invalidated the
j /■' ■
oath requirement trying, at the same time, to differentiate the 
case from the loyalty oaths for public employees which were sustained 
by the court, in two cases decided on the same day (Beilan and 
Lemer). Thus he accepted that the state could validly deny 
tax exemptions to subversives, but found that the procedure 
involved was a violation of due process of law. The burden of 
proof of the applicants loyalty of character was placed squarely 
on his shoulders and the circumstances made the onus extremely 
difficult to bear. Hie tax assessor could reject the truthfulness 
of the oath arbitrarily, in which case the claimant had to prove 
his lawfulness in court. But "how can a claimant whose 
declaration is rejected possibly sustain the burden of proving 
the negative of these complex factual elements?". Brennan admitted 
that the fact finding and the legal standards in such court cases were 
"but shifting sands on which the litigant must maintain his position";
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the procedural and substantive problems involved would lead all claimants to 
steer clear even from legitimate beliefs and expressions, a "result 
which the state could not command directly". The procedure,
205therefore, was not motivated by a valid "state compelling interest".
For Justice Clark, dissenting, the tax procedure was not a criminal 
one involving fines or punishments, or regulated by "due process 
rules". The exemption was "legislative largesse" and the state could 
extend or refuse it, as it saw fit.
However, two years later the Court accepted Clark's position that
denial of welfare benefits was not "punishment" and could be!
constitutionally effected because of a person's subversive beliefs.
Flemming v. Nestor^^ was one of the most bizarre cases of the
period, evidence according to Kirchheimer of the "competetive pressure
205to outdo one's colleague in vociferously rabid anti-communism".
Nestor, a non-American, had lived in the TJ.S. since 1913 a-nd was a 
member of the Communist Party from 1933 to 1939 when the Party was 
formally fully legal. He was deported in 1956 because of his past 
communist membership and his old-age pension was terminated under a 
1954 Amendment to the Social Security Act.
Justice Harlan upheld the provision overruling objections for 
denial of due process, bill of attainder, ex post facto law and 
punishment without trial. For the majority, the provision was 
related solely to the administration of the social security system!
Benefits could be terminated if they were not used within the United 
States.
Finally, in I960 again, the anti-subversive practices of the 
Federal Communications Commission came up for judicial review. The 
Commission, established under the Federal Communications Act, is 
empowered to issue and renew radio and television operators* licences.
During the 50s the Commission used to ask the applicants and licensees
whether they were members of the Communist Party and other.subversive
organisations. One licensee refused to answer such questions during
the hearings for the renewal of his radio operator licence, and
following that the licence was revoked. The Court of Appeals for the
206District of Columbia affirmed finding that no question could be 
more "relevant or more material to the qualification of a radio 
operator". The Supreme Court denied certiorari, thus accepting the 
Court of Appeals* ruling.
5 .5 . The”Subversive”Alien in the Courts
While the judicial protection of Americans who were caught in 
the intricate web of the huge loyalty-security complex was less than 
whole-hearted, the treatment of aliens who were trapped in it was 
probably the most cruel aspect of the period.
207One of the early cases, U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy
i
(1950) involved a German woman who had fled from Nazism to England, 
where she had served in the R.A.P. In 1948 she was married to an 
American veteran working in the U.S. base in Frankfurt, but later 
that year she was refused entry to the U.S. by the immigration 
authorities without a hearing. The ground given for the refusal was 
that her admission would be "prejudicial to the interests of the U.S.".
The Supreme Court upheld the exclusion and stated that since the 
woman had no right of entry, she was not entitled to a "due process" 
hearing. Entry to the country was a privilege regulated at wish by 
Congress and the executive decision was not subject to judicial review. 
Knauff spent three years in the no-man*s land of Ellis Island, a 
detention centre for aliens and was finally admitted in 1951 after 
the House of Representatives passed a bill permitting her to stay.
In Knauff. Justice Minton had differentiated the case of exclusion
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of an alien from that of deportation, and indicated that in the latter 
case a more extensive judicial protection would be forthcoming. This
promise was not fulfilled, however.
208In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy the Supreme Court upheld the 
deportation order of a Greek national, who had come to the U.S. in 
1920, and was a member of the Communist Party from 1923 to 1929» The 
deportation was ordered under the provisions of the Smith Act, which 
authorised the deportation of legally resident aliens for C.P. 
membership, even if such membership had been terminated before the 
enactment of the statute.
Justice Jackson found that no violation of First Amendment rights
209was involved in that case. ' Douglas dissented vigorously stating
that the Act, as construed, allowed the deportation of aliens not for
what they were but for what they had once been. In an opinion joined
by Justice Black, typical of the high rhetoric associated with the
two Justices, Douglas concluded that the "principle of forgiveness and
the doctrine of redemption are too deep in our philosophy to admit
that there is no return for those who have once erred".
210In Carlson v. Landon the Court upheld the indefinite detention
without bail of five alien communists, pending the completion of
deportation proceedings. One of the five was the mother of three
American-born children, who had been a communist from 1919 to 19 3&;
another was a 56 year old Pole, who had resided legally in the U.S.
211since the age of 17. The only ground offered by the immigration
authorities for the denial of bail was that they were security risks.
The district judge accepted the official request and stated that "I
am not going to turn these people loose if they are communists, any
212more than I would turn loose a deadly germ in this community".
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The Supreme Court affirmed,' per Justice Heed, ruling that Congress 
could constitutionally delegate to the immigration authorities the 
power to order,the indefinite detention without hail of deportable 
aliens. The fact that bail was denied did not violate the relevant 
constitutional provision (the Eighth Amendment) because a deportation 
"is not a criminal proceeding nor punishment".
213Finally, in Shaughnessy v. TJ.S. ex rel. Mezei,  ^the concept of
indefinite executive detention was fully upheld by the Supreme Court,
which consented to the permanent confinement of Mezei to Ellis Island,
when no country was found which would accept him. 4
In the meantime, the 1950 Internal Security Act had made Communist
Party membership a ground of deportation, and dispensed with the need
to prove in each case that the alien did, in fact, advocate the
215violent overthrow of the government. In Galvan v. Press. the 
provision was upheld in a case involving an ex-communist who had 
claimed ignorance of the party’s advocacy of violent overthrow. 
Frankfurter stated that the fact of joining up was sufficient for 
deportation. The power of Congress to regulate the entry and residence 
of aliens was not a "page of history" but a whole volume. It was too 
late for the courts, maintained the Justice, to start invoking "due 
process" and "ex post facto law" guarantees against this judicially 
accepted and unrestricted power of the legislature. Black and Douglas 
found the ex post facto law implications of the decision the most 
disturbing: "For joining a lawful political group years ago - an act 
which he had no possible reason to believe would subject him to the 
slightest penalty - petitioner loses his job, his friends, his house,
91 ftand... his children;.?
The only case in which the Supreme Court reversed a deportation
217order of an ex-communist during the period was Rowoldt v. Perfetto.
In that case, Frankfurter changed camps against vigorous dissents by
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his hitherto colleagues. He found that an alien who had Joined the 
Communist Party for one year in 1935» during which he worked in a 
communist bookshop, was covered by an exception clause of the Internal 
Security Act according to which Joining for purposes of "obtaining 
employment, food or other essentials of living" was not a sufficient 
ground for deportation.
Only in the 60s, the Court moved to put certain procedural
218guarantees on the discretionary power of immigration authorities. It
upheld, however, the deportation of homosexuals on the ground that
219"they were affected with a psychopathic personality". By that
time, communists, native or alien, had become an extremely rare species.
The 1952 passport regulations of the State Department came up for
220 221review by the Supreme Court in the 1958 Kent v. Dulles case.
Before that case most denials of passports had passed unchallenged by 
the courts. In Kent, the applicant wanted to travel to England and 
Finland to attend a meeting of the World Council of Peace, but the 
passport was denied on grounds of communist affiliations. The 
Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision, per Justice Douglas, that the
"right to travel is part of the »liberty* of which a citizen cannot be
222deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment" and 
that the State Department was not statutorily authorised to deny 
passports because of the citizen*s "beliefs and associations". After 
the Kent decision the State Department started granting passports to 
persons who had been previously denied one.
However, the 1961 Supreme Court ruling that upheld the order 
against the Communist Party to register under the Internal Security 
Act, put into effect section 6 of that Act under which it was a 
criminal offence for members of registered organisations to apply for 
or use a passport. The famous question "are you now or have you ever 
been a member of the Communist Party?" was reintroduced as a standard
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part of all passport applications. In Aptheker v. Secretary of State
(19 6 4) the Supreme Court invalidated section 6. Justice Goldberg 
found that the linking of free travel with lack of membership in a 
certain organisation violated the constitutionally protected right
of freedom of association. Membership in the Communist Party was made .
a ground of denial, without the conditions introduced by Scales^ ^
for criminal conviction for C.P. membership. The Court further
objected to the indiscriminate character of the passport denial and
suggested that the security needs, allegedly served by the ban, could
be covered by "less drastic" means. As it stood, the section was a
wide and indiscriminate violation of the "due process" clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Communists should be able to travel abroad for a
225"wholly innocent purpose".
In the meantime the Kennedy administration had initiated a policy 
of restrictions of passports for travel to particular sensitive areas
ppg
or countries, which was used to ban travel to Cuba. In Zemel v. Busk
(1 9 6 5) this restriction came up for review, and was upheld by the
Supreme Court. The appellant had argued that the right to travel is a
First Amendment right and its restriction impairs the free flow of
information. Chief Justice Warren rejected that argument. The right
to travel involved "liberty" to act protected by the Fifth "due
process" Amendment, and not rights of expression. Similar area
restrictions were later imposed on travel to North Vietnam but certain
227procedural restrictions were upheld by the courts. '
Finally, another question of restrictions upon the flow of
popinformation was reviewd in the case of Lamont v. Postmaster General 
(19 6 5). It involved the attempt to stop the flow of "foreign communist 
propaganda" in the TJ.S. through mail restrictions administered by the 
postal and customs services. Some of the books confiscated tinder the 
programme included "Leninfs Selected Works" and "Happy Life of
223
Children in the Rumanian People's Republic". The Kennedy- 
administration stopped the programme in 1961, but in 196 2 Congress 
passed a new law under which "communist political propaganda" was 
seized by the postal authorities and delivered only upon the specific
S'*
request of the addressee. The list of the persons that requested
delivery of such material was passed to the H.U.A.C.
Pour Justices agreed with Douglas1 opinion that the compilation
of the list and its communication to various security-loyalty watchdogs
had a serious deterrent effect upon the V .'uninhibited, robust and wide
230opeif debate and discussion contemplated by the First Amendment".
People in sensitive positions as well as all others included in the
list were compelled to steer clear from any publication designated as
communist propaganda lest they "invite disaster".
Justice Brennan concurring, added that the First Amendment
guaranteed the fundamental right to receive information. "The
dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing
addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a
231barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers". 
Although the case was related to a minor aspect of the loyalty-security 
complex the judicial rhetoric and action fully coincided for once.
The Supreme Court invalidated the statute as violating the First 
Amendment and thus, for the first time in its history, a federal law 
was voided on such grounds in 1965»
C. The Legislative Investigating Committees
6. Historical Background
The unquestionable stars of the period, in terms of publicity, 
were the various Congressional Investigating Committees. Their 
activities offer a panorama of all else that was going on during that
" - 353 “
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period
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The most famous of all was the House Committee on TJn-American 
Activities (H.U.A.C.).2^2 It was first established in 1938» from the
efforts of New York Representative Dickstein who wanted a full"\
investigation of the growing pro-Nazi and anti-semitic propaganda.
The term "Un-American" was coined by Dickstein himself, but by the time 
the proposal for the new Committee was passed, its predominant anti­
radical, anti-New Deal and anti-union bias had become evident and
233Dickstein was not elected a member. This bias coloured the hearings
of the Committee under its first Chairman Dies, from 1938 to 1944.
During those years, the Committee was preoccupied with the alleged
communist infiltration of the Roosevelt administration and the trade
union movement. Thus, its first hearings involved the testimony of an
A.F.L. leader, who asserted that the C.I.O. was ruled by communists,
and named 284 C.I.O. communist organisers, without, however, providing
any sources for his allegations. The accused were never invited by the
Committee to testify. That became a standard practice of the hearings
and was repeated throughout its history. The next target was the
Works Progress Administration's Federal Theatre and Writers' Project,
a New Deal programme of federally subsidized art. The Theatre Project
was discontinued in 1939» after the Committee accusation that it was
234"sheer propaganda for communism and the New Deal", while federal
funds were cut off from the Writers' Project. Prominent New Dealers
(like Secretaries Ickes and Perkins and W.P.A.*s administrator Hopkins)
235were accused as "purveyors of class hatred and Stalin associates". "
The Board of Economic Warfare, established after the outbreak of the War 
was found communist-infiltrated. Thirty-five names of communist top 
administrators of the Board were promised, and ten were finally named 
to the press. Dies*smain accusation was that one of those, an 
economist, had published a book on "Nudism in Modem Life". The author
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was fired but all others were later cleared by the F.B.I. "By the
end of 1938 hundreds of organisations and thousands of individuals had
been named before the Dies Committee, without any right of advance
X 237notice or rebuttal, as communists". In 1939* Dies started playing a 
"number’s game": he promised that his Committee would force the 
deportation of no less than seven million aliens, while in 1940 he 
claimed that he was going to publish the names of six million people 
who were members of organisations controlled by Germany and the Soviet 
Union. During the same year, the Committee issued with great publicity
a report on communist plans to sabotage American industry, which turned!
out to be a compilation of classic Marxist writings from K. Marx to 
E. Browder 2^
During the War years the activities of the Committee were somewhat 
subdued, but in 1945 it was upgraded into a permanent House Committee 
and its annual appropriation reached $200,000, the highest sum allotted 
to any House Committee.
The next major phase of the activities of the Committee started in 
1947 with the much publicised investigation of communist infiltration 
of the film industry during the war. At the beginning of the hearings, 
that took place in Hollywood,2^  "friendly witnesses" testified about 
the alleged infiltration and gave names of suspected communists, ex- 
communists and fellow-travellers. The Committee "indulged the witness 
in rumour, speculation and surmise, allowed them to enter numerous 
'names of alleged communists into the record... documentation, and 
spurted (them) to ever more fevered denunciations of communists, in 
Hollywood and everywhere else".2^  Next, some of the named were 
subpoenaed, and ten of them refused to answer any questions about their 
past affiliations and contacts, by invoking the constitutional rights 
of the First and the Fifth (self-incrimination) Amendments. The ten 
were dismissed and charged as communists. They were later cited for 
contempt of Congress and imprisoned.
236
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This pattern of examination of friendly witnesses and of informers -
241ex-communists and F.B.I. agents in the C.F. - and then of the hostile 
witnesses who refused to answer, was repeated throughout the 50s. The 
H.U.A.C. was supplemented by two Senate Committees, the Senate Internal 
Security Sub-Committee (S.I.S.S.) and the Committee on Government 
Operations chaired by Senator J. McCarthy. All areas of life csme 
eventually for investigation by one or more of the Committees: trade 
unions, education, the church, the press, governmental agencies and 
all sorts of foundations and research •units. The political profit of 
the various highly publicized investigations was such that the various
OAOCommittees were "colliding as they snatched at star witnesses". 4
The extraordinary character of the Committee hearings lay in 
their semi-judicial character which was coupled with an almost 
complete absence of the normal procedural guarantees attendant upon 
the criminal process.
Thus, the Committees were granted, in 1946, the power to subpoena 
any witness they wanted to investigate and put to him any questions, 
even if "most of the information sought... was already on the hands 
of the Committee". According to Chafee, the questions put by 
Committee members "rove over everything, and need prepare nothing".
The procedure! rules were set by the various chairmen as the 
hearings went along and the hostile witnesses were treated in a 
worse manner than the defendants in criminal trials. Dies, the first 
Chairman of the H.U.A.C., encapsulated the gist of the procedural 
rules, in a statement before a Senate Sub-Committee, in 1953*
"Primarily, if you get a good chairman and a good Committee you will 
have a good investigation. Outside of that, all you need is a few 
general rules to see that the witness and the public get a fair break". 
According to a Circuit Judge the witnesses were under a "triple threat",
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particularly those who had been named as subversives, in a previous
hearing, without any supporting evidence: "Answer truly and you have
given evidence leading to your conviction for a violation of federal
law; answer falsely and you will be convicted of perjury; refuse to
answer and you will be found guilty of criminal contempt and punished
245by fine and imprisonment”.
Despite all this formidable investigatory armoury "not a 
single person [went to] prison for spying or sabotage or urging 
violent revolution, because of evidence dug up in a Committee 
investigation".2^* But quite a few people were imprisoned for offences 
related to the hearings (perjuries and contempt of Congress). Indeed, 
it may be argued that the main task of the hearings was to punish 
people who could not be convicted in judicial proceedings, even under 
the draconian sedition laws of the period. The Committees did not 
uncover offences, they created them. But, even though Congress cited 
for contempt more people between 1952 and 19 5 4 than in its whole 
previous history, it is reasonable to suggest that the pickings of a 
few hundred perjury and contempt convictions could not match the 
extent of the exercise. The main aim behind the proceedings was to 
expose ideas, groups and people as subversive, rather than to unearth, 
prosecute and punish a few individuals.
President Truman's Committee on Civil Rights had recommended, in 
1947, the tactic of exposure of individuals as "the appropriate way to 
deal with those who would subvert our democracy by revolution or by
247encouraging disunity and destroying the civil rights of some groups". 
This recommendation, which appeared in a Government report entitled 
"To Secure these Rights", became the guiding principle of the various 
Legislative Committees. According to a historian of the H.U.A.C.
"the presence in this land of every individual communist and fellow
traveller and former communist who would not purge himself was
intolerable; the just fate of every such creature was to be exposed
in his community, routed from his job, and driven into exile". ^  The
H.U.A.C. Chairman Walter said as much. He hoped to expose all
subversives before their neighbours and fellow workers and expressed
"confidence that the loyal Americans who work with them will do the 
249rest of the job". With the wholehearted support of the media -
from 19 5 5 the hearings were transmitted live from television - the
"loyal Americans" answered the challenge. Uncooperating witnesses
were dismissed from their jobs and hustled out of factories by fellow
workers; hundreds of teachers and professors were fired after the
1953-4 investigation of education; when local "vigilantes", physically
attacked persons named in a hearing, a Committee member stated that
"this is the best kind of reaction there could have been to our 
250hearings"; and most of the unions and other groups investigated 
were destroyed.
As a result of McCarthy's investigation of the Voice of America, 
hundreds of books were withdrawn from American Information Libraries 
abroad and some were burnt. They included Barth's "The Loyalty of 
Free Men" and Hammett's "Maltese Falcon". • "Small state H.U.A.C.s" 
imitated the Congressional Committees and surpassed them in ingenuity. 
The California Tenney Committee was particularly ferocious. Once it 
had named somebody as a communist or fellow traveller, it then tried 
to excommunicate him completely. Lawyers were warned that they should 
not defend him; employers that they should dismiss him; landlords 
that they should not rent him a house; and the whole community that 
they should not join any group he was a member of, read any books, 
attend any play or film written by him, or even support any cause he 
espoused.
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Thus, the ordinary citizen learnt that he should not join any 
group, lend his name to any cause, or say anything that could be 
construed as unorthodox or Un-American by the Committees. It was this
pervasiveness of suspicion, the concept of "universal guilt", that called
/
upon each individual to scrutinize and cleanse not only his public
acts and affiliations but even his most private thoughts and
activities, that was the most dramatic result of the various loyalty
programmes and Committee investigations. "I don't say yes to anything
now except cancer, polio and cerebral palsy appeals" and "something
would have to happen to some of the cells of my cerebrum before anybody
could persuade me ever to touch politics" were typical answers of
251suspected subversives to Committee questions. And according to 
Gellhom, the only way in which scientists - one of the main targets
of the Committees - could avoid scandal was to confine their interests
252"to their laboratory, their flower garden and their golf game".
The next part examines the court cases that arose from the 
investigations of the legislative Committees.
7.1. The Judicial Upholding of the Practices of the Committees 
The courts came to review the various activities of the 
Legislative Investigating Committees when they dealt with the criminal 
prosecution of witnesses unwilling to testify, in all or in part, before 
the Committees. According to federal law, it is a misdemeanour for any 
witness summoned by either House to "wilfully make default, or, having 
appeared to refuse to answer any questions pertinent to the subject 
under inquiry". On the other hand, the House concerned may by a 
majority vote directly cite the recalcitrant witness for contempt of 
Congress, and imprison him, a procedure that may come under judicial 
review through a writ of habeas corpus. In both cases the courts are
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called upon to decide, whether the legislative power to compel the
253testimony was validly exercised.
Under its mandate the H.U.A.C. - and under similar ones the two 
Senate Committees - were empowered to investigate on
(1) the extent, character and objects of un-American propaganda 
activities in the United States;
(2) the diffusion within the U.S. of subversive and un-American 
propaganda; and
(3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress
in any necessary remedial legislation.
254In an 1880 case the Supreme Court had held that Congress could not 
investigate a subject on which it could not validly legislate.
The early challenges to the legislative investigatory power were 
based on that doctrine. Witnesses unwilling to testify on their 
present and past political beliefs and associations argued in court, 
either that Congress could not validly legislate in the field of 
political beliefs and, therefore, investigations on that field were 
barred as well; or that freedom of conscience and freedom from inquiry 
in political beliefs, allegedly protected by the First Amendment, were 
directly violated by the Committee's questions.
Five cases dealing with H.U.A.C. investigations, and decided by
appellate courts between 19 4 7 and 1950, rejected both objections. In
255U.S. v. Josephson the Court of Appeals argued that since the House 
had stated in mandating the Committee that it was set up for a 
"legislative purpose" the courts could not doubt it. The First 
Amendment could be violated only if Congress passed legislation that 
violated it.
256In Barsky v. U.S. the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia held that investigations were not restricted to "activities 
which might be regulated". A question, therefore, as to the relation
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of a witness to the C.P., still in 1948 a fully legal party, was valid
and refusal to answer it was a contempt of Congress,
257Equally, in Lawson v. ÏÏ.S, a case arising out of the "Hollywood 
Ten” investigation, the Court held that questions about communist 
affiliations were pertinent when addressed to people who "by their 
authorship of the scripts, vitally influence the ultimate production 
of motion pictures seen by millions". Investigation into communist 
affiliations was directly pertinent to an investigation into un- 
American propaganda. In four of those cases the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari, while in the fifth involving the famous composer Hans 
Eisler, the Court abandoned review after the defendant fled the U.S.^® 
Thus, the courts gave in those early cases full notice that they 
did not intend to intervene in the way in which the Committees were 
carrying out their investigations. On the other hand, Congress 
carried with overwhelming votes the contempt citations with which it was 
presented by the Committees. "Where the courts had deferred to the 
Congress, the Congress now deferred to the courts like two gentlemen 
bowing each other through a door which neither wishes to enter... The
authority of Committee Chairmen to pursue their own goals in their own
259ways was left unimpaired".
In the meantime, the increasing enactment of federal and state 
sedition laws that attached various punishments and disabilities to 
current and past membership of the Communist Party or other "subversive" 
groups, led witnesses before the Committees to start invoking the 
constitutional right against self-incrimination, provided by the Fifth
260Amendment. From 1950, the H.ÏÏ.A.C. started to prosecute witnesses
who employed that plea, which is fully operative in all sorts of
261judicial proceedings. In Sogers v. ÏÏ.S. the Supreme Court seriously 
undercut the right as applied in legislative investigations. Chief
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Justice Vinson held that a witness wno gives some initial answers
waives the right to remain silent and cannot invoke it later. The
right of a witness to select "any stopping place in the testimony" ^
would distort the facts. But as Black remarked, in dissent,
witnesses were put in an impossible position: "/o7n the one hand, they
risk imprisonment for contempt by asserting the privilege prematurely;
on the other« they might lose the privilege if they answer a single 
261a
question". The road to self-incrimination and betrayal of associates 
and friends was thus made a slippery slope. In another 1931 case 
(Tennv v. Brandhove ), arising out of the activities of the 
California H.U.A.C., the Supreme Court denied a civil suit for 
damages by a witness who had been unsuccessfully prosecuted for 
contempt of the Committee. Brandhove had refused to give evidence 
to the Committee and had argued that he was subpoenaed, not for a 
"legislative purpose", but so that he would be deterred from 
criticizing it.
The suit was brought under Section 43 of the Civil Bights Act 
of 1871, which provided a civil remedy for the deprivation of 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Justice Frankfurter, for 
the majority, gave a detailed exposition of English and American 
constitutional history on legislative privileges and concluded that 
the Civil Bights Statutes did not intend to reduce these privileges. 
Immunity from suit was intended to protect Congress and its 
committees, by giving them freedom in the conduct of their 
legislative functions. The Committee concerned was acting within 
the sphere of legitimate legislative activity, and the privilege 
was not destroyed by the fact that it had, allegedly, used its
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investigative powers for an unworthy purposes "Courts are not 
the place for such controversies. Self-discipline and the voters 
must be the ultimate reliance for discouraging or correcting 
such abuses.
Only in 1953 did the Supreme Court reverse a contempt conviction
arising from the acitvities of the minor House Select Committee
263on lobbying activities. Frankfurter found that the Committee 
was not authorised by the House to compel the secretary of an 
organization to disclose the names of all persons who had made 
bulk purchases of specified books and pamphlets to be distributed 
by it. Thus, in that case the Court indicated that the authorization 
of the particular Committee qualified the extent of the legal duty 
of disclosure of the summoned witness.
The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Warren, started reversing 
convictions of uncooperating witnesses and indicating a willingness 
to check the worse excesses of the various federal and state legislative 
investigations only after Senator McCarthy* s censure and downfall in 
late 1954» Thus, in 3 cases decided in 1955» the Court upheld the 
right of witnesses to invoke the "self-incrimination" Amendment before 
Committees and reversed citations for contempt of the Congress arising
264out of H.TJ.A.C. hearings. In Quinn v. TJ.S. Warren held that the 
power of investigation should not be extended "into private affairs 
unrelated to a valid legislative purpose" and warned that such 
investigations "should not be confused with any of the powers of 
law enforcement".^^
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By 1 9 5 5 » therefore, the conviction of witnesses who had taken
the Fifth Amendment for contempt of Congress was barred by the
Supreme Court. But the main purpose of the various Committees
was neither legislative nor investigative in the sense of being
particularly interested in unearthing indictable offences (see
above). Their main concern in exposure and public opprobrium
was an extra-legal one. For such purposes invocation of the
Fifth Amendment was sufficient for the Committee. The concept
of the "Fifth Amendment Communists" actively espoused by Senators
McCarthy and Nixon and the popular press had captured the public
imagination. "By 1953 the various Committees appeared to regard
their enquiries as successful whenever they produced a claim of
immunity from a witness because of the widespread assumption
266that such claims are made to hide C.P. membership".
While the punishment of Fifth Amendment Communists was left 
mainly to their community - "once a man took refuge in the Fifth 
he thereby lost all claim to the ordinary needs of life"^^ - 
several states started imposing additional legal impediments on 
such people. Thus, the New York State Senate passed a law, 
according to which employers could dismiss any employee who 
pleaded self-incrimination and the New York City Charter ordered
the dismissal of all city employees who utilized the plea. In
268Slochower v. Board of Higher Education a college professor 
was summarily dismissed after invoking the Fifth Amendment before 
the Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee in relation to a 
question about his relation to the C.P. in 1940. The New York 
Court of Appeals held that the "assertion of the privilege against 
self-incrimination is equivalent to a resignation". The Supreme
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Court reversed. Justice Clark condemned the practice of imputing a
"sinister meaning" to all invocations of the Fifth. "In practical
effect the questions asked are taken as confessed and made the basis
of the discharge". Clark, a consistent supporter of the loyalty-
security complex, distinguished Slochover from those decisions upholding
the loyalty programmes for teachers and public employees. The Board
of Higher Education had full knowledge of Slochower's past activities
and the Fifth was invoked in Committee hearings completely unrelated to
the fitness of teachers or the official conduct of city employees. The
summary dismissal was found in violation of due process of law.
Nevertheless, it was in two 1957 decisions that the Supreme Court
tackled favourably and directly, for the first time, the ordeal
269unwilling witnesses had to go through. Watkins v. TJ.S. involved the 
1954 testimony before the H.TJ.A.C. of John Watkins, vice president of a
iFarmers Union. Watkins testified fully as to his own involvementi
with the Communist Party from 1942 to 1947 and was willing to answer' I I
questions related to people he knew and had reason to believe they were 
still communists. But he refused to answer any question about people 
who might have been communists in the past, but had reasons to believe 
that were not any more at the time. In answer to such questions he 
repeatedly stated that they were not relevant to the work of the 
Committee investigating communist infiltration in the unions and that 
the Committee had not the right to expose publicly people for their 
past activities.
The Supreme Court reversed Watkins* contempt conviction, per 
Chief Justice Warren. Warren opened his opinion by indicating the 
hazards to freedom of expression created by a legislative investigation 
into subversive activities. These included the effects on the witness 
himself: forced revelation of beliefs, expressioxs'and associations
had disastrous consequences for his life, particularly harsh when they
involved past conduct which was legal at the time it took place; on
those whose names were revealed by the witness: they.became subject
to public stigma, scorn and obloquy; finally, to the public at large:
they were warned to stick to the most ''orthodox and uncontroversial
270views and associations" to avoid similar fate in the future.
Having said all that, Warren went on to reverse the conviction only on the 
narrower ground that Watkins was not informed as to the pertinency 
of the question to the matter under investigation. It was not some 
inherent fault of the procedure but the fact that the particular 
hearings were conducted in an inadequate manner that made the 
conviction a violation of due process of law. "The actual scope of the 
inquiry that the Committee was authorized to conduct and the relevance 
of the questions to that inquiry must be shown to have been luminous 
at the time when asked and not left, at best, in cloudiness".
The other case decided on the same day (Sweezy v. New Hamnshire^^  
involved a contempt conviction of Professor Paul Sweezy, perhaps the 
most famous contemporary American Marxist economist. Sweezy had 
refused to reply to questions about the Progressive Party and the 
content of a lecture on socialism delivered at the University of New 
Hampshire before the one-man New Hampshire committee on subversive 
activities. The Court dealt with the case mainly as one of academic 
freedom, without which "civilization will stagnate and die". There 
was a prima facie violation of that freedom;- and, since the State 
Legislature had not indicated any wish to be informed on the matters 
Sweezy had refused to reply, no state interest underlay the Attorney 
General*s aotion. The conviction, consequently, violated both 
constitutional rights and the due process of law. Frankfurter reached 
the same result by using the balancing process. It was the only case
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in which this doctrine was used and the individual rights upheld
during the period, due perhaps to the academic freedom overtones of
the case, and Frankfurter's academic past. In view of the "grave
harm resulting from governmental intrusion into the intellectual life ^
of a university", the "subordinating interest of the state" to
discover whether Sweezy had taught subversive theories was not
272"compelling" according to Frankfurter.
Sweezy and Watkins were decided on June 17, 1957 on the same
day as Yates, which came to be known as the "Red Monday". A strong
right-wing reaction to the Court's cautious but liberal rulings
started building up. The Chicago Tribune wrote that "the boys in the
Kremlin may wonder why they need a fifth column so long as the
273Supreme Court is determined to be so helpful", and Representative
Jackson stated that the Court had made the Committees "innocuous as
two kittens in a cageful of rabid dogs".2^  In 1958 the Conference
of the Chief Justices of the States and the Special Committee on
Communist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives of the American Bar
Association also criticized strongly the Court for those and some other
275decisions, like Nelson and the desegregation ones. The Court was 
accused of violating state rights and embarking upon the road of 
creating and implementing its own judicial policy. Various bills 
were proposed in the House, purporting either to limit the appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the loyalty-security field or to
reverse certain of the Court's judgments - in particular the Nelson
*  -
federal pre-emption doctrine. The House passed such bills which 
were, however, narrowly blocked in the Senate. Thus, none of the 
anti-Court measures was finally enacted.2^
Following these attacks the Supreme Court retreated from its 
Watkins and Sweezy position. In Barenblatt v. TJ.S.2^  decided in 1959»
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the Supreme Court, after an exhaustive analysis of the various
objections that had been levelled against the Committees, overruled
278all of them, and delivered the Committees a virtual carte blanche. ' 
The case arose out of the refusal of Barenblatt, a psychology 
instructor, to answer questions about his association with the 
Communist Party or with the Michigan Council of Arts, Sciences and 
Professions, before the H.U.A.C. Barenblatt based his refusal on the 
First Amendment, and specifically disclaimed reliance on the Fifth 
Amendment.
Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, stated that when First
Amendment rights are asserted as a ground for keeping silent in
legislative investigations, the conflict should be resolved through
the balancing of the private and public interests involved. The
public interest was the right of self-preservation, "the ultimate
value of any society", and therefore the investigation was based on
a valid legislative purpose. The questions were pertinent and "the
strict requirements of a prosecution under the Smith Act are not the
measure of the permissible scope of a congressional investigation into
"overthrow", for of necessity the investigatory process much proceed
step by step". Further, the contention that the purpose of the
Committee enquiries was simply to expose people, was overruled
without argument. All these compelling reasons were reinforced
by the fact that the Committee was not attempting "to pillory
witnesses" and that Barenblatt•s appearance did not follow
"indiscriminate dragnet procedures". The "balance was struck" in
favour of the Committee, without even a discussion of the "private
279interests" involved.
The usual four (Black, Douglas, Warren, Brennan) dissented.
For Black the authorising resolution was vague, balancing was
inappropriate in First Amendment cases, and in any case, it was 
misapplied in the present case. The only reason for the Committee's 
existence was "exposure purely for the sake of exposure". Barenblatt 
was the lowest point in the story of "balancing against the left” of 
the fifties. As the cases that followed Barenblatt showed, under its 
doctrine virtually no aspect of the activities of the investigating 
Committees was open to judicial challenge.
281In the case of Bohans v. Wyman (1959)* decided on the same 
day, the New Hampshire "legislative" Committee, comprised by the 
Attorney-General of that state Wyman, was upheld, in circumstances 
similar to Sweezy. The "government interest in self-preservation is 
sufficiently compelling to subordinate the interest in associational 
privacy” stated Justice Clark, sending Dr. Bphaus to prison for 
refusing to turn in a list of all guest speakers at a camp he was 
running.
Two further cases decided in 1961 were related to the H.B.A.C.
investigations of communist activities in the South. The hearings
were held in Atlanta in 1959» and the reluctant witnesses were F.
Wilkinson and C. Braden. Wilkinson was an official of the Emergency
Civil Liberties Committee, a group that had disassociated itself from
the A.C.L.U. following the latter's reluctance to campaign for the
protection of civil liberties of communists. Braden, the secretary
of the Southern Conference Educational Fund, a black rights
organisation, was organising opposition through a petition to the
Atlanta hearings of the H.TJ.A.C. Wilkinson went to Atlanta to help
and coordinate the anti-committee campaign. They were both sunmoned
by idle Committee and refused to answer any questions about their
282possible communist affiliations. In Wilkinson v. II.S. (1961) 
the Supreme Court upheld Wilkinson's contempt conviction. Justice
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Stewart held that the Committee had grounds to believe that Wilkinson's 
organisation was a communist front and his presence in Atlanta indicated 
that he was connected with communist propaganda; his invitation and 
the questions put to him were therefore pertinent to the matter under 
investigation. There was "probable cause for belief that he 
possessed information which might be helpful to the sub-Committee." ?
AQ J
The second case, Braden v. P.S. (1 9 6 1) 4 was ruled by Barenblatt
too. Justice Stewart, speaking for the same majority as in Wilkinson.
rejected Braden's contention that he had been engaging in a
constitutionally protected activity (preparing a petition for redress
of grievances), which could not become the subject of investigation.
All areas of life were subject of investigation for the discovery of
communist infiltration and propaganda, according to Stewart: ".../rThe
petitioner.• • had been actively engaged in propaganda efforts...
Information as to the extent to which the Communist Party was utilising
285legitimate organisations and causes in its propaganda efforts" 
was within the constitutional reach of the Committee. To the obvious 
objection that the invitation of both defendants by the Committee 
was intended as a form of harassment for their opposition to its 
operations, Stewart answered that courts could not speculate on the 
motives of Congressmen.
7.2. The Judicial Restrictions on the Committees
The Court started drawing back from the extreme Barenblatt 
position in the mid-60s. By that time the powerful weapon of the 
legislative investigation was being employed - along with other 
measures tested in the anti-communist campaign - by the Southern 
states against various civil rights organizations fighting for negro 
rights.
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The Florida legislature had since 1956 established a committee 
investigating the actuvities of N.A.A.C.P. By 1959 the Committee was 
authorized to investigate organizations operating in the field of race 
relations and of "coercive reform of social and educational practices 
and mores", an obvious reference to local attempts to enforce the 
Supreme Court school desegregation decisions. All organizations whose 
"principles or activities include a course of conduct on the part of 
any person or group which would constitute violence, or a violation 
of the laws of the state, or would be inimical to the well being and 
orderly pursuit of their personal and business activities by the 
majority of the citizens of this state" were to be scrutinized, and the 
N.A.A.C.P. was the first. Gibson, the president of the Miami branch 
refused to produce a list of the members, or to confirm from it 
whether fourteen alleged Communists were or had been members of his 
organization. Following these events Gibson was convicted for 
contempt and sent to prison. The Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision 
reversed the conviction in 1963 (Gibson v. Florida Legislative 
Investigation Committee).
Justice Goldberg who had recently joined the Court wrote the 
opinion. &  reviewed extensively the precedents on the field, and 
concluded that the principle emanating from those decisions was that 
the validity of an investigation depended upon the adequacy of its 
"nexus" or "foundation" with a valid legislative pujóse "or subject 
of overriding and compelling state interest". He agreed that questions 
about a witness* own past or present membership in the Communist Party, 
or another subversive organization were pertinent, since such 
activities were, in themselves, a proper subject of legislative 
investigation. On the other hand the N.A.A.C.P. had since 1950 purged 
itself of communists and subversives. There was, therefore, no
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substantial connection between the N.A.A.C.P. and communist
activities and the investigation lacked an "adequate foundation".
The free trade in ideas and beliefs should not be infringed upon slender
grounds, particularly when the "challenged privacy is that of persons
espousing beliefs already unpopular with their neighbors". Goldberg
concluded by emphasising again that the Court was not challenging the
legislative right to investigate or legislate "with respect to
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subversive activities by communists or anybody else". But groups
not engaged in "subversive or other illegal or improper activities...
are to be protected in their rights of free and private association".
Justices Black and Douglas would declare the whole exercise of
probing into associations! and expressive activities unconstitutional,
while the four dissenters stated that the effect of the decision was
to insulate from investigation "the time-proven skills of the C.P. in
288subverting and eventually controlling legitimate organizations".
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In another decision during the same year (Yellin v. U.S.) 7
the Supreme Court reversed for the first time a contempt conviction 
on the ground that the H.U.A.C. had not complied with the procedural 
rules that it had set up for its operations.
Finally, in two 1966 cases the Court reversed convictions for 
contempt, one involving the legislative committee of New Hampshire 
(Be Gregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire)2^  for staleness of 
the basis and subject matter of the investigation and the other on 
grounds of lack of authorization of the hearings of a subcommittee of 
the H.IT.A.C. The latter case (Go.jack v. U.S.)2^  was the conclusion 
of a long running battle between the H.TJ.A.C. and the United Electrical, 
Radio and Machine Workers of America, one of the few remaining left 
wing unions, expelled from the C.I.O. in 1949* The original contempt 
conviction of its vice-president Gojack was obtained in 1936. It was
finally reversed after 10 years, but on that occasion, the Supreme 
Court explicitly refused to overrule Baxanblatt. In the meantime the 
combined attack of the C.I.O. and the loyalty machinery had all but 
destroyed the U.E. In 1943 it represented all electrical vorkers.
By 1955» 30 different unions had cut into TJ.E.'s membership, and the
C. I.O. had authorized a rival international union (TJ.E.-C.I.O.). On 
one day alone in Chicago, three electrical companies fired more than 
500 TJ.E. shop stewards and were later upheld by the N.L.R.B.2^2
Thus, in this area too, as in those previously examined, the 
main objectives of the legislative committees had been accomplished 
before the Supreme Court moved in and put some restraints on their 
worst excesses.
D. Conclusions
8.1. The "Clear and Probable Danger" Test. The New Danger and 
the Commonists
The Dennis case was discussed and decided along the lines of the 
danger test. Both the Vinson majority and the Douglas dissent as well 
as the trial court's instructions to the jury and Learned Hand's 
opinion for the Court of Appeals, addressed the problems created by 
the communist prosecution under some version of the danger test. Vith 
the exception of Douglas, however, all other judges discussed and ■ 
decided the case on the basis of the "gravity" of the danger rather 
than its immediacy. Thus, the hallmarks of the test, as introduced 
by Holmes and developed by the decisions of the 30s and the 40s, the 
"clarity" and "presence" of the danger, were discarded and the test 
was completely transformed.
The danger did not lie in the possible adoption by people of 
ideas that would lead them to undertake acts of violence in the
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foreseeable future, but in the ideas themselves, irrespective of
consequences. This was the meaning of the changes in the clear and
present danger introduced by Judge Medina - "present” means as
"speedily as circumstances would permit"; Learned Hand - the
gravity of the evil outweighs its improbability; and Chief
Justice Vinson - "we must reject the contention that success or
293probability of success is the criterion". In all these formulations, 
an improbable eventuality - communist insurrection - coupled with 
circumstances extraneous to the activities of the defendants - the 
worsening world situation - made the full suppression of the 
communists permissible. Some other factors, like the highly 
disciplined character of the Parly - a perfectly lawful characteristic 
in itself - and the suspicion of some clandestine activities, were 
mentioned too. Their secondary character, however, was revealed 
by the rather scant reference they merited in the opinions and the 
lack of any evidence of illegal activities in the trial court.
Thus, it was the teaching and advocacy of the doctrine of violent 
overthrow of the government that was declared dangerous and illegal; 
and furthermore, since even that formulation of the indictment 
created the problem of identifying Marxism-Leninism as a doctrine of
I  iviolent overthrow, a complex exercise in textual analysis and political!
speculation, the communists were prosecuted for conspiracy to teach 
and advocate revolution. That way, the need of proof of specific 
acts on the parts of the defendants was further relaxed.
Nevertheless, in its attempts to attribute some concrete 
expressive activities to the communists and in its repetition of a 
verbal formulation resembling the danger test, the Supreme Court 
indicated that it was not prepared to follow the road of the complete 
banning of the Communist Party. Thus, both the protracted examination
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of party records and the evidence given by ex-communists and informers 
in the trial court; and the attempt to reformulate rather than abandon 
the danger test, may be seen as efforts to retain the distinction 
between punishable action and protected expression, inherent within 
the original test. To be sure, the only realistic threat that could 
be attributed to American communists was that they were parts or 
"proxies" of a world communist movement which had overthrown or attempted 
to overthrow governments politically and ideologically close to the 
U.S.
Thus, as regards the Communist Party and the avowed communists, 
the notion of "danger" became completely enmeshed with the official 
appreciation of the international situation and the state of the global 
American interests. The reaction against the party was an indicator of 
the way in which the American Government would answer any incursions 
upon its sphere of influence. The external danger was perceived as 
global and total and a similar total reaction befell its local - albeit 
impotent - representatives.
The obsession with the "foreign" character of the internal
communist challenge was found in all specific measures taken against
the Communist Party. Frankfurter's opinion in the Communist Party 
294registration case revolved around the dual characteristics of the 
monolithic character of the communist movement and its domination and 
control from a foreign centre. To be sure, by 1961 both those elements 
were in retreat and the judicial determination was somewhat at odds 
with the new trends in American foreign policy. But the fascination 
of the Supreme Court with the international dimensions of the problem
remained
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Seen in this way, the shortcomings of Jackson*s concurring opinion 
and Douglas' dissent in Dennis may he put in perspective.
Justice Jackson argued, it is recalled, that the communist 
prosecution was a simple conspiracy case and "conspiracy is not a 
constitutionally protected right". The Party had been proven to be a 
conspiratorial vehicle and its leaders were convicted on that basis; 
the debates about present, probable, future or eventual consequences 
were, therefore, irrelevant. In terms of legal doctrine and technique, 
Jackson was right. But a technical conspiracy conviction would have 
lacked the paradigmatic qualities of a decision based upon and 
elaborating the quite novel characteristics of an international and 
global danger. The results would have been the same, but the emphasis 
on the novelty of the danger and the formulation of the decision in 
terms of an identifiable freedom-protecting doctrine (the danger test) 
would have been lacking.
At the other extreme, Douglas' attempt to apply the danger test, 
as evolved in the 40s, to the facts of the case was an anachronism.
Noone had argued that there was a present danger of a revolution or 
even of an attempt to insurrection. Furthermore, the strong evidentiary 
flavour of the test required the ascription of concrete acts to the 
defendants. As Douglas consistently concluded, after a detailed review 
of the record and a liberal invocation of judicial notice, no such 
evidence existed and the communists should be acquitted. Such an 
approach, however, was placing the Communist Party at a par with any 
other soap-box orator or insignificant radical sect and extended to it 
all the normal constitutional guarantees. It, therefore, under­
estimated both the gravity of the new evil that could not be 
accommodated by the pious old formulas and the severity of the required 
reaction.
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Thus, the Supreme Court resolved the problem of facing a global 
danger with a total reaction, which was both paradigmatic and retained 
some constitutional scruples, by creating the new danger test. In 
Dennis, the particularistic approach of the original test was 
completely undercut. But its remnants were revitalised in the Yates 
and Scales cases.
In those later cases, through the reconstruction of the terms 
"advocacy and teaching" and of "knowing membership"; and the request 
of concrete evidence of illegal activity by the defendants, the wide 
import and applicability of the Dennis doctrine was reduced.
The whole story of the persecution of the Communist Party may 
be seen, therefore, as moving on a line, the one end of which called 
for the total destruction of a paramount threat and all those 
associated with it, while the other emphasized the importance of 
concrete evidence of illegal activities, even if the latter were merely 
seditious utterances, for the conviction of individual communists.
The first strategy, with its inherent assessment of the national and 
international sociopolitical situation was closer to the legislative 
function, the second to the traditional judicial one. The extent of 
the Supreme Court's protective role throughout the period was a 
function of its adoption, respectively, of the former or latter 
approach.
8.2. The Loyalty-Security Complex and the Balancing Test
The concept of the external global danger, personified within 
the United States by the Communist Party was developed in the 
various Smith Act prosecutions of the Communist Party and committed 
communists. If the analysis above is correct these prosecutions had a 
significant symbolic character. This aspect is further underlined 
by the fact that the federal legislature and agencies always stopped
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295short of banning the Communist Party. The frontal attack on it was 
coupled with a strange interest in its survival. Extensively 
infiltrated, wrecked by internal schisms and conflicts» it was 
preserved on its death bed. If the Party was such a danger» as it 
was repeatedly and publicly pronounced to be» a final blow would have 
been both desirable and irresistible. Interestingly enough, it was
E. Hoover and the other professional communist-hunters who always 
resisted the "final solution".
It seems, therefore, that while the communist prosecutions had 
certain symbolic undertones, the main thrust of the whole anti-communist 
campaign was directed at a much more realistic danger: the danger of 
the " infection of the public sphere" with subversive, radical or 
simply Un-American people, groups and ideas. All areas of social 
and political life, all organisations and individuals, the whole 
"body politic" was potentially susceptible to that threat. The 
loyalty programmes, the administrative and legislative investigations,
j
the lists of subversive groups, individuals, books and ideas, all this 
complex machinery that we may call the "loyalty-security complex", 
had as its m«-* « task to combat this much more extensive but less 
conspicuous danger.
It was in cases challenging aspects of this complex that the 
Supreme Court introduced and extensively utilized the balancing test. 
Indeed, if some version of the danger test with its inherent 
distinction between expression and action was used in criminal cases 
against communists, the overwhelming majority of cases involving 
the activities of the loyalty watchdogs were decided by means of the 
balancing technique.
The origins of the balancing test lie in the "preferred position" 
doctrine, that had been adopted by the Supreme Court in the 30s and
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40s. According to it, when a statute was challenged on constitutional 
grounds for violation of the First Amendment, the Court weighed the 
competing interests in free speech and those protected by the enactment 
and decided accordingly. However, as the name of the doctrine implied, 
the interest in freedom was placed on a preferred position within the 
hierarchy of social interests, and important state interests only, 
threatened clearly and presently by speech could tip the scales. Thus, 
the preferred position-danger test approach gave notification of a 
greater judicial activism in expression cases as well as of a judicial 
determination to protect expression claims.
The balancing technique retained, in theory at least, the element 
of independent judicial examination of the competing interests involved 
in each expression case. Thus, loyalty standards and qualifications 
were usually challenged and examined as potential violations of the 
constitutional freedoms of expression and association; the various 
loyalty procedures as violations of the "due process of law" 
requirements of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments; and the 
punishments and other incidental consequences on various grounds 
related to the specific nature of each case, and as indirect 
violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Faced with such 
challenges, the Supreme Court started redrawing the hierarchy of 
social interests.
The interest in national security was declared as "second to 
none", and as clearly outweighing most claims stemming from the 
First Amendment. The programmatic statement to that effect was 
made in the Dennis case, where the gravity of the evil was 
strongly emphasised. Dennis was decided at the end by a mixture of 
the danger and the balancing test. In the loyalty-security cases, 
however, where the undiluted balancing technique was utilised the
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main contribution of the Supreme Court lay in the framing of the interest 
in expression, that was to be compared with that in national security.
Thus, in Douds the purging of trade unions from subversives was a 
"relatively small" violation of free expression rights: the destruction 
of trade unions that had subversive officials was positively desirable 
and the forcing of trade unionists out of their jobs was unimportant.
Once they had lost their positions, they were free to maintain their 
affiliations and beliefs. The same applied to teachers and lawyers: 
they were "free to choose" between membership in listed organisations 
and their profession, but all freedom of choice involved similar 
restrictions (Adler and Königsberg II). And, since all public - 
employment was a privilege, its denial on security grounds did not 
impair private employment prospects nor did it involve any violation
png
of freedom of expression (among others C.R.W. v. McElroy).
The wide-ranging scrutiny in past beliefs and associations 
carried out by administrative and legislative committees was found to 
be an insignificant incursion of expression rights, too. Loyalty and 
professional fitness could be determined through a total examination 
of the individuales character, purpose, morality or intent, and such 
characteristics depended "from time immemorial" on past and present 
beliefs and the "company one keeps" (Königsberg. Garner. Adler).
j
Even perfectly legal statements and acts could be used as proofs of an
overall disloyal character (Killian, Braden) and were not, therefore,
297beyond the scope of investigation.
. When the constitutional challenge involved activities of the 
Legislative Investigating Committees, the judicial reaction was 
particularly cavalier. Thus, if the Committee was set up for a 
"legislative purpose" - whatever that purpose (Josephaon); and the 
questions put to the witnesses were pertinent to that purpose
381-
( Watkins), then anything could be legally asked and refusal to answer 
justified a contempt conviction. The interest of the witnesses in not 
disclosing their past and present beliefs and their moral duty not to 
betray their friends and associates were clearly outweighed by the 
interest in self-preservation, "the ultimate value of any society" 
(Barenblatt). Even the slender procedural guarantees afforded to 
communists prosecuted under the Smith Act were not available to 
witnesses unwilling to cooperate with the Committees (Barenblatt. 
Wilkinson. Braden). Furthermore, the Court was unwilling to extend 
any procedural guarantee whatsoever, or to restrict in any way the 
power of thé administrative authorities to deal at will with aliens 
(Harisiades. Carlson). In that area, there was literally nothing
OQO
that could be weighed against national security ( Galvan).
Finally, the Court*s reluctance to enforce the minimum procedural 
guarantees of due process of law, and in particular, the rights against 
self-incrimination and the constitutional prohibitions of bills of 
attainder and ex post facto laws, was reinforced by the way in which 
it defined the various loyalty programmes and their consequences.
Thus, the administrative and legislative investigations and deportation 
proceedings were not criminal proceedings stricto sensu, in which the 
normal legal guarantees are applicable; nor were their effects 
criminal punishments, according to the Supreme Court: union rights 
and powers were due to the government’s benevolence (Douds); public 
employment was not "property" or "liberty" (Gamer. Bailey) ; in 
particular, employment as a teacher and admission to the Bar were 
privileges (Adler. Königsberg II); tax exemptions and welfare benefits 
were "government largesse" (Justice Clark in Speiser and Flemming v. 
Nestor); the right to travel or the issuance of a passport were 
subject to the unlimited discretion of the State Department. All 
these privileges, therefore, could be revoked to various degrees 
without any procedural guarantees and in some cases without knowledge
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of the charges made against the applicant, or of the names of their 
accusers. And whenever the ultimate sanction was mentioned - the 
certain destruction of groups and the public opprobrium that followed 
individuals who were caught in the loyalty-security complex - the 
courts bypassed it: such effects were either idle speculation, or not 
intended by the loyalty watchdogs and the courts could do nothing 
about them (Barenblatt. C.R.W.U. v. McElroy, Braden).
We may conclude, therefore, that the use of the balancing test 
in the loyalty-security cases led to the abdication by the judiciary 
of its protective role. The emphasis put by the test on the importance 
of the general and comprehensive interest protected by the loyalty- 
security complex, and the underestimation of the interest in expression 
presented in a particularistic manner, meant that the excesses of the 
various programmes went on unchallenged. Indeed, any weighing between 
the interest of the "safety of the Republic" and that of an individual 
to remain silent before an investigating committee for example, inhered 
its outcome in the way in which the respective claims were set out. 
Justice Frankfurter^ exercises in balancing were quite characteristic. 
In his concurring opinion in Dennis, for example, the Justice 
enumerated the social interests involved in the communist prosecution. 
But when he reached the point of balancing them, he stated that a 
task of such complexity and enormity belonged to the legislature and 
not to the judiciary, and the courts were not entitled to question 
the legislative determination.
8.3. Changes in the law and the reconstitution of the public sphere
1. The importance of these developments for the concepts of criminal 
guilt and punishment and for law, in general, cannot be over-estimated.
(a) Criminal liability was disarticulated from specified acts 
and expressions or even from attempts at acts, and was attributed to 
an undesirable "state of mind". To be sure, the concept of undesirable
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or un-American ideologies is a vague one, and demarcation of its 
parameters is hardly a task suitable for the traditional judicial 
function. Equally, the search for disloyalty could not be limited to 
the discovery and punishment of specific indictable offences. The 
existence of loyalty/disloyalty perceived as an attribute of the total 
individual personality, or as a character trait according to Wolff, 
was sought out in present acts and expressions as well as in past 
associations and friendships and past and present ideas and opinions 
on various subjects: only through such a pervasive review which 
reached out and searched the most personal and private activities, a 
determination about the total commitment toward the sociopolitical 
order and its dominant ideas could be made. Consequently, the past of 
the individual was investigated in order to reveal the present and 
future tendencies of his character and apportion guilt.
(b) The determination of guilt was undertaken by various 
administrative and legislative agencies acting as semi-judicial 
bodies, which were freed from any extensive judicial intervention.
(c) Finally the novel character of the loyalty-security complex 
was highlighted by the nature of the punishments attendant upon a 
finding of actual or potential disloyalty. Such penalties varied in 
accordance with each particular programme but some common trends may 
be traced.
First, a finding of disloyalty put tinder severe strain the 
relations of the individual with the government, federal, state or 
local. Public employment became the most obvious area that depended 
on the prerequisite of loyalty. But as the relationship between society 
and the state had changed dramatically since the New Beal, and an ever- 
increasing part of the individual^ life had become dependent upon 
public provision, the effects of the loyalty programmes became even 
more pervasive. Governmental licences necessary for all sorts of
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activities, from professional to recreational; certificates of 
professional fitness or ability necessary for certain kinds of private 
employment; and tax exemptions and all kinds of welfare benefits were 
granted or denied on grounds of loyalty. Thus, in the more closely 
integrated economic and social life of the post-War period, the 
promised nrin-iimnn economic and social security for the working class 
and the poorer sections of the population was qualified by an important 
proviso! the "benevolent” state would extend its protection to those 
individuals and groups who accepted fully the legitimacy of the 
reconstituted socio-political order.
Secondly, since the "battle of loyalty" was fought for the 
hearts and the minds of the overwhelming majority of the Americans, 
the loyalty-security programmes had a predominantly paradigmatic 
character! conducted in maximum publicity, they were meant to involve 
the public at large in an ongoing effort to weed out subversive ideas, 
groups and individuals from all walks of life. Thus, while the
i
exposure of subversives was made so that the resulting public outcry 
and opprobrium would complete their excommunication, it acted at the 
same time as a reminder and incentive for the audience of the 
proceedings to purge themselves from any "bad" ideas.
The utilitarian concept of punishment was, therefore, radically 
transformed! from a rationally predictable, clearly known in advance 
and commensurate to the offence sentence, meted out in accordance with 
non-discretionary laws and rigid procedural guarantees, punishment 
became unpredictable, total and irregular. A certain element of 
theatricality, which according to writers like M. Foucault and M.
701Ignatieff . had withered away from modern criminal justice, was 
reintroduced. The severity and inconclusiveness of the punishment 
of those caught up in the loyalty-security web was followed by its
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highly visible and symbolic character for the rest of the society.
We may conclude that the three main characteristics of the
loyalty-security programmes were (a) the vague and elastic definitions
of disloyalty they contained, (b) the creation of a concept of loyalty
as a personality trait, the verification of which called for an
unlimited scrutiny of all aspects of the life of the person under
investigation and (c) the total character of the penalties that
followed a finding of disloyalty and the pervasive effects of the
loyalty proceedings for the whole of society.
These developments marked the introduction of a series of
administrative and legislative punishments of a semi-criminal
character. The involvement of criminal courts and the use of normal
legal procedures in those cases became secondary. Indeed, while the
302•'decline of law" since the War and the blurring of the distinction
303between state and civil society have been predominantly discussed
for their effects in the fields of private and property law, an
equally important change took place in criminal and constitutional
law. The courts virtually vacated the area of loyalty-security, in
favour of the executive and the legislature, thus leading to a
politicization of criminality and a real decline in law‘s role.
Furthermore the displacement of the public/private line, the
publicization of the private, was repeated in the most "private"
of areas: that of beliefs and ideas, the explicitly political ones
but also the more personal and intimate. Thus, a certain ideological
planning was undertaken, administered centrally by the federal
authorities. And to repeat C.S. Pierce the path of individual peace
304lay in "following the method of authority".
On the other hand, the cases in which the Supreme Court using 
narrow technical points - the mandate of a particular committee, the
pertinency of a question to the matter under investigation, the verbal 
formulation of a loyalty test or oath etc. - limited the worst excesses 
of the loyalty watchdogs, indicate the important protective role that 
courts and legal proceedings can play. To be sure, these decisions did 
not challenge the overall rationale of the loyalty-security complex and 
the procedural improvements imposed by the court could be accommodated 
without fundamental changes in the practices of the Committees. 
Nevertheless, in this area too, as in the cases of criminal prosecutions 
of communists, the difference between a gen ral approach that attempts 
to assess the whole rationale of a broad legislative or administrative 
practice, and a particularistic one focussing on its technical and 
procedural details, was underlined: whenever the former approach 
was proposed by the liberal dissenters of the period, it failed to 
attract the majority of the Court in favour of freedom of expression; 
but when it was adopted under the guise of the balancing test, it 
always resulted in a full judicial legitimation of the loyalty-security 
complex. The second approach, however, led to some reversals of 
convictions and, indirectly, to the imposition of certain substantive 
restrictions.
Thus, the role of the Supreme Court, during that period, appears 
as a complex one: it receded in importance, whenever the judicial 
discourse became general in import, and it became more protective 
when it dealt with substantive rights in procedural terms. As 
indicated above, the Supreme Court is neither the paragon of 
freedom nor the instrument of suppression, but an independent 
political actor. During the 50s, its main contribution lay in the 
legitimation of the whole repressive loyalty programme, by bestowing 
upon it the status of constitutional validity. In doing so, however, 
it forfeited its independence to a great extent, and contributed 
towards the politicisation of criminality. At the same time, the 
concepts of constitutionality and constitutional rights were
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reconstrued.
The claims to free and unhindered expression of political ideas or 
to free association for political purposes were differentially 
demarcated and denied to certain groups and ideas. In the few cases 
in which they were judicially upheld, it was because of violations 
of technical and procedural points by the various loyalty watchdogs.
In those cases, the substantive constitutional rights became coeval 
with procedural correctness, as defined by the judiciary: the 
judicial evaluation of its presence or lack, in each particular 
case, determined at the same time the existence and the degree of 
freedom. Beyond these cases, constitutionality and freedom were 
fully and finally decided by the loyalty-security complex.
2. The main target of all the measures examined above was political 
ideas. Starting from the hard-core of communist ideology which was 
banished as effectively as possible, a whole range of other radical 
ideas and political objectives were declared subversive or un-American 
and were excommunicated. The term "subversive ideas" was a quite 
elastic one. Various attempts at a precise definition made both by the 
loyalty watchdogs and by the courts have been encountered above. In 
1945* the chairman of the H.U.A.C. sent out letters to hundreds of
public figures asking them to define the term "un-American activities".
!
"Unless it is held that there is no such thing as un-American activity,
Americans should be able to agree on what it is and our Committee could
506then expose it" reasoned K. Mundt. Nevertheless, this as all other 
efforts remained unsuccessful. The expediency of the accusation of 
"un-Americanism" lay exactly in its openendedness and elasticity. It 
lay as a dragnet all-inclusive device that came to cover anything which 
the powers that be did not like.
Thus, union power, welfare and reform measures, leftist third 
parties outside the bipartisan mould of American politics, civil
rights campaigns and organisations and all other traditional targets 
of the right wing were, at one time or another, branded as subversive 
and un-American. Important ideological qualifications were imposed 
on organisations, social groups, demands and issues claiming admission 
in the "pluralistic" public sphere.
Only the groups who had acquitted themselves of any accusation of 
subversive ideas were admitted as legitimate participants in the market 
Characteristically, the Communist Control Act (1954) that created the 
category of "communist-infiltrated" unions exempted the C.I.O. and 
its constituent parts from its terms. By that time, the C.I.O. had 
completed its own purge of radical unions, and in 1955 it merged with 
its old rival, right wing A.F.L.
Reform measures were attacked as socialist or communist and were 
mostly abandoned. As H.S. Commager put it the paramount meaning of 
loyalty was conformity: "It rejects inquiry into the race question or 
socialized medicine, or public housing, or into the wisdom of foreign 
policy. It regards as particularly heinous any challenge to what is 
called "the system of private enterprise" identifying that system 
with Americanism. It regards America as a finished product, perfect
*07and complete". 1 This perfect product, however, did not accept any 
questioning of its premises. Only those were lawful who accepted the 
legitimacy of the whole socio-political order.
A radical reconstitution of the public sphere took place during 
the period, accordingly. A continuum consisting of "bad id.eas", "bad 
people" and "bad organisations" was created. Ideas were declared 
morally wrong and factually incorrect, people who held them criminally 
punishable. Moreover, such ideas and people infected whatever or 
whoever they came in contact with. Groups were subversive because some
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of their members were communists. Individuals were subversives because
they were members of subversive groups. Causes and ideas were subversive
because they were espoused by subversive people or groups. In this
intimate linkage between the "enunciator" and the "enunciated" in
which the one was subverted by the other and vice versa, the modem
notion of heresy and the heretic - which was introduced around the
508turn of the century became fully established.
Thus, at the time when the paramount validity and moral superiority 
of the free market became the ultimate principles of "Americanism" 
and the hallmarks of the global divide, the internal political market 
was the object of a wholesome ideological regulation and planning. It 
is ironic that while the social and economic organisation kept within 
the broad parameters of economic liberalism, the principles of 
political liberalism, as expounded by J.S. Mill, were in retreat.
This process of centrally administered ideological planning, which 
accompanied the New Deal measures and was fully consolidated during 
the 50s has been called the nationalisation of legitimation. The 
role of the Supreme Court in it was justificatory, in the main. By 
extending to the repressive reconstitution of the public sphere, 
constitutional and democratic credentials, the Supreme Court became 
one of the principal federal legitimatory agencies.
During the period under consideration the main legitimatory theme 
was democratici the pronouncement and celebration of the American 
democratic polity and its protection from an inherently anti-democratic, 
totalitarian challenge. But democratic legitimation has been 
traditionally linked with active political participation and the 
equalisation of social conditions and opportunities. Moreover, the 
breakdown of the public-private divide, perhaps the greatest 
contribution and legacy of the liberal state, led to the politicisation
of areas of social life which had been hitherto outside the terrain of 
politics propre. It may be argued, therefore, that the protest movements 
of the 60s were related to the constitution in the 40s and the 50s of 
the •'social” and the "personal” as legitimate areas of direct state 
intervention. The "democratic distemper" of the 60s - a phrase coined 
by Samuel Huntington-may be attributed, in part at least, to the 
contradictory demands of a profoundly political legitimation theme - 
the superiority’of democracy - and the apolitical practice of 
technocratic social engineering. The response of the legal order to 
this "excess of democracy" will be examined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER X
THE SIXTIES AND SEVENTHS: YEARS OF PROTEST
./
A. The Civil Rights Movement and the Right to Protest
1. Historical and legal background
The Kennedy administration with its theme "we need to get America 
moving again" gave the impression of a new urgency and vigour for the 
protection of civil liberties. The Communist Party had been discredited 
and destroyed. The international situation appeared more stable and 
less threatening than during the fifties. The demand for civil 
liberties for the blacks became the paramount political issue of the 
early sixties. Kennedy had pledged to create an "affirmative new 
atmosphere in which to deal with racial divisions and inequalities 
which threaten both the integrity of our democratic faith and the 
proposition, on which our Nation was founded, that all men are created
i
equal".^
2In its 1954 decision of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 
the Supreme Court had held that the "doctrine of *separate but equal* 
has no place" in the field of public education. Despite that ruling, 
education and most other public activities and establishments in the 
South remained segregated. The persistent indifference of the federal 
government, and its impotence at the face of Southern resistance to 
redress blatant discriminatory practices led to the creation of a 
strong black movement, which took to the streets in protest by the 
early sixties.
The early civil rights movement was competely peaceful. Exemplified 
by the "love and non-violence" sermons of Martin Luther King, it 
attempted to publicize the discriminations against the Southern Negro
and to exert pressure on state and local authorities. Institutionalized 
racism and discrimination pervaded all areas of life and the means of 
protest utilised varied accordingly. Thus, one of the seminal events 
in the development of the movement was the black boycott of the city 
buses of Montgomery, Alabama, in 1955» after the imprisonment of a 
black woman who had refused to obey the ordinance segregating bus rides. 
But the means of protest most widely utilised in those early years 
was the sit-in at segregated establishments. The first such incident 
took place in February i960, when four students asked to be served at a 
whites-only lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina. After they 
were refused service they sat silently down forcing the restaurant to 
close. The tactic spread and within twelve months 50»000 people 
participated in similar sit-ins which led to 3*600 convictions for 
various offences.^ The sit-ins were extended to all sorts of segregated 
facilities and a student organisation was formed to coordinate the 
black protest (the Student Non Violent Coordinating Committee).^
H
Another popular protest tactic was the so-called "Freedom Rides” of 
integrated buses through the Southern States which were met with 
considerable local hostility and violence. A series of local mass 
demonstrations, marches, picketings and vigils were organised too, 
which culminated in the 19 6 3 march to Washington.
The civil rights movement with its massive protest and self-help
tactics posed serious legal questions. The post-Civil War 14th
Amendment to the Constitution declared that "no State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
the citizens of the United States... nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws". These provisions were
interpreted as banning discriminatory practices against blacks and other
5minorities on account of race. Certain segregation practices had been
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additionally condemned by federal executive and judicial authorities.
The federal denunciation of racial discrimination put the old problem 
of the relationship between federal and state government at the centre 
of the civil rights debate.
Civil rights organisations asked for federal intervention against 
hostile or reluctant state authorities. Federal courts, in particular, 
were often relied upon to take affirmative action for the protection of 
the federal constitutional rights of the black population. The Southern 
states on the other hand interpreted all federal action in the field 
as an unjustifiable intrusion in state rights, as guaranteed by the
4
Constitution.
The southern resistance to reform was massive. The U.S. Commission 
on Civil Sights reported, in 1 9 6 3, that eight years after the original 
Supreme Court desegregation decision less than one half of one per 
cent of Southern blacks attended desegregated schools.** But racial 
discrimination was not limited to public authorities. Southern 
private establishments open to the general public and many professionals 
practised segregation and discrimination under the pretext that they 
were compelled to do so by "state action”. Invoking local laws or long 
established community practices they argued that segregation was imposed 
on them by state law. Under the dominant interpretation of the i 
constitutional clauses only official discrimination was prohibited.
Thus, the various sit-ins and other self-help tactics employed by the 
Southern blacks raised the legal question about the meaning of "state 
action": the courts were called upon to determine in which cases 
private discrimination was compelled by "state action" to such an
extent, that the unconstitutionality of the latter vitiated the former
7
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too
More importantly for our purposes, the black protest movement posed
serious questions related to expressive activities and rights. The
demonstrations, marches, picketings and vigils brought back to the
courts the problems dealt with above under the concept of the public 
8forum. The earlier liberal decisions grew out of the missionary zeal
of religious sects and in particular the Jehovah*s Witnesses. But as
a constitutional author remarked these cases were "a sign of how
tolerant toward a sharply dissident minority our society could be, if
gthe minority was small and eccentric”.
The claim of the civil rights movement to ’'commandeer the public 
forum” was directly political, however, and was raised by far greater 
numbers of people. Additionally, the sit-ins and other related 
practices, while intending predominantly to air publicly deeply felt 
grievances, carried undertones of force to the extent that they disrupted 
the "normal" running of the facilities in which they were taking 
place. Accordingly, the line of cases dealing with union rights in 
the public forum, and in particular with union picketing and boycotts, 
with their distinction between "pure speech" and "speech plus", seemed 
particularly apposite.
The picture was complicated by two further factors. First,  ^ many
of the protest activities were directed at local laws and practices
which had been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court; and in
some cases the protest involved elements of civil disobedience: the
protestors were willing to break local laws and suffer arrest and 
« <
imprisonment in order to challenge their constitutionality in federal 
courts, presumably more sensitive to black grievances. In such cases 
law-breaking per se became the protest activity: beyond the 
constitutional question it sought to raise in the federal judicial 
forum, it was an attempt to publicize and communicate in a dramatic
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manner the inequity of Southern practices. Nevertheless, until the 
first outbreaks of rioting in Harlem (19 6 4) and Los Angeles (1 9 6 5), 
the black movement remained non-violent. According to H. Kalven, 
although the black protest had "the muscle tone of revolution... it has 
been executed with an astonishing sense of tact and legality. It has 
often seemed... to be the first revolution in history conducted, so to 
speak, on advice of counsel«"'*®
2. The early protest; the sit-in cases
Various legal weapons were employed by Southern authorities to 
harass and frustrate this "peaceful and legal revolution". It was an 
indication of the interest of federal authorities in the field that the 
federal judiciary and the Supreme Court were uncharacteristically quick 
in undertaking judicial review of various cases arising from the early 
civil rights movement.
11- The first case (Gamer v. Louisiana) involved the conviction of a
group of blacks for "breach of peace". They had silently sat down at
the segregated lunch counters of two department stores and a bus
terminal, but in the two cases, at least, the owners had implicitly
12consented to the sit-in fearing loss of the "Negro patronage". The 
Supreme Court in a unanimous decision reversed the convictions. Chief 
Justice Warren wrote the opinion but avoided tackling the constitutional 
and legal problems created by the sit-in tactic. The silent protest of 
the blacks could not be construed as "violent, boisterous or disruptive" 
nor- did it involve behaviour which could "unreasonably disturb or alarm 
the public". The state had not presented any evidence that could support 
the conclusion that violence was imminent and the conviction violated, 
accordingly, the due process requirements of criminal justice.
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In concurring opinions, Justices Harlan and Douglas tackled the 
wider issues involved in the case. Harlan addressed the free speech 
dimensions of the sit-in. The protesters intended by their action to 
publicize the segregation practices and 'j^7his Court has never limited 
the right to speak, a protected'liberty'under the Fourteenth Amendment... 
to mere verbal expression". The Jehovah's Witnesses cases had extended 
protection to many kinds of conduct which carried a predominantly 
communicative intent, and the sit-ins were similar: "Such a 
demonstration... is as much a part of the'free trade in ideasl.. as is 
verbal expression,more commonly thought of as'speech! It, like speech, 
appeals to good sens^and to'the power of reason as applied through 
public discussion'.V To be sure, the fact that made the sit-ins in 
private facilities protected speech was that the owners had not asked 
the protestors to leave. If they had objected ". .the Fourteenth Amendment 
[does not protect] demonstrations conducted on private property over 
the objection of the owner.
Douglas * approach was the most radical. The Justice addressed the 
civil rights rather than the expressive aspects of the case. The blacks 
had a constitutional right to be served at the restaurants which was 
violated by the segregation practice. Such practices had all the force 
of law in Louisiana, and amounted to unconstitutional "state action".
The Court majority, however, was not prepared to face these wider issues 
as long as it was able to upset the convictions on technical grounds.
The next major case (Edwards v. South Carolina)^  arose out of 
the convictions of 187 black students under a breach of peace statute.
The students had marched to the South Carolina State House in Columbia 
while the legislature was in session. When they entered the premises 
of the House, they started walking silently and displaying pickets 
protesting against discriminatory laws. A crowd of bystanders gathered
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around the protesters and the police, which were present in force,
asked the students to disperse. When they refused and started singing
the "Star Spangled Banner" they were arrested and "inarched off to
jail". As Kalven remarked"one cannot hut be impressed with the grace
15and tact of the performance".
Justice Stewart writing for the Court reversed the convictions. He
accepted that there was enough evidence of violations of the breach of
peace statute, as construed by the state courts. But he went on to
examine the constitutional claims involved in the case. He stated that
the protesters were exercising the rights of assembly and petition for
16redress of grievances "in their more pristine and classic form".
Since such paramount rights were at stake the Court should review the 
whole record anew. He found that the convictions were motivated by the 
unpopularity of the views expressed and that the statute concerned was 
not narrowly drawn. The students were convicted on "evidence which 
showed no more than that the opinions which they were peaceably 
expressing were sufficiently opposed to the views of the majority of
17the community to attract a crowd and necessitate police protection". '
While Edwards was decided on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds
and seemed to move toward the rationale of the Jehovah’s Witnesses
cases, three other 1963 decisions extended the concept of unconstitutional
18state action. In Peterson v. City of Greenville. ten blacks had been 
convicted under a criminal trespass law after they had refused to leave 
a segregated lunch counter, although they had been specifically 
requested by the manager to do so. The Court reversed the convictions 
but avoided the challenge to examine the conflict between property and 
expressive and equal protection rights. Chief Justice Warren argued 
that since a city ordinance required segregation in restaurants, the 
decision to operate a segregated lunch counter was coerced on the
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management and indirect unconstitutional state action wes, therefore, 
involved.
In Lombard v. Louisiana1^ no statutory segregation was iivolved but 
the New Orleans Mayor and police authorities had publicly stated that 
they would not tolerate black protest against segregated services in 
restaurants. The Court found that the official statements had all the 
force of the city ordinance condemned in Peterson. ’’Consequently, the 
city must be treated exactly as if it had an ordinance prohibiting such 
conduct, .j^^be State cannot achieve the same result by an official
20command which has at least as much coercive effect as an ordinance".
The convictions of four students under the Criminal Mischief Statute
for sitting-in at a segregated restaurant were reversed.
In May 1 9 6 3, too, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions of
two black ministers who had advocated a sit-in at a Birmingham, Alabama 
21lunch counter. The Court found that since the sit-in itself haul been
22cleared from criminal prosecution, the conviction of the priests for
aiding and abetting could not stand.
In June 19 6 4» the Supreme Court decided a series of sit-in cases.
Nine were disposed of summarily and five received opinions. In one
case (Robinson v. Florida)^  restaurant segregation was found
unconstitutional state action, because the Florida Board of Health
required separate toilet facilities for blacks. This provision was
construed as indirectly imposing restaurant segregation and the
convictions of the protesters were reversed. In Griffin v. Maryland^
• .
the segregation of a private amusement park enforced by an employee,
was construed as state action, because the park bouncer was also a
25deputy sheriff. In Barr v. City of Columbia the convictions of the 
protesters for breach of peace were reversed for lack of adequate
evidence as in Gamer,
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26In Bouie v. City of Columbia a criminal trespass statute 
prohibited "entry [to a private establishment] after notice from the 
owner prohibiting such entry". The protesters were requested to leave 
the segregated lunch counter of a drug store after they had entered and 
sat down. The state courts interpreted the statute as prohibiting the 
act of remaining in the premises after a request to leave had been made. 
Justice Brennan for the Supreme Court» however, held that the petitioners 
had not received fair notice of the import of the statute at the time of 
the sit-in. The Court stated that the later "retroactive Judicial 
expansion of narrow and precise statutory language" amounted to a 
denial of due process of law.
Finally, in Bell v. Maryland2^ a number of black students had sat 
down at a segregated Baltimore restaurant and were convicted under a 
general criminal trespass law. The segregation was not statutorily 
imposed in that case, but was a long established community practice. 
Justice Brennan again reversed the convictions and remanded the case to 
the state courts on technical grounds. While the convictions were still 
on appeal, the state and city authorities had enacted legislation 
banning segregation in places of public accommodation. Invoking the 
common law rule that pending proceedings are dismissed when the relevant 
law is repealed, Brennan argued that the crime for which the defendants 
had been convicted was abolished and the state courts should vacate.
The general clause saving convictions that have not been specifically 
repealed was : found inapplicable in that case, because the change in the
1 ■
law was "dramatic" and the petitioners had acquired a positive right to 
desegregated services.
Thus, in all sit-in cases examined above the Supreme Court reversed 
the convictions of the protesters finding that unconstitutional state 
action was involved, or that the defendants had not had fair notice of 
the offences they were committing, or that some procedural rule had
been violated. The questions about the legal status of civil disobedience 
in the form of unauthorized sit-ins in privately owned establishments, 
and the First Amendment rights involved in the protest activities were 
largely avoided. The criminal trespass cases gave the Court an 
opportunity to tackle these problems and it was Justice Black in dissent, 
joined by Harlan and White, who addressed them. Interestingly, Black 
and Harlan had been consistently in opposing camps throughout the 50s 
in the loyalty—security cases. But by the mid—60s, Justice Black 
became the spokesman of a growing dissatisfaction with the Court’s 
protection of the protest movement. The Court was accused that, through 
its early decisions, it underwrote a threatening and increasing tendency 
of disrespect for the law and the rights of private property. Black 
would have upheld the convictions of the protesters in all three 
criminal trespass oases (Bell. Bouie and Barr). In a long dissenting 
opinion in Bell, the Justice made his position clear. For Black, the 
erstwhile protector of the underdog par excellence, no right to 
expression and protest existed in privately-owned premises, even if 
they were open to the public. In his earlier opinions, he had 
emphasized the paramount importance of the open and unhindered market 
place of ideas (see among others Martin v. Struthers. Kbvacs v. Cooper 
and Dennis ); but in Bell civic order, the majesty of the law, private 
property and public convenience take pride of place. In Kovacs he had 
introduced the concept of the "poor man’s media” essential to the 
”poorly financed causes of little people”; now the claim that the 
sit-ins were an exercise of expressive rights was seen as a "bootstrap 
argument”. The laws and the convictions were "directed not against what 
the petitioners said but what they did”. In another case of the 40s,
Black had argued that "the proponents of the First Amendment... were 
determined that every American should possess an unrestrained freedom to
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express his views, however odious they might be to vested interests
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29whose power they might challenge". In Bell it is private property 
that must he absolutely protected to prevent civil chaos.
"The experience of ages point to the inexorable fact 
that people are frequently stirred to violence when 
property which the law recognizes as theirs is forcibly 
invaded or occupied by others... the Constitution does 
not confer upon any group the right to substitute rule 
by force for rule by law. Force leads to violence, 
violence to mob conflicts, and these to rule by the 
strongest groups with control of the most deadly 
weapons"30
Black concluded his opinion by addressing the civil disobedience
aspects of the sit-in cases in the following words found "superb" by
31H. Kalven, the most prolific constitutional writer in this area.
"At times the rule of law seems too slow to some 
for the settlement of their grievances. But it is 
the plan our Nation has chosen to preserve both 
•Liberty* and equality for all. On that plan we 
have put our trust and staked our future. This 
constitutional rule of law has served us well.
Maryland*s trespass law does not depart from it.
Nor shall we? 32
Justice Black became increasingly disenchanted with the protest
movement itself, but he remained a firm advocate of officially supervised
33desegregation. In Griffin v. Prince Edward County. a  case decided 
just before the sit-in cases, Black writing for a unanimous Court strongly 
condemned the Virginia 5-yea.T old practice of completely closing down 
public schools to avoid desegregation. The states should accelerate 
the process of school desegregation ordered by the Court in Brown.
Black stated and he warned that the Court would not tolerate any further 
delays.
3. The protest cases of the late sixties
Two weeks after Bell. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 19 6 4. ^  
Title II of the Act banned discrimination in establishments of public 
accommodation which affect commerce as well as discrimination supported 
by state action. Other titles of the Act covered education and other
public services and provided various means designed to facilitate a
federally administered racial integration. The measure had been the
centrepiece of President Kennedy* s effort to ’’incorporate the Negro
35revolution into the democratic coalition". When it was first 
introduced in Congress, in 1965» it bad faced considerable Southern 
reaction and it was accused as a violation of the property rights of 
owners of segregated establishments. The Act was finally passed in 
July 1964» after an effective campaign by President Johnson who 
"proved a more effective champion (of civil rights) than Kennedy had 
been".J To be sure» the old communist menace made an appearance in 
the Act. Communists and members of organisations under final order to 
register with the S.A.C.B. were exempted from protection against 
employment discrimination.
The passing of the Act brou^at to an end the line of sit-in cases.
The Supreme Court used its provisions to abate trespass convictions of
37sit-in protesters which had occurred prior to its enactment. Justice
Black who had become the foremost observer of legal niceties replacing
his old rival Frankfurter furiously rejected the retroactive effect
attributed to the Act: "Ihe idea that Congress has power to accomplish
such a result has no precedent, so far as I know, in the nearly 200
38years that Congress has been in existence".
The protest movement did not end, however, with the passing of the 
Civil Bights Act. While peaceful mass demonstrations and marches went 
on a newly found militant mood became evident in the black ghettoes of 
large cities. The 1964 New York and 19 6 5 Watts riots were a turning 
point in the black movement. The report of President Johnson's 
National Advisory Commission on Urban Disorders found that the main 
cause of the riots was the "pervasive discrimination and segregation in 
employment, education and housing... growing concentrations of
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impoverished Negroes in our major cities, create a growing crisis of 
deteriorating facilities and services and unmet human needs... A new 
mood has sprung up among Negroes, particularly the young, in which 
self-esteem and enhanced racial pride are replacing apathy and submission 
to the 'system1". A continuing neglect of social reform, the Commission 
argued, would lead to a situation in which "a rising proportion of 
Negroes in disadvantaged city areas might come to look upon the 
deprivation and segregation they suffer as proper justification for
violent protests, or for extending support to now isolated extremists
39who advocate civil disruption by guerrilla tactics".
The threat of civil disorder and chaos came to replace the 
communist danger of the 30s. In this atmosphere the ine vitable cries 
for "law and order" were echoed in Supreme Court jurisprudence. The 
first traces of a new defensive attitude toward the use of public fora. 
by protesters can be found in the important 19^5 case of Cox v. 
Louisiana. ^
The case arose out of a protest march and demonstration in Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana, in 1961. Some 2000 students had marched to the local 
courthouse protesting against segregation, in general, and the arrests 
of some fellow students the previous day who were being held in a parish 
prison located in the premises of the court. The protesters were told 
by the chief of the police that they could stage their demonstration as 
long as it was confined to the sidewalk across the street from the court. 
The students. confirmed and started walking up and down the pavement 
bearing pickets. They prayed, sang symns and "God Bless America". As 
the Supreme Court admitted the whole affair was peaceful and orderly.
Their leader, Cox, a black minister made then a speech in which he urged 
the students to stage sit-ins at segregated lunch counters. Following 
the speech the police ordered the group to disperse and when they
refused started using tear gas against them. Cox was arrested the next 
day and was subsequently convicted for breach of the peace and for 
violation of two ordinances prohibiting the obstruction of public 
passageways and picketing "near a courthouse".
The breach of peace conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court
on grounds similar to Edwards. The protest had not created any fear of
violence and the interpretation of the breach of the peace statute by
the state courts was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad: ".../l7 t sweeps
within its broad scope activities that are constitutionally protected
41free speech and assembly".
On the obstruction count, the Court found that since city 
officials had permitted some marches,the administration of the ordinance, 
which on its face prohibited all "street assemblies and parades", lacked 
the proper non-discriminatory standards required from all licensing and 
permit systems. The majority went on, however, to examine the question 
of expressive rights involved in public marches and demonstrations.
Justice Goldberg found that such activities in public fora were not a 
"pure form of expression", but expression mixed with action, and he 
concluded:
"We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant 
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the 
same kind of freedom to those who would coomtunicate 
ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and 
picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments 
afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech. "4 2
Justice Black went even further. Patrolling and marching are pure 
conduct', as, distinguished from speech, and the state may constitutionally 
prohibit them. The right of protest may be exercised only in those 
places "where people have a right to be for such purposes". M n M w g  
his dislike of protest in both privately owned and public places, Black 
concluded:
- 4°4 -
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"[The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not] 
grant a constitutional right to engage in 
conduct of picketing or patrolling whether 
on publicly owned streets or privately owned 
property.”45
Black concurred in the result on the ground that the statute 
explicitly excluded trade unions from its blanket prohibition and 
fell, thus, foul of the Equal Protection clause. He made it 
clear, however, that he would have upheld an across the board 
non-discriminatory prohibition of all public protest and assembly.^ 
The conviction on the final ground (picketing near a 
courthouse) was reversed in a 5-4 decision. The suggestion of 
the police chief to the protesters that they could stage their 
demonstration opposite from the law court was an on-the-spot 
official construction of the statutory term ”near” which precluded 
subsequent prosecution and punishment. Justice Clark in an 
outraged dissent accused the Court of condoning ”the use of such 
anarchistic devises to influence the administration of justice" 
and of promoting anarchy and lawlessness. "...I never knew until 
today that a law enforcement official - city, state or national - 
could forgive a breach of the criminal laws”. -'
Thus, the Court adopted in Cox the two-tiered theory of expression 
protection introduced in the industrial picketing cases. "Pure speech"
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was declared a constitutionally protected right. But the loyalty-security 
cases of the 50s which dealt mostly with such "pure speech" were too close 
for comfort. Expressive activities in the public forum, on the other 
hand, were construed as a mixture of speech and conduct or as "speech 
plus" and according to Black*s theory at least they could be allowed or 
prohibited by the state authorities at will.
The next case (Brown v. Louisiana)^  involved the conviction of five 
blacks for sitting-in at a segregated public library before the enactment 
of the Civil Bigfrts Act. The protesters had been convicted tinder the 
Louisiana breach of peach statute found overbroad in Cox. The Supreme 
Court reversed the convictions, in a 5-4 decision, which followed the 
earlier sit-in rulings.
"As this Court has repeatedly stated [freedom of speech, 
assembly and freedom to petition for redress of grievances]... 
embrace appropriate types of action which certainly include 
the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest 
by silent and reproachful presence, in a place where 
the protestant has every right to be, the unconstitutional 
segregation of public facilities."47
Black, who wrote the dissent, was more concerned with the protest
movement, at large, rather than with the facts of the particular case.
"It is high time to challenge the assumption in which 
too many people have too long acquiesced, that groups 
that think they have been mistreated or that have 
actually been mistreated have a constitutional right 
to use the public*s streets, buildings and property 
to protest whatever, wherever, whenever they want, 
without regard to whom such conduct may disturb...
The peaceful songs of love can become as stirring 
and provocative as the Marseillaise did in the days 
when a noble revolution gave way to rule by successive 
mobs until chaos set in. "48
It was' not long after Brown that Justice Black found the necessary 
fifth vote for his position. In Adderly v. Florida^ his "no right to 
protest" rationale was fully adopted by a five Justices majority and 
led to the affirmation of the convictions of 32 black students. The 
students had marched to the prison of Tallahassee, Florida, to protest
the arrests of fellow students the day before for picketing outside 
segregated theatres. They staged their vigil on an open ground which was 
part of the prison premises but outside the prison proper. As the 
dissenting Justices emphasized "the evidence is uncontradicted that the 
petitioners* conduct did not upset the jailhouse routine". The sherriff 
asked the students to leave and when 32 refused they were arrested, tried 
and duly convicted for "malicious and mischievous trespass upon the 
premises of the county Jail".
Black’s opinion distinguished the protest from that involved in
Edwards on the basis of the respective places on which they were held.
"Traditionally, state capitol grounds are open to the public. Jails,
built for security purposes are not". To be sure, as T. Emerson remarks,
"the jailhouse grounds were an open area, not devoted to inconsistent
(to the protest) uses, and affording a peculiarly relevant location for
50the demonstration".
Black was not interested, however, in condemning the protest on such 
narrow grounds. In the criminal trespass cases he was prepared to uphold 
the rights of property owners against all expressive claims. In Adderlv 
he extended the private property rationale to publicly owned property 
too.
"The State,no less than a private owner of property* has 
power to preserve the property under its control for 
the use to which it is lawfully dedicated... petitioners* 
argument that they had a constitutional right to stay on 
the property... has as its major unarticulated premise 
the assumption that people who want to propagandize 
protests or views have a constitutional right to do so 
* whenever and however and wherever they please. That 
concept..was vigorously and forthrightly rejected in..*
Cox v. Louisiana..."51
The dissenting opinion was ironically written by Justice Douglas, 
Black’s most consistent colleague in earlier expression cases. In a 
series of pointed remarks borrowed from Black’s opinions, Douglas 
reminded the preferred constitutional position of expressive rights and
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the "poor man*s media” analysis. ’’Those who do not control television and 
radio, those who cannot afford to advertise in newspapers or circulate 
elaborate pamphlets may make only a more limited type of access to public 
officials”. The demonstration was a constitutionally protected "petition 
for redress of grievances” and its identification with criminal trespass 
violated the First Amendment.
"To say that a private owner could have done the same if 
the rally had taken place on private property is to 
speak of a different case, as an assembly and a petition 
for redress of grievances run to government, not to 
private proprietors. "5 2
Douglas went on to castigate the use of general statutes - like 
criminal trespass, disorderly conduct, breach of the peace and vagrancy 
ones - in order to penalize dissenters and minority groups for their 
unpopular views. He concluded by stating the "legitimation" justification 
for free speech: V ^ 7y allowing these orderly and civilized protests against 
injustice to be suppressed, we only increase the forces of frustration 
which the conditions of second-class citizenship are generating amongst 
us” . 55
The next case (Walker v. City of Birmingham)5^ involved an instance 
of civil disobedience. On this occasion, it was not property rights - 
private or public - but the "majesty of law" that was at stake.
The case arose out of the prolonged civil rights demonstrations 
in Birmingham, Alabama in 1963» The Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, its national leader M.L. King and various local leaders had 
been twice refused permits to demonstrate in the streets, under a city 
ordinance. The two rallies went ahead and many protesters were arrested 
for parading without a permit. Following these developments the black 
organisations announced two mass rallies for Good Friday and Easter Day, 
1963. The city authorities, in response, obtained a temporary ex parte 
injunction enjoining the groups and I39 named individuals from
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participating in or encouraging parades without a permit. The 
demonstrations went ahead again as planned and as a result King and 
eight more black ministers were cited for contempt of court.
Despite the passage of the Civil Eights Act and the relevant 
precedents of Hamm and Brown, the Supreme Court upheld the convictions. 
Justice Stewart found that the city ordinance on which the injunction was 
based raised substantial constitutional problems. (The ordinance was 
found unconstitutionally vague as applied, in a decision rendered two 
years after Walker. T h e  breadth and vagueness of the injunction were, 
too, constitutionally suspect and there were additional doubts about the 
arbitrary and discriminatory manner in which the permit system had been 
administered. Nevertheless the cardinal error of King and his followers 
was that they had not challenged the injunction in the courts. To be 
sure, there was only one day between the granting of the injunction and 
the scheduled demonstration and the Alabama authorities were known for 
their determination to prevent the marches by all means. The injunction 
and contempt proceedings themselves were initiated in order to harass the 
protesters, and to avoid a constitutional challenge against the suspect 
permit system.
Notwithstanding these facts and his own doubts about the conduct of
the city authorities, Justice Stewart found for the state. His concluding
remarks were an elegant essay on the merits of the rule of law.
"The rule of law that Alabama followed in this case 
reflects a belief that in the fair administration of 
justice no man can be judge in his own case, however 
exalted his station, however righteous his motives, 
and irrespective of his race, color, politics, or 
religion. This Court cannot hold that the petitioners 
were constitutionally free to ignore all the procedures 
of the law and carry their battle to the streets. One 
may sympathize with the petitioners' impatient commitment 
to their cause. But respect for judicial process is 
a small price to pay for the civilizing hand of law, 
which alone can give abiding meaning to constitutional 
freedom. "56
_ 4 1 0
The dissenting Justices castigated the Alabama ploy of using the
method of judicial injunction in order to avoid the invalidation of the
ordinance. Brennan found it an "inscrutable legerdemain", while Chief
Justice Warren stated t h a t . giving this Court's seal of approval to such a
gross misuse of the judicial process is [not] likely to lead to greater
respect for the law any more than it is likely to lead to greater
protection for First Amendment freedoms". He was prepared to accept a
qualified right to civil disobedience. ".. [Ift shows no disrespect for law
to violate a statute on the ground that it is unconstitutional and then
to submit one's case to the courts with the willingness to accept the
penalty if the statute is held to be valid". Douglas went even further.
"The right to defy an unconstitutional statute is basic m  our scheme...
An ordinance - unconstitutional on its face or patently unconstitutional
as applied - is not made sacred by an unconstitutional injunction that
enforces it. It can and should be flouted in the manner of the
57ordinance itself". '
However, the message of the Supreme Court was clear: the claims 
of the civil rights movement to commandeer the public forum would be 
judicially upheld only when all legal niceties had been scrupulously 
adhered to. According to one author "the Court has sounded the tocsin
for those who would protest after the judicial process has been
' i
engaged".^
But the tocsin was partial. In its next term, the Court reversed 
an ex parte injunction enjoining an extreme white racist organisation 
from holding any rallies or meetings for ten days in Princess Anne,
Maryland. (Carroll v. President and Comm-fg«* oners of Princess Anne).
The group had already held an "aggressively and militantly racist" rally 
and the local authorities obtained the injunction in order to prevent a 
new demonstration for which there was some fear of violence. The 
Court reversed relying on the ex parte character of the injunction. It
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stated that in the area of basic freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment
"there is no place for such orders, which are granted without notice or
59effort to invite the concerned in the proceedings".
The next black protest case (Cameron v. Johnson)^  involved the
validity of a Mississippi anti-picketing law. The statute prohibited all
picketing and demonstrations which obstructed or unreasonably interfered
with access to public premises and with the free use of adjacent streets,
sidewalks or other public ways. The statute was passed in an effort to
stop a three—month black campaign against racial discrimination in
voters registration. The protesters defied the statute and were arrested.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the law in a
unanimous decision. Justice Brennan found it a valid, narrowly drawn
regulation of the conduct involved in public rallies and picketing,
relying on the Cox rationale that public protest was a "second category"
speech. Petitioners had also argued that the statute had been applied
against them in "bad faith" and in an attempt to harass their protest
campaign and had asked the Court to grant an injunction enjoining its
further invocation against their activities. In an earlier case
(Dombrowski v. Pfister) ^  the Supreme Court had ruled that federal courts
could intervene in state proceedings if state laws were justifiably
challenged on constitutional grounds and the federal abstention could
result to "irreparable injury necessary to justify a disruption of
orderly state proceedings"; it had also noted the "chilling effect on
62free expression of prosecutions initiated and threatened".
In Cameron, however, the Court found that the statute had been 
applied in good faith and not in order "to discourage the exercise of 
protected rights", without any detailed examination of the evidence.
Sven if the criminal prosecution of the protesters failed, that could 
not prove that the state authorities intended to harass them. The two
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dissenting Justices (Fortas and Douglas) examined the record in detail 
and stated that no interference was caused by the picketing. They 
cnncluded that Mississippi had engaged "in a deliberate plan to put an
63end to the voting rights demonstration".
The last major cases arising from the civil rights movement were 
decided in 1969. In Gregory v. City of Chicago. ^  a group of demonstrators 
protesting against the persisting practice of school segregation had 
marched from the Chicago City Hall to Mayor Daley*s house where they 
started a vigil around the block. A hostile crowd gathered around them 
and the police ordered the protesters to disperse and arrested them for 
disorderly conduct after they refused to obey the order. Chief Justice 
Warren reversed the convictions finding no evidence of disorderly 
behaviour on the part of the protesters.
The last case (Shnttlesworth v. Birmingham). a companion case of 
Walker, arose out of the 1963 Easter protest in Birmingham, Alab. Martin 
Luther King, the leader of that protest had been assassinated in the 
meantime, in 1968. The case involved the conviction of a black minister 
to 90 days* imprisonment at hard labour for violation of a city 
ordinance which prohibited all parades, processions or other 
demonstrations without a prior licence by the City Commission. The 
Supreme Court found that the ordinance lacked "narrow, objective and 
definite standards to guide the licensing authority" and allowed the 
licensing officials to grant or refuse the permits according to their own 
arbitrary standards of "welfare", "decency" or morality of the community.
The Supreme Court of Alabama had construed the statute in 19 6 7 and by a 
"remarkable job of plastic surgery" had added some administrative 
standards in the licensing system, making the issuance of permits 
dependent upon the need for traffic regulation. The Supreme Court 
found that although the state court construction had saved the statute
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from the constitutional challenge, its application four years before 
that ruling had been completely discriminatory and unconstitutional 
and reversed the convictions.
It would be interesting at this point to compare the protest 
cases examined above with a case decided in 1968 which raised 
similar problems. In Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan 
Valiev Plaza Inc. ^  a trade union had been banned from picketing 
in the mall of a privately owned shopping centre open to the public, 
through the use of a criminal trespass statute. Thus, in Logan 
Valley Plaza the problems of the constitutional status of picketing 
and of the conflict between property and expressive rights, both 
familiar from the sit-in and black protest cases, came back to 
the Supreme Court, the ma/in difference being in the subject of the 
protest.
Justice Marshall, writing for a 6-3 majority, reviewed the 
early public forum cases and concluded:
"The essence of those opinions is that streets, side­
walks, and other similar public places are so historically 
associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights 
that access to them for the purpose of exercising such 
rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly or 
absolutely.M 67
Picketing involved more than pure speech, but the regulation 
of its non-speech elements should not amount to outright prohibition. 
The fact that the shopping-centre was privately owned was not 
sufficient for the creation of a “cordon sanitaire" around it, that 
would insulate it from all protest. Justice Marshall relied upon 
and expanded the rationale of the earlier Marsh decision, involving
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tne exercise of constitutional rights in a company town. Based 
on a use theory of private property, he argued that the shopping 
centre was the functional equivalent of a public business district, 
and stressed the increasing importance of shopping centres for 
suburban communities; he concluded that the total prohibition 
of picketing there, even though carried out "in a manner and for 
a purpose generally consonant with the use to which the property 
is actually put"^ would be at total variance with the goal of 
free expression.
Justice Black, the author of Marsh, disagreed completely 
with the application of the rationale of that case to shopping 
centres. Company towns, unlike shopping centres, had all the 
attributes of a town, and the majority was creating "court-made 
law wholly disregarding the constitutional basis on which private 
ownership of property rests".^ Justice White protested that, 
under the Court »s ruling, all speech on private property, which 
could be designated as serving a public function, should be 
permitted.
However, the Court explicitly refrained from ruling on the 
permissibility of picketing and other expressive activities 
"not thus directly related in its purpose to the use to which 
the shopping center was being put". An extension of the Logan 
Valley Plaza rationale, in the way envisaged by Justice White,
* would put private owners "in the same position as the government"
71for First Amendment purposes, contrary to existing constitutional
doctrine. Logan Valley did not go as fax, and the question was
72left open until a later day.
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B. The Anti-War Movementi Radical Protest and Dissent in the
Late Sixties and Seventies
4. The historical background and the lavs against protest
The student generation of the fifties has been called the 
"silent generation". But by the early sixties a new mood of 
militancy became discernible among students. The first signs 
came in May i960, when a three-member subcommittee of the H.U.A.C. 
started investigating communist and subversive activities in San 
Francisco. Students from Berkeley and other California colleges 
gathered in force outside the City Hall, where the hearings were 
held, and protested against the H.U.A.C. activities. They were 
denied access to the building and on May 13» the second day of 
the hearings, the police attacked and dispersed them using water 
cannons. The hearings ended in disarray and both the H.U.A.C. 
and Hoover claimed that the demonstrations were communist— 
planned and "the worst communist coup for twenty-five years". J 
No known communist had participated in the events, and all 
sixty arrested students were later acquitted in court.
Between i960 and 19 6 4 radical students became involved in 
the civil rights and peace campaigns. Many white students 
participated in the "freedom rides", the sit-ins and other 
protest activities, but student activism was concentrated mainly 
on■the college campus. Various campaigns for exucational reform 
were organised and culminated in the 196 4 Berkeley "Free Speech
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Movement". In 1961, students at New York City College boycotted 
their classes protesting against a ban on communist speakers 
and similar events took place at the Ohio State University. The 
Berkeley P.S.M. was created to fight a college regulation which 
banned political activities on the campus relating to non­
student issues. The movement culminated in a mass sit-in at 
Berkeley which was broken up by the police and led to the arrest 
of 814 students.^ In the meantime, a small radical student 
organisation, the Students for a Democratic Society (S.D.S.) 
which had been established in i960 grew in strength and started 
addressing general social issues outside the campus. In the 
mid and late sixties, the S.D.S. became a mass organisation 
which played a leading role in the anti-Vietnam War campaign.
The S.D.S. acquired national notoriety and press coverage for 
the first time, in April 1 9 6 5, when it organised the first anti­
war march to Washington, in response to the escalation of the 
war and the bombings of North Vietnam ordered by Johnson. Protest 
demonstrations and other anti-war activities mushroomed within
a few months and various umbrella organisations were created to
76 ,coordinate the national campaign.
As the protest movement grew from strength to strength 
the Johnson administration and other federal authorities 
started passing a series of laws and measures designed to 
harass and suppress the protest movement. In 1965, several 
hundred University of California students burned publicly their 
draft cards in protest against the American intervention in 
the Dominican Republic. The tactic was soon adopted by
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anti-war demonstrators as a standard means of protest. Under the Universal
Military Training and Service Act (1948) the possession of the draft card
at all times was obligatory, but the provision which was inserted in the
Act for administrative reasons was not vigorously enforced. After the
first draft card incidents, the Joint Armed Services Committee of the
Congress proposed a bill which would make draft card burning a federal
felony. The bill was passed by both houses in 1965» as 311 amendment to
the original Act. It punished the knowing destruction or mutilation or
in any maimer change of a Selective Services Certificate with a #10,000
fine and imprisonment of up to five years. The few speakers on the
floor of the House made clear that the amendment purported to stop the
public displays of lack of patriotism and to satisfy Mthe desire to
obtain a measure of retribution against those who would so openly and
77defiantly attack the military effort of the United States".
Resistance to the draft and draft card protests became a central 
point in the anti-war campaign. The S.D.S. adopted an anti-draft 
programme and started encouraging men liable to the draft to register as 
conscientious objectors and proposing various other ways and means 
designed to hinder the work of local draft boards. Mass demonstrations, 
draft card burnings, induction refusals, boycotts of draft boards and 
other similar tactics became common during 196 7 and 19 6 8.
The originality of some of the methods of protest ensured nationwide 
media coverage for the protesters. The Solicitor General E. Grisword 
admitted that the bizarre protest tactics were employed in order to 
attract media attention since the more traditional protest activities 
were not found newsworthy.^® During the nationwide Days of Protest of 
October I9 6 7, several University of Michigan students sat in at the 
local draft board office and were arrested by the police. Following 
these events the Selective Services Director-General L. Hershey sent 
a letter to the draft boards of the arrested students recommending the
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withdrawal of the student deferments of participants in "illegal 
demonstrations" and suggesting their reclassification for immediate 
induction. Twelve of the Michigan protestors were reclassified 
accordingly.
Two of the reclassified students took the case to the federal courts.
79In Volff v. Selective Services Local Board No.10. Judge H. Medina ruled
that draft boards could not punish registrants through reclassification 
on the sole ground that they had protested against the war. The decision 
was prompted by the case made by the counsel for the Justice Department 
who did not argue that the protestors* action had interfered with the 
Selective Services operations. Thus, the possibility of punitive 
reclassification for protest activities which had arguably led to the 
disruption of the service was left open. Director Hershey, undeterred 
by his partial defeat, changed his tack and issued a new directive based 
on the analysis of an article which had appeared in the American Bar 
Association Journal in February 19&7* According to the article andv l
Hershey*s directive deferments were given on the basis of national interest
considerations; the protestors and the draft card burners should be
reclassified under the existing regulations for delinquent behaviour.
Hershey ordered the immediate induction of anyone who had interfered with
the Service or had impaired the morale of the armed forces. Within one
year 537 students who turned in their draft cards were declared eligible 
81for induction. The Justice Department under Attorney-General B. Clark 
was not enthusiastic, however, about the method of punitive reclassification 
„which left the punishment of violations of the Selective Services Act to 
local draft boards. In December 1967« a compromise was worked out between 
Clark and Hershey under which the Justice Department would vigorously 
prosecute violations of the draft Act; local draft boards were notified 
that "lawful protest activities" should not subject registrants to 
reclassification.
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Immediately after the compromise the Justice Department initiated
the "single most repressive action of the Johnson administration", hy
indicting Dr. Benjamin Spock and four others for conspiracy to counsel,
aid and abet evasions of the draft. As one of the Justice Department
lawyers assigned to the case explained "the prosecution came about as
a result of our flap with Hershey about his October 26 letter to the 
82draft boards". However, in 1968 alone, E. Claris prosecuted "over
150 0 draft cases in federal courts" and was "as vigorous in this respect
0 2
as any other Attorney General". ** In an appearance before the House
Committee Claris stated that there was an "element of treason" in draft 
84card burnings.
When cases of reclassification reached the federal courts, the
latter disapproved the practice. In Oestereich v. S.S.B.. the
statutory exemption from military service granted to divinity students
was revoked by Oestereich's local board which reclassified him as a
"delinquent" and ordered his induction. The reclassification was based
on the ground that the student had returned his registration card to
the government in opposition to the war, and had thus violated the
requirement to keep it in his possession at all times. Oestereich lost
a suit to restrain induction and appealed to the Supreme Court.
Mr. Justice Douglas reversed and remanded. He felt that the
arbitrary use of the delinquency classification was "blatantly lawless"
and rendered "... the Boards freewheeling agencies meting out their
84abrand of justice in a vindictive manner". The exemption had been 
granted statutorily and could not be revoked for conduct unrelated to 
the merits of its granting. The Justice indicated that the delinquency 
regulations had no statutory authorization in the Selective Services
Act.
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Gutknecht v. U.S. involved the use of the reclassification procedures 
in order to accelerate induction. Gutknecht had left his registration 
and classification cards on the steps of a federal building along with 
a statement of opposition to the war. When subsequently his appeal for 
exemption on conscientious objector grounds was refused, the board 
classified him as a delinquent for failure to possess his draft card 
and ordered him to report for induction immediately. Gutknecht 
reported to the centre, but refused to follow the induction procedure.
He was prosecuted and found guilty of failure to "perform a duty" under 
the Military Selective Services Act; he was sentenced to four years* 
imprisonment.
The Supreme Court reviewed the legality of the delinquency regulations, 
which accelerated Gutknecht*s induction by depriving him of his previous 
standing in the order of call. Mr. Justice Douglas reversed the 
criminal conviction by finding error in the application of these 
regulations. He stated that the punitive reclassification of exempt and 
deferred registrants should, not be used as a quasi-criminal sanction in 
cases of violation of the Act. Congress had not authorized such a 
power and its exercise was "... a broad, roving authority, a type of 
administrative absolutism not congenial to [American] law-making 
traditions".®^
Finally, an important federal case (TJ.S. v . Falk) related to the 
criminal prosecution rather than reclassification of an anti-war protestor 
for violation of the Selective Services Act. Falk, an active member of 
a Chicago draft resisters organisation and anti-war campaigner, was 
prosecuted for refusing to submit to induction in the army and for 
failure to possess his registration and classification cards. He was 
convicted and sentenced to three years* imprisonment. Falk*s appeal 
was based on the ground that he was singled out for selective and
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discriminatory prosecution because of his political activities; 
furthermore, he argued that his prosecution had an "unlawful purpose", 
namely to "chill" the exercise of his and others* constitutionally 
protected expressive activities. The Court of Appeals, per Judge 
Sprecher, reversed and remanded.
The judge argued that opposition to the war was protected by 
the First Amendment and that the Constitution, through the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, prohibited discrimination against members of 
a "...group unpopular with the government". Arbitrary criminal 
prosecutions could amount to such discrimination. "...[E]qual 
protection of the laws is not limited to the enactment of fair and 
impartial legislation, but necessarily extends to the application 
of these laws". H A number of facts and allegations made out a 
prima facie case that Falk*s indictment was intentionally discriminatory: 
many registrants who had returned their draft cards had not been 
prosecuted; Falk*s prosection had been considered and decided upon 
by a succession of high-placed officials; the case was initiated 
three years after Falk’s return of his registration card and after 
the local board had "arbitrarily and without ground" refused to 
classify him as a conscientious objector, forcing him to refuse 
induction. However, evidence on the discrimination contention had 
not been admitted at the trial. The judge ordered a retrial, in 
which Falk should be allowed to argue his case and ruled that the 
burden of proof of a non-discriminatory enforcement of the law rested 
with the government, since a prima facie face had been successfully 
made by the appellant.
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1968 was a vintage year for new repressive measures. The
Internal Security Act which had not been used for some time was
revived. The registration provisions of the Act had been rendered
useless by the courts because of the self-incrimination problems
involved. But under an amendment to the Act, approved by Johnson
in January 1968, the Subversive Activities Control Board was empowered
to list organisations as "communist action" or "communist fronts"
and individuals as members of communist action groups without the
requirement of self-registration. The amendment expanded further
the definition of a communist front organisation and provided that
the S.A.C.B. would cease to exist unless a new proceeding was
instituted until the end of 19 6 8. Attorney-General Clark duly
obliged in July by asking the Board to designate seven individuals
as communists. Three of them were registered as communists by the
Board b%tt the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia set
aside the orders on the ground that punishment for mere membership
85in the C.P. was a violation of the First Amendment. However the
whole elaborate machinery «f the Internal Security Act was given a
new lease of life. The H.U.A.C. tried to revive the concentration
camp provisions of the Act and suggested that they should be used
86for the "temporary imprisonment of warring guerrillas"; the 
Committee claimed that communist-led groups and the S.D.S. were 
seriously considering the possibility of instituting armed 
insurrection. Nixon revitalised the S.A.C.B. by executive order 
in 1971* But as the communist danger had been eliminated and 
the majority of the federal measures against it had outlived their
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purpose, the S.A.C.B. was quietly wound up in 1973 when Nixon omitted 
all funds for it from his budget.
The major piece of repressive legislation of the period under
87examination was the 1968 Federal Anti-Biot Act. The Act was 
passed as a rider to a "fair housing" bill, enacted in the aftermath 
of Martin Luther King's assassination. The Act punishes anyone who 
"travels or uses any facility of interstate commerce with intent to 
incite a riot, or to organize, promote, encourage', participate in 
or carry on a riot and then or thereafter performs or attempts to 
perform any other act other than crossing state lines" for any of 
the purposes listed above and anyone who aids and abets such acts. 
Despite the objections of the Justice Department and the 
recommendations of the Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kemer 
Commission) the Act defined the term riot as "a public disturbance 
involving (l) an act or acts by one or more persons part of an 
assemblage of three or more persons, which act or acts shall 
constitute a clear and present danger of, or shall result in, 
damage or injury to the property of any other person... or (2)
a threat or threats of the commission of (such acts)". Senate
! 1
liberals and the Attorney General had initially objected the Act, 
but later accepted it as "part of the price for open housing 
legislation, fearful of jeopardizing the fragile coalition 
supporting the civil rights bill".^
' The anti-riot bill is on its face more draconian than the Smith 
Act. "Evil intent" was made the main determinant of guilt and any 
use of interstate facilities - even a long distance telephone call -
- 424 -
Could be used as evidence of violation of the Act. The Smith 
Act guarded against the evil of teaching and advocating revolution; 
in the anti-riot bill the mere thought of participating in a 
disturbance created by an ’’assemblage of three persons” was made 
punishable. Additionally as many peaceful civil rights and anti­
war demonstrations had led to disturbances from hostile crowds, 
the measure put under the threat of heavy federal penalties virtually 
all mass protest. J. Doar, the head of the Civil Rights Division 
of the Department of Justice, pointed out in a testimony before a 
House Subcommittee that under the law ’’local right-wingers could 
attack law-abiding out-of-state demonstrators and thereby make 
their targets, but not themselves, subject to federal imprisonment 
and fines, or, for that matter, such people as the police, could
accomplish the same purpose by creating a riot, as they have in
90the past”. The comprehensively repressive character of the
measure was soon proven. While the bill was enacted as a reaction
to black rioting in the aftermath of King's assassination, the first
prosecution under it came in the famous Chicago Eight conspiracy
trial of eight leaders of the anti-war movement.
In the meantime, after the televised burning of a flag at a New
York rally - another common means of symbolic anti-war protest -
Congress created the new federal crime of "publicly mutilating, defacing,
defiling, or defying, trampling upon or casting contempt” at the
American flag. "Who can vote against something like this”, a
91Congressman exclaimed, ”it's like motherhood”. Similar flag 
desecration statutes were passed and vigorously enforced in many 
states. Any unorthodox display of the flag was made a crime and the
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A.C.L.U. reported, in 1971» that it had easily one hundred flag
92descreation cases in its files.
University students, the most identifiable group of the anti-war 
movement, received special legislative attention during 1968. After 
the incidents at Columbia University, during which the campus was 
closed down by a massive student strike, the old warrior of the anti­
communist campaign, L. Wyman of New Hampshire, introduced a bill in 
Congress which would terminate federal grants, scholarships and loans 
to all students who participated in campus protests. The bill that 
was finally enacted by Congress, in September, gave college authorities 
the power to cut federal aid to students if they had been convicted 
for violent crimes during campus disturbances or if they had disobeyed 
college regulations. Similar measures were enacted by Congress in 
subsequent years and the states followed the federal lead. In 1969  
and 1970 thirty two states passed a wide variety of campus unrest laws. 
Under some of them students who participated in protest activities 
were immediately expelled from college. The most common penalty, 
however, was the withdrawal of state aid from individual students or 
whole colleges where disturbances had taken place and the administration 
had not reacted in a tough manner. According to one historian "many 
of these provisions were extremely vague; thus any student receiving
aid would have no way of knowing exactly what kind of activities might
94lead to a termination of his support". Disciplinary expulsion from 
college meant almost immediate induction. But as Solicitor General 
,E. Griswold, a former Dean of the Harvard Law School stated, "We must... 
make it plain that those who are to stay in our educational 
institutions are those who are worthy to join the company of educated 
men".^
Thus, the Nixon administration inherited a wide variety of federal 
anti-protest measures from the Johnson years. The old star of anti-
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communism did not lose any opportunity to put them to use against the
new radicals. H.S. Commager remarked in 1970 that "not since the days
when Senator Joseph McCarthy bestrode the political stage, have we
experienced anything like the current offensive against the exercise
of freedom in America. If repression is not yet as blatant or as
flamboyant as it was during the McCarthy years, it is in many respects
more pervasive and more formidable".^ The Chairman of the Association
of American Publishers spoke in a similar tone about the attack by Nixon
and Agnew on the liberal mass media: "It is a critical fact that we
are now faced with defending the First Amendment. Nothing like this
97has happened since the days of J. McCarthy".
Old criminal syndicalism and criminal anarchy laws were
revitalized and used against protestors. At the local level arrests
and prosecutions under laws of general applicability - breach of peace,
criminal trespass, criminal damage, disorderly conduct etc. — increased
dramatically. In three days alone in May 1971» thirteen thousand protesters
were arrested during the anti-war demonstrations in Washington but only
twelve valid convictions were obtained. The A.C.L.U. stated that the
protestors were illegally detained, illegally charged and deprived of
■be rights of due process of law, fair trial and assistance of counsel.
"The scale of arrests - and of official illegality - was unprecedented
in Washington. Indeed it has few equals in the 20th century history of
our country".^® Assistant Attorney General W. Eehnquist justified the
arrests under the doctrine of "qualified martial law", hitherto unknown
iii constitutional law. Eehnquist was appointed to the Supreme Court by
Nixon in 1972. In 1975» District Court Judge Waddy ruled that massive
civil rights violations and unnecessary police violence had occurred in
all major demonstrations in Washington, since 1969» and ordered the
99erasure of illegal arrest records for the entire period.
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One of the innovations of the Nixon administration was the trans- 
formation of the grand jury into a tool of harassment of radical dissent 
and of gathering of political intelligence, in similar ways to the 
legislative investigating committees of the fifties and sixties, 
Witnesses were subpoenaed, forced to testify without aid of counsel 
under threat of severe contempt convictions, and asked wide ranging 
questions about their political beliefs and associations. Under a 
1970 federal law, which was upheld by the Supreme Court, the immunity 
previously granted to the testimony of grand jury witnesses was 
revoked, if similar incriminatory evidence was derived from independent 
sources. Although a small minority of the resulting indictments led to 
valid convictions (IC96) one commentator remarks that "this is to be 
expected in the light of the Administration political strategy which is 
based on harassment of the opposition. If the time, money, energy of...
i
leading critics... can be diverted from affirmative action to 
defending themselves against grand jury inquisition and if in the
i
process these critics can be publicly stigmatized as outlaws, the 
Administration may prove to have won the political war while losing the 
legal battle".1^ 1
Finally, throughout the sixties and seventies an elaborate 
network of covert intelligence was developed which became the trademark 
and the legacy of the Nixon years. The F.B.I. continued 
gathering information on political dissenters and extended its 
activities to all politically active organisations and individuals. 
According to one report 250,000 people were under active intelligence 
in the late sixties and seventies and the methods used varied.
Informants, agents provocateurs, wiretapping and bugging, mail 
opening and refuse searches were all employed against the various 
” subversivesl(of the civil rights movement, the New Left, the S.D.S. and
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all other radical and dissenting organisations. The surveillance
extended to all those "who do not operate within the confines of the
two major parties to all organisations who take a militant or strong
dissenting position, to all groups who are considered by the Bureau
102potentially disruptive and to all persons associated with these'1.
The F.B.I. was assisted in its operations by the C.I.A., the National 
Security Administration, the Army Intelligence and the Internal 
Revenue Service. In 1967* Clark established an Interdivisional 
Information Unit to coordinate and computerize the mass of 
information coming from the diverse intelligence sources.
By the early 70s, a siege mentality overtook the Nixon administration 
and the surveillance was extended beyond its hitherto 'legitimate" 
targets in the left and radical groups. Democratic Representatives 
and Senators, liberal journalists and other prominent members of the 
establishment were investigated and had their telephones tapped.^ In 
1973* Justice Douglas stated that he was "morally" convinced that even 
the Conference Room of the Supreme Court had been "bugged". Indeed 
the Watergate scandal and the resulting outcry which led to Nixon*s 
resignation was not a reaction against the use of wide ranging 
surveillance practices, which had been accepted as legitimate, but 
against their extension and use against an established party. In 
acting against the Democrats as if they were the communists, the Socialist 
Workers or the Black Panthers, Nixon violated one of the rules of the 
game, namely that intelligence gathering and harassment may be 
directed only against those outside the established political 
consensus and thus contributed to his own downfall.
The wealth of new and old laws employed against protest and 
• dissent in the 60s and 70s, led to an expansion of court cases 
dealing with aspects of expressive activities. The following
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sections examine the most important of these cases. The first three 
deal with protest and dissent cases. The fourth with loyalty-security 
cases and the fifth with the judicial constitutionalisation and 
relaxation of libel law.
5. The Conspiracy Trials
When in the mid-60s the protest started becoming more violent 
two of the most powerful legal weapons employed against the protestors 
were the prosecutions for criminal anarchy and syndicalism and for 
conspiracy to commit serious substantive crimes. The first such case
4 A
arose nut of the Harlem riots of 19^4 (People v. Epton). William
Epion, a black leader of the Progressive Labor Party, a small leftist 
group of Maoist orientations, addressed a small crowd in Harlem in 
August 19 6 4. He protested against police brutality and the killing of 
a 16-year old black youth by a policeman. His speech was recorded by 
P.S.I. agents in the crowd and was used as the main evidence for the 
prosecution in the subsequent trial. It was an emotional address and 
among other things, Epton said: "The cops declared war on us damnit, 
we'll kill one of them... We will take our freedom. We will take it by 
any means necessary and any means necessary as we know the beast that 
we are dealing with is that we have to create a revolution in this 
country and we will create a new government that is run by the people". 
Some time after Epton's speech riots broke out in Harlem but no evidence 
was produced in the trial of any "direct, causal connection" between 
Epton's speech and the riots. He was prosecuted under the New York 
Criminal Anarchy law - which had been used for the last time, in 1919 
in the Citlow case. &  was charged with advocacy and conspiracy to 
advocate the violent overthrow of the New York Government; conspiracy 
to riot; and committing the crime of riot. The last count was
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dismissed in the trial court for lack of evidence but he was convicted
under the other charges. The prosecution case against Epton consisted
of the transcript of his Harlem speech, some leaflets he had distributed
bearing the picture of the policeman who had killed the youth and
allegations that he had formed an organisation dedicated to armed
revolution. All the evidence, therefore, was based nn Epton*s public
105statements and some informers' reports. Under the doctrine of Yates J 
advocacy of violent revolution is punishable if it consists of 
incitement to action rather than the teaching of the abstract 
doctrine of revolution. Both the trial judge and the New York Court 
of Appeals rejected this interpretation. Epton's public statements 
qualified as "overt acts" and were sufficient proof of the criminal 
conspiracy. Thus, the technical guarantees that the Supreme Court 
had gradually built up in the communist cases were undermined under 
the conspiracy theory.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari and endorsed the lower court's 
106construction. Justice Douglas dissented. The trial judge's 
instructions had "made no qualification whatsoever as to the 
permissive range of the use of speech and publication as overt acts".
The jury should have been asked "to determine that the particular 
speech or publication was not constitutionally protected" since the 
evidence against Epton was based almost exclusively on expressive 
activities.1^
The pattern established in Epton was utilized extensively in later 
conspiracy trials. Expression of political dissent was combined in 
one indistinguishable whole with some evidence of illegal acts and as 
a result the individuals, groups or ideologies on trial were completely 
discredited and severely planished. Furthermore, as the F.B.I. had put 
the P.L.P. on the top of the list of groups to be investigated and
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harassed, Epton gave full backing to such activities. The combination
of conspiracy prosecutions and covert surveillance led to the
destruction of the P.L.P. and was a good example of what Justice
Jackson has called the most dangerous weapon at the hands of the
prosecutor: "He will pick people that he thinks he should get, rather
than pick cases that need to be prosecuted... In such cases, it is not
a question of discovering the commission of a crime and then looking
for the man who has committed it, it is a question of picking a man
and then searching the law books, or putting investigators to work,
108to pin some offense on him".
The Epton logic was put into full effect in the famous Spock- 
Coffin conspiracy trial. In September 1967* a number of well-known 
war dissidents signed a document entitled "A Call to Resist 
Illegitimate Authority". In it, they described many methods of 
resistance to the draft and of refusal to "obey illegal and immoral 
orders" by those already in the armed forces in Vietnam. They declared 
that "we believe that each of these forms of resistance against 
illegitimate authority is courageous and justified"; they pledged 
their support to those who "undertake resistance to this war" and 
concluded: "Now is the time to resist". They stated that the 
declaration was protected by the Pirst Amendment but accepted that a 
final determination on that point rested with the courts. Among the 
original 150 signatories of the Call, who were joined later by 
thousands, were Dr. Benjamin Spock, a well known paediatrician, the 
Yale Chaplain William Coffin and the author Mitchell Goodman.
During the October 19 6 7 march to the Pentagon, the three leaders 
attempted to present to Justice Department officials a briefcase full 
of draft cards which had been gathered in a previous meeting.
Addressing the gathered protestors, Rev. Coffin declared that "we
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hereby publicly counsel these young men to continue in their refusal 
to serve in the Armed Forces as lnng as the war in Vietnam continues 
and we pledge ourselves to aid and abet them in all the ways that we 
can*'.
In late December, after the compromise between R. Clark and
Hershey on the punitive reclassification issue, the Justice Department
brought conspiracy indictment against the three leaders and two more.
The charge was for conspiracy to "counsel, aid and abet diverse
Selective Services Registrants to... neglect, fail, refuse and evade
service in the armed forces". Although all five had helped in the
gathering and returning of the draft cards they were charged with
conspiracy to counsel and aid violations of the Selective Services
Act, in general. The evidence against them was based on their
public activities in support of the Call - the signing of the Call
itself, and various press conferences and letters advertising and
promoting the declaration . Thus, the widely publicized trial was
presented and was probably intended by the Justice Department as an
indictment of the whole anti-war movement. The Department's prosecutors
made it clear during the trial that all signatories of the Call as
well as those who had heard and applauded the defendants at anti-war
rallies were liable to conspiracy prosecutions. When one attorney was
asked why those particular five defendants were charged he replied that
the situation was similar to the enforcement of laws against speeding:
"One of the reasons for enforcement of the law is deterrent to others -
you can't get everybody in the speed trap, but you are going to get
enough so that' everybody knows. If it's a real bad speed trap... there
comes a point where may be you will have to have enough police there to
109stop everybody who speeds". And according to a Law Professor the 
government increased the risk of ultimate judicial defeat by charging
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"a loosely knit, widespread and uncircumscribed conspiracy” in order to
have "the greatest impact on discouraging organised opposition to the
Vietnam War”. B .  Clark expressed some doubts about the case, after
his replacement by Nixon, but he explained: "Conspiracy charges are
fairly common legal devices - to a degree, because they're easier for 
111the prosecution".
At the end of the trial the three main defendants and M. Ferber, 
a student, were found guilty and sentenced to two years imprisonment 
while the fifth, M. Baskin, was acquitted. All four appealed arguing, 
in the main, that their public activities were protected by the First 
Amendment.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the appellants' activities were
112"a bifarious undertaking, involving both legal and illegal conducts".
The Court accepted that some political expression "within the shadow 
of the First Amendment" was involved and went on to balance the
conflicting public and private interests. The state interest lay in|
the "maintenance of an army in peacetime"; since a "registrant may be
convicted for violation of the draft laws", it follows that "a man may
be punished for encouraging the commission of the crime". The
defendants had called for immediate action in resistance to the draft
and they had therefore forfeited the protection of the First Amendment.
To be sure, General Hershey himself had admitted that there was no
evidence of any concrete resistance acts instigated by the activities
113of the defendants.
On the conspiracy aspects of the trial, the Court ruled that the 
open and public character of the agreement to oppose the war could not 
bar a conspiracy conviction. It added, however, that the mere signing 
of "the Call" was not sufficient evidence. It should be supported by 
evidence about the specific intent of the defendants to adhere to the
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illegal portions of the agreement. The Court offered three criteria 
for a finding of "evil intent": a. the defendants* prior or subsequent 
to the agreement Unambiguous statements; b. the subsequent commission 
of illegal acts contemplated in the agreement; or c. the subsequent 
undertaking of lawful acts "clearly undertaken for the specific purpose 
of rendering effective the later illegal activity which is advocated". 
Under these criteria public statements and acts - themselves legal and 
constitutionally protected - could become the basis of convictions for 
criminal conspiracy.
The convictions of all four were reversed, however, on technical 
grounds. The Court insisted that Coffin and Goodman, at least, who 
were found to have the required evil intent could be retried without 
constitutional problems. One Judge dissented in part and stated that 
he was "tempted to say that the law should recognize no overt conspiracy 
in the sensitive area of public discussion and opinion". Judge Coffin 
reviewed the criteria for the proof of criminal intent and found the 
third, in particular, objectionable: "To say that 'subsequent legal 
acts* render retrospectively conspiratorial the earlier protected 
ambiguous advocacy is to say that two rights make a wrong". He 
concluded that the decision allowed the Government to use "the conspiracy 
weapon... again on another day in another court" against other protestors. 
The Government did not retry any of the defendants, so all five of 
them went finally free. In response to the increasing use of symbolic 
forms of protect by the anti-war protestors, the Spock-Coffin and the 
later conspiracy trials had a largely symbolic character too.
The next major conspiracy trial became known as the "Chicago 
Conspiracy" or the "Chicago Eight" trial. It arose from the disturbances 
in Chicago during the 1968 Democratic Convention. The Government 
sponsored study of the incidents (the Walker Report) concluded that
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"despite the presence of some revolutionaries the vast majority of the
demonstrators were intent on expressing by peaceful means their dissent
either from society generally or from the administration's policies in
Vietnam". The report found that police violence "was a fact of
Convention week" and that the police were "violators of sound police
11/1
procedures and common decency". The dogged refusal of Mayor Daley 
to grant permits for marches and the occupation of a park has been 
assessed as one of the major factors that contributed to the escalation
lie
of violence. J Attorney-General R. Clark tried to convince the local 
authorities to adopt a low profile but he failed. After the events, 
Clark refused to bring prosecutions under the recently enacted Federal 
anti-riot Act and started proceedings against various policemen in a 
Chicago grand jury. But the new Attorney-General Mitchell moved 
swiftly against the demonstrators. He obtained grand jury indictments 
against eight nationally known leaders of the anti-war movement. The 
most famous among them were Tom Hayden of the S.D.S., the pacifist
D. Dillinger and the Black Panther's Chairman Bobby Seale. No 
prosecution was brought against any police officer despite the findings 
of the Walker Commission.
All eight were charged with conspiracy to cross state lines with 
intent to incite a riot and six of them with actually crossing state 
lines to incite a riot. Five of the defendants had acquired national 
notoriety a few months before the Chicago incidents when they had 
appeared before the H.U.A.C., which was investigating the anti-war 
movement, and had attacked and ridiculed the Committee. During the 
trial they started calling themselves "the Conspiracy" and they were 
contemplating the creation of a party under that name.
The trial lasted five months and was one of the less dignified 
chapters of American criminal justice. The defendants were determined
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to make their trial a forum for the public denunciation of the
injustices of American society and the war. They were faced by an
equally determined and openly antagonistic Judge. The evidence
against all eight relied largely on their public speeches and private
conversations, the latter obtained through police informers and
extensive electronic surveillance. Judge Hoffman, however, overruled
all objections based on the First Amendment. He accepted the
prosecution's argument that the various statements of the defendants
were not at issue and that they were used as evidence of their criminal
intent to incite the riot. According to one historian of the trial,
the prosecution's attitude was that "the punishable crime, under the
anti-riot statute, occurred within the minds of the defendants and the
Constitution says nothing about states of mind".^^
One of the most dramatic moments of the trial was when Bobby
Seale - who continuously protested because he was not allowed to
conduct his own defence - was chained on a metal chair and had his
117mouth gagged with muslin and later with adhesive tape. The trial 
went on for a few days with Seale chained and gagged and then Judge 
Eofftaan summarily sentenced him to an unprecedented imprisonment of 
four years for contempt of court and severed his case.
At the end of the trial the remaining seven were found not guilty 
on the conspiracy charge; five of them were found guilty of crossing 
state lines with intent to incite a riot and were given maximum 
sentences of five years imprisonment. After sentencing, Hoffman added 
175 contempt citations against all seven and two of their lawyers.
'-One lawyer was sentenced to four years and thirteen*days in prison.
Among various other counts, he was sentenced to six months imprisonment
118for asking Mayor Daley "objectionable questions".
All substantive and contempt convictions were later reversed by 
the Court of Appeals. During the retrial of some of the contempt
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convictions the judge stated that Hoffman had been guilty of
•'condemnations conduct" and had from the beginning "telegraphed to the
119jury his contempt for the defendants".
Prosecutions for conspiracy continued under the Nixon administration
120which "prosecuted virtually every prominent anti-war leader". The
"Pentagon Papers" and the "Gainesville Eight" conspiracy trials were
two of the most famous cases. The first was declared a mistrial when
the government refused to reveal the illegal wiretap records on
defendant Ellsberg, who had leaked to the press a Defense Department
study on American policy in Vietnam between 1950 and 19^7. In the
second, eight members of an anti-war organisation were prosecuted for
conspiracy to disrupt the 1972 Republican Convention but were all
acquitted when the main prosecution witness, an F.B.I. "plant" in the
organisation was found to have serious mental and psychiatric problems.
A number of other conspiracy prosecutions were brought against various
dissenting groups but failed either for lack of evidence or because of
the Government’s refusal to disclose the surveillance records on which
121the prosecutions were based.
6. The New Criminal Anarchy and Criminal Syndicalism Prosecutions 
The successful prosecution of W. Epton, in 19 6 4* led to a 
revival of the old criminal anarchy and criminal syndicalism laws.
They had remained in the state statute books as relics of an earlier 
era of moral panic, but by the mid-60s they started being invoked 
again, against black militants whose public speeches had allegedly 
triggered disorders and riots. In 19^9» the Supreme Court reviewed this 
revival in a case that has since become famous as one of the liberal 
milestones in First Amendment theory.
Ironically, the victorious petitioner in Brandenburg v. Ohio 
was a Ku Klux Klan leader who had been convicted under the Ohio
122
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Syndicalism Act for "advocating the duty, necessity or propriety of 
crime, sabotage or violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a 
means of accomplishing industrial or political reform". The prosecution 
was brought for a speech that Brandenburg had made in a typical K.K.K. 
meeting among the ritual "nigger" and Jew—bashing of such occasions.
The most objectionable part of Brande riburg‘s speech, according to the 
record, was his statement that "if our President, our Congress, our 
Supreme Court continue to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it*s 
possible that there might have to be some revengence taken".
The Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion reversed Brandenburg* s
conviction and expressly overruled the 1927 Whitney decision which had
upheld a similar California statute. "Whitney has been thoroughly
discredited by later decisions" the Supreme Court ruled and cited
Dennis, Yates and Noto among others to that effect. According to the
Court, these decisions had "fashioned" the principle that advocacy of
violence and law violation could be constitutionally punished only
when "such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
123lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action".
The Ohio statute fell short of that standard, on its face and as 
applied to the facts of the case and was therefore invalidated.
Under the Brande riburg test the advocacy/incitement distinction 
was revived and a contextual requirement (advocacy likely to produce 
imminent lawless action) was added to it. The principle emerging was 
that the nature of the particular speech as incitement, examined 
within the context of its delivery and of the likely results that it 
could produce, would determine the extent of the constitutional 
protection. To be sure, the analytical problems that inhere in the 
independent forms of the incitement/advocacy distinction and the clear
• j n i
and present danger test remain in their combined version as well. 4
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The enthusiastic reception of Brandenburg by the constitutional
commentators is perhaps more interesting than the decision itself.
The Court insisted that the principle enunciated was the "theory" of
125the Smith Act and of Dennis. The "clear and not improbable danger"
test of Dennis, which distorted the original danger test "beyond 
126recognition" cannot be assimilated to the much stricter linguistic
formulation of Brandenburg, by any stretch of imagination. It has
been suggested, accordingly, that, in reality, Brandenburg overruled
Dennis and opened the road for an extensive protection of radical
speech.12*^ Such an interpretation cannot be sustained, however, on
the face of the Court's explicit reliance on Dennis. The "Brandenburg
Concerto" may be seen as a further example of the effort of
constitutional theorists to iron out the less liberal decisions of
the Court and to present them as the exceptions within an otherwise
consistent discourse of liberal decision making. The Court's
129decisions immediately before and after Brande riburg ' clearly indicate 
that major doctrinal revolutions, as Brandenburg was supposed to be 
rarely, if ever, occur.
Justice Douglas concurring sounded a cautionary note amid the
general euphoria. He stated that the line of criminal responsibility
is that "between ideas and overt acts" and that a long line of Court
decisions fell far short of that principle. The Government had too
often invaded "the sanctuary of beliefs and conscience" with judicial
approval and the return to the danger test or the abstract doctrine/
advocacy of action distinction was not a reason for rejoicing. The
decisions of the 70s justified Douglas' caution.
150In Younger v. Harris, the appellee was a black militant who
had distributed some leaflets calling for radical change in'industrial 
ownership through political action. He was indicted under the California
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Criminal Syndicalism Act which had been condemned by the Supreme Court
in Brandenburg. When the State Courts dismissed his constitutional
objections, Harris brought a federal suit challenging the constitutionality
131of the Act. Under the Dombrowski v. Pfister rule the District 
Court declared the Act void for vagueness and overbreadth and granted 
an injunction enjoining the District Attorney from further prosecutions. 
Harris was joined in his action by two members of the Progressive Labor 
Party and a history professor who claimed that their political 
activities, and his teaching of Marxism respectively, were threatened 
by the Act.
The Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the District Court
should not have exercised jurisdiction. Justice Black, for the Court,
discussed the jurisdictional and procedural aspects of the case. He
disposed of the claims of the additional appellees, stating that they
132had no "acute, live controversy" with the state, since they had not 
been arrested or indicted. He went on to distinguish Harris from 
Dombrowski. He stated that when proceedings have been initiated in 
State Courts the normal practice of the federal judiciary is to refrain 
from intervening. Federal action could be initiated only if "both 
great and immediate" irreparable injury was shown to threaten the 
parties. According to Dombrowski, Federal equitable relief was 
available whenever a state statute was found to be a vague or over­
broad violation of the First Amendment, on its face. Justice Black 
ruled, however, that "such statements were unnecessary to the 
decision" of Harris and that Dombrowski . should not be regarded as 
having upset the settled doctrines'that have always confined very 
narrowly the availability of injunctive relief«..M He denounced, too, 
the tendency to examine statutes, on their face, for their 
constitutionality and added that the judicial power does not amount to
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an unlimited power to survey the statute books and pass judgments on
laws before the courts are called upon to enforce them". ^
Having decided the case on those grounds, the Justice did not
fully address the question of the constitutionality of the Criminal
Syndicalism Act. He came closer to pronouncing on the issue when he
stated that *J^here a statute does not directly abridge free speech,
but - while regulating a subject within the State's power - tends to
h=ve the incidental effect of inhibiting First Amendment rights, it is
well settled that the statute can be upheld if the effect on speech
is minor in relation to the need for control of the conduct and the
135lack of alternative means for doing so". Thus, the Act was
declared an incidental only limitation on political rights and
Harris' prosecution for mere advocacy of political change was allowed
to go on. As Douglas wrote in dissent ". .in times of repression...
interests with powerful spokesmen generate symbolic pogroms against 
136nonconformista.."
137In Samuels v. Mackell, J Black denied declaratory relief to the 
appellants who had been indicted under the New York Criminal Anarchy 
Act, on similar grounds. The Court made clear in those cases, that 
the procedural techniques it had devised, in order to protect the early 
civil rights movement, were not available to its more militant 
successors. And despite its procedural overtones, Harris indicated 
that the Brandenburg euphoria was, at the best, premature.
7. . New Forms of Protest: Symbolic and Offensive Speech
While the Supreme Court was prepared to uphold the protest 
activities of the early civil rights movement, its attitude toward 
the anti-war and peace movements was much more ambiguous. The 
prosecutions of protestors multiplied, in the mid-sixties, and the
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Court was forced to deal with the new forms of protest and the
federal and state reaction against them.
The first case in which the Court dealt with the new protest was
U.S. v. O'Brien. ^  O'Brien was prosecuted under the 19 6 5 amendment to
the Selective Services Act which prohibited the knowing mutilation or
destruction of draf.t cards. The case turned out to be a seminal one;
the Court addressed in it the issue of symbolic protest and clarified
I 3 9its doctrinal approach toward free speech in general. The scene 
for Obrien was set by the contradictory decisions of two district
140courts on the constitutionality of the amendment. In U.S. v. Miller
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the amendment using
the balancing test: the state had a paramount interest in raising
141armies and the regulation did not restrict protest. In Obrien, 
however, the First Circuit ruled that the amendment suppressed free 
speech and it was, therefore, unconstitutional. Chief Judge Aldrich 
found that the amendment had no proper legislative purpose, since it 
did not add anything to existing law. Additionally the act of public 
destruction of draft cards was protected "symbolic speech" and its 
prohibition "strikes at the very core of what the First Amendment 
protects". O'Brien's conviction was upheld, however, on the basis 
of the Selective Services Act requirement that registrants keep their 
certificates, at all times. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
the second case and reversed the Court of Appeals, ruling the 
amendment constitutional.
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court with Justice Douglas 
dissenting, viewed the amendment as a valid regulation related solely 
to the administrative needs of the Selective Services system. O'Brien 
had challenged his conviction on two counts: he had argued that its 
application against him was in violation of the constitutionally
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protected right to free speech and further that the amendment as such 
was unconstitutional on its face because it had been enacted for an 
improper purpose, namely the suppression of free speech.
On the first count, Warren stated in a somewhat elliptic fashion
that "we cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety
of conduct can be labelled "speech" whenever the person engaging in
142the conduct intends thereby to express an idea". He did not elaborate, 
however, on the criteria that could qualify some conduct with 
communicative intent as protected symbolic speech, and which 
differentiated O'Brien’s draft card burning from other symbolic forms 
of protest which were accorded a degree of protection (the sit-ins were 
the latest example of "silent" symbolic speech). Having said that, 
the Court went on to examine O'Brien’s challenge, on the assumption 
that his conduct was "sufficient to bring into play the First 
Amendment". It stated a general legal doctrine applicable in cases 
where conduct and expression are intertwined. Four criteria were 
offered tinder which a regulation which limits incidentally First 
Amendment freedoms remains nevertheless valid:
"[l]f it is within the constitutional power of the 
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial 
governmental interest; if the governmental interest 
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; 
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential 
to the furtherance of that interest."143
All four conditions were satisfied in the present case, according 
to the Court. The substantive governmental interest lay in the smooth 
and proper functioning of the Selective Services. The Court indicated 
the various administrative functions performed by the draft cards and 
insisted that the purpose of the amendment was to prevent harm to the 
efficiency of the Services. The preservation of "every last draft 
card in perfect shape" was crucial for that purpose. On the other 
hand, O ’Brien was convicted for the "noncommunicative impact of his
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conduct and nothing else".^^ Thus, the Court closed its eyes to the 
facts of the case and concluded that since the amendment did not appear 
to interfere with expressive activities, on its face, its application 
was unobjectionable, too. Reversing its earlier position, according 
to which vague or overbroad statutes are unconstitutional if their 
specific application leads to violations of expressive rights, the 
Court effectively ruled that a narrowly drafted statute would withstand 
constitutional challenge even if its application clearly infringed 
expressive rights.
The Court was equally cavalier on 0 ,Brien*s second challenge. It 
underplayed the obvious reason for the passage of the amendment and 
stated that since there existed a valid governmental interest in the 
efficient functioning of the draft system, the legislative purpose to 
muffle protest was insignificant. Interestingly enough, during the 
brief congressional debate, the only reason given for the amendment was 
the suppression of the unpatriotic draft card burnings.
All in all, the Supreme Court1 s performance in Obrien was not 
impressive. Through a series of subterfuge and rhetoric, it failed 
to address the main problem involved both in the enactment of the 
amendment and its application in the particular case. Despite the 
emphasis put on the administrative aspects of the draft card law, the 
tenor of the opinion and its result showed a growing judicial 
intolerance toward the new forms of protest.
The next case in which aspects of symbolic protest were discussed 
was Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.1^  A 
group of high school students had protested against the war by wearing 
black armbands in school. The school authorities asked them to 
remove them and, when they refused, suspended five of them until they 
returned without the armbands. The parents of the students sought a
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court injunction restraining the authorities from disciplining the 
students which was refused. In this case the Supreme Court reversed 
the Court of Appeals and granted the injunction.
Justice Fortas held that the silent protest of wearing armbands was 
"closely alHn to pure speech" entitled to comprehensive constitutional 
protection. He reviewed the facts of the case and found that the protest 
had not caused any interference with or disruption of the normal school 
functinns. The only reason for the action of the school authorities was 
a wish "to avoid controversy which might result" from the symbolic 
expression of opposition to the war. Symbols of other political parties 
and campaigns were not affected by the school * s order, a fact that made 
the school attitude unconstitutionally discriminatory.
Justice Black dissented. He thought that the Court decision was 
an injustified incursion in the schoolroom and would undermine "school 
discipline, [which] like parental discipline, is an integral and 
important part of training our children to be good citizens”. High 
school students do not carry "into a school... a complete right to 
freedom of speech" and the armband wearing had disrupted the lessons 
because it "took the students* minds off their classwork and diverted 
them to thought about... the Vietnam War". In a somewhat exaggerated 
fashion, Black denounced the decisions as "the beginning of a new
4 AC
revolutionary era of permissiveness fostered by the judiciary". 4
The Court continued to review cases involving the public expression 
of protest and the effort of authorities to suppress them. In Street 
v. New York.**^ Street had cursed and burned an American flag in 
outrage after he had learned about the shooting of James Meredith,the 
civil rights activist. He was convicted under the New York flag 
desecration statute which prohibited the public casting of the flag in 
contempt "by word or deed". The Supreme Court ruled that the expression
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of public criticisms of the flag was constitutionally protected speech
and invalidated the "contemptuous words" part of the statute. But it
refrained from passing on the flag mutilation part. Since the lower
courts had not made clear whether Street was convicted for his critical
remarks or the flag burning, the Supreme Court reversed his conviction.
Thus, the question of the constitutionality of the flag desecration
laws was left unresolved against the dissent of three Justices who
148argued that the Court should explicitly uphold the statute.
14.9In Watts v . TJ.S. a small group of demonstrators had 
been discussing police brutality on the Washington Monument Grounds 
after an anti-war rally. According to an army intelligence agent, 
petitioner Watts, an eighteen year old youth stated to the group that 
"I have already received my draft classification as I-A and I have got 
to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they 
every make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights
iis L.B.J. They are not going to make me kill my black brothers".I
Watts was convicted under a 1917 statute which prohibited the utterance
of threats to kill or injure the President. The Supreme Court in a per curiam
decision reversed this. . The political hyperbole of the statement did
not constitute the statutorily prohibited threats and, in any case,
public debate "should be uninhibited, robust and wide open, and it may
well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasant sharp attacks
150on government and public officials".
A different kind of speech was involved in Cohen v. California. ^
Cohen had been convicted for breach of the peace for walking about in a 
law court wearing a jacket with the words "Puck the draft". The 
Supreme Court reversed his conviction in a 5-4 decision.
The state had argued that the inscription in Cohen *s jacket 
constituted "offensive conduct"; it should be eseised from public
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discourse for being either a "fighting word” that inherently provokes
violent reaction or as an immoral and obscene word. To the amazement
152of some authors the Court spelt out "that Chaucerian term” which
153denotes an ”act of unlawful carnal knowledge”.
Justice Harlan rejected one after the other all contentions of the
state. "lighting words", a category of speech placed outside
constitutional protection since Chaolinsky. were defined as words that
led "substantial numbers of citizens... to strike physically”"'at those
who utter them. The egression in question could provoke only "a
hypothetical coterie of the violent and lawless". As to the immoral
and obscene character of the word used, the Court remarked dryly that
155"one manis vulgarity is another*s lyric". Words convey both 
cognitive and emotive messages; in some cases the emotive content of 
a particular message, which cannot be expressed by precise and "detailed 
explication", is the predominant element. Words that express it are, 
therefore, protected by the First Amendment. In some cases the 
suppression of' words may be used as a guise for the censorship of 
unpopular views.
Although the case seemed rather trivial, Justice Harlan went on to
make a general statement on the justification and function of free
speech in a democratic society:
"The constitutional right of free expression is powerful 
medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It 
is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints 
from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as 
to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of 
each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will 
ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more 
perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach 
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and 
choice upon which our political system rests... To many, the 
immediate consequence of this freedom may often appear to 
be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance.
These are, however, within established limits, in truth 
necessary side effects of the broader enduring values which 
the process of open debate permits us to achieve7156
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The interesting fact about Harlan's opinion is that it constitutes
an emphatic restatement of the Mlllian premises of individualistic
utilitarianism. The importance attributed to the protection of
individual eccentricity, to the function of free public debate which
contributes to the development of the human personality and the statement
that the state cannot cleanse the public vocabulary on the highly
subjective grounds of morality are reminiscent of the great liberal
decisions of the 30s and 40s. According to some constitutional
authors, the Court1s Brandenburg and Cohen decisions have established
a legal doctrine of speech protection according to which public statements
may be suppressed, on account of their propositional contents, in a
157few and clearly delineated cases. Justice Harlan, however, the 
author of the Cohen opinion had been one of the most consistent 
supporters of the loyalty-security programmes of the 50s and 60s. The 
difference between O'Brien and Cohen, both in theoretical approach and 
in result, indicates that the "pure speech" element of Cohen and the 
limited impact of the protest may have been the determinant factors 
in deciding that case.
158The question of "fighting words" came up again in Gooding v. Wilson. 
Wilson had made certain offensive remarks to police officers during an 
anti-war picketing in Georgia. He was prosecuted and convicted under 
a Georgia statute vhich prohibited the "use to or of another, and in 
his presence... of opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to 
cause a breach of peace". The Supreme Court, affirming a District Court 
decision on a writ for habeas corpus* invalidated the statute as a 
vague and broad enactment in breach of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, did not review the facts of 
the case and indicated that the appellee's conduct could be constitutionally
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punished under a narrowly drafted statute. He examined, solely, the
statutory language according to the principles of Chaplinsky and Cohen
on the permissible punishment of "pure speech". Counsel for the state
argued that Georgia*s statute had been narrowly drawn and was directed
at "fighting words "as defined in Chaplin sky: furthermore, that the
state appellate courts had consistently construed the statutory language
to such effect. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments. The
dictionary meaning of "opprobrious" and "abusive words" gave them
"greater reach than fighting words". Brennan went on to review a number
of Georgia appeallate decisions which had construed the terms and
concluded that according to the decisions a breach of peace was "...merely
to speak words offensive to some who hear them, and so sweeps too 
159broadly". "  The judicial interpretation did not distinguish 
adequately between legal and illegal speech and the standard of 
criminal liability was left to the discretion of prosecuting authorities 
and juries. Thus, in Gooding, the statute was invalidated, on its 
face, because of its overbreadth, an approach much more radical than 
those encountered before in the same field. The dissenting Justices 
thought that the Court had exceeded its power and had unwarrantly disarmed 
the state. As Justice Blackmon concluded his dissent "/t7he Court has 
painted itself into a corner from which it, and the States, can extricate 
themselves only with difficulty".^0
Not before long, however, the Court retreated from the "void for
161overbreadth" doctrine of Gooding. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma. a case 
dealing with the prohibition of political activities of state employees, 
the Court rejected the constitutional challenge against the relevant 
provisions, on vagueness and overbreadth grounds. When elements of 
speech and conduct are intertwined in a particular case, the "overbreadth 
of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in
- 450 -
relation to the statute*s legitimate sweep". The employees had
argued that the prohibition of partisan political activities was so
broad that it excluded them from virtually all political life. The
Court accepted that the restrictions could be improperly applied on
occasion. But the fact that "some person# arguably protected conduct
may or may not be caught or chilled by the statute" did not suffice for
163its invalidation on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth.
164A similar conclusion was reached in Parker v. Levy. In that 
oase a military doctor had been convicted by a court martial for 
"conduct unbecoming an officer or gentleman" and for "disorders and 
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed 
forces", both criminal offences under the Code of Military Justice.
Levy1s "unbecoming behaviour" had been his public expression of 
opposition to the war. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction 
finding the two clauses of the Code vague and broad, but the Supreme 
Court reversed.
The clauses gave enough notice of the proscribed behaviour and were
not overbroad under the Broadrick ruling. The Court stated that it
would not "strike down a statute on its face where there were a substantial
number of situations to which it might be validly a p p l i e d " . I n  any
case, even if these clauses appear vague to others they are models of
clarity to "practical men in the navy and army".
While the Court did not extend the theoretical rationale of Cohen
or the legal doctrine of Gooding to other forms of expressive activity,
it continued to upset breach of peace and disorderly conduct convictions
167for foul language. In Hess v. Indiana. a small number of anti-war 
demonstrators at Indiana University were ordered by the local sheriff 
to clear a street and were subsequently pushed off it by the police.
Hess was arrested and convicted for disorderly conduct for shouting
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"Puck" and "We111 take the fucking street later". The Supreme Court in 
a per curiam opinion reversed. The remarks did not fall in any of the 
"narrowly limited classes of speech" which are punishable. They were 
neither obscene, nor a personal insult to the sheriff and could not be 
construed as "fighting words". Additionally, according to the evidence, 
they were not likely to produce imminent lawless action by the crowd.
In Pa-pish v. University of Missouri. a  student had been expelled
from the University for distributing on campus an underground newspaper.
The offending issue carried a cartoon depicting policemen raping the
Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice and an article entitled
"Motherfucker Acquitted" on the trial of the leader of an organisation
called "Up gainst the Wall, Motherfucker". Papish was expelled under a
college regulation which prohibited "indecent conduct or speech". The
Supreme Court ruled that the two items were not obscene and that the
expression of opinions on campus cannot be "shut off in the name alone
of Conventions of decency1". The Court made clear in Pa-pish that the
restrictions on the criminal prosecution of offensive or foul language
could not be relaxed by university authorities claiming some special
170powers of- supervision of the conduct of students.
In 1974» the Supreme Court returned to the various flag desecration
171laws. In Smith v. Goguen. the Massachussets statute at issue 
punished the contemptuous treatment of the flag. Goguen had been 
convicted to six months imprisonment for going around with a small flag 
sewn on the seat of his trousers. The Supreme Court found that the 
statute involved was unconstitutionally vague.
Justice Powell for the Court ruled that the statutory language did 
not give fair notice of the proscribed conduct and "men of common 
intelligence" were forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal offence. 
Furthermore, the statute*s "standardless sweep" allowed policemen,
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prosecutors and Juries to enforce it according to their personal 
172predilections. Justice White, concurring, found the ''contemptuous
treatment" provision a violation of the First Amendment since "neither
the United States nor any state may require any individual to salute or
173express favourable attitudes towards the flag". At the other end, 
three Justices including Chief Justice Burger found the statute necessary 
and valid.
In Spence v. Washington. a  student had hung a flag from the 
window of his house and had attached a peace symbol on it. He was 
convicted under the Washington flag desecration statute which prohibited 
the exhibition of flags on which any words, figures, marks, pictures, 
designs etc. were attached. In a per curiam opinion the Supreme Court 
reversed.
The Court accepted that Spence*s conduct was "symbolic speech",
a "pointed expression of anguish" triggered by the invasion of Cambodia
and the Kent State shootings. The state had a valid interest in
"preserving the national flag as an unalloyed symbol of our country".
But as the flag had not been disfigured or destroyed the state interest
was outweighed by the protected character of the expression. Three
Justices dissented and differentiated the Washington statute from the
usual desecration ones. It prohibited the improper use of the flag in a
non-discriminatory way by outlawing both communicative and non-communicative,
political and commercial, respectful and contemptuous uses of the flag.
"It simply withdraws a unique national symbol from the roster of
173materials that may be used as a background for communications."
These decisions which were based on particular aspects of the various 
flag protective laws involved did not stop the prosecutions and convictions 
for flag desecration. In 1974 two teenagers were convicted in a Juvenile 
court for burning a flag and, in 1975» a man was convicted to four
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months imprisonment in New Hampshire for having sewn a flag on his 
jacket.1^
8. Anti-War Protestors and Trade Unions in the Public Forum
As the anti-war and peace movements became more massive and militant 
toward the end of the sixties, a series of cases arising from mass 
demonstrations and other protest activities in the public forum started
arriving at the Supreme Court.
177In Baohellar v. Maryland '' a number of protestors, who had 
participated in an anti-war demonstration in front of a Baltimore army 
recruiting station were convicted for disorderly conduct* The judge 
instructed the jury that they could return a guilty verdict if they 
found that the protestors had engaged in the '’doing or saying or both 
of that which offends, disturbs, incites or tends to incite a number of 
people gathered in the same area". The Supreme Court unanimously 
reversed and remanded the case. Although the conviotion could stand on 
a number of grounds the "doing or saying" instruction had violated the 
Constitution by basing the determination of guilt on the unpopularity of 
the views of the protestors. Since it was impossible to know the ground 
on which the guilty verdict was actually returned, the convictions were 
set aside.
178
In Coates v. City of Cincinnati, a student involved in a peace 
demonstration and several pickets related to a labour dispute were 
convicted under a city ordinance which prohibited "three or more persons 
to assemble... on any of the sidewalks... and there conduct themselves 
in a manner annoying persons passing by". The Ohio Supreme Court had 
held that the term "hnnoying* , is a widely used and well understood word" 
and the ordinance could not be, therefore, challenged on vagueness and 
overbreadth grounds.
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The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Stewart found the ordinary 
unconstitutionally vague, because it did not give fair notice as to the 
standard of conduct it was prohibiting. Its violation depended 
entirely on "whether or not a policeman is annoyed". Furthermore, the 
ordinance qualified the rights of speech and assembly in a potentially 
discriminatory way. People could be annoyed because they resented the 
"ideas, lifestyle or physical appearance" of the protestors. The 
Cincinatti ordinance was declared as unconstitutional on its face, 
against the dissent of four Justices.
179In Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley. ' a 
Chicago ordinance prohibited all picketing and demonstrations within 
150 feet of any school during school hours, but exempted the picketing 
of schools involved in labour disputes. Mosley had conducted a seven 
month solitary vigil and picketing outside a Chicago school protesting 
against "black discrimination". After the passage of the ordinance 
above, he brought a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against 
its enforcement. The Supreme Court granted the injunction.
Justice Marshall held that the essence of the First Amendment is
to forbid the control of the contents of messages. " .../g7ovemment has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
180subject mattery or its contents". Quoting from Meiklejohn and Kalven, 
he went on to state that once a public forum had been opened for a 
particular group or idea "equality of status in the field of ideas", 
the gist of the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause barred 
the government from selectively excluding other groups and messages.
The city could exclude all picketing from outside its schools to prevent 
disruption to their functions but it could not pursue this valid
objective "by the wholesale exclusion of all but one preferred subject". 181
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Mosley is one of the most definite judicial statements on the need of
content neutrality in the regulation of the contextual characteristics
of public expressive activities. As Chief Justice Burger remarked
however, the "discussion of the First Amendment could, if read out of
context, be misleading". Burger was concerned about the possible
liberal implications of the decision. On the other hand, Mosley left
open the possibility of a wholesale non-discriminatory exclusion of all
groups and ideas from the public forum. Additionally, the loyalty-
security decisions explicitly and a large number of protest decisions
implicitly had sustained the position that certain ideas are dangerous
and should be discriminated against. Despite the (conservative) fears
182and the (liberal) hopes, Mosley*s rhetoric did not mark a radical 
departure in First Amendment theory.
On the same day as Mosley, the Court handed down its decision on
• 1 0 7
the similar case of Gray red v. City of Rockford. A number of black 
students and their parents had marched and picketed outside a Rockford,
111. school protesting against racial discrimination practised by the 
school authorities. Forty of them were arrested and convicted under an 
anti-picketing statute identical to that involved in Mosley and an anti­
noise one which prohibited "the making of any noise or diversion in 
grounds adjacent to schools which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace 
or good order" of the school. However, as Justice Douglas said, 
there was no evidenoe that the appellants had "yelled or made any noise 
whatsoever". The only noise was created by police loudspeakers and the 
entire picketing "was done in the best First Amendment tradition".
t
'The Supreme Court invalidated the anti-picketing statute on the 
same grounds as Mosley but upheld the convictions under the anti-noise 
one. The statute was neither vague nor overbroad: although its terms 
were marked by "flexibility and reasonable breadth rather than meticulous
- 456 -
specificity" they were clear and comprehensible. Justice Marshall 
reviewed the various public fora decisions of the Court and stated the 
basic principles that ruled expressive activities in places not 
traditionally used for such purposes.
"The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal 
activities, dictate the kinds of regulation of time, 
place and manner that are reasonable'.. Although a 
silent vigil may not tmduly interfere with a public library... 
making a speech in the reading room almost certainly 
would*. • The crucial question is whether the manner 
of the expression is basically incompatible with the 
normal activity of a particular place at a particular 
time."185
Thus, by assimilating the streets around a school to a library, 
the Court ruled that any demonstration there, even those related directly 
to the operation of the school and staged by the pupils and their parents 
can be constitutionally prohibited.
In 1972, too, the Supreme Court returned to the controversy about
the right of protest in privately owned places which are open to the
public. A number of protestors had distributed leaflets advertising a
anti-war meeting in the mall of a large shopping centre. The centre
covered a massive 50 acres and its main area had a perimeter of almost
one mile which enclosed a number of sidewalks, stairways, statues, benches,
bridges, gardens and some 60 businesses, to which the public had
unrestricted access. The management allowed the Salvation Army, the
American Legion, the Volunteers of America and mainstream presidential
candidates to speak and solicit money in the centre. The anti-war
protestors were ordered to leave, however, by security guards enforcing
a management rule which prohibited the distribution of handbills in the  ^•
premises. The protestors sought an injunction against the shopping 
centre, which was granted by the District Court and was affirmed by the 
Court of Appeals on First Amendment grounds. In Lloyd Corporation v. 
Tanner. the Supreme Court reversed.
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Justice Powell, for a 5-4 majority, was faced with two clear,
albeit controversial, precedents. In the early Marsh case, a privately-
owned company town had been identified with state municipalities
for First Amendment purposes. The Court had held that "the more
an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by
187the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it"; '
in Logan Valley Plaza, decided in 1968 and involving a shopping
centre similar to that owned by the Lloyd Co. although more remote
from the city, the Marsh rationale had been extended to shopping
centres which were found "functional equivalents of a public business
district"i in which expressive activities could be rightfully 
188exercised. These precedents, seemingly, ruled the present case, 
a fact that had been canvassed, by one of the dissenting opinions 
in Logan Valley, agains t the Court ruling in that case. However, 
rnder the well-established principle of constitutional law, the 
constitutional guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
guard against the abridgement of free speech by federal and state 
governments, not by private parties. Marsh and Logan Valley had 
been based on the fact that the private property involved had been 
dedicated to public use, but in the latter case the Court had stopped 
short from declaring private shopping centres as fully open public 
fora.
The Court's answer to the dilemma was to distinguish the two 
precedents out of existence, without explicitly overruling them.
Justice Powell distinguished Tanner from Marsh on the ground that the 
company town was a unique phenomenon, "an economic anomaly of the 
past". Private interests had undertaken there the customary functions 
of government, and there were no publicly owned places, where First
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Amendment rights could be exercised. The difference between Tanner 
and Logan Valley was that the picketing in the latter was related to 
a labour dispute, affecting a store located in the centre, while the 
•'hand-billing by respondents in the malls of the Lloyd center had no
189relation to any purpose for which the center was built and being used".
There was no open-ended invitation to the public, which was invited
to the centre for the purpose solely "of doing business with the
tenants"; the selected public functions allowed, purported to "bring
potential shoppers, to create a favourable impression, and to
generate goodwill". Furthermore, the centre was surrounded by public
streets and sidewalks, in which expressive rights could be exercised.
"It would be an unwarranted infringement of property 
rights to require them to yield to the exercise of 
First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate 
alternative avenues of communication exist." 190
The attempt of the Court to reconcile its decision with the
two precedents was somewhat tenuous, but its answer to the main
doctrinal questions involved was clear. The theory that the function
of the property determines its character for First Amendment purposes
was rejected as well as any suggestion that private shopping centres
could be brought under the doctrine of "state action", which was used
in the sit-in cases:
"The First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the rights 
of free speech and assembly by limitations on state 
action, not on action by the owner of private property 
used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only...
The Constitution by no means requires such an attenuated 
doctrine of dedication of private property to public use... 
nor does property lose its private character merely because 
the public is generally invited to use it for designated 
purposes." 190a
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The importance of Tanner cannot be underestimated. Private 
shopping cnetres, of the scale involved there, have become the meeting 
places of entire communities, as the opinion in Logan Valiev has 
documented in some detail. "As governments rely on private enterprise, 
public property decreases in favor of privately owned property... /an£J 
it becomes harder and harder for citizens to find means to communicate 
with other citizens" wrote the four dissenters. Recalling the "poor 
man's media" rationale of earlier cases, Justice Marshall emphasized 
that those who have no access to the mass media must increasingly 
rely on inexpensive means of communication, and must be allowed 
access to those places where "most of their fellow citizens can be 
found". Additionally, as the Lloyd Corporation had allowed main­
stream groups to hold public functions at the centre, but had 
barred the anti-war protestors, Tanner contradicts the principle 
of ideological neutrality in the public forum, as enunciated in 
Mosley, among other cases. As Justice Marshall argued, the centre 
had been opened to First Amendment activities; the protestors,
therefore, could not be excluded since their activities were consonant
191with the use to which the property was actually put. For Marshall 
the interests in free speech outweigh those in private property, and 
should be upheld even against private parties which have undertaken 
extensive public functions. He accused the majority of overruling 
Logan Valley without admitting it, and in a rare display of anger 
attributed this change of heart to the "radical change of the Court 
composition" by the Nixon appointments to the bench.
Four years after Tanner the conflict between private property and 
expressive rights in the public forum, which was first encountered 
in the early Jehovah's Witnesses cases and then in the sit-in cases of
192the 60s, received a seemingly final resolution. In Hugdens v. N.L.R.B. 7 
the Supreme Court followed the road opened in Tanner and held that no-one,
including those trade unionists engaged in an industrial dispute with a
_ 460 _
privately owned shopping centre, has the right to enter, picket or 
otherwise communicate to the public within the centre against the wishes 
of the owner of the property.
The picketing in Hugdens was carried out by a trade union, outside
the retail shop of a company which was involved in a labour dispute with
its warehouse employees. The shop was located in a shopping centre and
agents of the management of the centre ordered the pickets to leave and
threatened them with criminal trespass prosecutions. The pickets left
and their union initiated an action with the National Labor Belations
Board claiming that trade union rights had been unconstitutionally
interfered with by the centre*s management. The N.L.B.B. upheld the
union and the Court of Appeals enforced the Board * s order to cease and
desist relying on the Logan Valley Plaza and Tanner decisions of the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, however, and directed the latter to remand the case to the
N.L.H.B. The Board should reconsider the case on statutory grounds
(the National Labor Belations Act) and should overrule all constitutional
arguments. ". Jffas constitutional guarantee of free expression has no part
193to play in a case such as this".
The Court declared that its decision in Tanner had overruled Logan 
Valley Plaza and derided the efforts of the Tanner majority to present the 
two decisions as reconcilable. "Our institutional duty is to follow the 
law as it now is... [and] we make clear now, if it was not clear before, 
that the rationale of Logan Valley did not survive" the Tanner decision.
The process of reasoning through which the Court reached its conclusion
* ■
is quite interesting. It relied on the principle of equality in the 
field of ideas or ideological neutrality. This principle, which had been 
first used in the cases of the 60s, postulates that once a public forum 
has been opened to some group or category of speech it cannot be denied
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to other ’’undesirable" people or ideas. In Hudgens, the Court used the
principle in an original way: Tanner had ruled that anti-war protestors
have no constitutional right to communicate their ideas in a privately-
owned shopping centre. The principle of equality demanded that trade
unionists should have no such right either and should be excluded
from the centre, if the owners so wished. The fact that the picketing
in Hudgens was related to a labour dispute involving a shopping centre
194.store was declared irrelevant. Justice Marshall, dissenting, argued
as in Logan Valley and Tanner, for a function theory of private property
for First Amendment purposes. He thought that the majority*s resolution
of the conflict between property and free speech was formalistic and
ignored the importance of massive shopping centres for local communities.
The autonomy of the owners should be reconciled with the interests of
the public, since "the shopping center owner has assumed the traditional
195role of the state in its control of historical First Amendment forums".
Such a radical doctrinal change was not forthcoming, however. Tanner 
brought to an end the line of development which was envisaged in Logan 
Valley»s identification of shopping centres with company towns.
In 1976, too, the Court addressed the question of the permissibility of 
political activities in military installations open to the public, (Greer 
v. Spock).^^ In an earlier unanimous per curiam opinion (Flowers v. U.S.)^ ^  
the Court had held that a peaceful leafleteer could not be excluded 
from the main street of a military reservation which was open to the 
public. The base commandant could "no more order petitioner off this 
public street because he was distributing leaflets than could the city 
police order any leafleteer off any public street". In the case of 
Spook. the anti-war leader Dr. B. Spock,who was running for the 1972 
presidential elections, and three other candidates, informed the 
commanding officer of another military reservation that they intended to 
hold a meeting and distribute campaign literature in it. The officer
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denied permission invoking a post regulation which prohibited all 
political activities. The Court of Appeals granted an injunction 
against the military authorities based on the Flowers decision, but 
the Supreme Court reversed.
Justice Stewart distinguished the two cases arguing that the 
military authorities of the second reservation had not "abandoned any 
claim of special interests in who walks, talks or distributes leaflets 
on the avenue", while the authorities of the Flowers camp had. The
«
District Court and dissenting Justice Brennan found, on the contrary, 
after a detailed examination of the facts that the second reservation 
was clearly a more "open post" than the first. On the general issues 
involved in the case, the Court held that the purpose of the army is to 
be prepared for the "common defense" and that the military must be 
"insulated from both the reality and the appearance" of politics. 
Furthermore, the commanding officer is entitled to "avert what he 
perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline or morale
1QO
of troops on the base". 7
The dissenters Brennan and Marshall thought that the decision went 
a long way toward the complete eradication of the constitutional rights 
of both civilians and servicemen "whenever the military thinks its 
functioning would be enhanced by so doing". Military preparedness doesI !
not require such drastic curtailment of political activities "unless,
of course, the battlefields are the streets and the parking lots, or the
199war is one of ideologies and not men".
Beyond the public protest cases, the Supreme Court dealt extensively 
with two other areas of First Amendment adjudication. The first was a 
continuation of the loyal/subversive ideas story of the fifties. The 
second was more of a new beginning: it led to the constitutionalisation 
and nationalisation of the law of libel and to a redefinition of the 
constitutional guarantee of a free press.
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C. The Loyalty-Security Cases of the Sixties and Seventies
The main threat to the established order was perceived as coining 
from the protest movements in the 60s and 70s, but the loyalty-security 
measures of the 30s remained in the statute books and were invoked, 
albeit more sparingly, against communists and subversives of the old 
type. As the communist danger, real or imaginary, had receded in the 
late 60s, the Supreme Court started to address more boldly the 
theoretical and legal problems created by the persisting loyalty-security 
complex.
200In U.S. v. Robel the Court dealt with the constitutionality of 
section 5(a)(1)(D) of the Internal Security Act, under which once a 
group was under final order to register as a communist-action organisation 
its members were barred from "any employment in any defense facility". 
Robel, a communist, was employed as a machinist in a privately owned 
shipyard which had been designated as a defence facility. When he 
continued to work there, after the Supreme Court had upheld the S.A.C.B. 
order against the Communist Party to register as a communist-action 
organisation, Robel was indicted for violation of the section. The 
Supreme Court in a 6-2 decision dismissed the indictment.
Chief Justice Warren found that the statute "sweeps indiscriminately
across all types of association with Communist-action groups, without
regard to the quality and degree of membership /and thvyj/ runs afoul of
201the First Amendment". The section did not distinguish, as it stood, 
between active and knowing members of the Communist Party and others 
who could not be prosecuted for C.P. membership, according to the 
criteria established in Scales. Furthermore the section did not 
distinguish between sensitive and non-sensitive positions in defence 
facilities, thus excluding communists from all employment irrespective
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of the security problems involved. These two characteristics made the 
statute an unconstitutional violation of the rights of expression and 
association.
"The statute quite literally establishes guilt by 
association alone, without any need to establish that 
an individual's association poses the threat feared 
by the Government in proscribing it. The inhibiting 
effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights is 
clear... That statute casts its net across a broad 
range of associational activities, indiscriminately 
trapping membership which can be constitutionally 
punished and membership which cannot be so proscribed.
It is made irrelevant to the statute's operation that 
an individual may be a passive or inactive member of 
a designated organization, that he may be unaware of 
the organization's unlawful aims, or that he may 
disagree with those unlawful aims. It is also made 
irrelevant that an individual who is subject to the 
penalties of 5(a)(1)(D) may occupy a nonsensitive 
position in a defense facility. Thus, 5(a)(1)(D) 
contains the fatal defect of overbreadth because it 
seeks to bar employment both for association which 
may be proscribed and for association which may not be 
proscribed consistently with First Amendment rights."202
The Court recognised that there existed a valid state interest in 
preventing espionage and sabotage in defence facilities. It stressed, 
however, that when First Amendment freedoms are involved the legislature 
should achieve its valid goal by devising means which have a "less 
drastic" impact on the continued vitality of First Amendment freedoms.
In Robel the Supreme Court indicated that the state interest in
national security could be validly served through general loyalty
screening programmes of defence facilities employees. Such a programme
203came up for review in Schneider v. Smith. ^ The Magnusson Act required 
that all applicants for seagoing employment obtain a certificate stating 
that their employment "would not be inimical to the security of the 
United States". The power to issue the certificates had been delegated 
by the President to the Coast Guard. Schneider applied for a job as a 
second assistant engineer and was asked to answer a questionnaire 
relating to his political beliefs and association. He stated that he
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did not advocate the forcible overthrow of the government but that he had 
been a member of some organisations on the Attorney-General * s list. When 
he was requested to answer a number of more detailed questions, he 
refused and sought a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the 
Coast Guard*s power to deny him employment. A district court dismissed 
the suit but the Supreme Court reversed unanimously.
Justice Douglas construed the Act narrowly and avoided the question 
of its constitutionality. Despite the obvious legislative purpose of 
the Act, he stated that "we are loath to conclude that Congress in its 
grant of authority to the President to safeguard vessels and waterfront 
facilities from sabotage or other subversive acts, undertook to reach 
into the First Amendment area" and that "we hesitate to conclude that 
Congress told the Executive to ferret out the ideological strays in the 
maritime i n d u s t r y " . S i n c e  Schneider was not charged with any acts 
inimical to the security of the United States his beliefs and 
associations could not become the ground for refusal of employment.
In three cases decided on the same day in 1971 the Court returned
to the loyalty investigations for admission to the Bar. In Baird v.
205State Bar of Arizona J petitioner had been denied admission because she 
refused to answer whether she had ever been a member of the Communist 
Party or any other subversive organisation. She had answered nevertheless 
another question listing all organisations she had associated with since 
the age of sixteen.
Justice Black wrote the plurality opinion and reversed the Arizona 
Supreme Court which had upheld the Bar Committee*s refusal. He referred 
to the cases of Anastaplo. Königsberg and Schware. which had dealt with 
the issue in the 50s and concluded that they "contain thousands of pages 
of confusing formulas, refined reasonings and puzzling holdings that touch 
on the same suspicions and fears about citizenship and loyalty". The
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issue was a "divisive and bitter" one and should be resolved in a simple 
way: "narrate its simple facts and then relate them to the 45 words that 
make up the First Amendment". Thus Justice Black returned to his 
"absolute" theory of freedom of expression and quoted from the cases of 
the 40s which had developed the "preferred freedom" position. Having 
made clear his theoretical basis he went on to resolve the case 
accordingly overruling in the process the earlier Bar admission 
decisions.
"[A] state may not inquire about a man*s views or 
associations solely for the purpose of withholding a 
right or benefit because of what he believes... Without 
detailed reference to all prior cases, it is sufficient 
to say we hold that views and beliefs are immune from 
bar association inquisitions designed to lay a 
foundation for barring an applicant from the practice 
of law. "207
Furthermore, Black held that the practice of law is not "a matter
of grace, but of right for one who is qualified by his learning or his
imoral character". Justice Stewart concurred in a separate opinion while
four Justices dissented.
208In He Stolar the issue was resolved in a similar way to Baird 
and produced the same divisions among the Justices. In that case the 
applicant, a member of the New York Bar seeking admission to the Ohio 
Bar, had refused to answer one question about his membership of 
subversive organisations and two more requesting a list of all organ­
isations of which he had been a member "since registering as a law 
student".
Justice Black again rejected the various reasons advanced by the 
state for putting the questions. Citing Shelton v. Tucker^ ^  he held 
that "law students who know they must survive this screening process 
before practising their profession are encouraged to protect their 
future by shunning unpopular or controversial organisations" and 
concluded that not one overt act existed in the record that could cast
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doubt on Stolar's moral character or professional fitness. For the
dissenters the "crux" of the matter was that "to forestall inquiry at the
threshold stultifies Ohio's appropriate concern as to faithful adherence
to a lawyer's trust when the state is about to rest great professional
210and fiduciary power in those who seek entrance to the Bar".
In the third case (Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v.
211Wadmond) a number of organisations and individuals representing a class
of law students and graduates attacked on constitutional grounds the
screening procedures of the New fork Bar for determining the character
and fitness of applicants. Justice Stewart, who had given a decisive
fifth vote in the first two cases, changed camps and wrote the 5-4
opinion which upheld the constitutionality of the practice.
He first sustained the "character and fitness" requirement of the
screening procedure in general and then went on to examine the
constitutionality of certain specific questions. Questions about past
membership of subversive organisations were found constitutional since
they were put in terms which followed the "knowing and intentional"
membership requirements of Scales. Returning to the ruling of Königsberg.
the Court held that "/TTt is also well settled that Bar examiners may ask about
Communist affiliations as preliminary to further inquiry into the nature
of the association and may exclude an applicant for refusal to answer...
Surely a state is constitutionally entitled to make such an inquiry of
an applicant for admission to a profession dedicated to the peaceful and
reasoned settlement of disputes between men* and between a man and his 
212government". Finally on the general challenge that the screening
*  '
system had a serious "chilling effect" on the exercise of the rights 
to speech and association the Court held that this was an argument 
based solely on policy and therefore outside its power and Jurisdiction.
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The four Justices, who held the majority position in Baird and 
Stolar. dissented. Black repeated the same accusations that had been 
levelled against him in those cases: "I do not see how today*s decision 
can be reconciled with other decisions of the Court". He was particularly 
incensed by one question which asked the applicants to affirm that they 
are "without any mental reservation, loyal to and ready to support the 
Constitution of the U.S.". He found the "mental reservation" 
requirement overbroad and the whole question an unconstitutional exercise 
reserving the law profession to those who hdLd certain unspecified loyal 
beliefs.
"Perhaps almost anyone would be stunned if a State 
sought to take away a man's house because he failed 
to prove his loyalty or refused to answer questions 
about his political beliefs. But it seems to me that 
New York is attempting to deprive people of the right 
to practice law for precisely these reasons,and the 
Court is approving its actions."213
In Connell v. Higginbotham^ ^ the Court dealt with the loyalty oaths 
required from school teachers in Florida. In a per curium decision it 
upheld the part of the oath stating "that I will support the Constitution 
of the United States and the State of Florida" but invalidated another 
provision according to which the oathtaker should disclaim the belief in 
the violent overthrow of the government. The provision was struck 
because it led to "summary dismissal from public employment without hearing 
or inquiry". Befusal to take the oath was made a "conclusive, irrebutable
proof of the proscribed belief", thus violating due process requirements.
215In Cole v. Richardson. however, the Supreme Court sustained the 
Ma8sachus8etts loyalty oath "to uphold and defend the Constitution...
[and to] oppose the overthrow of the government... by force, violence 
or any illegal or unconstitutional means" required from all state 
employees. The oath had been demanded by the Boston State Hospital in 
which Richardson had been employed as a research sociologist. When she
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re fused to take it she was dismissed but the District Court granted an 
injunction against the hospital finding the second part of the oath 
"fatally vague and unspecific". The Supreme Court reversed, per Chief 
Justice Burger.
Dismissing summarily the challenge against the first, the Chief
Justice addressed himself to the second part of the oath. He ststed that
the District Court was wrongly troubled by the oath. By defining the
word "oppose" in a too literalist way, it came to the unwarranted
conclusion that the oathtaking imposed "nebulous, undefined responsibilities
for action in some hypothetical situations". Such an approach of
"dissection with a semantic scalpel could make any word vague and ambiguous"
and was little more than "verbal calisthenics". According to the Court's
"non-literal" analysis, the second part was a "repetition" of the first;
the word "oppose", being "the negative implication" of "support" for the
constitutional system as demanded by the first clause, was "redundant".
This semantic redundancy was not of constitutional interest: "[we] are
not charged with correcting grammar (sic) but with enforcing a 
216constitution". Furthermore the Court held that the oath was a mere
"amenity", that no criminal prosecution was threatened for refusal to
take it and that it was not a part of an "endless parade of horribles".2^
The fact that refusal to take the oath led to dismissal without any hearing,
which was relied upon in Connell. was not one of the "horribles", since
the oath was constitutional. Three Justices dissented. For Douglas
the oath was a direct violation of First Amendment rights in addition
to being vague and overbroad. Referring to his Brandenburg dictum that
the line between permissible and prohibited state control is one "between
ideas and overt acts", he stated that the oath requires from people to
pledge that they "'oppose' that which [they have] an indisputable right 
218to advocate"
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During the same year the Court endorsed the lnng standing practice
of the Executive to refuse visas to foreign '•subversives" wishing to
219visit the United States. In Kleindienst v. Mandel the renowned Belgian 
Marxist economist was refused entry under a provision of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act which excludes aliens "who write or publish... the 
economic, international and governmental doctrines of world communism". 
The Attorney-General could grant a temporary waiver, which he refused. 
Mandel had been invited for a lecture tour at various colleges and a 
number of professors joined him in bringing a suit against the Attorney 
General. The District Court found that the exclusion violated the 
professors' rights to hear Mandel and engage in free academic debate but 
the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Blackmun stated that a "facially 
legitimate and bona fide reason" existed for Mandel's exclusion and that 
no serious First Amendment rights were involved in the case. Thus the 
Court assured the Executive for one more time, as the dissent put it, 
that it would not question "the discretion to pick and choose among the
ArtA
ideological offerings which alien lecturers tender from our platforms".
Finally, two years later the loyalty oath requirement for access to
221the ballot was dealt with in ComTmir|,t «t Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb.
Under Indiana law all candidates for elective offices should pledge by 
oath that they do not advocate the "overthrow of local, state or National 
Government by force or violence". The Communist Party refused to 
comply and its candidate for the Presidency was denied a place on the 
Indiana ballot for the 1972 elections. Its efforts to obtain injunctive 
relief against the Indiana Election Board failed. It subsequently 
submitted an affidavit qualifying the oath in accordance with the 
Supreme Court Yates decision, which was rejected by the Board. In 1974 
the Supreme Court invalidated the oath as violative of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Counsel for the state argued that the oath should
-  471 "
be sustained even though it did not distinguish between advocacy of 
abstract doctrine and advocacy of action as required by Yates for the 
criminal prosecution of communists and subversives. In addition he 
maintained that the Communist Party was a "fraudulent group" disguising 
itself as a political party. Justice Brennan rejected all these 
contentions. The differentiation between advocacy of abstract doctrine 
and action should be extended to the field of politics proper. The 
right to exercise the "franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is 
preservative of other basic civil and political rights" and the interest 
in free and effective political action should be treated at least as 
favourably as the ones in "public employment, tax exemption or the 
practice of l a w " . ^
Thus some 25 years after Dennis the Supreme Court admitted the
Communist Party in the national political life as a legitimate political
group. In itself the decision was an important one and has since been
denounced by a constitutional author for putting the Communist Party on
223an equal footing with other legitimate parties. On the other hand, 
as the Wadmond and Hichardson decisions above show, past or present 
membership of the Communist Party and adherence to assorted subversive 
beliefs continued to be used as a ground for the refusal of various rights 
and benefits. While a politically annihilated party was finally recognised 
as legal, communists, ex-communists and "subversives" were still harassed 
and discriminated against. As it has been argued in the previous chapter 
the legal persecution of the Communist Party in the 50s was used more as a 
springboard for the setting up of a framework proscribing radical ideas 
and people rather than as a goal in itself. In this sense, even though 
a period of formal restrictions on the Communist Party was undisputedly 
brought to an end by the Indiana case, important components of the 
loyalty-security complex remained intact to be utilized in some new era 
of moral and political panic.
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It is instructive at this point to compare the vaccilating decisions
of the Court in the area of loyalty oaths with a recent decision in which
a state-imposed obligation to publicly state a certain political message
conflicted with the religious beliefs of followers of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses sect. A New Hampshire statute required all non-commercial motor
vehicles to bear number plates with the state motto "Live Free or Lie".
Obscuring the motto was a misdemeanour. A couple of Witnesses found the
motto repugnant to their "moral, religious and political beliefs", covered
it and the husband was subsequently three times charged and twice convicted
to small fines under the statute. The Listrict Court granted an
injunction against future arrests and prosecutions and the Supreme Court
224in Wooley v. Maynard affirmed.
The opinion was written by Chief Justice Burger who treated the New 
Hampshire statute as imposing upon individuals the obligation to disseminate 
publicly non-held ideological beliefs. The statute, Burger held, "requires 
that appellees use their private property as a ’mobile billboard* for the 
state’s ideological message - or suffer a penalty... [and] display "Live 
Free or Lie" to hundreds of people each day". Burger, therefore, viewed 
the motto embossed on all cars as a compulsory public affirmation of belief 
to a particular ideology and in doing so he identified the case with the 
earlier Cole where he had sustained the loyalty oath on the ground that 
the public affirmation of non-subversive ideas was a valid requirement for 
state employment. Ironically, however, the only valid precedent that he 
utilised to resolve the conflict in Maynard was the 1943 Barnette case 
while none of the intervening loyalty oath cases was mentioned. Based 
nn 'the early flag salute case, Burger found the statutory requirement 
an unconstitutional invasion in the sphere of "intellect and spirit".
The right to speak and to refrain from speaking were declared the 
"complementary components of the broader concept of ’individual freedom
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of mind*". The First Amendment "protects the individuals to hold a point
of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster... an idea
they find morally objectionable". Finally the state interest in promoting
"appreciation of history, individualism and state pride" was not
ideologically neutral and could not outweigh the individual right "to
225avoid becoming the courier for such message".
These were sweeping and startling statements, if one compares the form 
and content of the expression and of the penalties involved in Maynard 
with those in the loyalty oaths cases, where remaining silent was 
construed not as a right but as the standard of criminal liability and 
the reason for severe penalties. A further irony of the case was that 
the three dissenting Justices, who were among the foremost supporters of 
the loyalty oaths, argued that the. case was wrongly decided because no 
compulsory affirmation of beliefs was involved. Expressive rights are 
implicated according to Justice Behnquist, probably the most conservativej
Justice of the period, only when the citizen is placed in the position of 
either apparently or actually "asserting as true" the messages. But 
when such assertions were indisputably requested from citizens,
Behnquist had always sustained the demand.
Wooley falls in the category of cases in which the Court employed a 
wide theory of thought, conscience and speech protection. As such it 
may replace in constitutional treatises the earlier Barnette decision, 
as a standard indication of the liberal spirit of the Supreme Court.
But when it is compared with the loyalty oath cases which raised 
substantially similar questions, Wooley may be put in its proper 
perspective. The liberal rhetoric was used in order to distinguish and 
protect the claims of a small and eccentric, religious minority. The 
"intellect and spirit" of radical, political dissenters have been 
consistently accorded a much lower degree of protection.
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D. Freedom of the Press and the Constitutionalisation of the Law of Libel
The most important departure in First Amendment theory and legal 
doctrine in the period tinder consideration, was made in the area of libel 
law. Before the 1964 New York Times v. Sullivan decision, the Supreme 
Court had made clear that both civil and criminal libel were outside the 
protection of the First Amendment and were ruled by the differing common
22Q
law or statutory standards of the various states. In its famous Chaplinsky
decision the Supreme Court had distinguished between utterances protected
by the free speech clause and others which are "no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight value as a step to truth" and
had included libellous statements in the second category. The Chaplinsky
229statement and other similar dicta did not address the relation between 
libel law and freedom of speech.. It included libel and other categories 
of speech (the lewd and obscene, the profane, the insulting or "fighting 
words") in the list of unprotected utterances, by a question begging 
process of definitional categorization without any further explanation. 
However, when the Court came to discuss in detail the relationship between 
defamation and freedom of speech, in the New York Times case, the result 
was an almost complete reversal of its earlier rulings.
The Times case arose out of the Southern efforts to harass and 
suppress the civil rights movement. In the Southern demonology of 
subversives, the Eastern liberal press, which had adopted a pro-civil 
rights editorial policy, ranked high. When the New York Times carried 
an advertisement by a Civil Bights Committee denouncing various civil 
rights violations in Montgomery, Alabama, the Commissioner of Public 
Affairs of that city brought a libel suit in Alabama and obtained an 
award of $500>000 in damages, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court 
of that state. The main basis of the excessively high award was a number
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of factual errors that had appeared in the paid advertisement: M.L. King 
had not been arrested seven times, as the advertisement asserted, but only 
four; the police had been deployed in force near a college campus where 
students were protesting, but had not "ringed” it; the students had 
boycotted the classes but had not refused to re-register, and so on. The
fact that the gist of the allegations had not been refuted by Sullivan;
2*0that only thirty-five copies of the paper had been sold in Montgomery; 
and the level of the damages award made the case a clear example of 
Southern intimidation of the national liberal press through the use of 
state libel law.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the political undertones of 
the libel award assured reversal which, indeed, was unanimous. But in 
the process of reversing the state courts* decision, Justice Brennan, 
who wrote the opinion for the Supreme Court, went out of his way and 
made several general statements both on the theory and justification of 
freedom of expression and on the "technical” aspects of libel law.
He started by stating that although the state courts had construed 
the Times advertisement as a libellous statement, constitutional 
scrutiny was not precluded. He thus cleared the way for the invocation 
of the First Amendment and went on to explain the import of the clause.
The Amendment amounts to a "profound national commitment to the principle 
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open, 
and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly 
sharp attacks on governmental and public officials".^ Under this rule, 
the advertisement qualified, on its face, for constitutional protection
t
and the Court examined in this light the principles of Alabama*s libel 
law. The falsity of the statements was rejected as the basis for 
denying constitutional protection: "factual error affords no warrant 
for repressing speech that would otherwise be free"; injury to official
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reputation did not suffice, either: "the right of free public discussion 
of the stewardship of public officials is a fundamental principle of the 
American form of government"! finally, a combination of factual error 
and injury to official reputation was equally inadequate to "remove the 
shield from criticism of official conduct... This is the lesson to be 
drawn from the great controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798... which 
first crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of the 
First Amendment".
Brennan reviewed the "great controversy" and concluded that the 
"attack upon [the] validity [of the Sedition Act] has carried the day in 
the court of history". Thus, the Act was declared unconstitutional 166 
years after its enactment. According to the Court, seditious libel had 
no place in the American legal system. The traditional law of libel 
created a sort of self-censorship by forcing people "to make only
It
statements which steer far wider of the unlawful zone . Its standards
should be, therefore, relaxed in accordance with the underlying
philosophy of the First Amendment.
"The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a 
federal, rule that prohibits a public official from 
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating 
to his official conduct unless he proves that the 
statement was made with 1actual malice* - that is, 
with knowledge that it wan false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not'.'233
Justice Brennan remanded the case because it was impossible to
determine whether the Alabama courts had followed the "actual malice"
rule. He indicated, however, after an "independent examination of the
whole record" that the evidence could not support a new finding against
*
the'Times under the new rules. Justice Black, Douglas and Goldberg 
concurred in the result, but stated that "actual malice" is an "elusive, 
abstract concept hard to prove and hard to disprove". They proposed 
instead, an "unconditional right to say what one pleases about public
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affairs... [this] is the minimum guarantee of the First Amendment".2^
The New York Times decision has been greeted as a landmark one and
as "the best and most important (the Supreme Court) has ever produced
235in the freedom of speech”. "It is an occasion for dancing in the
streets”, Alex.Meiklejohn enthused and his disciple H. Kalven underlined
the fact that the Court discarded in it all previous legal doctrines
in favour of an almost absolute protection of political speech. Kalven
predicted that "the invitation to follow a dialectic progression from
public official to government policy to public policy to matters in the
public domain, like art, seems... to be overwhelming". 0 But in an
article written in the aftermath of the New York Times decision its
author Justice Brennan stated that the Supreme Court had not adopted
nor did it intend to. adopt the "absolutist" position advocated by
237Meiklejohn and Kalven,
Thus, under the Times rule, libellous statements were declared a
category of speech which was not, by definition, outside the protection
of the First Amendment. But subsequent Supreme Court rulings that
sprung from the principles enunciated in Times were cautious. The
Times rule did not spill over, against Kalven’s prediction, to other
areas of public discourse and was invoked exclusively in cases involving
alleged defamatory statements about the official conduct of public
officials and public figures. In these cases, the "Times progeny" so
to speak, the Supreme Court gradually removed the differences between
the various state jurisdictions and imposed on the states the libel law
principles enunciated in the Times case.
238In Garrison v. Louisiana the Times rule was applied to a 
prosecution for criminal libel. The Court reversed the conviction of 
the District Attorney of New Orleans who had accused the city judges 
for inefficiency, laziness and racketeer connections. The Court stated
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that although some statements relating to the fitness of public officials 
could impinge upon their private reputation, this was not enough reason
for the relaxation of the Times rule.
239In Rosenblatt v. Baer ^ a first sign of tension in the evolving 
libel case law became evident. The question was whether the application 
of the Times rule was determined by the nature of the issues involved 
or by the character of the defamation plaintiffs as public officials. 
Justice B*ennan for the majority adopted the second course. He did not 
offer a definition of the term "public official" but he stated that the 
"..designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of 
government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, 
substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental 
affairs".2^0 Justice Douglas found this rule inadequate and thought that 
the question should be "..whether a public issue, not a public official, is 
involved".2^
In two 1967 cases2^2 the Court added the category of "public figures" 
to that of public officials. An athletics director and a retired general 
were found to be "public figures" because "they commanded a substantial 
amount of independent public interest at the time of the (libellous) 
publications". Their libel suits against a newspaper and the Associated 
Press news agency, respectively, should be examined tinder the Times 
rule. Pour Justices stated that in cases involving the defamation of 
public figures a less stringent rule should be followed for the award 
of damages. A "public figure" who is not a public official should be 
able to recover damages for a defamatory falsehood "on a showing of
f
highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the 
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by 
responsible publishers".2^  But according to Chief Justice Warren and
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the Court majority, the differentiation between public officials and 
figures has no basis in "law, logic or First Amendment policy" and 
cannot be used as the standard for the relaxation of the Times rule. 
Warren pointed at the blurring of the public/private line: "This blending 
of positions and power has also occurred in the case of individuals so 
that many who do not hold public office at the moment are nevertheless 
intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, 
by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society 
at large".2^  Public figures, too, ’should prove "actual malice" in order 
to recover defamation damages.
The Times rule was next extended to all candidates for public office. 
A candidate, the Court reasoned, puts all aspects of his life in front 
of the electorate, for public scrutiny. Thus when he "seeks to further 
his cause through the prominent display of his wife and children [he] 
can hardly argue that his qualities as a husband or father remain of 
•purely private* concern". All statements about a candidate were found 
relevant to his fitness for office.
But in Goldwater v. Ginzburg. 4 the Court denied certiorari and 
affirmed the award of substantive damages against the publisher of a 
magazine which had printed an article arguing that B. Goldwater was 
psychologically unfit to become president.
In St. Amant v. Thompson.2^  the Court distinguished the "reckless 
disregard of truth" part of the actual malice rule from the similar 
concept of the law of negligence. For libel law purposes reckless 
disregard is not "measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would 
have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There 
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant 
in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication".2^6
In the case of Rosenbloom v. Metromeda •the Court moved toward the 
Biack-Douglas position who had consistently argued throughout the series 
of libel cases that libel suits had no place within the system of freedom 
of press. In that case, a distributor of pornographic magazines had 
obtained #750,000 in damages for a series of allegedly defamatory 
broadcasts which had followed his arrest and trial for criminal obscenity 
in which he was found not guilty. The Supreme Court reversed the award 
of damages and extended the "actual malice" rule to statements about 
people outside the public domain proper.
Justice Brennan stated that the public had an interest in the event 
"the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and significance 
of the conduct, not the participant’s prior anonymity or notoriety". A 
subject of public interest does not lose its importance because a private 
person was involved in it. The commitment to an uninhibited, robust 
debate on public issues should extend to all matters of "public or 
general concern".
The extension of the strict defamation rule to private persons
undermined one of the reasons given in earlier cases for the creation of
the rule. As Justice Goldberg had argued in the New York Times case, for
example, "the public official certainly has equal if not greater access
than most private citizens to media of communication" and could, therefore,
250reply to any misstatements and falsehoods that affected his reputation.
Public officials and figures were assumed to be able to upset the adverse
effects on their reputation through their greater capacity of access to
the media. But in Rosenbloom. the Court rejected a petitioner's
objection to'the extension of the "actual malice" rule based on the access
assumption. Denials and retractions of news stories were not "hot" news
even if they were made by public officials; their publications depended
251solely upon the continuing interest of the mèdia in the story.
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Furthermore, as the American commitment to private property placed vast
economic and social power in private hands "we are virtually all •public*
men to some degree". The distinction between public figures, whose
entire life was open to public scrutiny, and private citizens concealed
from all "public view" was an untenable "legal fiction". Thus, the Court
rejected in Rosenbloom a differentiation in the rules of recovery of
defamation damages, based on the different opportunities of public and
private citizens; it added that the states could improve the capacity
of private citizens to respond to adverse publicity and took notice of
an article by Professor Barron which argues for the creation of a legal
252right of access to the media.
Rosenbloom indicated that the Court was moving toward an extension
of the applicability of the Times rule; it left the earlier distinction
between public officials and figures and private citizens in some
253confusion. However, in G^rtz v. Welch Inc.. the Court drew back from
this position. In that case, the libel plaintiff was a Chicago attorney
who had been accused by a magazine that he was involved in a conspiracy
to discredit the police and that he was a fellow traveller. The lower
federal courts had applied the Times rule and had concluded that the
petitioner failed to prove actual malice on the part of the publishers.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded.
Justice Powell, for the Court, drew a distinction between false
and pernicious ideas and false statements of facts. He accepted
that although lies are not worthy of constitutional protection,
they are inevitable in free debate, and their limited protection
, »was one of, the main results of the Times rule and its progeny.
The change of the common law rules of defamation was motivated by the 
"need to avoid self-censorship by the news media". The interest in free 
public debate should be balanced, however, against the social interest 
underlying the law of libel, that in the protection of individual
reputation. This protection is a reflection of the "basic concept of
the essential dignity of every human being - a concept at the root of
any decent system of ordered l i b e r t y " . T h e  interest in human dignity
is more at stake when the libel plaintiffs are private individuals.
Public officials have greater access to the mass media and have voluntarily
accepted the risk of closer public scrutiny. Equally these public
figures who "have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs
of society... /ox who/ occupy positions of... persuasive power...
have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues 
255involved". However, the Court sounded a cautionary note on this
access based theory of the Times rule. Although public officials and
figures have greater access to the media in order to rebuff unfair
criticisms, even they need some protection from false factual statements,
256since "truth never catches up with the lie". Thus, the Court rejected 
the Rosenbloom ruling, according to which the 'general or public interest" 
of the issues involved determined the applicability of the Times rule, 
and returned to the earlier distinction based on the status of the 
plaintiffs. In a further attempt at a meaningful definition of the 
category of "public figures" the Court held that some individuals 
become public figures for a limited range of issues and that a case-by- 
case examination of the "nature and extent of an individual*s 
participation" in a particular public controversy should decide his 
status.
When however the plaintiff is a private individual the balance 
should be struck in favour of the interest in reputation and the strict, 
rules should not apply. The Court held that liability for the defamation 
of private citizens exists when the publisher is "at fault" (without 
explaining this term which however is less strict than "actual malice"); 
in cases where "actual malice" is not proven presumed or punitive 
damages should not be awarded and the compensation should be commensurate
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Following Gertz. the Court continued to refine its definition of 
public figures. A research assistance who had gained access to the media 
in order to respond to the announcement of a derogatory "award” given to 
him by a Senator for wasting public money, had not become a public 
figure by that fact alone. (Hutchinson v. Proxmire). The media cannot 
create a "public figure" merely by quoting a person in a limited context, 
and then claim the protection of the Times rule. One of the "accoutrements 
of having become a public figure is the regular and continuing access 
to the media", the Court held.2'*8 In another 1979 case (Wolston v.
Headers1 Digest Assoc.), petitioner had been named as a KGB agent in a 
"spy-revealing" book. Volston had been convicted in 1958 for contempt 
of court, because he had failed to respond to a subpoena of a grand jury 
investigating Soviet espionage, but no further action had been taken 
against him. The Court rejected the contention that "any person who Nj
engages in criminal conduct automatically becomes a public figure";
such a rule "would create an open season for all who sought to defame
259persons convicted of a crime".
As we saw the evolution of the federal constitutional rules of libel
law were connected with the question of access to the media. Indeed in
Rosenbloom the Court indicated that the creation of a legal right of
access could be seen as compensating the increasing difficulty of public
and private persons in recovering defamation damages. In Miami Herald
260Publishing Co. v. Tornillo. the Court addressed the problem of access 
to the press in reply to newspapers attacks. Toroillo, the leader of a 
teachers1 union, was a candidate in the Democratic primaries for the 
Florida House of,Representatives elections. The Miami Herald attacked 
editorially his candidature, on two occasions, and accused him for the 
role he had played in an earlier official union strike. Toroillo asked 
the newspaper to print a reply to the attacks. He based his request on
a little used Florida statute which obliged newspapers to publish, free 
of cost, the replies of candidates for public office whose personal 
character or official record had been assailed. The newspaper refused 
to publish and Tomillo brought a suit for declaratory and injunctive 
relief. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
"right to reply" statute and granted the injunction, but the Supreme 
C0urt reversed unanimously.
Chief Justice Burger reviewed favourably the literature arguing for 
the creation of a legal right of access to the media (constitutionally 
or statutorily enforced) which was put before the Court by Professor J. 
Barron, the leading exponent in the field. He took notice of the 
communication revolution, of the trend toward media concentration and 
monopolization, and of the economic factors that "have made entry into
26*tthe marketplace of ideas served by the print media almost impossible".
Bbwever, after the sympathetic review of the pro-access material, the
Court invalidated the Florida statute as a violation of the freedom of
the press._ The implementation of a statutorily enforced right of
access called for the creation of a mechanism which would be necessarily
censorial, reasoned the Court. The obligation to provide space for
replies free of cost would "dampen the vigor and limit the variety of
public debate" by forcing editors to avoid controversial topics. As
the right of access to the media could be neither constitutionally enforced
nor statutorily created, the Court accepted that the power of a newspaper
to advance its political, social and economic views is limited, solely,
262by considerations of financial success and editorial integrity. "A 
responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility 
is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues cannot 
be legislated". Notwithstanding these passing remarks about editorial 
integrity and responsibility, the Court1s opinion was categorical: "The
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choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to
limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public
issues and public officials - whether fair or unfair - constitute the
exercise of editorial control and judgment". ^ Thus, for the first time
in its history, the Supreme Court adopted a doctrine of almost absolute
protection of speech - whether fair or unfair - but only for the publishers
and editors of the mass print media. Even one of the leading opponents
of the creation of a legal right of access to the media regrets the weak
reasoning and absolute language of the decision. "Prom the perspective
of First Amendment law generally, Miami Herald would be a stark and
unexplained deviation if one were to read the decision as creating
absolute prohibition on access obligations. One would expect some
264rationalization in support of such a course".
In the New York Times case the First Amendment was declared to have
as its central meaning "the uninhibited, robust and wide open public
debate"; the Times progeny allegedly materialized this principle by
gradually freeing the print industry from the barriers of traditional
defamation law. The Miami Herald ruling, ten years after the Times
case, may be seen as an extension of the same process. The free public
debate rationale of Times was applied almost exclusively to cases related
to the print media. Thus, at the end, it became subdued to an absolutely
sounding principle of editorial autonomy. In the process, the original
"free market of ideas" rationale was lost. As B. Schmidt approvingly
concludes his review of Miami Herald: "The Court sees a core principle
in the First Amendment from which it will not exact instrumental
justification... the decision represents a judicial preference for the
principle of publisher autonomy over the competing policies of diversity 
265of expression". J This core principle of editorial autonomy resembles 
the "guarantees of religious liberty" while the "policies of diversity of
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expression and equality may have to find their primary outlet in the
266guarantee of freedom of speech" and they are, therefore, only of 
secondaiy importance.
E. The Supreme Court, Legal Doctrine and the Public Sphere
9. Facets of Protest
9.1. The early civil rights movement
The civil rights movement brought back to the Supreme Court the 
question of public activities in the public forum. The earlier Jehovahfs 
Witnesses and trade union cases had addressed the problem, but the pre­
occupation of both legislatures and the judiciary with dangerous ideas, 
during the fifties, had suspended the examination of public forum issues.
"The problem receded and the story of the streets became a bit quaint. We
were likely to regard the law that had been developed as one that
267concerned a luxury civil liberty". ' When the problem re-appeared in the
Isixties, it could no more be considered as a luxury. Combining a massive 
character, a variety of protest methods and a deeply felt sense of injustice, 
the civil rights movement could not be construed as a temporary aberration 
or as the annoying but innocuous antics of an eccentric minority. Thus, 
while it attacked the systematic violations of civil rights, the movement 
posed at the same time serious questions relating to civil liberties.
The protestors claim for equal treatment was inextricably linked with 
their claim to use public places as fora for airing their grievances.
The intimate connection between civil rights and civil liberties 
issues makes the black movement of the early sixties a special case, and 
the claims of expressive rights involved cannot be examined in isolation.
The fact that many of the practices that were the object of protest had been 
declared unconstitutional obviously helped the Supreme Court to uphold the
- 486-
protest activities themselves. Indeed, one category of protest which has been
268called "direct civil disobedience" involved an open violation of local 
laws and practices deemed unconstitutional, with the declared purpose of 
invoking federal Judicial intervention and invalidations of the offending 
laws (for example sit-ins in statutorily segregated places). In such 
cases the protest activities had the dual purpose of publicizing 
grievances and of setting in motion federal authorities against 
recalcitrant or feet-dragglng local ones. The Court had little difficult y 
in protecting such protest activities. Local law-breaking was dealt with 
as a legitimate self-help tactic that appealed above the heads of local 
majorities and courts to the higher rationality and Justice embodied in 
the Federal Constitution. To facilitate this process, the Court 
relaxed traditional rules of standing, inviting, thus, early appeals 
to the federal Jurisdiction, To the extent that the protestors were 
prepared to accept punishment for their disobedience and place the fate
of their cause at the hands of federal Judges, accepting the ultimate
269morality of the legal system as a whole, ' the protest tactics 
were sustained and local convictions were reversed.
Thus, the early sit-in cases were dealt with as an inseparable whole: 
if the content of the claim (equality of treatment, desegregation) was 
deemed valid, its form (the particular protest activity) was upheld, too.
This identification of the form and content of the various claims was most 
easily effected when the particular discriminatory practice was ordered by 
state or local law. However, the concept of "state action", which was 
extensively used in those cases, could not serve equally well when the 
discrimination was a,result of long established but not legally 
sanctioned community practices or of the uncoerced decisions of the owners 
of private establishments. Similarly, when the protestors were convicted 
under general statutes, unobjectionable on equal protection grounds
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(criminal trespass, breach of peace, disorderly conduct), the "state 
action" rationale and the collapse of expressive claims to the underlying 
substantive ones could not be easily used. In the former category of 
cases and up to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 19 6 4* the doctrine of
state action was utilised in order to uphold the sit-ins, but it was
270considerably strained. (See, for example, Lombard and Griffin). When 
the 19 6 4 Act put an end to segregation in publicly used facilities and 
the sit-in wave subsided, the Supreme Court was forced to deal in a more 
direct way with traditional protest activities in the public fora, like 
assemblies, marches, demonstrations and picketing.
What becomes immediately apparent from the examination of the relevant
cases, is that the Court avoided the formulation of any coherent theoretical
or doctrinal approach which could serve as the backbone for the decision of
concrete cases. Indeed, the few general pronouncements that can be found
are usually elliptic and contradictory. Thus, Justice Harlan stated in
Gamer that sit-ins are "as much part of the free trade in ideas as is verbal
expression". In Edwards, the march and the picketing was declared an
exercise of basic constitutional rights in their "most pristine and
classic foxm". But in Cox, the Court reintroduced the concept of lower
level expressive activities - "patrolling, marching and picketing on
streets and highways" - that cannot be afforded "the same kind of freedom
as pure speech". Justice Black took an even more extreme position and
declared that patrolling and marching were pure conduct, as distinguished
from speech, and their regulation or prohibition only incidentally
affected expressive rights. In Brown the Court went back and stated
that freedom of speech includes the right of "peaceable and orderly protest
by silent and reproachful presence". But in Adderley the old theory
according to which the Government, as the owner of public places, can
exclude public protest from its property as any other private owner,
271repudiated in Hague v. C.I.O., was resurrected by Black.
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It can be argued, however, that with the appearance of black militancy
and the anti-war movement, in the mid-sixties, the Court moved towards a
more conservative approach. The conceptual and constitutional status of
the protest activities remained obscure, but the decisions reflect a
growing intolerance toward even the peaceful and good natured protest
activities. H. Kalven concludes his exhaustive review of Cox, by
stating that the Court chose to discard its "fine tradition” of public
272fora precedents and that it distorted the facts of the case. T. Baer son,
who has taken a more critical attitude toward the case law, concludes
equally that the Supreme Court "came close to abandoning the doctrine that
there is an "inmemorial right" to use the streets, parks and other public
273places for purposes of assembly and petition".
Thus, after the end of the sit-in cases, the Court failed to accord
any particular importance to the continuing civil rights or to the
growing anti-war protests. The earlier validation of the forms of protest
on the ground of their legitimate content came to an end and the various
protest activities were treated on a case to case basis. Any mention to
the substance of the demands that appears in the later cases is usually
dismissive, and these demands are weighed against the "paramount"
interests in internal order, tranquility and the values of the rule of
law. A clear distinction was, therefore, drawn between the earlier
demands for equality and similar grievances and forms of protest which
arrived in the courts after 1965. Justice Black*s performance was
characteristic of that change. His opinions gave the impression that
the necessary reforms were well under way, spearheaded not least by
judicial intervention, and that the continuation of dissent activities was
clearly jeopardising the achieved reforms as well as the overall "majesty 
274of the law". Justice Douglas only continued to link the protest 
activities with the substance of the grievances. He insisted that since
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the substantive demands of the protesting minorities had not been met, a 
constitutional niche for protest and disobedient activities should be 
found. Following this line, Douglas was forced to a continual and 
consistent minority position.
9.2. Equality of ideas in the public forum
While the Court did not work out any consistent theory on the 
constitutional nature of public protest, it utilised a number of 
approaches when dealing with the issues raised in each particular case.
It accepted, in general, that protest activities differ from "pure 
speech" and set up certain standards according to which the contextual 
characteristics of protest could be regulated.
When the fora of protest were public streets, parks and similar places, 
the Court insisted that the granting of licences and the prosecution of 
protestors under general breach of peace statutes and the like should 
not discriminate against certain ideas or groups. The regulation of the 
time, place or manner of the particular protest should not be used as a 
pretext for the suppression of certain unpopular messages. The concept of 
equality in the field of ideas or content neutrality in the regulation of 
the circumstances of protest was the most repeated doctrine in the cases 
of the sixties and seventies (for example, Shuttlesworth. Baohellar.
Coates and Mosley The doctrine has been greeted as a clear liberal
victory and as the judicial endorsement of the "Meiklejohn thesis" 
according to which the content of ideas should be absolutely protected 
while their presentation should be regulated by dear and non-discriminatory 
"rules or order". The Meiklejohn thesis was, however, considerably 
qualified.
First, the''equality principle was applied exclusively to public
expressive activities in streets and parks. The concept of the intrinsic 
unworthiness and dangerousness of certain political ideas remained intact 
although the "subversive" ideas of the 60s and 70s were not fully identified
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with communism, aa in the 50s.
Secondly, even within its more limited field of application, the 
principle of equality does not exclude and indeed is quite reconcilable 
with an across the board non-discriminatory prohibition of all public 
protest (Cameron v. Johnson). '
Thirdly, the application of the equality principle does not create 
great difficulties when the discrimination is ordered by a statute or ordinance 
in clear terms (as in Mosley). When, however, the statute is unobjectionable 
on its face the application of the principle is much more difficult. The 
banning of a politically undesirable demonstration can be easily couched 
in terms of traffic or noise regulation or the need for public comfort or 
convenience. Judges and juries are customarily used in the decoding of such 
legal subterfuge, to be sure. Even so, the impetus and immediate impact 
of a public protest is necessarily lost, if the protestors have to resort 
to the costly and time-consuming judicial proceedings. The problem is 
highlighted by the facts of Walker. In that case convictions arising from 
protest activities that took place in 19 6 3 were still sub judice in 1969  
(Shuttle sworth).^
Finally, even a fairly administered equality principle necessarily 
underestimates the structural inequalities of those groups which 
customarily use public fora for protest activities. Minority and radical 
groups are almost totally barred from the established and effective mass 
media, and their lack of opportunities of communication through the media 
can never be fully compensated by public protest. As a media lawyer argued, 
the equality principle has been used in order to restrict a broad right of 
access to the public fora and the decisions applying it cannot be used as 
a precedent for the creation of a right of access to the mass m e d i a . I n  
this and similar analyses a limited and controlled right of protest is seen 
as a means through which minority groups "let off steam" and accept the 
overall legitimacy of the political and social order.
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When the demonstrators move from the streets to other public places the 
picture becomes more complicated. Protest activities outside a State 
Parliament and in a library were upheld (Edwards. Brown). But those outside 
a law court, a prison and a school were condemned on various grounds (Cox. 
Adderly. Grayned). 7 In those canes, the Court has insisted that the
specific purpose to which the public establishment is dedicated and the 
disruptive effects of the protest on its normal operations should be taken 
into account. On the other hand, the direct link of the protest with the 
public facility on which it takes place has not been given equal weight.
Thus, the later protest cases establish a tendency of insulating from protest 
the premises and surroundings of certain public places, finally, public 
expressive activities have been banned from privately owned establishments 
open to the public (unless the owner authorizes them) and from open 
military facilities. The three shopping centre cases (Logan Valley.
Tanner and Hudgens) make quite interesting reading. The demise of 
Logan Valley is indicative of the relative value of precedent - even the 
most recent one. In Tanner the shopping centre's refusal to admit anti­
war protest was upheld, despite the equality principle, on the ground 
that the protest was not directly related to the operations of the centre.
But in Hudgens, the equality principle was relied upon in order to 
exclude union picketing, too, related to an industrial dispute with a 
business located in the centre. The principle of equality was interpreted 
as conferring both equal rights and equality in the refusal of rights.
9.3. Vagueness, overbreadth and symbolic speech
The other doctrines consistently used in the protest cases of the 60s 
were the related ones of "vagueness” and "overbreadth". The vagueness 
doctrine, which derives from the due process requirements of criminal law, 
postulates that a criminal offence must be formulated in clear language 
which gives "fair notice" of the proscribed conduct to "men of common
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intelligence". According to the overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand,
statutes which regulate or punish activities, that are a proper subject of
state regulation, must not achieve their purpose by broad means which
281unnecessarily invade the area of protected freedoms. These doctrines 
are, therefore, concerned in the main with the statutory language and its 
interpretation and constitute an injunction to the legislatures and the 
trial courts to draft and construe criminal laws clearly and unambiguously. 
The federal courts used these doctrines to reverse convictions and 
invalidate statutes and ordinances the language of which was vague or/and 
overbroad either on its face or as construed and applied in the 
particular case.
The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines were extensively used for the 
first time, in the early civil rights cases. They may be seaa along with 
the relaxation of the standing to sue requirements as part of the Supreme 
Court’s effort to accelerate reform and resist Southern harassment of the 
early protest movement. Although they appear as technical, they produced 
the most consistently liberal case law in recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. The majority of the decisions in which the two doctrines 
were employed sustained the protest activities, but their reliance on the 
meaning of the statutory language led to some strange results.
Thus, in Cameron, "unreasonable interference with free ingress or 
egress from public premise" was found to constitute clearly understood 
language; but in Gooding, the punishment of "opprobrious and abusive 
words" was declared vague and overbroad; equally the "contemptuous 
treatment" of the flag provision in Street. In Parker, however, the 
"conduct unbecoming an officer or gentleman" clause gave fair notice of 
the proscribed behaviour which included criticism of the Vietnam War by a 
navy officer. An interesting aspect of those cases was the frequent shift 
of judicial analysis from the "natural" to the "technical" meaning of
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the crucial statutory terms. In Gooding the terms involved were taken in
their dictionary meaning and were declared vague; their technical
construction hy the courts was discarded. But in Parker and Shuttlesworth
the broad statutory language was saved by the fact that lower courts had
defined in narrowly; according to these cases the "reasonable man"
should seek the "fair notice" of the proscribed conduct in judicial
reports. In Cole v. Richardson again, a "not too literal" analysis was used
in order to uphold a loyalty oath. To use the dictionary meaning of words
282was an exercise in "verbal callisthenics" the Court ruled.
In the late 60s and 70s the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines were 
employed in cases involving prosecutions for fighting, offensive and 
foul language. These cases offer another example of the manner in which 
breach of peace, offensive language or disorderly conduct statutes may 
be used in order to intimidate protestors and make protest a hazardous 
enterprise. But when "pure" speech was involved, the Supreme Court used 
the vagueness of the statutory definitions or their indiscriminate 
invocation in order to protect the protest. (Cohen. Watts. Gooding).
These decisions made clear that the Supreme Court would not tolerate 
convictions for mere offensive language, and this aspect at least of 
public speech - or rather of the public vocabulary - was almost totally 
protected.
When, however, public protest activities had a predominantly non-verbal 
character the Court’s attitude was again ambiguous. The absence of any 
coherent theory of protest, noted above, meant that cases involving 
elements of symbolic speech were decided in contradictory ways. The 
"silent speech" of the early sit-ins was protected and the Court came close 
to accepting this.form of protest as a constitutional exercise of free 
speech rights (Justice Harlan in Gamer and Brown). But as new and 
diverse forms of protest claimed similar status, the Court refrained from 
creating a comprehensive definition of "symbolic speech".
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The draft card burning case was particularly important, in relation 
to the symbolic speech issue. The Court dismissed summarily the claims 
that the activity was a kind of symbolic speech and sustained the statute 
involved, as a constitutionally innocent regulation of the administrative 
needs of the draft system. To reach this conclusion the Court ruled that 
it was not competent to guess what purposes the legislature had in mind 
when passing the statute; but went on to provide a whole series of valid 
purposes which the Act was allegedly pursuing. It further disarticulated 
the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth which until O tBrien had been 
used as mutually supportive. The Act was not vague because it singled 
out a well defined conduct for criminal prosecution. As a narrowly 
drafted law, the Act did not violate expressive rights either. The 
undermining of the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth went even further 
in the later cases of Broadrick and Levy and their status in
285constitutional free speech adjudication remains somehow ambiguous.
While O ’Brien’s conduct was not “symbolic speech”, the wearing of black 
armbands in school in protest against the Vietnam War was found to be such 
speech (Tinker). Equally the public burning of a flag and other protest
activities involving unorthodox displays of the flag (Street. Goguen.
236Spence). One author has argued that the draft card and flag cases may 
be reconciled. The former involved the protection of an unobjectionable 
state interest (in the efficiency of the draft system), while the interest 
protected by the flag desecration laws was an ideological one (the 
feelings of patriotism conveyed by the flag); according to Professor Ely 
the free market of ideas rationale of the First Amendment prohibits the 
protection or promotion of a uniform ideology. This analysis seems 
attractive but it must be somewhat qualified. Draft card and flag burning 
conveyed a similar message and both sets of statutes intended to suppress 
the message as well as the bizarre forms of protest through which it was
expressed. It can be argued that the contradictory results of the symbolic 
speech cases were due to the absence of any strict definition of what "speech'1 
is for legal and constitutional purposes. This absence permits the 
differential construction of the various protest activities, as 
constitutionally protected or not speech, on a case to case basis. Extra- 
legal considerations may thus enter and influence the disposition of cases, 
while the utilisation of open-ended and elastic doctrines endows the 
judicial discourse with the element of continuity and consistence. The 
difference in outcome between the 0*Brien and Spence cases may be 
attributed as much to the timing of the decisions - the first was decided 
in 1968, the second in 1974 after the protest movement had subsided - as to 
some substantial difference in the facts or the doctrines employed in the 
two cases.
10. The "National Commitment to an Uninhibited. Robust. Vide. Open Debate"
10.1. The preference for the freedom of the media
The most important doctrinal development in First Amendment adjudication, 
during the period tinder consideration, was made in the area of libel law.
The constitutionalisation of defamatory statements and the process of 
nationalisation of libel law introduced in the Kew York Times case were a 
dramatic departure from traditional tort law. Changes both in the 
standard (actual malice) and the burden of proof made the recovery of 
defamation damages much more difficult.
The mass media were, thus, considerably relieved from one of the legal 
burdens traditionally perceived as hindering free public criticism. The 
free market plaoe of ideas rationale of Holmes and Brandeds was revitalised 
and an important legal immunity of publishers and editors was created.
Times and its progeny fully matched the liberal rhetoric with a seemingly 
equally liberal outcome. Nevertheless, the identification of the free
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market in ideas with a virtually complete editorial autonomy is not fully
convincing. As we saw, this tendency was first introduced in the press
cases of the 30s and 40s, when the trend toward monopolization in the
ownership of the mass media had already set in but was far from complete.
By the late 60s and 70s, the belief that a free market in ideas could be
sustained through the competition of the mass media was unrealistic. "In
1967 out of 15 4 7 cities with daily newspapers, there were competing dailies
in only 64". The bulk of national and international news is provided by
two news agencies, the A.P. and the U.P.I. and the similar trends in
television and radio control and ownership are well known. According to
T. Emerson,"the economics of radio and television press inevitably in the
direction of programs that appeal to the lowest common denominator of a
mass audience" and "the expression emanating from the mass media tends to
represent a single, generally bland point of view... based upon conventional
wisdom".: 7 Professor Barron argues that media owners have identified
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press with themselves and
that although the market place of ideas has expanded with the help of the
various technological innovations the emphasis has been placed on the market
290rather than the ideas. '
Various theories have been advanced as a reaction to these trends.
It has been argued that the government should undertake the affirmative
promotion of diversity of opinion; that a constitutional or statutory
right of acoess to the mass media should be created; and that the
interest of listeners, viewers and readers to know should be balanced with
291the right of editors and media controllers to speak. But the Supreme* -
Court has insisted in defining freedom as the absence of governmental and 
legal controls on the print media. In the Miami Herald case it invalidated 
a "right to reply" statute as a violation of the First Amendment. The
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origins of a new two-tiered approach toward free speech adjudication may 
be traced in that decision. A protective net has been cast around the 
freedom of the press, defined as editorial autonomy, more extensive than 
any encountered before in first Amendment adjudication.
Freedom of the press is, surely, an essential component of a functioning 
"universe of discourse”. The Watergate revelations and their consequences 
have underlined the importance of a free press. But the continuing under­
estimation of the censorial powers of the semi-sovereign mass media and the 
identification of their editorial freedom with the "central meaning” of the 
First Amendment is a far cry from the diversity of expressions and the 
market theory of truth advocated by the early liberals. Such an application 
of free market theories to the oligopolistic market of the modem mass 
media can lead to the complete elimination of all dissenting voices from 
the established means of communication. It will be ironical if in the 
name of the free market, the market in ideas will be all but destroyed.
10.2. Dangerous ideas in the sixties and seventies
Expressive activities outside the established mass media, were 
treated to a lower level of protection. The Times ruling that the First 
Amendment guarantees an "unhibited, robust and wide open" public debate 
and the accompanying dicta on the Sedition Act were, of course, a radical 
reversal of the "dangerous ideas" rationale of the fifties. Combined with 
the principle of equality of ideas, which was developed in the public 
forum cases, they could have led to a dramatic change in free speech theory 
and practice and they were deservedly welcomed in constitutional theory.
The hopes did not materialise, however. The innovative power of Times 
was restricted to the area of libel law.
The virtual elimination of the Communist Party and communist front 
organisations led to a relaxation of anti-communist legislation and the 
Supreme Court decisions in that field were considerably more liberal than
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before. The concept of subversive ideas was retained, however, in
constitutional law. Loyalty tests and oaths continued to come for
judicial review and although a majority of them was invalidated on various
292grounds, the underlying rationale was not comprehensively challenged.
The reactivation of the old criminal anarchy and syndicalism laws
against black and anti-war militants indicates a change in the concept of
"dangerous ideas" and political activities. The old laws with their
broad definitions of seditious speech provided a better means of
suppression of the decentralized and anti-authoritarian radical dissent of
the 60s and 70s than the laws employed against the Communist Party. In
Brandenburg the Supreme Court restricted the applicability of these laws by
imposing strict incitement to action and danger-in-context requirements for
valid convictions under them. But later anarchy and syndicalism cases
(Younger v. Harris) and the decisions sustaining loyalty oaths (Cole v.
Richardson) qualify the hopes expressed after Brandejfcurg for the
creation of a consistent legal doctrine protecting radical political groups 
295and ideologies. ^
The conspiracy prosecutions, a major characteristic of the Nixon era, 
was another major means of harassment of anti-war dissent. Much of the 
prosecution evidence in those trials was based on public statements of the 
defendants, critical of the American foreign policy. Thus, the cases 
involved crucial questions about the permissibility and extent of sharp 
radical dissent. Most of the prosecutions failed, however, at the trial 
or appeal stage, and the Supreme Court did not rule on the method of using 
. conspiracy prosecutions as a substitute for sedition ones.
The various seditious speech cases indicate that no new all-inclusive 
category, of "dangerous ideas" - as Communism was in the 50s - was created 
in legal discourse during the sixties and seventies. Allegations of 
subversive infiltration were often made against the protest movements.
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Both civil rights and New Left groups were repeatedly investigated
: and publicly condemned either as communist fronts or as having an
ideological affinity with communism. But the clear ideological and
organisational differentiation of the new movements from the Communist
Party as well as the virtual elemination of the latter made the
identification of the old bête noire with the New Left impracticable
and unconvincing. Indeed, as the cases reviewed show, the common
elements of the protest and dissent movements were their public and
highly visible character and the variety of the forms of protest
utilised rather than any common ideological denominator. Consequently,
the reaction of the legal and political order was directed at the forms
of the protest and only indirectly at its content. As these forms
varied the reaction took a multiple and flexible character, too. The
draft card burning, flag desecration, breach of peace, disorderly
conduct, offensive and foul language laws and prosecutions reflected
the ideological and organisational dispersal of the protest movement.
This multiformity and immediacy of the protest movement was a sign of
its strength, but at the same time one of the reasons that led to its
ultimate failure to mount an effective challenge to the sociopolitical
294order as it set out to do.
11. In Conclusion. The Supreme Court, Freedom of Expression and the- 
Constitution of the Public Sphere
The civil rights caaes of the early 60s constitute one of the more
sustained periods of judicial activism in recent American legal history.
The Warren Court Undertook to integrate the blacks within the pluralistic
process against Southern resistance and federal hesitation. Barriers to
the formal participation of blacks and urban poor in the political
29 «5process were removed in the voting rights cases; ' in the civil rights
cases propre, segretation and racial discrimination were declared 
unconstitutional; and in the early protest cases the Court protected 
civil rights and black organisations which campaigned for the improvement 
of negro life.
This phase of judicial activism derives directly from the theories
of legal change and social engineering of Roscoe Pound and the Legal
Realists and may be seen as a continuation of the principles of the
New Deal. According to one author, the Brown school desegregation
decision "was no fortuitous legal aberration but was instead the fruit
of the collective hopes and efforts of a distinguished group of
progressive jurists... (like) R. Found, L. Brandeis and B. Cardozo,
who were largely responsible for the development of the sociological
school of jurisprudence, which stood for a more enlightened understanding
of the nature and role of the law in a rapidly changing democratic 
296society". Chief Justice Warren was "the closest thing the U.S. 
had had to a Platonic Guardian, dispensing law from a throne without 
any sensed limits of power except what was seen as the good of society. 
Fortunately, he was a decent, humane, honourable, democratic Guardian" , ^  
wrote A. Lewis of the New York Times. Thus, the Court returned to its 
pre-New Deal role of a full-fledged political actor and attempted to 
start and later accelerate a process of admission of traditionally 
disadvantaged groups to the pluralist give-and-take. The fact that the 
main black organisations, and in particular the N.A.A.C.P. had articulated 
a non-radical list of demands and had consistently sought, through 
litigation, a legal-constitutional solution to racial discrimination 
helped considerably the judicial effort. The interests and needs of 
the blacks were declared a legitimate concern for legal action and reform 
but certain conditions were imposed.
The disadvantaged groups should be properly represented by central 
organisations internally purged from any suspicion of radical or subversive
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influence. In a series of cases, in the early 60s, the Court accepted
the N.A.A.C.P. as the legitimate representative of the black movement
298and protected it from Southern harassment. The Court noted repeatedly 
that the N.A.A.C.P. had expelled communists and subversives from its 
membership and on that basis resisted Southern efforts to use the anti­
communist arsenal against it. More radical black organisations, however,
299were consistently denied similar protection.
Secondly, the Court suggested as acceptable methods of political
action by the blacks,the participation in party politics within the
traditional mould of bipartisanism and litigation. In one case, it
fully endorsed the tactic of litigation adopted by the N.A.A.C.P.
leadership and declared that the solicitation of litigants for the
institution of civil rights suits and the litigation itself were First
Amendment freedoms. "In the context of the N.A.A.C.P. objectives,
litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences; it is
a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by
all government, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro
500community in this country. It is a form of political expression".
The relaxation of the rules of standing, noted above, and similar
procedural changes were part of the Supreme Court tactic to use federal
litigation for judicial social engineering. Thus, the admission of
black groups and interests to the plateau of legitimate state concerns
was predicated on the existence of internal disciplined and disciplining
mechanisms built into the organisations charged with the articulation of
the political needs and on the acceptance by those groups of the overall
legitimacy of the legal and political orders and of their capacity to
effect the sought after reforms through the established channels of 
501action. As one of the most perceptive observers of modern American 
politics put it, each entrant to the domain of pluralistic group
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competition must pledge "to keep its house in order, to regulate itself
302according to certain agreed upon criteria".
When during the late 60s the black movement rejected certain of 
the methods of action and solutions proposed by the Court and became 
more militant, and the anti-war protestors took to the streets, the 
problem of expressive activities in the public forum and of the 
permissible regulation of protest became the main concern in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence. The decisions and legal doctrines of the period 
have been examined above. In the brief concluding remarks their 
implications for the construction of the public sphere will be further 
examined.
1. Despite the precedents of the 30s and 40s, the Supreme Court 
did not work out a comprehensive theory of a right to protest. Instead, 
it treated the various incidents on a case-to-case basis and its 
decisions upholding protest activities were made on technical points.
Dy that tin» the wealth of precedents and legal doctrines that existed 
in the case law was such that almost any concrete decision could be 
accounted for by some previous holding. Thus, the contradictory 
requirements of judicial deference to legal continuity (the law-as- 
given) and of judicial freedom (the law-as-construct) were both 
preserved and enhanced. To be sure, the eclectic reference to some 
precedents and doctrines and not other, equally relevant, ones has been 
the cause of continuous friction within the Court itself and of 
considerable criticism of its performance in constitutional commentaries. 
This method enabled the Court, however, to open up a considerable margin 
for the appreciation of extra-legal factors involved in each case, and 
to distinguish among forms and circumstances of protest, which seemed 
similar on their face, without any great loss of institutional 
credibility.
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The lack of any clear standards set out in advance offered, in 
addition, a considerable leeway to local enforcement authorities faced 
with protest activities. This is the area of expressive conduct where 
there exists, probably, the greatest need for advance notification of 
the line between what is permitted and what prohibited. The judicial 
approach, with its particularistic character, delegated an extensive 
area of discretion to local police and prosecutors. Contrary to the 
trend toward nationalisation of defamation law, the endorsement of the 
right of protest became increasingly localised. In a large number of 
its protest decisions the Court found for the protestors. But the 
total number of protest cases decided by the Court was minimal. In 
the overwhelming majority of protest prosecutions, the right to publicly 
assemble and protest was defined and regulated locally. Correspondingly, 
the role of the Supreme Court and of constitutional discourse in this 
area was relatively decreased.
2. In its later public fora decisions the Court adopted an 
approach under which the nature of the public forum in question 
determines the permissibility of the protest itself. The Court 
hierarchised the contextual characteristics of the protest activities 
and the right to public expression became dependent upon the position of 
the forum of protest on a line stretching from relatively open to 
completely closed public fora. Public streets and parks are at the 
one end of the line, military installationsat the other with the 
precincts of courts, prisons and schools in between.
Of particular interest was the judicial treatment of protest 
activities in privately-owned establishments open to the public. In 
those cases, the two concepts of freedom identified in constitutional 
discourse - freedom as the unhindered enjoyment of private property and 
personal and political freedom - were in direct conflict. In the sit-in
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cases the doctrine of state action was employed - sometimes in extreme
ways - in order to present private violations of civil and expressive
rights as governmental violations of the Constitution. In the shopping
centre cases where the doctrine of state action was unavailable, the
conflict was resolved in favour of the rights of private property. To
be sure, the Court was not unmindful cf the importance of shopping
centres as public fora and of the censorial power delegated to their
owners by its Tanner and Hudgens decisions. The final resolution of
the conflict indicates the difficulties that the contemporary state
faces in pursuing its social and constitutional policies against the
v\xentrenched interests of private property.
3 . A similar situation occurred in the Miami Herald case which 
involved the right of access to the print media. There again the Court 
reviewed approvingly the arguments in favour of the creation of such 
a ri^it. The concentration in the ownership of the mass media, the 
attendant power of their owners and editors, and the inability of 
people excluded from media coverage to communicate their views 
effectively were all referred to. But at the end, the rights of property 
held sway. To be sure, the Court presented its decision as protecting 
freedom of the press, defined as full editorial autonomy. Thus, the 
conflict was presented as one between two opposing policies, both 
emanating from the same constitutional source, the guarantee of free 
public speech: editorial or press freedom versus diversity of opinions. 
Tinder this interpretation the rhetorical free market of ideas was 
subordinated to editorial freedom. At the same time the role of 
constitutional discourse in the regulation of the print media was 
relatively diminished.i
It should be noted here that in a 1976 decision the Supreme Court 
invalidated, on First Amendment grounds, the financial limits on electoral
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campaign expenditures imposed by Congress in 1974. The Court held
that a "restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend
on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression... This is because virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today*s mass society requires the expenditure of
m o n e y " . B y  identifying political speech with the expenditure of
money, the Court rejected the attempt of Congress to equalise the
opportunities of communication, which would have benefited the poorer
candidates. The equalisation was presented as a violation of the
"natural" right of speech. According to one commentator, Americans can
boastof that decision because it upheld "the idea of free speech as
an individual liberty - something that belongs to a person by inherent 
506right". One could add, an inherent right that is quite _ 
expensive.
The shopping centre, access to the press and campaign expenditures 
cases appear, on their face, unrelated. There is a common thread that 
runs through them, however. Private property has been accepted in all 
three as the constitutionally protected means for "buying" or 
restricting opportunities of expression. The implications of these 
decisions are not yet clear and predictions based solely on a few 
decisions are always risky. But it would be ironical if the increased 
opportunities of human communication offered by the various new 
technologies lead to an even greater uniformity and conformism in media 
output, under the endorsement of a new "natural" right to speak (if 
you have the money) theory.
4. It can be said, in conclusion, that by the end of the 
seventies an important differentiation has taken place in First Amendment 
jurisprudence. Radical dissent and public protest - "the poor man's 
media" - have been dealt with in a particularistic and not strictly
504
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principled maimer while the established mass media have been accorded 
a high degree of constitutional protection. The constitutional recognition 
of the press and electronic media as the standard bearers and regulators 
of the public sphere contrasts with their gradual abandonment of any 
extensive critical function. The early liberals and democrats supported 
freedom of speech and of the press as the institutional guarantee of a 
continuous process through which both officials and policies would be 
put under the scrutiny of public reason. But as Habermas put it the 
contemporary "process of making public simply serves the arcane 
policies of special interests; in the form of 'publicity' it wins 
public prestige for people or affairs, thus making them worthy of 
acclamation in a climate of non-public opinion."*^ The centrally 
Imposed and administered process of ideological planning and depoliticisation 
initiated in the fifties came to an incomplete end, but similar 
functions have been undertaken by the mass media under constitutional 
endorsement. One could say that under the banner of freedom of the 
press, freedom of speech and the market place of ideas has been gradually 
abandoned to the instrumental calculations of the media barons.
The future role of the Supreme Court and of constitutional
discourse as regards the protection and promotion of diversity of
opinion remains in some doubt. As radical dissent and protest subsided
in the late seventies, the area of constitutional adjudication in which
the Supreme Court made its more recent liberal contribution disappeared.
In a 1981 decision the Court ruled that live nude dancing is protected
508by the First Amendment and in other recent decisions it extended
constitutional protection to commercial advertisements and the showing
509of sexually,explicit films. However important these decisions may be 
they are only marginal to the contemporary problems of an "uninhibited, 
robust, wide open" public debate.
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The Supreme Court efforts to implement these principles, 
throughout the 20th century, have been erratic and some parts of its 
case law were outright repressive. But at the same time the Court did 
maintain a separate institutional structure and mode of discourse by 
means of which it participated as an independent political actor in 
the constitution of the public sphere. The road covered, from the 
early decisions dealing with the rights of socialists and pacifists 
to preach their political doctrines to the nude dancing one, has been 
long and adventurous. But as new pressures build up and "moral 
majorities" call for a further strengthening of political and 
ideological conformism, a return to the principles of the market place 
in ideas is necessary. The new communications technologies permit 
their full and affective realisation, for the first time in human 
history.
We have learnt, however, that technology, a most powerful means 
for human emancipation, may, too easily, become a weapon of domination. 
»•»The free society* can no longer be adequately defined in the traditional 
terms of economic, political and intellectual liberties, not because 
these liberties have become insignificant, but because they are too 
significant to be confined within the traditional forms. New modes of 
realization are needed corresponding to the new capabilities of society". 
The Supreme Court could play an important role in the redefinition of 
these liberties. As America and the world enter a period of "clear and 
present danger" one can only hope that the freedoms of conscience, 
thought and speech will be restored to their original, critical function.
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CONCLUSIONS
1. One of the characteristics that strikes the observer of 20th 
century American constitutional law is the continuous proliferation 
of legal material dealing with freedom of expression. An increasing 
amount of human conduct involving a communicative intent has come 
Tinder legal overview during that period. Legal discourse with its 
internal determinations, procedures, conditions and evolution has 
undertaken to sanction the social universe of discourse.
But has this increasing legal intervention enhanced the possibilities 
od debate, criticism and dissent, as many constitutional authors have 
argued, or has it led on the contrary to the silencing and repression 
of unpopular, minority viewpoints, as some radical critics would have 
us believe? Is there a dividing line between freedom and repression 
which could be used as a yardstick to help determine and criticize 
the relationship between legal and social discourse?
The multiplication of legal material has been accompanied by an 
equally impressive increase of theoretical writings in the field which, 
explicitly or implicitly, have tried to answer these questions. Two 
analytically separate approaches have been used in the literature.
The first, followed by political philosophers and philosophically- 
minded constitutional theorists, seeks to clarify the justification(s) 
for the protection of expressive activities. Freedom of thought, 
speech and discussion relate to the functioning of the political system 
and an understanding of their role would provide a normative principle 
according to which the relevant legal material could be classified and 
criticized. In this approach the value and function of free speech 
becomes the principle of the relationship between legal and social
discourse.
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The second approach, followed in the main "by constitutional 
lawyers, is more empirical. Instead of asking the reason(s) for the 
protection of free speech, it examines the limits of that protection. 
Laws, administrative acts and judicial decisions related to expressive 
activities are selected and classified, the legal doctrine(s) emerging 
are clarified and explained. In this approach the relationship between 
legal and social discourse is dealt with at the level of positive law, 
and normative questions are not usually emphasized.
It may be argued that behind most of these contributions lies a 
shared problematic: what is the principle according to which the law 
intervenes or should intervene in older to sanction the social universe 
of discourse. If such a principle existed and could be extracted from 
the legal material or alternatively if it could be theoretically
constructed, then an ordered description of the law and/or a normative
|
blueprint for the developing legal intervention would be available.
The case-study is, therefore, preceded by a review of the contributions 
which posed the question first at a theoretical then at a more 
empirical level.
2. ' J.S. Mill*s seminal essay "On Liberty" asks the question why 
should expression be protected more than other human conduct even 
though it may lead to harmful consequences. Mill did not base his 
classical defence of free speech on the well-known distinction 
between self and other-regarding action but on the "assumption of 
infallibility": all silencing of opinions assumes that the censor 
knows the truth and is infallible. For Mill and the liberal tradition 
the only way of arriving at the truth lies in the process of debate and 
exchange of opinions, of argument and counterargument. Free debate 
leads to the development of human personality, to the enjoyment of 
life as an open process of experimentation and innovation and to social
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progress. A tyrannical government threatens this precarious freedom 
greatly, hut Mill believes that this danger has receded in England 
where the main threat comes from the imposition of a "tyranny of the 
majority" which will stifle individual excellence, innovation and 
dissent from the uncritically received opinions.
The modem democratic tradition, on the other hand, is more 
concerned with the exercise of political power. Freedom of expression 
and of debate is seen as a method for the integration of the general 
will of the sovereign, self-governing people into the supreme power of 
the state. Alexander Meiklejohn, the most famous exponent of the 
democratic theory of free speech in America, argues that there exists 
a common interest which may be clarified through open debate and thus 
enable the people to participate in the continuous process of self- 
governing and its formal completion, voting. There is no radical 
separation between rulers and ruled: the ultimate authority lies with 
the people, who take all consequential decision collectively and 
delegate to the removable government of the day the power to carry out 
the sovereign will. The role of legal institutions is, therefore, to 
remove all hindrances to free political debate and enable the citizens 
to exercise their right and duty of self-government intelligently.
Thus, for the classical liberals freedom of expression is mainly 
a means for the development of individuality and the discovery of 
truth, while for the democrats, a basic prerequisite for the successful 
functioning of the political/democratic process. The two schools moved 
close to each other in the 1930s» and by the end of the 40s the 
pluralist theory of politics dominated American political and 
constitutional thought. The pluralists, who reacted against the 
exaggerated claims of democratic theory, saw politics and democracy as 
a competition among interest groups, and maintained that the pluralistic
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process had been perfected In the U.S. The role of legal institutions 
is to balance the competing interests and effect the necessary- 
compromises and reforms which would keep the sociopolitical order in a 
state of equilibrium. But as a background value-consensus had been 
allegedly achieved, the balance between the demands of stability and 
change should be carefully protected. Free expression became one of 
the interests which had to be weighed in the scales of social 
priorities, in which the interest in national unity and security 
ranked high. Thus, the effective functioning of the democratic 
process became the main justification for free speech. But democracy 
had been identified with the actual process of group pluralism and the 
normative emphasis of the earlier liberal and democratic theories of 
free speech was lost. In the 60s and 70s however, when the protest 
movements challenged the most optimistic assumptions of pluralism, the 
need for structural reforms, particularly in relation to the blacks and 
poorer sections of the population, became evident. Freedom of speech 
and of protest were perceived as a means for the airing of deep-seated 
grievances, which politics proper had not fully appreciated. A number 
of "qualified pluralists" argued that a degree of legal protection of 
public - even unconventional - protest would legitimize political power 
in the eyes of those who felt underrepresented in the pluralistic 
process and restore confidence and consent to the legal and political 
system.
Thus, the theoretical justifications for freedom of speech 
developed considerably during the 20th century. The writings of those 
constitutional authors who tried to devise a practically applicable 
legal,doctrine of protection of expression reflect the changes. Some 
of the differences among the doctrines proposed and used in constitutional
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adjudication may be attributed to a differing understanding of the 
theoretical rationale of free speech and of the definition and import 
of the political/democratic process. Theoretical positions and 
normative principles have been incorporated in legal proposals and in 
adjudication, but there is not one central justification of protection 
of expression which may account for the wealth of legal material that 
came to be examined by the American courts under that heading. Indeed, 
as the •understanding and study of politics moved gradually away from 
the normative basis of political philosophy, still strong in early 
liberalism and democratic theory, and towards a positivistic account, 
measurement and rationalization of the empirically observable reality, 
the theoretical grounding of the highly critical institution of free 
speech was neglected.
The second, analytically distinct, approach utilised in the 
literature in order to account for the evolution of the legal material 
draws attention to the institutional aspect of expression protection. 
The First Amendment to the Constitution raises freedom of speech into 
an individual constitutional right; the extensive involvement of the 
legal institutions is, therefore, mandated by the clear command of 
the constitutional text. However, this approach too creates a number 
of problems.
First, the "clear" words of the First Amendment are not self- 
interpreting. Historical research has not been particularly helpful 
in clarifying the intentions of the framers, and if it were their 
contemporary significance would be arguable. Secondly, the American 
courts and the Supreme Court have taken an active interest in First 
Amendment adjudication relatively recently. Indeed, the whole concept 
of freedom and of individual rights had been interpreted until the 
1930s by the Supreme Court as relating more to economic freedom and
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property rights than to political and personal freedoms. Finally, 
the institutional approach is inevitably linked with the controversial 
question ¿bout the role of the Supreme Court within the legal and 
political order and the opposing theories of judicial activism and 
restraint, which have always accompanied any judicial inroads in the 
powers of the legislature. These theories draw their basic arguments 
from a differing understanding of the political/democratic process 
and similar problems to those encountered in the attempt to draw a 
theoretical justification out of political theory are faced here.
The fact remains, however, that since the seminal Supreme Court 
judgments of the 20s, in which a theoretical justification of free 
speech and the mainsprings of a legal doctrine of protection of 
expression were offered for the first time and the applicability of 
the First Amendment was extended to the states, the judiciary under 
the guidance of the Supreme Court has accepted the institutional duty 
of protecting the constitutional right of free speech. The legal 
doctrines, which have evolved since Schenck. constitute the method 
through which the Supreme Court dealt with an expanding and varied 
field, often involving important political acontroversies. They have 
given a measure of consistency, continuity and predictability to 
judicial interventions. However, the relatively large number of the 
doctrines used, the small periods of their consistent use, the marked 
differences between some of them - for example between the bad tendency 
and danger tests or between the preferred position and balancing ones - 
and the use of opposing doctrines in similar cases indicate that the 
various doctrines, instead of being mutually exclusive and capable of 
dealing with all sorts of situations, have been utilised as a panoply 
of approaches, which could be mobilized simultaneously or successively.
Their development and use has served both needs of presenting the law 
as a unified, self-consistent whole and of judicial flexibility to 
deal with novel and controversial cases.
Thus, the various justifications for the protection of free speech 
the institutional duty created by the constitutional command and the 
legal doctrines that developed in constitutional adjudication have all 
contributed to the expansion of the relevant legal material. But one 
is Justified in concluding that the field of legally sanctioned social 
discourse cannot be seen as realising some central principle. The 
attempt to draw, in theory, the line between protected and prohibited 
speech to be compared, in a second step, with the actual legal 
decisions has been neglected as empirical political science abandoned 
normative and practical questions. On the other hand, the lines of 
precedent and the legal doctrines which may be drawn from the legal 
material are many, varied and sometimes contradictory and none among 
them may be considered as the principle that animates or organises the 
evolving legal intervention. The realisation of the situation has led 
recently a number of constitutional authors - most notably T. 
Emerson- to acknowledge that First Amendment theory and practice find 
themselves in an unsatisfactory state. It has been argued that this 
approach is related to an essentialist concept of law often encountered 
in American legal thoery. The law - and its part dealing with freedom 
of expression - is considered as constituting a closed corpus of 
hierarchized rules unified through their emanation from a central rule 
and/or permeated by a small number of principles and values. However, 
the increasing intervention of the state in society and the economy, 
carried out in the main by means of legal rules and procedures, has 
changed the role and function of the legal system and has led to its 
direct politicization. The use of the law for the management of socio­
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economic crises and the pursuit of contingent policy objectives and 
its reflection of intense political conflicts make the effort to 
present the legal system as a closed ensemble of rules extremely 
difficult. A different approach is, therefore, suggested for the 
examination of the case-study. The procedural and substantive elements 
that give this part of the law its specifically legal and relatively 
consistent character are fully acknowledged and considered; but, at 
the same time, legal discourse is examined in relation to the outcome 
of its intervention on the social universe of discourse.
3. The majority of the cases involving First Amendment rights are 
politically contentious. Individuals and social and political groups 
claim the right to participate in public debate and influence public 
opinion in pursuit of their interests and of what they perceive as the 
common good. Other groups and interests resist these claims and when 
such conflicts are taken to the courts the legal institutions undertake 
to endorse some against others. In this perspective the constitutional! 
right to free expression was defined as those claims related to 
expressive activities which have been effectively upheld by the 
competent legal authorities and granted legal status. The courts 
translate the claims in the technical language of the law with its 
own substantive and procedural guarantees and by resolving - temporarily 
or pezmanently - the dispute participate in the process of forming 
public opinion. Public opinion is neither the embodiment of an 
organically evolving volonte generale which by being transmitted to 
the political authorities becomes the sovereign opinion nor is it the 
object of manipulation by the powers-that-be. It is rather in a 
continuous process of constitution and reproduction, as its parameters 
and substance are in each historical period contested and differentially
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demarcated. To be sure, political and social inequalities put some 
groups and interests in an advantageous position, and as the case-study 
indicates legal institutions often take the side of political power in. 
situations of acute political conflict. However,.the importance of 
legal involvement lies in the fact that independent institutions using 
their own formalities and doctrines are asked to participate in a 
process that has serious political repercussions. Law thus becomes a 
privileged social discourse: its descriptions and norms help shape 
social and political reality and its endorsement of certain values as 
those of the community mobilizes popular assent toward them and the 
established order. But, at the same time, law's procedural and 
substantive guarantees impose significant constraints on power and its 
intrusions. The cases of Dennis (p. 291 ) and of the Chicago conspiracy 
trial (p. 434 ) among others, which were fiercely and somewhat 
theatrically contested by both prosecution and defence, indicate that 
the established political power as well as its enemies and critics 
actively seek the legitimizing force that legal endorsement produces 
for their respective claims.
The legal material in the second part of the thesis is, therefore, 
examined in two ways. The first addresses its internal determinations 
and development. Theoretical justifications and legal doctrines are 
the means through which legal discourse evolves internally in an 
orderly manner and give this part of the law its coherence and 
continuity. On the other hand, the political nature of the expressive 
claims dealt with by the courts makes the outcome of their intervention 
open and historically specific. The relationship between these two 
aspects of the legal material is examined under the methodological 
hypothesis of the public sphere.
- 518 -
The public sphere is the realm of social life, in which opinions
on matters of public interest are formed, reproduced, criticized and
changed, the site in which the process of public opinion formation and
debate takes place. Individuals and groups, issues and affairs strive
continuously in each socie ty and historical era to pass the threshold
of the public sphere and legitimize their claim to influence public
opinion. It was argued above that many of these claims are politically
contentious and are often taken to the courts for resolution. In those
cases, the courts extend or restrict formal political rights, sanction
issues and alternatives as legally permissible and open to debate,
endorse individuals and groups as legitimate subjects of public discourse
and distribute control and access to the fora and media of communication
necessary for effective public debate. When the courts decide cases
involving free speech claims, they determine who can speak about what,
what may be publicly uttered and what not, when and where public
discussion may take place. The legal answers to these questions involve
distinctions and differentiations among ideas, social and political
groups and contexts of discourse as well as similarities and analogies.
The process of drawing lines in practice between legal/legitimate and
proscribed/illegitimate subjects, objects and contexts of discourse has
been called the "process of the constitution of the public sphere".
Thus, while the legal intervention cannot be easily placed within the
bipolar freedom/repression paradigm it has become an increasingly
important factor in that process. Legal discourse with its own
♦dynamic and ability to reproduce itself according to its internal 
procedures participates in the task of definition, demarcation and 
endorsement of the universe of social discourse.
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4. The second part of the thesis examines the process of the legal, 
and particularly judicial, constitution of the public sphere in the 20th 
century. The case-law is classified in chronological order and four 
periods are distinguished which display a broad thematic unity.
(a) During the first quarter of the 20th century, the legal 
institutions dealt with radicals, socialists and trade-unionists who 
challenged the American involvement in W I  and the corporatist 
capitalist development which preceded and followed the Great War. It 
was the first occasion in which the courts were asked to work out a 
theoretical justification snd a legal doctrine for the protection of 
public political speech. The early cases, which came under the 
Espionage Act, 1917» involved public dissent and criticisms of the 
Administration's war policy. As the Act had not prohibited such 
dissent explicitly but rather the intentional obstruction or attempted 
obstruction of the war effort, the legal question was posed in the 
following terms: when does political dissent become the means of 
violation of the Act, in other words when do expressive activities come 
close to being criminal conduct.
The majority of the lower federal courts construed the act under 
a doctrine that came to be known in the literature as the '‘bad tendency" 
testl If the intention to obstruct the war was proven - and in many 
cases that was not denied by the defendants - the possibility of success 
of their efforts was of no great importance. The expression of 
opposition to the war tended to sow dissension among the population and 
would set in motion a chain of causation which could result in someone 
being persuaded in the future to carry out the prohibited conduct.
i -
Against this approach Justice Holmes for the Supreme Court enunciated 
the "clear and present danger" test which is taken as the starting point 
of the modern American theory and practice on freedom of expression.
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Justice Holmes clarified his position in the famous dissenting 
opinions in Abrams and Gitlow. He was joined in dissent by Justice 
Brandeis, whose Whitney dissenting opinion is usually taken as the 
definite statement of the evolving position of the two great Justices. 
They based their approach on an examination of the import of the First 
Amendment. Justice Holmes' theory was closer to the reformed liberalism 
of the social utilitarians, Brandeis* position was closer to the 
democratic justification of free speech. They both argued that the 
importance of freedom of expression in a democratic society and the 
command of the First Amendment created an institutional duty for the 
courts to put greater emphasis on the protection of expressive rights. 
Words could become criminal triggers to action, but a clear causal and 
a present chronological link between the utterances and the apprehended 
evils should be established for conviction. If there was no reasonable 
possibility that the prohibited consequences would come about, then 
the expression should be protected. This , link should be examined in 
the light of all the circumstances of the case in a manner similar to 
that used in prosecutions for criminal attempts.
The two approaches, initially used for the construction of the 
same act, are radically different. The bad tendency test addresses 
the propositional content of the expression and tends to ban 
certain political ideologies from the public sphere as inherently 
dangerous. The danger test, on the other hand, emphasizes the fact 
that all expression is contextually situated. The "message" must 
not be judged in vacuo, but in its specific capacity to create 
present and serious threats by influencing its audience. Solicitation 
of law-violation cannot be condoned butpolitical dissent that stops
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short of that and has no possible chance of leading to criminal action 
must be protected. The first approach prohibits and punishes ideas 
deemed as inherently dangerous or undesirable. The second makes their, 
prohibition dependent upon the circumstances surrounding their 
communication. Prohibition of content, regulation of context: these 
were the two major ways in which the courts dealt with political speech 
in the first period of First Amendment adjudication.
(b) The thirties and early forties were a period of expansion in 
free speech theory and practice. An increasing number of First 
Amendment cases were dealt with by the courts and the Supreme Court 
became more willing to review such cases. As a result the legal 
doctrines used multiplied.
All parts of the First were delcared as limiting state as well 
as federal power, through the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. For the first time some state legislative and administrative 
acts were struck down by the Supreme Court as inconsistent with the 
constitutional guarantee of free speech. The bad tendency test 
disappeared and the danger test was adopted by a majority of Justices.
In the previous period, the test had been used as a rule of evidence 
calling for the examination of the specific threat created by the 
utterances in question. While it still kept this evidentiary flavour 
and led to the first reversals of convictions for expressive activities, 
it acquired an additional function. When the constitutional validity 
of a state or local act was challenged the danger test became a 
constitutional standard, which demanded that there should exist a 
high degree of necessity linking the expression-restricting law with a 
valid, and serious apprehended evil. If the social interest served 
by the law was considered as not serious enough or if the Court thought 
that it could be protected by less drastic means than the prohibition
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of expressive activities, then the measure was invalidated. The 
Supreme Court showed a particular dislike for prior restraints on 
free speech and voided a number of licensing systems related to public 
meetings, for giving a vague and broad discretionary power to local 
authorities. The gist of these decisions was that activities in the 
public forum could not be prohibited because of their content. Their 
time, place and manner - their context - could be regulated to protect 
public peace, order, privacy and repose, but the regulation should not 
amount to outright bans or discriminate against unpopular issues and 
minorities.
Behind all these developments lay the theory of the "preferred 
position" of personal and political freedoms. It gave notice at the 
least of an increased judicial vigilance in cases involving First 
Amendment claims and at the most of a prima facie assumption of 
invalidity of measures violating freedom of expression. The adoption 
of this position coincided roughly with the Supreme Court's dramatic 
endorsement of the New Deal measures of economic regulation. Until the 
mid-1950s, freedom of contract and the rights of private property had 
been declared as the primary forms of freedom and a number of social 
welfare, economic regulation and union protective measures had been 
invalidated for violating the 14th and 5th Amendments. But now 
freedom was redefined as personal and political. When the Court 
examined expression-restricting laws for their constitutionality, it 
embarked on a balancing of the social interest in free speech against 
the interests served by the challenged measure. The Court, thus, 
undertook to draw a hierarchy of social and political values and check 
it against that of the legislature. The preferred position of freedom 
meant that expressive claims were favourably handicapped in this
balance.
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The activist stance of the Court had important repercussions.
The words of the First Amendment are not as clear as they sound and as 
Justice Black insisted. Thus, the Court embarked on a process of 
construction of the constitutional tezms in which the Constitution 
became "what the Supreme Court says it is". "Speech", and the "press" 
were defined as including the use of symbolic objects and gestures, all 
sorts of activities in the public forum (parades, demonstrations, 
canvassing), the publication as well as the circulation of printed 
matter. The "laws" which should not abridge free speech were defined 
as referring to federal and state legislative enactments, administrative 
acts and judicial decisions. Through this process of definition some 
activities were construed as protected expression, others as non­
protected action. The "definitional balancing" of the period indicates 
one of the major ways in which the constitutional discourse intervenes 
and sanctions social discourse: the constitutional definitions, 
sometimes theoretically defended, sometimes question-begging, acquire 
immediate normative consequences and are backed by sanctions and thus 
help shape social reality.
Thus, the Supreme Court increased substantially its involvement 
in the process of the constitution of the public sphere. The majority 
of its decisions were preceded by eloquent essays on the liberal- 
democratic justification of free speech. However, the endorsement of 
the claims of groups and interests to commandeer the public forum was 
somewhat differentiated. Almost all proselytizing activities of 
religious sects, and in particular of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, were 
accorded the status of protected expression. But picketing and other 
public activities of the trade-unions were defined as "speech plus" 
and were gradually excluded from a "definitional" protection.
Heligious dissent was treated more favourably than political dissent.
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Civil servants were denied the right to participate actively in 
political activities, and during a brief period in WWII the Japanese- 
Americans of the West Coast were temporarily excluded from almost all 
political rights and procedural guarantees.
The democratic tenor and liberal effect of the bulk of the case 
law remains undeniable, however. Through its redefinition of the 
concept of freedom and its new activism the Court retained its position 
as the guarantor of the spirit of the Constitution, of individualism 
and limited government. At the same time it endorsed the democratic- 
reformist ideology of the New Deal and participated in the effort to 
mobilize popular assent toward the new socio-economic structures.
Thus, the Court undertook a much more extensive role in the 
constitution of the public sphere and through it in the direct 
legitimation of the social order.
(c) When the Cold War started gripping America in the late 40s 
the legal system was put under strain. National confidence crumbled 
and external and internal enemies seemed to threaten the very 
foundations of the republic. In the previous period the Supreme Court 
had opened up public fora to expressive activités; but in the 50s 
public protest fainted. Seditious ideas and people became the 
main issue in First Amendment adjudication. The Court had already 
occupied the role of the national protector of free speech and soon 
became embroiled in litigation over the formidable anti-subversive 
legal arsenal built by both federal and state authorities.
There were three main components of this arsenal. First, federal 
and state criminal laws which punished severely the teaching and 
advocacy of seditious doctrines and membership in subversive 
organisations. The centrepiece was the Smith Act, 1940 which many 
states copied. Secondly, loyalty programmes and tests were 
introduced, linking the acquisition or retention of positions, rights,
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benefits or privileges by individuals or groups with a loyalty 
qualification, confirmed through oath-taking by the persons concerned 
or through investigations by official bodies. The most common 
programmes related to public employment but they were gradually 
extended to areas of public life and positions and benefits not 
related to the Civil Service. Finally, a number of federal and state 
legislative investigating committees were set up, modelled on the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities, charged to investigate and 
expose the activities of subversive groups and individuals.
The major criminal case of the period, Dennis v. U.S. involved 
the prosecution under the Smith Act of the top leaders of the 
Communist Party for conspiracy to teach and advocate the violent 
overthrow of the government. The case was decided in all three 
instances under some version of the danger test. However, the 
requirement of a close chronological link between the utterances and 
the apprehended evil was dropped. The external and internal threat 
from communism was perceived as total and global, and although there 
was no likelihood of a communist insurrection the gravity of the 
danger outweighed its improbability. Ho evidence of illegal 
activities carried out by the communists was produced, but the 
advocacy of the communist ideology was construed as creating a danger 
of revolution "as speedily as circumstances would permit". Thus, in 
Dennis under the amended test, which came to be known as the "clear 
and probable danger" test, the Communist Party was declared a criminal 
conspiracy, Marxism-Leninism was construed as the doctrine of the 
violent overthrow of the government, the communist leaders were 
convicted and awarded maximum sentences and the rationale of the 
loyalty-security complex was given the legitimacy of constitutional 
validity. But in the later cases of Yates and Scales, the Supreme
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Court, without challenging the constitutionality of the Smith Act, 
reinterpreted some of its key terms and imposed stringent conditions on 
the prosecutions of communists for seditious utterances. There should 
he evidence that the defendants advocated specifically the taking of 
future violent action rather than the abstract doctrine of revolution 
and that the tenor of the advocacy was to urge people to act.
Convictions under the membership clause of the Act could be obtained 
only if the defendants were "active" members of the Party, knowing 
that it was involved in illegal advocacy and intending specifically to 
accomplish its illegal aims. Thus, by the late 50s, the Court returned 
to the particularistic approach of the original danger test. It asked 
for specific evidence of illegal activities and expressions and, as 
such evidence was difficult to obtain, brought to an end the Smith Act 
prosecutions.
In cases involving challenges to loyalty programmes and investigating 
committees the test most consistently used was that of the balancing of 
interests. In the previous period free speech was placed in a 
preferred position when balanced against social interestsendangered by 
its exercise. Even during that period, the preferred position doctrine 
had been attacked by a minority of Justices, who thought that it amounted 
to an unjustifiable and undemocratic violation of legislative powers by 
the judiciary. During the 50s the implicit balancing of the previous 
period continued, but the preference for First Amendment claims was 
dropped. Thus, the paramount interest in national security was 
balanced against the right of radical trade-unionists and professionals 
to keep their jobs, or of investigated persons and witnesses before
i „
loyalty committees to avoid the public confession and disclosure of 
their past and present beliefs and associations. But this balancing 
between an overwhelming social interest and the personal interests of
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a few individuals contained its outcome in the way in which the 
respective claims were formulated, as Justice Black repeatedly 
complained. Indeed, such a "balancing act should take into account 
trends in national social and political life and in international 
relations, not a task suited to the judiciary, a point made by Justice 
Frankfurter. Thus, the balancing technique meant in effect that the 
rationale and excesses of the loyalty-security watchdogs went 
unchallenged, against the elegant protest of Justices Black and 
Douglas who continued placing expressive rights in a preferred position.
But when the Court dealt with First Amendment rights using 
procedural and technical points - the exact mandate of a particular 
committee, the pertinency of a question to the matter under 
investigation, the verbal formulation of a loyalty oath, the pre-emption 
of a state measure by a similar federal measure etc. - the worst 
excesses of the loyalty machinery were restricted. In those cases, 
substantive claims were upheld through the requirement of procedural 
correctness, and the protective role of the liberal system of justice 
was underlined.
The importance of these developments cannot be overestimated.
In Dennis the gravity of the danger, that communists and communism 
posed for the security of the state, was emphasized in grave terms and 
became the main point of the reformulated danger test. However, the 
relative weakness of the Communist Party and the lack of any evidence 
of preparations for an eventual insurrection indicate that the 
apprehended evil was not that of a pending revolution. Chief Justice 
Vinson specifically stated that the success or probability of success of 
'revolution was not the criterion for criminal liability under the Smith 
Act, and accepted that the Communist Party did not have the ability 
to bring about a popular rising. Indeed, throughout the period, the 
Communist Party, heavily infiltrated by police agents and t o m  apart
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"by internal schisms, was not outlawed, a measure which would seem reasonable 
if the danger of revolution was perceived as real and present. Reports 
of some clandestine activities by Party members and the defence of the 
Soviet foreign policy in an era of international tensions justified a 
degree of apprehension about the character of the Communist Party. But 
the nature and reach of the anti-subversive measures indicate that the 
apprehended danger was not, solely or even mainly, that of a communist 
uprising. Chafee had remarked in the 40s that an "American party-line" 
had started taking shape and was aggressively propagated. It may be 
argued, therefore, that a fear that motivated the drastic reaction of 
the 50s was the more extensive but less conspicuous threat of the 
"infection" of the body politic by subversive, radical or un-American - 
an elusive term never fully defined - people, organisations and ideas.
This danger remained in the background of the criminal prosecutions 
of communists. But it was more evident in the activities of the 
loyalty-security machinery. In those cases the existence of loyalty/ 
disloyalty was disarticulated from the commission of specified criminal 
offences and was perceived as a character trait which called for an 
extensive scrutiny of all aspects of a person’s life; it was sought 
out in past and present beliefs, opinions, expressions, acts and 
associations. The determination of loyalty was undertaken by 
administrative and legislative agencies acting as semi-judicial bodies, 
but freed from cumbersome procedural guarantees or any extensive 
judicial supervision. Finally, as since the New Beal an increasing 
part of the individual’s life had become dependent upon public provision, 
a finding of disloyalty put under severe strain all relations of the 
person concerned with the public authorities. Furthermore, the 
publicity of the activities of the loyalty watchdogs was explicitly
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intended to act in a symbolic manner for the rest of the society and 
to mobilize the public in the effort to uncover and isolate socially 
those suspected or found guilty of disloyalty.
Thus, a range of political ideas, starting from the hard-core of 
communism and extending to other radical and socialist doctrines and 
political objectives, was declared subversive and banned from the 
public sphere. Organisations and groups were admitted in the pluralistic 
process only if they acquitted themselves of any accusation of disloyalty. 
Social welfare measures and civil rights reforms were mostly abandoned 
as communistic and un-American. Individuals with past or present, 
real or alleged subversive connections were excommunicated from all 
areas of public life. The regulation of the economy by the state, 
which had started in the 30s, was complemented by an extensive inter­
vention in the public sphere and by the further displacement of the 
great liberal,dividing line between public and private.
(d) The sixties and the seventies were the years of public 
protest. The civil rights movement initially and later the Vietnam 
War movement took to the streets to air deeply felt grievances and 
militant politican dissent. The Supreme Court, since its seminal 
Brown decision, had taken an active interest in the promotion of civil 
rights and became increasingly involved in an effort to remove the most 
offensive discriminatory laws and practices of the southern states, 
through constitutional adjudication. Thus, when the civil rights 
movement started a campaign of protest against southern segregation in 
the late 50s and early 60s, the Court was ‘prepared to extend full 
protection to the sit-ins and demonstrations. Many of the practices 
complained of had been declared unconstitutional, and direct action 
and civil disobedience were treated as the means through which the 
protesters could invoke the higher rationality and justice of the
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federal constitution above the heads of recalcitrant local authorities. 
The content of the grievances - racial discrimination and segregation - 
justified the means of their publicity, and the doctrine of "state 
action" was extensively used to uphold the protests, if the offending 
practices had some - even remote - relation to state or local 
authorities.
The validation of the forms of public protest because of their 
legitimate content came to an end in the mid-60s, after the passage of 
the Civil Rights Act, 196 4 which outlawed segregation in public 
facilities. As black militancy increased and the first anti-war 
demonstrations started, the Supreme Court was forced to deal with the 
protest activities as such. The forms of protest utilised in those 
turbulent years were many and varied: marches, demonstrations, sit-ins 
and pieketings which often led to breaches of local licensing systems 
and to prosecutions for public order offences; commitment of illegal 
but newsowrthy symbolic acts like draft-card and flag burnings; use 
of foul and offensive language particularly against law-enforcement 
officers. The authorities for this sort of situation dated back to the 
public forum decisions of the 30s and the 40s. But the massive scale 
of the protests and their overtly political character differentiated 
this period from the earlier one.
The Court's answer to the challenge of the protest movements was 
particularistic. It accepted, in general, that public protest was more 
than "pure speech" and utilised a number of doctrines to deal with each 
situation on a case-to-case basis. Vhen the fora of protest w$re public
streets and parks, the Court took a relaxed position. It insisted that
*
the"regulation of the context of protest - its time, place and manner - 
should not discriminate against unpopular ideas. Equality in the 
field of ideas required that public fora which had been opened to
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some expressive activities should not he denied to others. But when 
public protest took place in fora other than streets or parks, the 
nature of the forum determined the permissibility of protest. Thus, 
political activities were excluded from military installations 
otherwise open to the public, from privately owned shopping centres 
and from the precincts of courts, schools and prisons. In those cases 
great emphasis was placed on the procedural and statutory grounds of 
the prosecutions involved, and the line between open and closed public 
fora was not very cle.ar or strictly adhered to.
In the examination of the statutory background of the prosecutions 
for protest, the Supreme Court used the two related doctrines of 
"vagueness" and "overbreadth" deriving from the due process requirements 
of criminal law. These doctrines require that the law should give 
clear and fair notice of the proscribed conduct and should not infringe 
unnecessarily upon protected freedoms. In the early 60s, they were 
used to protect the civil rights movement against southern harassment. 
But in the later cases, their status became uncertain. In some, the 
statutory language was examined according to its "natural", in others 
according to its "technical" meaning. When the prosecuted activity 
was foul or offensive language, the Court extended full constitutional 
protection. But the constitutional status of "symbolic speech" 
remained obscure. Draft-card destruction was not a protected expressive 
activity, but the earlier sit-ins, the wearing of black armbands and 
the burning and desecration of the flag were.
We may conclude, therefore, that no comprehensive theory or 
legal doctrine of public protest for constitutional purposes was worked
t  Tout*by the Supreme Court. The forms of protest were distinguished, 
the fora of protest were differentially demarcated; foul speech was 
declared fully protected, some symbolic conduct was found to be fully
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protected expression, some other proscribed conduct. The differences 
in the outcome of the "symbolic speech" case indicate the conceptual 
problems facing any theory of free speech that relies on a strict 
expression/action distinction. The wealth of precedents and legal 
doctrines, that existed by that time, allowed the Court to refer back 
most of its decisions to some authority, while retaining at the same 
time a considerable margin for the appreciation of the form, 
circumstances and extra-legal factors pertaining to each particular 
situation. In this way, a degree of protest protection was worked out 
in practice, and the courts resisted effectively, in the conspiracy 
and criminal anarchy trials, the attempt of some legislative and 
prosecuting authorities to create a new all-inclusive category of 
"subversive radicalism" as a substitute for the communist danger of 
the 50s. Thus, as the common element of the protest movements was 
their multiformity and immediacy rather than any common ideological 
denominator, the reaction of the legal system became equally varied 
and flexible.
During the same period a major doctrinal change took place in the 
area of libel law. Defamatory statements became the object of a 
cautious constitutional protection and changes in the standard and 
burden of proof made the recovery of defamation damages extremely 
difficult. Thus, a trend in constitutional adjudication favouring 
freedom of the press, which had started in the 30s, was further 
developed and an extensive degree of constitutional protection was 
given to the editorial autonomy of the mass media. However, during 
the same period, economic and commercial factors had led to extensive 
concentration in the ownership and control of the mass media. The 
almost absolute protection of editorial autonomy, if not accompanied 
by a right of access for minority and dissenting views, may lead to
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the stifling of diversity in the market place of ideas and to a silencing 
of effective free speech in the name of freedom of the press.
These are still open questions and constitutional discourse will 
have an important role in their development. As we enter a new era of 
expanding opportunities for cheap and effective communication, one 
hopes that the institutions of free speech and press will be fully 
restored to their original, critical function, best encapsulated in 
the writings of the early liberals and democrats. The universe of 
social discourse came under increasing public scrutiny during the 20th . 
century and the constitution of the public sphere has been examined as 
an antagonistic process in which subjects, objects and contexts of 
discourse are continuously contested and differentially demarcated.
But the normative principle of the public sphere, that political power 
will follow the discursively arrived at will of an informed and 
sovereign public, even though never fully realized, remains perhaps 
the greatest contribution of the Western civilisation to the theory and 
practice of politics.
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Pull reference to all books cited in the notes is given in the 
bibliography. Periodical articles which are cited only once get 
their full reference in the notes. . Articles of major significance 
for my argument or which are cited more than once are fully referred 
to in the bibliography.
INTRODUCTION
1. L. Levy in the Legacy of Suppression (i960), ch.6, argues that the 
Sedition Act led American libertarians to "formulate a broad 
definition of the meaning and scope of liberty of expression". He 
suggests that most of the ideas were taken from English liberals 
and not until 1798 did any American rival the libertarianism of 
the English, ibid.. p.258.
2. Quoted from Emerson, Haber, Dorsen, Political and Civil Rigfcts in 
the United States (19 6 7), Vol.I, p.7«
3 . Barron v. Baltimore. 7 Peters 243» 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833)»
4. L. Whipple, The Story of Civil Liberties in the U.S.. (1 9 2 7), p.51.
5. R. Nye, Pettered Freedom: Civil Liberties and the Slavery 
Controversy. (1972). p.177.
6. See the interesting history of the anti-vice societies in P. Boyer, 
Purity in Print. (19 6 8).
7 . A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. (I864), Vol.II, p.400.
8. K. Marx, "Debates on the Freedom of the Press and Publication of 
the Proceedings of the Assembly of the Estates"« Newspaper article 
dated May 5» 1842 in K. Marx and P. Engels, Collected Works. Vol.I, 
p.132 at p.167, 162. (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1975)«
9. The two classical treatises in the field are Z. Chafee, Free Speech 
in the United States. (1941) sad Emerson, The System of Freedom 
of Expression (1970). The best collection of legal material is 
found in Emerson, Haber and Dorsen (1967)*
10. The first authority in the field is Roth v. U.S.. 354 U.S. 476 (1957) 
The reformulation of the Roth obscenity test is found in Miller v. 
California. 4 1 3 U.S. 15 (1973); "the "pandering" rule is found in 
Ginzburg v. U.S.. 383 U.S. 463 (1966) and the ideological obscenity 
one in Kingsley v. Regents. 360 U.S. 684 (1959)» in Ginsberg v.
N.Y.. 390 U.S. 629 (19 6 8), a law against the sale of obscenity to 
minors was upheld as a "rational regulation". For the difference 
between obscenity and ideas see J. Finnis, 'Reason and Passion1:
The Constitutional Dialectic between Free Speech and Obscenity. 116 
Univ. of Pennsylvania L.R., p.222 (1 9 6 7).
11. "The Supreme Court as a Political Institution", in A. Westin (ed.), 
The Supreme Court: Views from Inside. (19 6 5)* p«170.
12. J. Griffith, The Political Constitution. (1979)» p.20.
- 535 -
CHAPTER I
1. Recent articles on Mill's theory of freedom of expression include 
H. McCloskey and D. Monro, "Liberty of Expression: Its grounds and 
Limits" (I and II) (1970) and
T. Scanlon, "A Theory of Freedom of Expression" in R. Dworkin (ed.),
The Philosophy of Law. (1977)« Two recent books on Mill discuss his 
free speech theory, too: G. Himmelfarb, On Liberty and Liberalism:
The Case of John Stuart Mill. (1974); C. Ten. Mill on Liberty. (1980). 
See also H. McClosley, John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study. (l97l):
J. Barron, Freedom of the Press for Whom?. (1975). ch.8: I. Berlin, 
Four Essays on Liberty. (1979). ch.IY. A radical critique of Millian 
liberalism is found in R. Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism. (19 6 8) 
arid R. Wolff, B. Moore and H. Marcuse, A Critique of Pure Tolerance
(1965).
2. J. Milton, "True Religion, Heresie, Schism and Toleration", in 
Works. Vol.IV, 172-3.
3. J. Milton, "Areopagitica", in Works, Vol.IV, 4:353«
4. J. Locke, "The Fundamental Constitution of Carolina", quoted in 
Levy (i960), p.103.
5. L. Levy, Legacy of Suppression, (i960), p.104.
6. J.S. Mill, On Liberty (1972 ed.), p.79.
7. Popper1 s classical statement is found in The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery (1959). In Open Society and its Enemies. (19^6). Popper 
applies his epistemological position of "critical rationalism" to 
society at large. However both the epistemological and political 
theory have been criticized. "Popper's philosophy, which some people 
would like to lay on us as the one and only humanitarian rationalism 
in existence today, is but a pale reflection of Mill", P. Feyerabend, 
Against Method. (1978), p.48, n.2. Feyerabend argues forcefully 
that "Popper's version of Mill's pluralism is not in agreement with 
sciantific practice and would destroy science as we know it".
ibid.. ch.6 - 1 3  and p.1 7 1 .
8. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (1970). For a 
comparison of the respective epistemological theories of Popper and 
Kuhn see A. Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory. (1977), 
PP.57-64 and A. Giddens, Hew Rules of Sociological Method. (1976), 
ch.4.
9. A. Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England. (19 6 2), pp.438-9.
10. I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, (1979), p.128.
11. R. Wolff, (I968), ch.l, particularly pp.3-12.
« ■
12. '- Berlin (1979), p.190; Wolff (196 8), pp.10-11.
13. But see H. Marcuse (1976), p.3°4.
14. J.S. Mill (1972), p.73.
- 536 -
1 5 . ibid.
16. C.B. Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. (1977), p.3 4.
17. C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. 
Hobbes to Locke. (19 6 6), ch.V generally and p.2 3 6.
18. ibid.. p.224 quoting from Locke*s Works.
19. J.S. Mill, (1972), p.277.
20. ibid., p.284.
2 1 . ibid., pp.284-28 6.
22. See J. Habermas, Theory and Practice, (1974)» ch. 1 and 2 passim.
2 3. See infra. Ch.VI, 4,5*
24. Justice Holmes dissenting in Ahrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616 (1 9 1 9 ).
25. 268 U.S.652 (1925) at 673.
26. A. Kelly and W. Harbison, The American Constitution. (1970), p.6 78.
27. C.H. Pritchett, American Constitutional Issues. (19 6 2), p.412.
28. F. Frankfurter, Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, (1937)» PP.54-5.
29. T. Enerson, The System of Freedom of Expression. (1970), p.48.
30. M. Lemer, The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes. (1943)» p.306.
31. A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom, (i960), p.73*
32. W. Bems, The First Amendment and the Future of American Democracy. 
(1976), pp.153-54.
33« O.W. Holmes, Speeches. (1934)* p»58.
34. M. Lerner (1943)» P.59. !
35» Holmes to Laski, March 4» 1920 in Holmes-Laski Letters. Vol.I, p.249.
36, Holmes to Pollock, June 18, 1925 in Holmes-Pollock Letters, Vol.II» 
p.ll, 163.
37» Holmes to Pollock, April 5» 1919 in Holmes-Pollock Letters. Vol.II, 
p.7.
38. H. Dworkin in Taking Bights Seriously argues that Holmes and his
disciple Learned Hand based their preference for judicial restraint 
' „on a "pervasive moral scepticism" according to which "even to speak 
of an act being morally right or wrong makes no sense", pp.13 8-40.
38a. A. Hunt, ■ The Sociological Movement in Law. (19 7 8), pp.40-44.
- 537 -
39» O.W. Holmes, "Ideals and Doubts", 10 Illinois Lav Rev, p . 3  (1 9 1 5 ).
40. A. Meiklejohn (i960).
4 1. ibid.. p.81.
4 2. p.2 6.
43. p.77.
44. p.37.
45» J« Dewey, The Public and its Problems. (1946) and Freedom and
Culture. (1 9 3 4); R. Molver. The Modern State. (19 2 6) and The Veb 
of Government. (1947)» An informative review of the impact of 
pragmaticism in America is found in H.S. Commager, The American 
Mind. (1950)» ch.V which includes an extensive bibliography.
4 6. Meikle.iohn. ibid.. p.74.
47* Mcpherson (1977)» p.7 6 .
48. Meiklejohn, p.75«
49» Barron (1973)»
50. Vest Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette. 319 ir.S. 624 (1943)»
See infra, Ch.VIII, 3«
31* This idea was adopted in some Supreme Court decisions of the 30s and 
40s: "[The Framers] chose to encourage a freedom which they believed 
essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful 
ignorance", Justice Black at 319 H.S. 143 (1943)» See also the 
opinion of Justice Murphy in Jones v. Opelika. 316 TJ.S. 584 (1942) 
at 611.
52. Z. Chafee Book Review of MeikleJohn's Free Speech. 62 Harvard Law R. 
p.891 (1949); V. Brennan (19^5) » Karst, "The First Amendment and 
Harry Kalven", 13 U.C.L.A. Law R. p.l; Kalven, Uninhibited Robust 
and Wide-Open. (1968) and The New York Times Case (196A)~
53. L. Levy (i960).
54« Mieklejohn (1948 ed.), p.21.
55» Meiklejohn (i960), p.21. This is the only difference between the 
two editions.
56. Chafee (1949)»
57. Al. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute (1 9 6 1), p.257. 
MeikleJohn attempts to refute in this article the criticisms of 
constitutional authors that his interpretation of the First Amendment
'• cannot stand "the test of lawyer-like application"; ibid.. n.4.
See also A. Meiklejohn, "What Does the First Amendment Mean?", 20 
Univ. of Chicago Law Rev. 461 (1953)»
- ’538 _
58. A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent (1975)» p.62.
59. E. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems.
(1971), pp.25-26.
60. For example, T. ESnerson, Towards a Theory of the First Amendment
(1966), p.9; J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust. (1980). in particular 
ch.4.
61. H. Kalven (19 6 4, 1965, 19 6 5); Emerson (19 6 6, 1971).
62. Bems (1957) i Bork (1971); Bickel (1975), p.70ff.
63. Bickel (1975), PP.73-76.
6 4. Bork (1971), P.25; Bickel (1975), p.62ff.
6 5. J. Schumpeter, Capitalism. Socialism and Democracy. (1 9 7 6), p.250. 
Schumpeter defines democracy as a "political method, that is to say,
a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political- 
legal and administrative - decisions and hence incapable of being 
an end in itself", ibid., p.2 4 2.
66. Voting (1954), ch.14.
6 7. A. Bentley, The Process of Government, (19 6 7).
68. E. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, (1956), ch.5 and in 
particular, pp.131-135.
69. ibid.. ch.3. The interest in social control methods is shared by 
all social sciences during that period in America. T. Parsons*
The Structure of Social Action, (1949) is the best sociological 
statement of the pluralist position.
70. Macpherson (1977), p.85. A concise presentation of the pluralist 
theories of democracy is found in M. Margolis, Viable Democracy.
(1979), ch.5.
71. E. Pound, Social Control Through Law, (1942), p.66.
72. A. Hunt (1978), p.21.
73. ibid.. pp.22-25.
74. ibid., P.47.
75. K. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush, (i960), p.22.
7 6 . J. Stone, The Province and Function of Law. (19 5 0), p.494* Stone 
applies the interests theory on the social situation of the Schenck 
case in which Holmes enunciated the danger test.
77» Among others see Barenblatt v. U.S.. 36O U.S. 109 (1959).
78. See above, 2.
- 539 -
79» H. Marcuse (1972) describes the process through which the universe of 
discourse has been closed and a "functional'' language of total 
administration has been imposed in Western societies. This 
Orwellian language "imposes images and militates against the 
development and expression of concepts". "The image may be 
»freedom1 or »peace* or the »nice guy* or the »communist* or 
»Miss Reingold». The reader or listener is expected to associate 
(and does associate) with them a fixated structure of institutions, 
attitudes, aspirations, and he is expected to react in a fixated, 
specific manner", ch.4» p.86, 83* One of the greatest American 
comic novelists, John Toole, expresses the same point in a dialogue 
between two typical New Orleans characters:
"What you think about somebody wants peace, Claude?"
"That sounds like a comuniss to me".
(A Confederacy of Dunces, p.225).
80. H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, (1979)» p.1131.
81. R. Horn, Groups and the Constitution, (1956), p.150.
82. Bems (1976), p.180.
83. Bickel (1975), ch.3.
84. ibid#, pp.76-78.
85. See Wellington (1979), p.1132.
86. ibid., pp.1110-1121.
87. Bickel (1975), ch.l. A similar interest and approval of Burke*s 
theories of representation as against those of Mill is found in a 
book criticising the Supreme Court voting rights decisions of the 
60s: W. Elliott (1974), pp.193-204.
88. Bork (1971), passim.
89. M. Shapiro, Freedom of Speech (196 6), pp.46-47.
90. Etaerson (19 6 6), pp.1-15.
91. M. Shapiro (1966) and Krislov, The Supreme Court and Political 
Freedom. (19 6 8), passim. But see the criticism of the pluralist 
assumptions in Wolff (1968), ch.4.
92. The major case was Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (19 6 2). For 
criticisms and bibliography see Ely (1980), pp.116-125.
93. 304, H.S. 144, n.4 (1938).
94* See ch.X.
95* On positive discrimination see Ely (I98O), ch.6; Dworkin (1977), 
ch.9 and bibliography cited there.
9 6. See ch.X, A, B.
- 540 .
97. Hague V. C.I.O.. 307 ïï.S. 496 at 515 (l959).
98. Bickal expressed this thesis in his lecture "The Supreme Court 
and the Idea of Progress" (1970). For criticisms of the thesis
- based on "qualified pluralism" see Ely (1980), pp.69-7 0; and on the 
"rights thesis", Dworkin (1977), pp.144-147.
99» See B. Dahl, Democracy in the United States. (1976). Dahl, Galbraith 
and Schumacher concentrate their criticism on the tendency of 
government toward "bigness". Others are concerned with the popular 
participation in decision-making. A review of theories of 
"participatory democracy" is found in Macpherson (1 9 7 7), ch.4 ; 
Margolis (1979), ch.7. A recent statement is J. Lucas, Democracy 
and Participation (1976).
100. Ely (1980), p.135.
101. ibid.. P .2 4 2 , n.4.
102. A. Cox, "Direct Action, Civil Disobedience and the Constitution", 
in A. Cox et al. (19 6 7), p.20.
103. Bickel (1975), pp.6 2 -6 5 and ch.4 passim.
104. Black, H., "The Bill of Bights", 35 New York Law B. p .866 (i960) and 
Black, H. and Cahn, Ed., "A Public Interview", 37 New York Law B.
P.549 (1962).
105* Dennis v. IT. S. 341 ÏÏ.S. 494 (1951). Douglas dissenting, joined by 
Black, at 568.
106. y. ïï.S.. 322 ïï.S. 487 at 501 (1944).
107. See ch.VIII for cases'protecting union rights. Justice Black 
found that the Sherman Act had been violated by business monopolies 
in all 19 cases that reached the Supreme Court between 1949-1959.
He equally upheld the great majority of union and workers * 
complaints under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Federal 
Employer's Liability Act. See W. Mendelson (1 9 6 1), ch.2 and the 
same (19 6 5), pp.33-36.
108. See ch.X, n.145 and text accompanying.
109. The phrase is taken from an anecdote about Black quoted in 
Showiss (1973), p.2 4 1.
110. See S. Snowiss, "The Legacy of Justice Black", 1 9 7 3 Supreme Court Bev. 
p.187. The article attempts to explain the inconsistency of the
later opinions.
111. Elliott (1974), p.2.
112. ibid., p.VIII.
113. D. Truber, Toward a Social Theory of Law (1 9 7 2).
114. ibid.. p.20.
- 541"
115. R.M. Unger argues that the purposive legal reasoning is one of the 
major characteristics of the Welfare State and leads to the decline 
of the formalistic modes of reasoning associated with the classical 
idea of the rule of law. R. Unger, Knowledge and Politics (1976),
pp.94-100; Law in Modem Society (1977)» pp.193-200.
1 1 6 . Truber (1 9 7 2), pp.37-59.
117. Ely (1980), p.71.
118. J. Rawls. A Theory of Justice, (1973). A radical critique of 
Rawls* theory is found in C.B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory. (1973)* 
PP.87-95.
119. R. Dworkin (1977).
120. J. Ely (1980).
121. B. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution (1977). There 
is a wealth of legal books that use neoclassical economics. A 
classical text in that approach is R. Posner, Economic Analysis 
of Law (1973).
122. Recent economic and political developments have sparked off an 
interesting debate about the viability and future of the Welfare 
State. I have found particularly instructive: N. Poulantzas,
State. Power. Socialism. (1978); S. Hall, "Popular-Democrativ vs. 
Authoritarian Populism: Two Ways of Taking Democracy Seriously", 
in A. Hunt (ed.), Marxism and Democracy, (1980); and the debates 
"Sur l*État" and "Démocratie, Autogestion, Crise du Marxisme", in 
Dialectiques No.17 and 21.
1 2 3 . Wellington (1979), p.1141.
124. ibid., 1140.
125. Ely (1980), p.135.
126. Wellington (1979), p.1137.
127. H. Arendt, "Civil Disobedience" in Crises of the Republic (1972).
128. The expression was coined by A. Bickel.
129. Arendt (1972), p.81.
130. Wellington (1979) passim.
131. See N. Punen (19 6 8), p.714.
132. Dworkin (1977), ch.8.
^133. See materials cited in ch.X, infra, note 2 6 7.
134. Emerson (196 6), p.12.
135. Barron (1973) passim; The Georgetown Law Journal."Media and the
First Amendment" (1973), P»15«
-542
136. A Free and Responsible Press (1947)» p.113*
137» Emerson (19 6 6), pp.12-13.
138. C.S. Pierce, "The Fixation of Belief", in The Philosophy of Pierce, 
(ed. by J. Buchler) (1940), p.20.
139. H. Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance. (1976), p.323»
140. ibid. Postscript.
141. T. Scanlon (1977).
142. Ely (1980), pp.105-116 and Ely (1975); Wellington (1979).
143. Scanlon (1977)* p.l6l.
1 4 4 . ibid.. p.1 6 2.
145* See the analysis of meaning and communicative intent in A. Giddens, 
(1976), pp.86-92.
146. This is the basis of T. Emerson*s impressive treatise The System of 
Freedom of Expression. (1971)«
1 4 7 . Meiklejohn*s theory of two categories of speech is based on that 
distinction.
148. See J. Austin, How to do Things with Words. (19 6 2) and J. Habermas 
(19 7 9)» pp.44-50 and 59-65 for the illocutionary force of speech acts.
149. Scanlon (1977), PP.159-60.
150. W. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society (1972), p.l6l and H. Hart, 
Punishment and~Responsibillty. (1978),ch.VII and VIII.
151. For a criticism of legal essentialism and its applications in 
Marxist theories of law see P. Hirst, On Law and Ideology. (1979), 
pp;106-126 and "Law, Socialism, Rights", in P. Carlen (ed.),
Radical Issues in Criminology. (1980). I have found some particularly 
interesting critiques of legal philosophy in M. Miaille, TJne 
Introduction Critique au Droit (1977), PP*343-379? M. Miaille, 
l*Etat du Droit. (1978). pp.159-198; and the collection, M. Bourjol 
et al., Pour une Critique du Droit, (1978), pp.114-146.
152. Wellington (1979), p.1122.
153. Scanlon (1977)* p . 1 6 3  and n.8 .
154. Wellington (1979), p.1124.
155. For the theory of formal freedom that grew from the Kantian tradition 
see R. Unger (1976), p.85.
156. Special issue "On Civil Disobedience and the Law", 21 Rutgers Law 
Rev. (Fall 1966). p.6.
-  543 -
157» See A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory. (1979) and in 
particular ch.l, 2 and 4; E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory. 
(1978), pp.193-399 and P. Anderson, Arguments within English Marxism. 
(1980), ch.2; the classical liberal position on human agency and 
structure is found in I. Berlin (1979)» ch.II.
158. H. Hart (1978), ch.VIII. .
CHAPTER II
1. Shapiro (196 6), pp.87-95*
2. See, for example, F. Neumann, "The Concept of Political Freedom" 
and "The Change in the Function of Law in Modem Society", in The
Democratic and Authoritarian State (19 6 4)? 0. Kirchheimer, "The
Rechstaat as Magic Wall" in Wolff and Moore, The Critical Spirit.
(19 6 7)5 Unger (1976), pp.88-100; Unger (1977), pp.176-181, 192-220; 
Hart (1 9 6 1), ch.VII; Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and 
Morals. (1958); C. Eisenmann, L'Esprit des Lois et la Separation 
des Pouvoirs. (1933); L. Althusser, "Montesquieu", in Politics and 
History (1972). pp.87-95; M * Miaille (1978), pp.212-219 presents an 
informative criticism of the dominant understanding of Montesquieu's 
theory of separation of powers.
3. In J. Habermas (1974): The Classical Doctrine of Politics in 
Relation to Social Philosophy, particularly pp.41-76.
4 . C.B. Macpherson (1 9 6 1), pp.87-100, pp.221-232 passim.
5. In J. Habermas (1974): Natural Law and Revolution, pp.82-120.
6. C. Black, The People and the Court, (i960), p.17.
7. B. Ackerman (1977), p.ll.
8. See Ely (1980), pp.48-54; Hart (l96l), ch.IX; J. Griffith,
The Political Constitution (1979)*
9. H. Collins, Introduction to T. Paine, The Rights of Man (19 6 9).
10. T. Paine (19 6 9).
11. ibid.. ch«4 passim.
12. ibid., p.188, 185.
1 3 . ibid., p.187.
14. ibid.. p.186.
„1 5 . ibid.. p.187.
16. ibid., p.193* 
ibid.. p.206.17*
- 544-
18. Farewell address quoted in Carroll, P. and Noble, D., The Free 
and the Unfree: A New History of the United States (1977), p.187.
19. ibid., p.132.
20. ibid.. ch.8 passim. See also L. Levy (i960), ch.5.
21. Quoted in E. Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court (1934), p.6 3.
22. A. de Tocqueville,Democracy in America (1864). Vol.II, p.3 1 4 .
2 3 . Tpcqueville saw free press as a cure against the evil of equality:
ibid.. Vol.I, ch.XI and Vol.II, ch.VI.
24. See A. Giddens (1979)» PP*89-96; Unger (1976), ch.2; H.F. Pitkin, 
Wittgenstein and Justice (1972), p.220f.
25. Hart (1961), ch.VI.
26. F. Frankfurter, "The Judicial Process and the Supreme Court" in 
Mendelson (19 6 5)» p.492; A. de Toqueville (I864), Vol.I, p.357.
27. C. Black (i960), p.118.
28. ibid., pp.6-23 and at 12; Mcllwain, C., Constitutionalism and the 
Changing World (1939), ch.XIII. and XIV.
2 9. Mcllwain (1939), pp.278-9.
30. C. Black (i960), p.32.
31. A. Cox (1968), p.24.
32. Dworkin (1977) and J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980) 
provide new interpretations of the relation between natural law and 
the constitution.
33» I was greatly helped by J. Habermas article on "Natural Law and 
He volution" in Habermas (1974)»
34» X. Marx, Early Writings (1975), P«88.
35. 1». Colletti, Introduction to X. Marx (1975), p.42.
36. Colletti (1975), P.46; cf. A. Wolfe (1977), p.5.
37. Carroll and Noble (1977), p.l99.
38. C.B. Macpherson, The Beal World of Democracy (19 6 6), p.l and 
Macpherson (1973), I, VII, IX passim. Similarly E.H. Carr remarks that 
"in England... the word democracy long remained in bad odour with the 
English ruling classes". The Soviet Impact on the Western World 
(1946), pp.8-9.
39» See above, 2.1.2.
40. C. Black (I960), pp.106-107.
41. 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
- 545 -
42. ibid.. at 176, 177* 178.
43. E. Corwin, Liberty and Government (1948), pp.72-85»
44. Corwin (1934)» pp.54-62 at p.56.
45. Quoted in Corwin (1934)* p.59»
4 6. "The Court’s persistent resort to notions of substantive due process 
for almost a century attests the strength of our natural law 
inheritance in constitutional adjudication, and I think is unwise
as well as hopeless to resist it”. A. Cox, The Role of the Supreme 
Court in American Government (1976), p.113* The question of 
"substantive due process” has been one of the most vexed in American 
constitutional theory. For an informative review and bibliography 
see H. Abraham, Freedom and the Court (1977)* ch,IY.
47» Corwin (1934)» p.80.
48. Corwin (1948), p.l37f. "The country was presented with a new,
up-to-date version of natural law", p.138. Tocqueville stated that 
"If I were asked where I placed the American aristocracy, I should 
reply without hesitation..» that it occupies the judicial bench 
and the bar", oj>. cit. Vol.I, p.355*
49» Pollock v. Farmers L. and T. Co.. 158 U.S. 429 (1895)» Advocate's 
argument is recorded ibid, at 544 and Field’s reply at 607.
50. U.S. v. Knight Co.. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
51» In Re Debs. 158 U.S. 564 (1895)»
52. Lochner v. Hew York. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) at 57»
53» A. Wolfe (1977), P»57.
54» 110 U.S. 535 at 536.
55« Lochner v. N.Y.. 198 U.S. at 59»
5 6. The Slaughter House cases, 16 Wallace 56 (1873)» Justice Field 
dissenting at 95»
57» H. McCloskey, American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise (1951) 
pp.81, and 1 2 2-1 2 3 »
58. See infra. ch.VI, 4 .
59» Davis v. Massachusetts. 1 6 7 U.S. 43 (1897) at 47-48.
60. Children’s Hospital v. Adkins. 284 Fed. 6 13 at 622 (D.C. Cir. 1922).
61. U.S. v. Carolene Products Co.. 304 U.S. 144 (1938) at 152, n.4.
62. Dissenting in Drivers’ Union v. Meadowmoor. 3 1 2  U.S. 287 (1941) at 
3 0 1-2 .
6 3. Palko v. Connecticut. 302 U.S. 319 (l937) at 326.
- 546 -
64. Jones v. Opelika, 316 ÏÏ.S. 584 (1942) at 600.
6 5. M. Konvitz, replying to B. Bussell's suggestion that freedom has 
been receding in the world, wrote "In the U.S., in the last twenty- 
five years, progress in civil liberties and civil rights has been 
made in an unprecedented way", Konvitz (19 6 7), p.xiii.
66. Schwartz, B., A Commentary on the Constitution. Vol.I, p.2 6 4.
6 7. Kovacs v. Cooper. 336 U.S. 77 (1949) at 90*
68. "We cannot give some constitutional rights a preferred position 
without relegating others to a deferred position; we can establish 
no first without thereby establishing seconds", Jackson dissenting in 
Brinegar v. U.S.. 338 U.S. l60 (1949) at 180.
69. Learned Hand was equally opposed to the doctrine. He could not 
understand "why property itself was not a personal right", L. Hand 
(1946), p.698.
70. P. Freund (1950), eh.I; Mendelson (1961), pp.124-131.
71. P. Freund (1950), p.19.
72. Kovacs v. Cooper. Frankfurter dissenting, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) at 95* 
Learned Hand, too, in his famous lecture on the "Bill of Rights" 
came close to accepting the preferred position doctrine (i960), p.69.
73. A similar distinction between judicial activists and proponents of 
judicial restraint was drawn in the earlier cases that were decided 
on due process grounds. See Mendelson (1961, 1 9 6 5); A. Bickel (1962, 
1970); C. Black (i960); J. Deutch, "Neutrality, Legitimacy and the 
Supreme Court", 20 Stanford Law B. p .16 9 (19 6 8); Learned Hand,
The Bill of Bights (l958)~. In freedom of expression theory the 
activism/restraint distinction is usually presented as that between 
the "absolutists" and the "balancers". See Meiklejohn, "The 
Balancing of Self-Preservation Against Political Freedom", 49 California 
Law B. (1961); Frantz, "The First Amendment in the Balance",
71 Yale Law J.. p.1424 (19 6 2) ; Mendelson, "On the Meaning of the 
First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance" 50 California Law B. p.821 
(1962). The Frantz-Mendelson debate was continued in 51 Calif.L^B. 
p.729 (19 6 3) and 17 Vanderbilt_L.g, p.479 (19 6 4). Krislov (19 6 8) and 
Shapiro (1966) provide a pro-activist review of the debate.
74. The'rules under which the Court avoids passing upon a large part of 
the constitutional challenges brought before it are gathered in a 
concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. T.Y.A,fl 297
U.S. 288 (19 3 6).
75» See Note, "The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law", 69 
Columbia ^aw Bev. p.808 (19 6 9).
76. Hague v. C.I.O.. 307 U.S. 496 (1939) at 515-516.
77» S. Krislov, The Supreme Court and Political Freedom (19 6 8), p.77.
78. Quoted in B. Hodder-Williams, The Politics of the U.S. Supreme 
Court (I98O), p.7.
- 547 -
79» Justice Eoberts in ÏÏ.S. v. Butler. 297 U.S. 1 (1 9 3 6).
80. H. Black and E. Cahn (19 6 2), pp.555-4«
81. An interesting convergence of such schools as Phenomenology, 
Ethnomethodology, Post-Wittgensteinian Philosophy, Critical Theory 
and of some schools within the Marxist tradition has taken place in 
an attempt to break from earlier positivistic concepts in the 
social sciences. See A. Giddens (1976), ch.I.
82. E. Unger (1977)* p.196.
8 3. See E. Dworkin, "The Jurisprudence of President Nixon", 18 New York 
Beview of Books. 27-38 (May 4* 1972) and B. Ackerman (1977), ch.7.
84. For an extensive review of the literature on the 14th Amendment 
see Ely (1980), pp.14-41 and accompanying references.
8 5. S. Krislov (19 6 8), pp.65-6 6. G. Anastaplo, The Constitutionalist 
(1971) attempts an exhaustive examination of the legislative history 
of the First Amendment.
86. Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell. 290 U.S. 398 (1954) 
at 442-443.
87. Quoted in Bodder-Williams (1980), p.7*
88. Linde, Judges. Critics and the Bealist Tradition (1972), p.2 5 4.
89. Abrams v. U.S.. 250 U.S. 6l6 (1919) at 6 30.
90. "[T]he First Amendment repudiated seditious libel for this country", 
Black and Douglas dissenting in Beauhamais v. Illinois. 343 U.S. 250
(1951) at 272.
91. Schoffielf, Essays on Constitutional Law and Equity (1921), Vo'1.2,
p.5 2 1-2 .
92. Levy (I960), pp.247-8.
93* New York Times v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254 (1968) at 2 7 6.
94. Kalven (19 6 4), p.209.
95. J. Eoche, "American Liberty: An Examination of the Tradition of 
Freedom" in M, Konvitz and C. Eossiter, Aspects of Liberty (1958),
pp.129-162.
9 6. See L. Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy (1971)» pp.127-186, 195-219 
and M. Foucault, L 1Ordre du Discours (197l).
97. Krislov (19 6 8), p.75.
98. J. Auerbach, Unequal Justice (19 7 6), p.171.
99. See infra. ch.VIII.
100. Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45 (19 0 5), Holmes dissenting at 75.
- 548 “
101. A. Cox (1968), ch.l.
102. M. Shapiro (19 6 6), p.l6.
103« Note the contradiction of this argument with the claim of the
pxuralists that political apathy is a necessary characteristic of 
advanced democratic societies. See above, ch.l, 3.2. This was the 
favourite argument of Frankfurter and Learned Hand even though they 
had both fully adopted the pluralist assumptions.
104. Monaghan, "Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When", 82 
Yale Law Journal. 1 3 6 3 (1973) at 1366.
105. "Law [is] the expression of the views and feelings that may fairly 
be deemed representative of the community as continuing society",
F. Frankfurter, "Some Observations on the Nature of the Judicial 
Process of Supreme Court Litigation", 98 Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society, p .2 3 3 (1954).
106. A. Bickel (1975). ch.l; Elliott, W. (1974), pp.193-204.
107» H. Stone, "The Common Law in the United States", 50 Harvard Law 
Bev. (1 9 3 6), pp.23-5. But see the criticisms of the position in 
Ely (1980), pp.6}-69.
108. H. Wellington in "Common Law Sules and Constitutional Double 
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication", 83 Yale Law Journal p.221 
(1 9 7 3)» argues that the courts should implement in law the 
conventional or "common" morality. It is one more effort at 
defining the principle, or essence, or "spirit" of the law. See 
ch.III, infra.
109. This is the position of Ely (i960), ch.3 .
110. M. Shapiro (1966), p .8 and Krislov (19 6 8), ch.l; Corwin (1934), ch. 
Ill: "due process of law is no Frankenstein*s monster that rides 
down legislation in defiance of its creator*s will - it is the 
servant of the court*s legislative judgment", ibid.. p.1 0 1.
111. Shapiro (19 6 6), pp.17-25.
1 1 2 . ibid.. pp.25-3 4.
113. This thesis has been advanced by E. Dahl in Decision Making <n a 
Democracy (1957) ; cf. E. Latham, "The Supreme Court and the
Supreme People", 16 Journal of Politics, p.207 (1954).
114. Bishin, "Judicial Review in Democratic Theory", 50 S. Cal. Law 
Rev, p.1099 (1977) at 1112.
115. T. Grey, "Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?". 27 Stanford 
Law Rev.. p.703 (1975) at 705.
116. H. Black and E. Cahn (19 6 2), p.553.
" 549 "
CHAPTER III
1. T, Cooley, A Treatise in Constitutional Limitation (1890), ch.VII 
and IX.
2. See generally, F. Neumann (19 6 4)» Approaches to the Study of 
Political Power.
3. Habermas (1976) and (1979)» ch.5; C. Black (i960), ch.II gives a 
classical liberal argument for the legitimatory. role of 
constitutionalism and judicial review.
4. See J. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (19 6 6); on the 
link between liberalism and authoritarianism, N. Poulantzas, 
Political Power and Social Classes (1978)* pp.219-221? on the 
ambiguous attitude of liberal political theory to state power
F. Neumann (19 6 4)* The Concept of Political Freedom.
5. C.B. Macpherson (19 6 2), passim.
6. An interesting review of the theories of civil society is found in
N. Bobbio "Gramsci and the Conception of Civil Society”, in C. Mouffe 
(ed.), Gramsci and Marxist Theory (1979)«
7* ,G. Poggi, The Development of the Modern State (1978), ch.IV and V
draws extensively from constitutional theory and is particularly 
informative.
8. The phrase is coined by Macpherson (19 6 2).
9» H. Pound in The Spirit of Common Law (1 9 2 5), p .4 6 describes the 
contradictory attitude of the Puritans toward legislation: they 
are both hostile to it and they prefer it against common law and 
equity.
10. M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962). p.34.
11. See Macpherson (19 6 2) passim and Habermas (1974)» pp.92-96 and 
105-109.
12. On the notion of law in J.J. Bousseau, P. Neumann, The Governance 
and the Rule of Law (1936)» pp.240-265 and in particular 25I-256.
1 3 . Unger (1977)» pp.58-86.
14. Habermas (1974)» pp.56-6 7.
15. Axendt, H., Vita Activa. p.291, quoted in Habermas (1974), p.6l.
16. The classical Marxist analysis of the form of law and of legal right 
is E. Pashukanis, Law and Marxism (1978).
17. Habermas (1974), p.85.
18. Marxist theories of law deriving from the analysis of Pashukanis 
suffer from formalism, too. See P. Hirst (1979), pp.153-176.
18a. Dr. J. Finnis argues that the inference of norms from facts often 
attributed to theories of classical natural law is not true. Finnis 
(1980), pp.3 3-4 2. I do not argue for any such inference but for the 
global character of traditional world-views which are "interpretations 
of the world, nature, and history as a whole". Habermas (19 7 6), p.80.
- 550 -
19. "Technology and Science as ‘Ideology'", in Habermas (1971), pp.81-122, 
and p.9 7.
20. Unger (1976), p.85 and B. Leoni, Freedom and the Law (1 9 6 1), ch.3,
4 and 5 * ~
21. E.g. A. Bant, "Perspectives in the Sociology of Law", in P. Carlen 
(ed.), The Sociology of Law (1976); M. Cain, "Optimism, Law and the 
State; A Plea for the possibility of politics", 1977 European 
Yearbook in Law and Sociology: B. Edelman, Le Droit Saisie par la 
Photographie (19717: C. Sumner, Reading Ideologies (1979). ch.8 .
22. E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters (l977). p.2 6 3.
2 3. The expression is coined by Habermas (1 9 7 1).
24. See A. Hunt (1978), ch.5. However, economic and social changes
in Western democracies after the 1950s have increased the need for 
direct legitimation of the political order. See infra. ch.III.
25. D. Hay's '•Property, Authority and the Criminal Law" is an excellent 
description of the ideological role of the law in 18th century 
England. In 3). Hay et al., Albion's Fatal Tree (1977).
26. The concept of "negative freedom" is well known in continental legal 
philosophy and derives from the Kantian theory of law. The term was 
introduced in England by I. Berlin (1979).
2 7. See Neumann (1936), pp.405-424 and 462-491.
28. Corwin (1934), pp.89-90.
2 9. ibid.
30. ibid., at 91; cf. "The Court's power is a natural outcome of the 
necessity for maintaining capitalist dominance under democratic 
forms... judicial review has proved to be a very convenient channel 
through which the driving forces of American economic life have 
found expression and achieved victory". M. Lemer, "The Divine Right 
of Judges" in A. Christensen and E. Kirkpatrick (eds.), The People, 
Politics and the Politician (1941)» P«578.
31. See above, p.56*
32. Unger (1977) 192-242; Poggi (1978), ch.VI.
33* Habermas (1971), ch.5 and 6.
34. M. Edelman (19 6 4) passim.
35* See above, ch.II, 3*2.1.
36. Habermas (1971)» P*75 and Habermas (19 6 4) passim.
. Ely (1980), p.79.37
- 551 -
38. The debate on the "decline of law" started in Germany <*u-Hng the 
Weimar years by C. Schmidt and his school. The advent of the Welfare 
State after WWII in all major Western democracies made the theme one 
of the most discussed - and controversial - in legal philosophy.
G. Ripert's Le declin du droit (1949) is a classical statement of the 
neoconservative position. In England F. Hayek's The Constitution 
of Liberty (i960; particularly ch.16 contains all the main arguments 
and a full bibliography. See also Hayek's later Law, Legislation and 
Liberty. Vol.I and III. For the United States see Mazon, "The 
Crisis of Liberal Legalism", 81 Yale Law J .. p.1032 (1972) and 
references provided there. An interesting critique of the "decline 
of law" thesis is provided in M. Bourjol et al. (1978), pp.6l-67.
39. H. Hart (1961).
40. E. Bworkin (1977)*
41. Hart (1961), Cn.IV. There are similarities with T. Parsons' 
understanding of power in Western societies. For Parsons "authority" 
is not a form of power (legitimate power) but a basis of power.
Power is, therefore, by definition legitimate. See A. Giddens 
(1979), ch.10, pp.340-41.
42. Dworkin (1977)* p.198.
43. See ch.I, 5 and J. Griffith (1979).
44. Ch.II, 4.1.
45. Ch.II, 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.
4 6. Ch.I, 3 . .
47. A. Bickel (1970).
48. Elliott (1974), p.2, 11.
49. Ch.III, 2.
50. A clear statement to that effect is found in Prudential Insurance Co. 
v. Cheek. 259 E.S. 530 (1922) at 543.
51. For the centrality of law in legal philosophy and the sociology of 
law see A. Hunt in P. Carien (ed.) (1976).
52. See ch.II, n.30 and accompanying text.
53« Bork (1971)» p.l. According to classical political philosophy
legitimacy is a characteristic of authority. The question is when 
power is legitimate, i.e. when power is authority. See Arendt (1972), 
On Violence, and A. Passerin d'Entreves, The Notion of the State 
(1967) on Power and Authority.
54. See the criticisms of A. Giddens (1979b), pp.101-103.
55. Marshall (1971), p.198.
5 6. S. Scheingold, The Politics of Rights (1974)» P»3.
- 552 -
57» M. Foucault, la Volante de Savoir (1976), pp.111-120 and p.ll6.
58. Chief Justice Hughes quoted in Hoddler-Williams (1980), p.ll.
59. See H. Wechsler, ’’Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law",
73 Harvard Law Rev, p.l (l959) and Bork (1971) applying Veschler's 
theory on free speech issues.
60. Ackerman (1977) and Posner (1973)»
61. M. Foucault (1971) p.23-38» See also G. Therbom, The Ideology 
of Power (1980), pp.81-84.
62. See F. Neumann (19 6 4)* Approaches to the Study of Political Power.
H. Dahrendorf in his Society and Democracy in Germany (1969) remarks 
that "the exaggerated faith in the rule of law as an institution 
beyond all conflicts of interests betrays the same aversion to 
discord and thus the same evasion of the uncomfortable diversity of 
uncertainty that is inherent in the German idea of the state", p.197. 
The American theory of constitutionalism inheres similar faiths, 
aversions and evasions.
6 3. I was greatly helped in my analysis by the articles of B. Hindess, 
"Democracy and the Limitations of Parliamentary Democracy in 
Britain" in 1 Politics and Power (1980) and of P. Hirst, "Law, 
Socialism, Bights", in P. Carlen (19 8O).
6 4. Griffith (1979), p.l6.
6 5. Giddens (1979b), ch.2, p.93; M. Foucault (1976), pp.121-135;
Poulantzas (1978), Part Two, particularly pp.146-1 5 4 .
65a. Offe in Connerton (1976)» p«394«
66. "The creation of frames of meaning... [and their] reflexive elaboration 
is characteristically imbalanced in relation to the possession of 
power", A. Giddens (1976)» p.H3 and ch.3. See also J. Brigham, 
Constitutional Language (1978)»
6 7. Poulantzas (19 7 8), Part One.
68. B. Hindess in Hunt (ed.) (19 8O), p.44«
6 9. W. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (1974)* p.180.
70. Hunt in Carlen (ed.) (1976), pp«39-43« •
71. E.P. Thompson (1977)* p.2 6 5.
72. Poulantzas (1978), pp.76-93«
73« Therbom (1980), pp.100-115«
74. Talmon (1952).
75« See the critical review of functionalist social theory in A. Giddens 
(1979a), ch.2.
553 -
76. A. Giddens (1979b), p.103.
77. H. Hart (I96l), pp.5 6 and 79-88.
78. ibid.. at PP.113, 111.
79. ibid.. at p.113 and pp.107-115 passing.
80. 0. Kirchheimer (1 9 6 7), part III.
81. See H. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (i960), ch.YI and 
infra, ch.VIII, 1.
82. M. Foucault, Discipline and Punishment (1979), passim.
- 554 -
CHAPTER 17
1. Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications (1947)» Vol.I, pp.21-2. ,
2. Ibid.. p.21.
3. p.28.
4. Associated Press v. U.S.. 326 U.S. at 20 (1945)*
5. A.7. Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England (19 6 2).
6. ibid’., pp.2 1-2 7.
7. p.ll.
8. pp.12-16.
9. p.l6.
10. p.42.
11. p.43.
12. p.57.
13. J. Habermas, Stukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Neuwied: Luchterhand, 
1962. The argument is summarized in Habermas,"The public sphere:
an encyclopedia article", 3 New German Critique. 1974» p.49* Habermas 
develops this idea in his later work, where the public sphere is 
related to problems of legitimation in late capitalism. See Habermas 
(1974, 1976, 1979) passim.
14. S. Wolin, Politics and Vision (i960). His concept of the "political" 
resembles closely that of the public sphere.
15. H. Arendt, The Human Condition (1959) and Crises of the Republic 
(1972), passim.
16. Habermas (1974), p.49*
17* Other public spheres may be equally conceptualized, like an artistic, 
moral or scientific one. Popper*s understanding of scientific practice 
as an "open society" is very close to the concept of a "scientific 
public sphere".
18. Karl Bucher, quoted by Habermas (1974)» p.55*
1 9 . oj>. cit., p.55.
20. o£. cit.. p.5 2 .
21. oj>. cit.. p.55» see also Habermas (1974)» p.l and Poggi (1978)» PP* 
104-7.
22. Ch.II, 2.1.2.
23. J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract (M. Cranston traasl.), London 
Penguin, 1968, Bk.II, Ch.II, p.9 6.
2 4. Habermas (1974)» p.54*
- •555 -
25. ibid. The translation of this passage is taken from D. Held, 
Introduction to Critical Theory. London, Hutchinson, 1980, p.262.
26. Similar statements are found in Arendt (1959) p.220, 41 and Volin 
(I960), p.287.
27. Habermas (1971)* p.106.
28. J. Griffith (1979), P-12, 19.
2 9. op. cit., p.1 7 .
30. H. Abraham (197'0, p.170*
31. 0. Kirchheimer (19 6 7).
32. Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty (ed. I. Billiard), New York,
Knopf, 1953, pp.189-90.
33« Dennis y . ÏÏ.S.. Ch.IX, 3*1.2.
34. Griffith (1979)» P.19. "Everything that happens is constitutional.
And if nothing happened that would be constitutional also."
35. Giddens (1979b), Ch.2, 3, 5, particularly pp.97-100, 120-128, 190-193; 
see also Habermas analysis of "distorted communications" in (1971)
Ch.5 and (1979), Ch.1.
3 6. See generally books cited in Ch.Y, n.34 and in particular Eoelofs (1979). 
CHAPTER V
. 1. Bems (1957), P.50.
2. Z. Chafee, The Blessings of Liberty (1956), p.70*
3. Bork (1971), P*33; Freund (1950), p.24f; Justice Frankfurter 
dissenting in Bridges v. California, 314 O.S. 252 (1941) declared that 
the test was a mere "rule of reason", ibid, at 282.
4. Meiklejohn (i960), p.45*
5. M. Konvitz, Fundamental Liberties of a Free People (1957), p.288.
6. Frankfurter dissenting in Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) at 6 6 3?
Emerson (19 6 6), p.52.
7. Kalven (19 6 4), pp.213-4; Kalven (1968), p.2 9 7.
8. Wellington (1979), p.1141.
9. Ely (1980), p.116.
10. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
11. Ely (1980), p.115.
12. H. Linde, "Clear and Present Danger Reexamined" (1970), p.1179;
a more sympathetic view is found in F. Strong, "50 years of Clear 
and Present Danger" (1969)»
13. R. Cushman, "Clear and present danger in Free Speech Cases: A Study
in Judical Semantics" (1948) passim; cf. C. Antieau, "The Rule of Clear 
and Present Danger" (1950); V. Mendelson, "Clear and Present Danger"
(1952).
14. For criticisms of all other main tests see Emerson (1966), pp.48-62.
15. Krislov (19 6 8), p.108.
- 556 -
16. See W. Brennan (19 6 5) and Krislov (19 6 8), pp.97-107.
17. E. Hudon, Freedom of Speech and Press in America (19 6 3), p.ix.
18. Baerson (19 6 6), p.vii.
1 9 . ibid., p.viii.
20. ibid, passim, and Emerson (1970). Bnerson*s theory is based on a 
conceptual distinction between speech and conduct.
21. Among others I have found most interesting the efforts of Chafee 
(1941); Meiklejohn (i960); Shapiro (19 6 6); Krislov (19 6 8);
Kalven (19 6 4); Wellington (1979)i Ely (1980) and Emerson (1970).
22. Ch.II and III.
2 3 . C. Campbell, Legal Thought and Juristic Values (1974).
24. ibid.. pp.18-19 and n.24.
2 5. M. Cain, “Necessarily out of Touch”, in P. Carlen (ed.) (19 7 6), 
pp.229-234.
26. Quoted from Perelman, "The Idea of Justice and the Problem of 
Argument", p.19.
27. Campbell (l974),pp.27-8.This is done when jurisprudence limits its 
task in "seeking the validity of legal norms".
28. See ch.X, D.
29. Kalven (19 6 4).
30. Brennan (19 6 5).
3 1 . ibid.. pp.6-10.
32. See the criticisms of H. Hart (1961), pp.121-137 and Hunt (1978),
PP.45-59.
35. E.P. Thompson (1977), p.266.
34. See, e.g., R. Lefcourt, Law Against the People (1971); Balbus
(1973, 1977)? Taylor, Walton and Young, Critical Criminology (1975)? 
A. Skillen, Ruling Illusion (1977), ch. 3; R. Quinney, Class. State. 
Crime (1977)? V. Tumanov. Contemporary Bourgeois Legal Thought 
719 7 4)? J. Roelofs, The Warren Court and Corporate Capitalism
(1979).
- 557 -
CHAPTER VI
1. Ely (1980), p.107.
2. M. Davis, "Why the U.S. Working Class is Different" (1980a), p.30.
3. Wolfe (1977)» ch.4, passim.
4. Nelson (19 6 7)* p.xxxii.
5. Carroll and Nohle (1977)» P*331*
6. Nelson (19 6 7)» p.xxxiv.
7. R. Murray, Red Scare (19 6 4).
8. M. Davis (1980a), p.43*
9. Carroll and Nohle (1977). p.331.
10. Chafee (1956), p.6 7.
11. ihid.
12. New York Penal Law, Il60-l66.
13. Chafee (1956), p.71.,
14. See Wolfe (1977). ch.6 passim.
15. 0. Kirchheimer, "Politics and Justice" in Politics. Law and Social 
Change.
16. J. Paul and M. Schwartz, Federal Censorship (1961). pp.1 7 -2 4.
17. Nelson (19 6 7)» p.xxviii.
18. See ch.I, 2.
19» The process leading to the adoption of the Espionage Act is 
recorded in Chafee (1941)» PP*35-41* For the Congressional 
debates see T. Carroll, "Freedom of Speech and of the Press in 
War-Times the Espionage Act" (1919) and J. Hall, "Free Speech 
in War-Time", 21 Columbia Law R., p.526.
20. Act of June 15, 1917 0.30, Title I, §3, 40 Stat. 219, now 50
TJ.s.c.A., §3 3 «
21. ibid.. ch.30, Title XII, §2.
22. The judicial construction of the terms of the original Act makes 
the fears of the Attorney-General appear unjustified. See infra. 
3*1, 3.2.
- 558 -
23. Act of May 16, 1918, C.75* §1* 40 Stat.553? repealed Act of March 3* 
1921, C.I3 6, 41 Stat. 1359* Numerals are mine.
2 4. The total number of persons convicted is stated in the Attorney- 
General^ reports as 877 out of 1958 prosecutions commenced.
25. Learned Hand in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten. 244 Fed. 535, 540 
(S.D.N.Y. 1917).
26. U.S. v. Pierce et al.. 245 Fed. 878 (N.D.N.Y. 1917)? p.6l. Most 
of the lower federal courts decisions which are quoted in this part 
(3*2) are taken from W. Nelles, Espionage Act Cases (1918). M s  
book contains a compilation of extracts from federal decisions 
construing the Act. Some of these decisions are reported in the 
Federal Reporter; many in the "Interpretation of War Statutes” 
Bulletins published by the U.S. Department of Justice; finally 
some of the decisions are not elsewhere reported. Each quotation 
has two references; one to the relevant judicial reports or 
Bulletins and one to the Nelles' book where the case and quotation 
appears.
27. U.S. v. Ramp. Bui.66; p.15«
28. U.S. v. Max Eas~tanan. S.D. of N.Y., May 1918; the case is reported 
only in Nelles (1919)* pp.29-30.
29. Carroll (1919), p.6 4 2. Compare with Judge Rogers in Masses v. Patten 
246 Fed. 24: "Indeed the Court does not hesitate to say that 
considering the natural and reasonable effect of the publication it 
was intended wilfully to obstruct recruiting."
30. U.S. v. Wolf. Bui. 81; p.16.
31. U.S. v. Krafft. Bui.84; pp.36“7*
32. U.S. v. Kirchner. Bui. 6 9; p.6 5.
35. Chafee (1941), PP-50, 6 3.
34, U.S. v. Rose Pastor Stokes. Bui.110; p.70.
35« U.S. v. Motion Picture Film "The Spirit of 76". Bui.35; P*34.
3 6. In a similar case Montana ordered public schools to cease using a 
textbook on ancient history that gave a "too favourable treatment 
of the Teutonic tribes prior to 812 A.D.". H. Schreiber, The 
Wilson Administration and Civil Liberties (i960), p.2 3 . There is 
apparently an established"proximate causation" between moral and 
political hysteria and the ridiculous.
37. U.S. v. Capo. Bui.37.
38. W. Nelles, Espionage Act Cases (1919), p.v and 78. Carroll (1919) 
remarks that "Mr. Nelles • book was produced with the evident purpose 
of influencing opinion in favour of a milder interpretation of the 
law", p.6 4 2, n.47*
- 559 -
39. Judge Rogers in Masses v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24.
40. W. Nelles (1918), p.v. He supports his case from the opinions in 
TT.S, v. Frerichs. Bui.85; p.8 ; U.S. v. Hall. 248 Fed. I56 and 
Learned Hand's opinion in Masses. 244 Fed. 535»
41. 245 Fed. 878 (N.D.N.Y. 1917); P*56.
42. A similar blurring of the distinction between statements of fact 
and opinion is found in U.S. v. Harper. Bui.7 6; p.66; U.S. v. 
Stokes. Bui.110; p.66.
43» Masses v. Patten (Civil Suit 244 Fed. 535)»
44* Congress exercised such a power by passing the 1918 Amendment to 
the Act.
45» Masses v. Patten. 244 Fed. 540.
4 6. "There is no presumption that the minds of Americans in or out the 
military service, are to any extent imbecile", Nelles (1918), p.80. 
The dominant construction, however, went against Hand and Nelles.
47* From a letter of Learned Hand to Z. Chafee of Jan. 2, 1921 quoted 
in G. Gunther, "Learned Hand and the Origins of Modem First 
Amendment Doctrine" (1975)* P«725« The article marks a new interest 
in Hand's early doctrine.
48. Masses v. Patten at 540. Hand was reversed at 246 Fed. 2 4.
49. 246 Fed. 24 (C.C.A. 2d 1917).
50. U.S. v. Goldman et al.. Bui.41; P»39*
51. U.S. v. Philips et al.. Bui.14; p.38.
52. U.S. v. Wallace. Bui.4; p.44*
53» From Judge Wade's charge to the jury in U.S. v. D.T. Blodgett 
reported in Nelles (1918), p.48.
54. U.S. v. Tanner. Bui.5 6; p.43«
55. Gunther (1975), p.729.
5 6. Chafee (1941), p.15.
5 7 . ibid.. pp.5 1 -2 .
58. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
58a. ibid, at 50-5 1 .
59. F. Giffin, "Six Who Protested" (1977), p.2 9.
60. 249 U.S. at 51-52.
. Frohwerk v. U.S. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).61
- 560 -
6 2. ibid, at 206.
6 3. ibid, at 208, 209.
64. Chafee (1941)» p.83 argues that Frohwerk’s conviction was the result 
of the inadequately prepared defence. "However, on the inadequately 
prepared record as it stood, the evidence might conceivably have 
been sufficient to sustain a conviction since the circumstances
and the intention, though not the words per se, might satisfy the 
danger test."
65. 249 ff.S. 2 1 1 (1919).
66. D. Karsner, Debs (1919). pp.23-4 records the whole Debs plea.
67. F. Giffin, Six Who Protested (1977)» P«42. Justice Holmes remarked 
that "...the jury were most carefully instructed that they could 
not find the defendant guilty for advocacy of any of his opinions 
unless the words used had as their natural tendency and reasonably 
probable effect to obstruct... and unless the defendant had the 
specific intent to do so in his mind", 249 U.S. at 216. Chafee 
(1 9 4 1), p .8 4 found that the instructions had a "wide scope" and 
that Debs was "probably convicted for an exposition of socialism".
68. 249 U.S. at 213, 215.
69. D. Shannon, The Socialist Party of America: A History (1955), 
p.114.
69a. Chafee (1941), p .8 6
70. E. Freund, "The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech", New Republic.
3 May 1919.
71. A. Pinchot, "Debs Sent to Prison", Appeal to Reason. 26 April 1 9 1 9 .
72. Z. Chafee (1941), p.85.
73. E. Black, "Debs v. U.S. - A Judicial Milepost on the Road to 
Absolutism", 1932 TJniv. of Pennsylvania Law Rev., pp. 174-195.
74. H. Kalven, "Prof. E. Freund and the First Amendment American 
Tradition", AO Univ. of Chicago Law Rev., p.235 (1973) at p.237; 
even one of the most conservative writers on free speech issues 
found the decision of Debs distasteful: Bems (1976), pp.1 6 7-8 .
75. Chafee (1956), p.70; Kalven (1973), PP.237-8; Gunther (1975) 
passim.
7 6. Gunther (1975), p.,739.
77. Holmes-Pollock Letters. 7ol.II, p.7* Chafee (1941) concludes 
from that extract that Holmes made a successful tactical move by 
launching the test as the spokesman of a unanimous Court, even 
though he did not apply it to the facts of the case. "For subsequent 
decisions prove that he would then have been in a small minority and 
he would not have been able to announce with the backing of a unanimous 
Supreme Court the rule of clear and present danger", p.86. Holmes, 
however, did not use the rule, in the way Chafee understands it,
in the two follow-up cases of which Debs was much more important
than Schenck.
- 561 -
78. Abrams v. U.S. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
79. ibid, at 6 2 1.
80. Holmes dissenting at 250 U.S. 627-8.
81. ibid, at 6 2 7.
82. Shaefer v. U.S.. 251 U.S. 466 (1920); Pierce v. U.S.. 252 U.S.
239 (19 2 0).
83. See above 3.2(e).
84. 252 U.S. at 266, 267, 269.
85. Chafee (1941), p.95, n.99.
8 6. Carroll and Noble (1977), P»331.
87. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
8 8. Chafee (1941), p.319.
88a. 268 U.S. at 665, 671-2.
89. 268 U.S. at 6 6 7.
89a. ibid, at 668.
90. ibid, at 668-9.
91. ibid, at 670, 6 7 1.
9 2. ibid, at 6 7 3.
93. See Ch.II, n.59 and 4«1.
94. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
95» The clause provides that "any person who... organizes or assists in 
. organizing, or is or knowingly becomes a member of any organization, 
society, group or assemblage of persons organized or assembled to 
advocate, teach or aid and abet criminal syndicalism... is guilty 
of felony".
96. 274 U.S. 375 (1927).
97» Fiske v. Kansas. 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
98. ibid, at 387.
* - 562 -
CHAPTER VII
1. 0. Kirchheimer. Political Justice (1961), particularly Introduction 
and Conclusions.
2. Chafee (1941)» p.6 4.
3. U.S. v. Mackley. Bui. 83; p.16.
4. For the use of conspiracy prosecutions in English law as a means 
of political repression see R. Spicer, "Conspiracy Law, Class and 
Society" in P. Carlen (ed.) (1976). For the use of conspiracy 
trials in the 30s and 60s in the U.S. see Ch.IX, 3*1 and Ch.X, 3*
5. Certain offences may he committed by a legally defined category 
of persons.
6. According to Holmes a danger is automatically present in two other 
social situations: (a) when a man falsely shouts fire in a crowded 
theatre and causes panic; and (b) when a man utters words that have 
all the effect of force.
7* E. Corwin, in "Bowing Out Clear and Present Danger", 27 Notre Dame 
Lawyer, p.332 (1951) argues that a strict intent requirement of 
liability is an alternative test to the danger one. But in his 
Abrams dissent Holmes included an intent requirement as an integral 
part of the danger test.
8 . Abrams v. U.S. 250 U.S. 6l6 (1919) at 621.
9* Chafee (1941), P.135*
10. e.g. Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55 (1901); Swift and Co. v. 
U.S. 196 U.S. 375 (1905) a t 396; Hyde v. U.S. 225 U.S. 347 (1912) 
at 38 8.
11. O.W. Holmes, The Common Law (1881). "Attempt and intent... are two 
distinct things. Intent to commit a crime is not in itself 
criminal... The law only deals with conduct; An attempt is an 
overt act... the importance of the intent is not to show that the 
act was wicked; but to show that it was likely to be followed with 
harmful consequences", p.6 5, 68.
12. Commonwealth v. Peaslee. 177 Mass. 267 at 272.
13* Commonwealth v. Kennedy. 170 Mass. 18; cf. "the considerations being 
(for a finding of criminal attempt) the nearness of the danger, the 
greatness of the harm and the degree of apprehension felt", Holmes
(1881), p.68.
14* Sayre, "Criminal Attempts", 41 Harvard Law R. 821 (1928) was
instrumental in the development of the American law of attempts.
15. Scott v. P.. 141 111* 195» 30 N.E. Rep. 329* The problem of intent 
is tackled in J. Smith, "Two Problems in Criminal Attempts", 70 
Harvard Law R. p.422 (1957); cf. Sayre, "Criminal Attempts" (l928).
- 563 -
16. Justice Brandéis ref erred to the relationship of the danger test and 
the theory of criminal attempts: "The test to be applied as in the k 
case of criminal attempts and incitements, is not the remote or 
possible effect. There must be a clear and present danger", 
Schaeffer v. U.S. 251 U.S. 46 6 (1919).
17. Berna (1957)» P»69 and Shapiro (1966), pp.122, 124 argue that the 
applicability of the test is limited to national security cases.
18. Most commentators agree on that point. Bems (1957)* p.60;
Cushman (1948)* PP»315-6* Konvitz (1957)* Part III; Emerson (19 6 6), 
pp.51-3* Put see Shapiro (1966), p.122. Chafee (1941), p.82 argues 
that the important question is the construction of the terms of the 
statute at issue and not its constitutionality. The test provides 
the means for a liberal judicial construction of statutes and 
accordingly "the concept of freedom of expression received for the 
first time an authoritative judicial interpretation in accord with 
the purposes of the framers of the Constitution".
19. Lochner v. U.S. 198 U.S. 45 (1905)» Holmes dissenting at 75.
20. Thus, Justice Brandéis dissenting in Schaeffer v. U.S.:
"The trial provided for is one by judge and jury, and the judge 
may not abdicate his function. If the words were of such a nature 
and were used under such circumstances that... they would (not) 
bring about the evil which Congress sought and had a right to 
prevent, then it is the duty of the trial judge to withdraw the 
case from the consideration of the jury; and if he fails to do so, 
it is the duty of the appellate court to correct the error."
251 U.S. at 483.
Brandéis found from an examination of the record that Schaeffer's 
conviction was wrong. Thus, the test seems to be both a matter of 
law and of fact. In Dennis v. U.S.. Justice Douglas argued that the 
test is one of fact to be submitted to the jury (see Ch.IX, 3*1 and. 
8.1) .
21. Brandéis concurring in Whitney v. California. 274 U.S. 357 (1927) 
at 377, 378.
22. 274 U.S. at 37 7 (1 9 2 7).
23. See the analysis in Ten (1980), p.132.
24. J.S. Mill (1972), p.78.
2 5. Quoted in Gunther (1975), pp.749-50.
26. The Sunday Times. June 21, 1981.
2 7. 0. Kirchheimer, Politics and Justice in (1969),
28. A. Giddens (1976), pp.104-107.
- 564 -
CHAPTER VIII
1. 295 U.S. 495 (1936).
2. 298 U.S. 258 (1936).
3. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
4 . 298 U.s. 587 (19 3 6).
5. Quoted in R. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (i960), p.168.
6. See Mason, "Harlan P. Stone and P.D.R.*s Court Plan", 61 Yale Law J. 
p.791 (1952).
7. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
8. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
9. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
10. ibid, at 36 9.
11. On the concept of statutory vagueness see Ch.X, 9 .3 ,
12. De Jonge y. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)» Herndon v. Lowry.
13. ibid.. at 564» 365.
1 4 . ibid, at 3 6 2, emphasis mine.
15. Brandenburg v. Ohio. . See Ch.X, 6.
16. Herndon v. Lowry. 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
17. ibid, at 248-2 5 2.
18. The statute punished with death anybody who attempted, by speech 
or writing, to excite an insurrection of slaves or who brought in 
the State printed matter calculated to excite insurrection. (Ga. 
Code, 1861, §4214)» After the Civil War the reference to slaves was 
dropped, tut the statute was otherwise retained verbatim. See 
Chafee (1941), p.389.
19. 301 U.S. at 256.
1 9 a. ibid, at 2 5 7.
20. ibid, at 258-9.
21. ibid, at 262, 2 6 3.
22. See R. Keeran, "Everything for Victory: Communist Influence in the 
Auto Industry Luring WWII", Science and Society (Spring 1979).
23. U.S. v. McWilliams. 54 P. Supp. 791 (D.D.C. 1944); 163 F. 2d. 695
(D.C. Cir. 1947).
24. Dunne v. U.S.. 138 P. 2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943), cert, denied, 320 
U.S. 790 (1943).
. - 565 -
25. M. Davis (1980b), p.6l.
26. 322 U.S. 680 (1944).
26a. ibid, at 686, 687.
27. 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
28. ibid, at 589-590.
29. For example, Chafee (1956), p.79.
30. See Ch.VIII, 2.
31. N.C.L.B. publications, March 1919» New York, p.113.
32. See D. Manwaring, “Render Unto Caesar" (19 6 2).
33. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
34. ibid, at 596, 598.
35. 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
3 6. 3 19 U.S. 624 (1943).
56a. ibid, at 641-2.
36b. ibid, at 639.
37. ibid, at 634.
37a* Frankfurter dissenting at 650, 6 6 7, 6 6 3.
38. at 662
39» For the historical background see R. Daniels, Concentration Camps 
U.S.A.: Jananese-Americans and WWII (1971). For legal comments 
sees Freeman, "Genesis, Exodus and Leviticus - Genealogy, Evacuation 
and the Law", 28 Cornell Law Qu.. p.414 (1943); Rostow, "The 
Japanese-American Cases - A Disaster in the SovereL gn Prerogative" 
(1962)} Dembitz, "Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment", 
45 Columbia Law Rev., p.175 (1945).
40. Kluger (1977)» pp.66l, 662.
41. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
4 2. Kalven (19 6 5), pp.11-12.
43. Emerson (1970), pp.285-292; Schmidt (1976), Ch.7 .
44« See ChJV , 2.
45. Emerson (1970), p.291.
46. Chafee (1941), p.399.
47. Schmidt (1976), pp.90-91.
-  566 -
48. 303 U.S. 444 (1938); 308 ïï.S. 147 (1939).
49. 303 U.S. 444 (1938) at 451,452.
50. 308 U.S. 147 (1959) at 161.
5 1 . ibid. at 164, 1 6 3 .
5 2 . 3 10 U.S. 296 (19 4 0).
53. ibid. at 307.
54. ibid. at 308.
55* Chaplinsky v. Nev Hampshire. 315 U.S. 568 (1942) at 571, 2.
5 6. According to Meiklejohn (i960) this sort of régulation compares 
vith the Eoberts' rules of order.
5 7 . 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
58. ibid. at 576.
59. Niemotko v. Maryland. 340 U.S. 268 (l95l).
60. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
61. ibid. at 146, 14t.
62. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
6 3. Valentine v. Chrestensen. 316 U.S. 52 (1942) at 54-5.
64. .319 U.S. 105 (1943) at 114.
6 5. Follett v. MçÇomdck, 321 ïï.S. 573 (1944).
66. Bréard v. City of Alexandria. 341 ÏÏ.S. 622 (1951).
6 7. 326 ÏÏ.S. 50 1 (1946).
6 8. M. Davis (1980b), p.4 7.
6 9. 326 ÏÏ.S. at 506.
69a. ibid. at 509.
70. See S. Fine, Sitdown (19 6 9) and Davis (1980b), pp.50-52.
71. J. Walsh, C.I.O. Industrial ïïnionism in Action (1937).
72. M. Davis (1980b), p.62.
73. -301 ÏÏ.S. 1  (1937).
74. 312 ÏÏ.S. 100 (1941).
75. 301 ÏÏ.S. 548 (1937).
76. In Re Debs. 158 ÏÏ.S. 564 (1895) and ÏÏ.S. v. E.C. Knight Co.. 1 5 6 . 
ÏÏ.S. 1 (1895).
- 567 -
77» Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co. 211 U.S. 418 (1911) at 439*
78. C. McArthur Destier, American Radicalism 1865-1901 (1946), p.183.
79» Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union. 301 U.S. 468 (1937) at 476, 
per Justice Brandeis.
80. Emerson (l97o), p.300.
81. M. Davis (1980b), p.54.
82. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
83. ibid, at 515» 516; see above, p.72.
84. 310 U.S. 88 (l940); see also Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 
(1940) and A.F.L. v. Swing. 312 U.S. 321 (194l).
85. 310 U.S. 88 (1940) at 104, 105.
8 6. Milk Wagon Drivers* Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies Inc.. 312 U.S. 
287 ( m i ) .
87. ibid, at 293, 29 4.
87a. ibid, at 29 9*
88. 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
88a. ibid, at 775.
89. ibid, at 776, 777.
90. Thomas v. Collins. 323 U.S. 5 16 (1945).
91» ibid, at 530.
92. at 531-532, 529-530.
93. M. Davis (1980b), p.7 2.
94. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
95. ibid, at 498.
96. See Cox, "Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution", 4 Vanderbilt 
Law R.. p.547 (1951); Jones, "Free Speech »Pickets on the Grass’", 
29 Southern California Law B.. p.137 (1956); Note, "Use of Economic 
Sanctions by Private Groups: Illegality under the Sherman Act", 30 
Uhiv. of Chicago Law R.. p.171 (1962).
97. 339 U.S. 460 (1950). ,
98. ibid, at 464, 6.
99« International Brotherhood of Teamsters Union v. Hanke. 330 U.S. 470 
(1950); Building Service Empire International Union v. Gazzam. 339
U.S. 532 (19 5 0).
99a. 330 U.S. at 474, 475» 476; Justice Minton dissenting at 483.
100. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Union v. Vogt Inc.. 354 U.S. 
284 (1957).
101. ibid at 289, 2 9 3.
1 0 1a. ibid, at 2 9 7.
1 0 2 ; 53 Stat. 1147 (1939).
103. Emerson (1970), p.584.
- 568 - .
104. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
105. ibid, at 115.
106. L. Loeb, Public Employees and Political Activity (19 6 8), p.209.
107. 337 U.S. 1 (1949)5 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
108. Note, "The Problem of the Hostile Audience", 49 Columbia Law 5. 
p.1118 (1949); W. Gellhom, American Rights (i960), pp.55-62.
109. 337 U.S. at 4-5 (1949).
110. ibid, at 37.
111. 340 U.S. 315 (1951) at 321.
112. ibid, at 325. 326, 327.
1 1 3 . 340 U.S. 290 (1 9 5 1).
114. See n.59 above and text accompanying.
115. See n . 36 above and text accompanying.
116. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
117. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
118. See Chapter Y.
119. 336 U.S. 77 (1949) at 87; Black dissenting at 98.
120. Black dissenting at 102, 103.
121. A Free and Responsible Press; A General Report on Mass 
Cnmimmications: Newspapers. Radio. Motion Pictures. Magazines 
and Books. Chicago, 1947»
122. Chafee (1947), p.585.
123. Nelson (19 6 7), p.xlii.
124. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
1 2 5 . ibid, at 7 2 0.
126. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
127. Chafee (1941), pp.381-4.
128. Carroll and Noble (1977), p.342.
129. Chafee (1947), p.318f.
130. 314 u.s. 252 (1941).
1 3 1 . ibid, at 2 6 3.
- 569 -
132. ibid, at 271.
1 3 3 . 328 U.S. 351 (I946).
1 5 4 . 531 U.S. 36 7 (1947).
13 5 . Wood v. Georgia. 370 U.S. 375 (1965).
135a. 37O U.S. at 388, 39O, 389.
1 3 5 b. Emerson (1970), p.456
1 3 6 . Kovacs v. Cooper. 336 U.S. 77 (1949)» Black dissenting at 102.
136a. Schmidt (1 9 7 6), P.251.
13 7 . Chafee (1947), pp.802-3.
138. Bickel (1 9 7 5), p.81.
1 3 9 . Schmidt (19 7 6), P.251.
14 0. J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (1978), Part III;
Habermas (1979), Ch.l.
1 4 1 . Marcuse (1976), p.310.
14 2. P. Lazarsfeld and H. Merton, "Mass Communications, Popular Taste 
and Organized Social Action", in B. Eosenberg and D. White (eds.),
Mass Culture (1957), p.457; see also R. Miliband's critique of
the mass media in Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (1973), Ch.8.
1 4 3 . Nelson (1 9 6 7), p.xxxvii.
144. Chafee (1956), pp.77-80.
1 4 5 . Berns (1957), PP*56, 71.
1 4 6 . The phrase is coined by McKay in "The Preference for Freedom",
34 New York Law S.. p.1182 (1959).
147. Nelson (19 6 7), p.l.
148. 319 U.S. at 639-640.
1 4 9 . M. Arnold Foster in The Guardian. July 21, 1981.
1 5 0 . See Ch.IX, 8.1.
151. Bickel (1975), Ch.2.
1 5 2 . J. Bury, A History of Freedom of Thought (1952), p.134.
153. Chafee (1956), p.80f.
1 5 4 . H. Gallagher, "American Liberalism at the Crossroads", 36 
American Bar Association Journal, p.813 (1950), p.814.
1 5 5 . ' Chafee (1956), p.98.
1 5 6 . Kalven (1965), p.3, n.15.
1 5 7 . See Ch.III.
- 570 -
158. Freund (1950), Ch.l.
159» Shapiro (19 6 6), pp.6l-2 .
160. Marshall (1971), p.183.
161. See Ch.III, 3 .3 .
CHAPTER IX
1. Pennsylvania v. Nelson. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
2. E. Corwin (1934)» p.91.
3. 54 Stat. 670 (1940), now incorporated in United States Code
& 2 3 8 5.
4. W. Goodman, The Committee (19 6 9), pp.98-9» For the history of the 
Act see Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (1941)» pp. 
439-490 and at 446. The best collection of relevant materials and 
references is found in T. Emerson, B. Haber and N. Börsen,
Political and Civil Rights in the United States (1967)» Vol.I, pp. 
10 5-6).
5. See F. Claudin, The Communist Movement (1975) and in particular
pp.182-210.
6. I. Howe and L. Coser, The American Communist Party (19 6 2), Ch.VTII.
7. Z. Chafee (1941)» op. cit., p.46l.
8. Bnerson, Haber, Börsen (19 6 7)» op. cit. See also: B. Goldstein,
- Political Repression in Modem America (1978), pp.246-7 .
9. M. Bavis, "The legacy of the C.I.O.", New Left Review. 124, p.43 at 
p .6 7 and bibliography cited there.
10. Howe and Coser (19 6 2), p.427.
11. Shneiderman v. U.S.. 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
12. The history of the creation of the H.U.A.C. is best narrated in 
S. Carr, The House Cr>mnrittee^on Un-American Activities. 1945-1950 
(1952), and W. Goodman (19 6 9)» Ch.2,3,4.
1 3 . Quoted in Goldstein (1978), p.288.
14. Howe and Coser (19 6 2), pp.419-28.
15. Z. Chafee, The Blessings of Liberty (1956), p.126.
« •
1 6 . Goldstein (1978), p.3 2 3.
-  571 -
17. Some recent contributions by historians include: A. Theoharis,
Seeds of Repression. Harry S, Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism 
(1 9 7 1)» R. Griffith and A. Theoharis (eds.). The Specter: Original 
Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthy!sm (1974); R. 
Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism (1972). 
No conclusive history of the internal and international aspects
of McCarthyism exists, however. It is reasonable to conclude that 
the lack of extensive critical bibliography on the subject, 
particularly in the 50s and 60s, was in itself an effect of 
McCarthyism.
18. Quoted in H. Zinn, A Peopled History of the United States (1980), 
p.430. For a similar analysis see A. Wolfe, The Limits of 
Legitimacy (1977)» Ch.7 and P. Carroll and D. Noble, The Free and 
the Unfree: A New History of the United States (1977)» pp.354-5«
19. Quoted in Goodman (19 6 9)» p.32.
20. Quoted in Goldstein (1978)» p.242.
21. Goodman (19 6 8), op. cit., p.122.
22. Quoted in E. Goldman, The Crucial Decade and After, 1945-1960 
(I960), p.137.
2 3 . Goldstein (1978), op. cit., p.334.
24. T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression (1970), p.1 6 4 .
2 5. Section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act amending the National Labor 
Relations Act.
26. A. Link. American Epoch: A History of the TT.S. since the 1890s,
(19 6 7), pTs f e — -------;---------------------------------
2 7. 335 TT.S. 106 (1948).
28. 352 TT.S. 567 (1957).
2 9. For a comment on those and similar cases see T. Emerson (1970).
pp.636-7 .
30. The C.I.O. purge of radical unions is described in M. McAuliffe, 
Crisis on the Left. Cold War Politics and American Liberals.
1947-1954 ¿1978), ch.4.
3 1 . ibid.. p.59.
32. See infra. 4.1 and 5*
33* Goldstein (1978), op. cit., p.312.
34. McAuliffe (1978), op. cit., pp.104-5.
35* Z. Chafee (1956), op. cit. Chapter VI, and pp.157-8.
36. H.S. Commager, Freedom. Loyalty.-Dissent (1954), p.20.
-  572-
37» P» Murphy, The Constitution in Crisis Times. 1918-1969 (1972), 
p.175» n.15.
38. Z. Chafee (1950, op. cit. p.176. On the problems of the lawyer 
of the politically unpopular see M. Alexander, MThe Right to 
Counsel for the Politically Unpopular'*, Law in Transition 
Quarterly 22 (19 6 2), pp.19-45* and J. Casper, "Lawyers and Loyalty- 
Security Litigation", Law and Society Review 3 (1969)»
39» The case became internationally known as the "Hollywood Ten". See 
Goodman (19 6 8), op. cit., pp.202ff and at 218.
40. Goldstein (1978), p . 3 6 1 and Goodman (19 6 9), p.290.
41. Goodman (19 6 9), p.304.
42. Goldstein (1978), p.3 6 3.
45» Quoted in Goodman (19 6 9), p.3 2 7.
44« Goldstein (1978), ibid.. and Goodman (19 6 9), ibid.
45» Chafee (1950, op. cit., p.2 4 2.
4 6. Goldstein (1978), p.352.
47* &• Kahn, Hollywood on Trial (1948), p.139.
48. 65 Stat. 987 (1950); 50 U.S.C. § 7 8 1-7 9 8, 8 1 1-8 2 6.
49. Emerson (1970), op. cit., p.131.
50. A detailed description of the effects of registration is found in 
Chafee (1956), Ch.V and Emerson (1970), pp.l29ff.
51. Under a narrow construction, the Act was found constitutional in 
Schneider v. Smith. 390 U.S. 17 (19 6 8), per Justice Douglas.
52. 68 Stat. 775 (1954),* 50 U.S.C. §841-844.
53« The history of the passing of the Act is based on McAuliffe (1978), 
op. cit., Ch.9 and Note, "The Communist Control Act of 1954",
Yale Law Journal. Vol.6 4 (1955)* p.712.
54. Humphrey quoted in McAuliffe (1978), p.139 and I3 8.
55. Quoted in H. Chase, "Security and Liberty: The Problem of Native 
Communists, 1947-1955" (1955;, p.7.
56. Chafee (1956), op. cit., p.82.
57» Goodman (1969) op. cit., p.1 9 6 .
58. ïkerson (1970), op. cit., p.150.
Goldstein (1978), p.350. An early account of state sedition laws 
is found in W. Gellhom (ed.), The States and Subversion (1952).
See also Emerson, Haber, Dorsen (1 9 6 7), op. cit., pp.192-194.
59.
- 573 -
60. E. Cushman, Civil Liberties in the United States (1956), p.201.
61. The ordinance is referred in Emerson, Haber, Borsen (1 9 6 7)» p.194*
62. For the background of the communist trial see; M. Belknap, Cold 
War Political Justice (1977)» Chapters 1 to 5» G. Marion, The 
Communist Trial: An American Crossroads (1950)» N. Nathanson,
"The Communist Trial and the Clear and Present Banger Test",
Harvard Law Review 63 (1950), 1167-1175* Note, "The Conspiracy 
Bilemma; Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of 
Individual Befendants", Harvard Lav Review 62 (1948), pp.276-286;
E. La than, The Communist Controversy in Washington: From the New 
Beal to McCarthy (1966)7"
63. U.S. v. Bennis. 183 F. 2d. 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
6 4. Bennis v. U.S.. 341, U.S. 494 (1951).
6 5. Belknap (1977), p.81; Marion (1950) op. cit., pp.7 6 ff.
66. 0. Kirchheimer, Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure 
for Political Ends (l96l). n.194. n.38.
6 7. Schneiderman v. U.S.. 320 U.S. 118 (1943) at 157* 154.
68. Belknap (1977), P.82.
69. The story of the trial has been told by the irritable Judge himself, 
too: H. Medina, The Anatomy of Freedom (1959).
69a. U.S. v. Foster. 9 F.R.B. 36 7 (S.B.N.Y. 1949), at 391-392.
70. See above, Ch.VI, 3*2. For an approving description of Learned Hand's 
efforts to have his "masses" test adopted, see: G. Gunther,
"Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Boctrine:
Some Fragments of History", Stanford Lav Review. Vol.27 (1975), 
pp.719ff.
71. 183 F.2d, at 212.
72. Bennis v. U.S.. 341 U.S. 494 (1951), at 510-511.
73» Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications (1947), Vol.I, p.54 
and 59*
74. 341 U.S. at 550-551.
75. For example, see: C.H. Pritchett, Civil Liberties and the Vinson 
Court (1954), p.75, Iverson (1970), op. cit., p.175.
76. 341 U.S. at 570.
77. See above, Ch.VIII, 3 .
78. For the use of conspiracy law against political dissenters in 
England see: R. Spicer, "Conspiracy Law, Class and Society", in 
The Sociology of Law (ed. P. Carlen), (1976), pp.45-63*
79* See 0. Kirchheimer (1 9 6 1), op. cit., pp,138ff.
-  574 * *
80. 541 U.S. at 589.
80a. ibid, at 5 8 1.
81. Emerson, Haber, Dorsen, (1967), P«121.
82. Yates v. U.S.. 554 U.S. 298 (1957).
85. 554 U.S., at 550.
84. 554 U.S., at 524-5 2 5.
85. A similar critique is made in G. Marshall, Constitutional Theory 
(1 9 7 1). pp.180-1.
8 6. 554 U.S., at 530, 531, 332.
87. For press and academic reactions to Yates, see Belknap (1977)»
Ch.1 0 , pp.2 52-2 5 8.
8 8. E. Mbllan, "Smith Act Prosecutions: The Effect of the Dennis and 
Yates Decisions", University of Pittsburg Lav Review 26, pp.752ff.
89. Among others, U.S. v. Silverman. 248 F.2d 6 7 1 (2d Cir. 1957).
90. 567 u.s. 205 (1 9 6 1).
9 1. 567 u.s. 290 (1 9 6 1).
92. 567 U.S at 229-250.
9 5. 568 u.s. 2 5 1 (1 9 6 1).
9 4. 568 U.S., at 2 4 6, 247» 249. Court approved the jury instructions 
to that effect, ibid, at 24 6, n.5 .
95. ibid, at 2 5 4.
9 6. C.P. v. S.A.C.B.. 567 U.S. 1 (1961).
97. ibid, at 104.
98. Among others: National Council of American Soviet Friendship v. 
Subversive Activities Control Board. 522 F. 2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 19 6 5); 
American Committee for'Protection of Foreign B o m  v. S.A.C.B., 551
F. 2d. 53 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
99» American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born v. S.A.C.B. 580 
U.S. 505 (1985)*Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v.
S.A.C.B. 580 U.S. 5 1 3 (I9 6 5).
100. Goldstein (1978), op. cit., p.408.
101. Quoted in Goodman (l969)» op. cit., p.52 9.
102. ibid, at 400.
105. ibid; - at 417.
104. Ch.IX, 2.5.
- 575 “
105. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
1 0 6. ibid, at 504, 505.
107. The decision was found as too liberal and sparked off a series 
of attacks on the Supreme Court, by right-wing commentators and 
press. For such reaction see Hunt, "State Control of Sedition: 
The Smith Act as the Supreme Law of the Land", 41 Minn.L.Rev. 287
(1957).
108. 360 U.S. 7 2 (1959).
1 0 9. ibid, at 7 6 , 77.
1 1 0 . 366 U.S. 29 3 (1 9 6 1).
111. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
112. 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
113. Goldstein (1978), op. cit., p.424.
114. See generally: El. Bontecue, The Federal Loyalty-Security 
Program (1953). B.S. Brown, Loyalty and Security (1958) and T. 
Emerson and 3). Herfeld, "Loyalty among Government Employees",
Yale Law Journal 58 (December, 1948).
115. Chafee (1956), p.33.
116. Brown (1958), Ch.6 and Emerson (1970), p.206.
117. Bontecue (1953), p.105.
118. Brown (1958), p.34.
119. Goldstein (1978), p.30 3.
120. Chafee (1956), p.2 5 .
121. For the list see Bontecue (1953), pp.l57ff, Freeland (1974),
pp.208-216.
122. Chafee (1956), p.28.
123. Pritchett (1954), op. cit., p.266, n.28; Emerson (1970), p.222.
124. Chafee (1956), p.1 6 9 , 170, 28.
125. Bontecue (1953), p.204.
126. A. Barth, The Loyalty of Free Men (1952), p.110.
127. Ch.IX, 2.2.
. See ’Goldstein (1978), pp.351-2; Chafee (1956), pp.29-30, 33, 34 
and material cited there.
128
-  576 -
129. For this and other immigration provisions see: Emerson, Haber, 
Dorsen (19 6 7)» pp.320- 3 2 8.
150. Chafee (1956), p.249.
131. See Goldstein (1978), p.337 and references cited there.
132. Pritchett (1954), pp.101-102. These cases are reviewed infra, 5*5.
133. Chafee (1956), p.2 3 .
134. See Note: "Government Exclusion of Foreign Political Propaganda",
68 Harvard Law Review 1 3 9 3 (1955), which contains a list of some 
of the books of the new Index.
135. See above 2.2. for the provision of the Act, and the terms of the 
oath.
136 . 339 TT.S. 382 (1950).
1 3 7 . ibid, at 396.
1 3 8 . ibid., at 401, 404.
1 3 9 . ibid, at 4 20.
140. See the Dennis case above 3 and infra 8.1.
14 1. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
142. Goldstein (1978), p.402.
143. 353 U.S. at 681-682.
144. See W, Murphy, Congress and the Court (19 6 2), p.121; D. Fellman, 
"The Jencks Legislation: Problems in Prospect", Yale Law Journal 
LXVII (1958)» pp.674ff.
145. at 3.3.
1 4 6 . Section 9(h) was repealed by section 504 of the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 525 (1959).
147. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
148. ibid, at 455, 4 5 6.
149. V. Bems (1976), pp.183-4.
150. See above at 2.2; For a detailed description of these practices 
see: Chafee (1956), Ch.VI; Drown and Fasset, "Loyalty Tests for
Admission to the Bax", 20 University of Chicago Law Rev, 480 (1953)5 
Emerson, Haber, Dorsen (I9 6 7), pp.249-251.
15 1 . 325 u.s. 561 (1945).
. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).152
- 577 _
153. Kalven and Steffen, "The Bar Admission Cases", 21 Lav in Transition 
(1961), p .155, at 160.
154» Königsberg v. State Bar of California, 3 5 3 U.S. 252 (1957).
155. 366 u.s. 36 (1961).
156. ibid, at 50, 52, 53, 51.
157. ibid, at 7 2 , 74, 73-74.
158. 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
159. ibid, at 90, 97
160. Anastaplo describes his attempts to enter the Bar in: G. Anastaplo, 
The Constitutionalist (1971), and "One Man's Brief Against the 
Bar", The Natinnal Law Journal. June 18, 1979, p.21.
161. See above 2.2. and 4*1.
162. 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
1 6 3 . Bailey v. Bichardson. 182 I*.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), at 59»
164. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
16 5. ibid, at 7 2 0.
166. ibid, at 735-736
16 7. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
168. See above 2 .5 .
169. ibid, at 4 9 3.
170. ibid, at 509.
17 1 . 341 u.s. 123 (1951).
172. Pritchett (1954), p.97.
1 7 3 . 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
174. 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
175. Quoted in Chafee (1956), p.36.
176. Emerson (1971), pp.218-219.
177. Quoted in A. Wolfe, The Seamy Side of Democracy. Repression 
in America (1973), p«10i>.
178. The Eisenhower loyalty-security programme was partially restricted 
by the Supreme Court in Cole v. Young. 3 5 1 U.S. 536 (1956).
The Court held that only holders of "sensitive positions, in the 
federal government, could be dismissed on security grounds.
_ 579 _
179. 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
180. 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
181. Nelson v. County of Los Angeles. 362 U.S. 1 (i960).
182. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
183. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
184. 364 U.S. 479 (i960), also Carr v. Young decided together.
185. Emerson (1971), p.233 and A. Bickel, The Most Dangerous Branch 
(19 6 2), pp.52-54.
186. ibid, at 487-8 , 490, 4 8 8.
187. ibid, at 499.
188. Bickel (19 6 2), ibid.
189. 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
190. See above 3 .3 .
191. Bagget v. Bullitt. 377 U.S. 36O (19 6 4).
192. 384 U.S. 1 1  (1966).
193. See above 3*3»
194. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
195. ibid, at 603,. 605, 609. The Adler case is reviewed supra 5 .3 . 
195a. ibid. Justice Clarice dissenting at 622, 628.
196. 389 U.S. 54 (1967).
197. See 5*4. below.
198. 389 U.S. at 6 3.
199. 341 u .s. 56 (1951).
200. Murphy (1972), p.299; Pritchett (1954), p.91.
201. See above 2.5. and 4.2 and Emerson (1971), p.192.
202. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
2 0 3. ibid, at 526.
204. 363 u.s. 603 (i960).
2 0 5» Kirchheimer (1 9 6 1), p.158, n.6 9.
206. Borrow v. F.C.C.. 285 P.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1960)5 certiorari
denied 364 U.S. 892 (i960).
-579
207. 388 U.S. 537 (1950).
208. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
209» In a previous case (Bridges v. California. 314 U.S. 252 (1941))* 
the Supreme Court had ruled that legally resident aliens enjoyed 
such rights.
210. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
211. Chafee (1956), p.33.
212. Quoted in Pritchett (1954), p.113.
213. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
214* See above.
215. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
2 1 6 . ibid, at 533.
217. 355 U.S. 115 (1957).
218. Immigration Service v. Errico. 385 U.S. 214 (1966); Benenyi v. 
Immigration Director. 385 U.S. 630 (19 6 7).
219. Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 387 U.S.
1 1 8  (19 6 7).
220. See above 4«2.
221. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
222. ibid, at 1 2 5 .
2 2 3. 378 u.s. 500 (19 6 4).
224. See above 3» 3»
225. 378 U.S. at 507.
2 2 6. 381 U.S. 1  (19 6 5).
227. For example, U.S. v. Laub. 385 U.S. 475 (1967).
228. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
229. See above 4.2; Chafee (1956), p.2 3 .
230. 381 U.S. at 307.
2 3 1. at 308.
*  .
2 3 2. The two best histories of the Committee are: fi. Carr, The House 
Committee on Un-American Activities (1 9 5 2) and Goodman (1969)» 
op. cit.
233« Goodman (19 6 9), Chapter 1.
-  580 -
234» ibid, at 43« No other effort was made after that for a federally 
subsidized theatre.
2 3 5. ibid, at 5 4.
2 3 6. ibid, at 1 3 2 .
237. Goldstein (1978), p.243*
238. Goodman (19&9)» P*83 and.111.
•239* See G. Kahn, Hollywood on Trial (1948).
240. Goodman, (19 6 9), p.209.
241. See Kirchheimer (1 9 6 1), pp.234-237.
242. Goldstein (1978), p.344.
243. Chafee (195$), p.221 and 219.
244. Goodman (19 6 9)» p.162.
2 4 5. Aiuppa v. U.S.. 201 Fed. Rep. 2d Cir. 287 at 300.
24 6. Chafee (1956), p.2 2 3.
247. To Serve Sfhese Rights, Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1947, P.52.
248. Goodman (19 6 9)» p.223.
249. Quoted in R. Carr (1952), p.280.
250. Quoted in Goldstein (1978), p.345.
251. ibid.. p.377.
252. W. Gellhom, Security. Loyalty and Science (1950), p.2 3 2.
253. See C. Beck, Contempt of Congress (1959).
f
254. Kilboum v. Thompson. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
255. I65 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947).
2 5 6. 167 F. 2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
257. 176 F. 2d. 49 (1949).
258. Eisler v. U.S. 170 F 2d 273 (1948).
259. Goodman (19 6 9), p.222.
*  ■
260. On the Fifth Amendment and subversives, see the debate: E. 
Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today (l955) and S. Hook, Common
Sense and the Fifth Amendment (1957).
261. 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
26la. 340 U.S. at 378.
- 581 -
262. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
262a. ibid, at 3 7 8.
2 6 3. U.S. V. Rtunely. 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
264. 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Empsak v. U.S.. ibid, at 190, and Bart v.
U.S.. ibid, at 219.
2 6 5. 349 U.S. at 161.
266. Pritchett (1954)» p.2 6 5, n.12 and Hook (1957).
267. Goodman (1969), P*356.
268. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
269. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
270. ibid, at 197-198.
271. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
2 7 2. ibid, at 261.
273. Goldstein (1978), p.405.
2 7 4. Goodman (19 6 9)» p.3^1.
2 7 5. See above 3.5»
276. Murphy (1972), pp.330-333.
2 7 7. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
278. The Barenblatt decision created a strong reaction from liberal 
academics. Characteristically see: A. Meiklejohn, "The Barenblatt 
Opinion", 27 Univ. of Chicago Law Rev., 329 (i960); and "The 
Balancing of Self-Preservation against Political Freedom", 49 
California Law Rev. 4 (1961); H. Kalven, "Mr. Alex. Meiklejohn 
and the Bameblatt Opinion", 27 Univ. of Chicago Lav Rev. 329 
(I960).
279. 36O U.S. at 127, 128, 134.
280. ibid, at 141, 142.
281. 360 U.S. 712 (1959).
282. 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
283. ibid, at 412.
284. 365 U.S. 431 (1961).
285. ibid, at 435.
286. 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
287. ibid, at 557, 558.
289. 374 U.S. 109 (1963).
290. 383 U.S. 8 25 (19 6 6).
2 9 1. 384 U.S. 702 (19 6 6).
2 9 2. Davis (1980b), p.77.
2 9 3. Dennis v. U.S.. 341 U.S. 494 (1951) at 510.
294. See above, 3 .4 .
2 9 5. See above, 2.4.
29 6. Above, p.326, 335, 331, 339.
297. Above, p.331, 334, 335, 329, 370.
298. Above, p.360, 3 6 5, 367, 369, 370,349, 350.
2 9 9. Above, p.326, 334, 333, 335, 331, 346, 347, 367, 339, 370.
300. Wolff (1968), Ch.2.
501. M. Foucault. Discipline and Punish (1979) î M. Isnatieff, A Just 
Measure of P a i ^ Ï978T.'' --------- “ ---
302. See Ch.III, n .3 8 and W. Friedmann (1972), Ch.3, 5, 6, 10.
303. Poggi (1978), Ch.VI; Unger (1977), pp.192-216.
304. p.43 above.
305. Ch.III and V above..
306. Qaioted in Goodman (19 6 9), p.170.
307. H. Commager (1954), p.142.
308. See above, Ch.VII, 4 .
583-
CHAPTER X
1. Quoted in Murphy, P. (1972), pp.353-4.
2. 347 U.S. 483 (l954)> The story of the desegregation adjudication 
is told in Kluger R, Simple Justice (1977)«
3. Zinn (1980), p.444*
4. Zinn, fl., S.N.C.C.: The New Abolitionists (1964).
5» The Constitutional commentary on the meaning of the 1 4 th
Amendment is prolific. The main positions are found in A. Bickel, 
"The Original Understanding the the Segretation Decision" (1959)» 
Kurland, "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative 
and Executive Branches of the Government" (19 6 4); Karst, "Foreword: 
Equal Citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment" (1973); H. 
Vechsler, "Equal Protection is a Double-Edged Sword"(l973)5 Ely, 
(1980), op. cit. Chapter 2.
6. S. Kutler (ed.), The Supreme Court and the Constitution (1969), 
p.515.
7. T. Lewis, "The Sit-in Cases: Great Expectations" (19 8 3)»
8 . See Ch.VIII, 4.
9. Kalven (19 6 5a), p.2.
10. H. Kalven, The Negro and the First Amendment (19 6 5b), p.124.
l
1 1 .  368 u.s. 157 (1961).
12. - ibid. Harlan concurring at 201.
1 3 . ibid, at 202.
14. 372 u.s. 229 (1963).
15. Kalven (19 6 5a), p.1 4 3 . I
16. 372 U.S. at 235.
1 7 . ibid, at 2 3 7.
18. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
19. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
20. ibid, at 2 7 3.
21. > Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham. 373 U.S. 262 (19 6 3).
22. Gober v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963).
23. 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
-584
24. 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
25. 378 U.S. 146 (1964).
2 6. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
27. 378 U.S. 226 (19 6 4).
28. See Ch.VIII, 4.2. and 4.4.2 and Ch.IX, 3*1.3«
29. Fieldman v. U.S.. 322 U.S. 487 (1944). at 301.
30. 378 U.S. 226 (1964), at 34 6.
31. Kalven (19 6 5), p.172.
32. ibid, at 346.
33. 377 U.S. 218 (19 6 4).
34. 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
35. A. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White
House (1965). P.977.
36. Murphy (1972), p.364. For the background of the Act see A. 
Bickel, Politics and the Warren Court (1965). pp.92-108.
37. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill. 379 U.S. 306 (1964): Blow v. North 
Carolina. 379 U.S. 684 (1964). ■
38. 379 U.S. 306 at 3I8 .
39. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 
(19 6 8), p.397.
40. 319 U.S. 536 and 379 U.S. 559 (19 6 5).
41. ibid, at 5 5 2.
42. ibid, at 555.
43. ibid, at 578.
44. But compare with Kovacs v. Cooper, above p.249 where 
condemned a similar rationale.
Black had
45. ibid, at 588-9.
46. 383 U.S. 131 (1965).
47. ibid, at 141-2.
48. ibid, at 162, 168.
49. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
50. Emerson (1970), p.305*
- 585 -
51. ibid, at 47-48.
5 2 . ibid, at 52.
53. ibid, at 56.
54. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
55. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham. p412 .
56. ibid, at 320-1 .
57- ibid, at 346, 330, 327, 336, 338.
58. N. Puner, Civil Disobedience (19 6 8), p.692.
58a. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
59. ibid, at 180-181.
60. 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
61. 380 U.S. 479 (1965); see also p.318 above,
62. ibid, at 485, 487.
6 3. 390 U.S. at 622, 627.
64. 394 U.S. Ill (1969).
6 5. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
66. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
6 7. ibid, at 3 1 5 .
68. Marsh v. Alabama. 326 U.S. 501 (1946); see p. 228 above.
69. 391 U.S. at 318, 319.
70. ibid, at 3 3 2-3 3 3 .
71. T. Emerson (1970), p.309, agreed with Justice White's prediction,
that the decision opened the road for a major doctrinal development, but 
unlike the Justice he welcomed the prospect: ".../r7he logic of the 
decision would clearly seem to carry that far... the private owner is 
exercising control over property of a character that is customarily 
exercised by government, and the demands of the system of free expression 
put the owner in the same position as the government". The Court's 
reservation is found in 391 U.S. at 320, n.9.
72. See infra. Ch.X, 8#
73* Goodman (19 6 9), p.431*
74« S. Lipset and S. Wolin (eds.), The Berkeley Student Revolt (1 9 6 5)•
75. K. Sale, S.D.S. (1974), PP.15-95.
7 6. The most interesting among a large selection of books on the protest 
movement is J. Skolnick, The Politics of Protest (1969), esp. Ch.2.
77« D. Alfange, "Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct" (1968), p.6.
-  586 -
78. Quoted in Note: "Symbolic Conduct", 68 Columbia Law Review
(1968), p.1091; for a similar analysis, Barron (1967), pp.1644-7*
79. 372 F. 2d. 817 (2d Cir. 19 6 7).
80. C. Schiesser and D. Benson, "The Legality of Reclassification of ^  
Selective Services Registrants" (1967)*
81. Goldstein (1978), p.439*
82. Quoted in J. Mitford, Trials of Dr. Spook (1970), pp.55-6.
83. R. Harris, Justice (1970), p.62.
84. J. Ellif, Crime. Dissent and the Attorney General (1971), p.175»
84a. Oestereich v. S.S.B.. 393 U.S. 233 (1968), at 237»
84b. Gutknecht v. U.S.. 396 U.S. 295 (1970), at 306*
84c. U.S. v. Falk. 479 E. 2d 616 (1973), at 618.
8 5. Boorda v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 421 F. 2d. 1142
(D.C.Col. 1969).
86. Emerson (1970), p.145«
87. 18 U.S.C. 8 2101-2102.
88. Eliff (l97l)» p.2 6 4, n.44 and text accompanying.
89. ibid, at p.110,
90. Quoted in Harris (1972), p.6 5.
91. Ellif (1971), P.177.
92. Civil Liberties, May 1971«
93» D. Vasserstein, "The Courts and the Campus", in B. Wasserstein 
and M. Green (eds.), With Justice for Some (1972).
94» Goldstein (1978), p.442.
95. Ellif (1971), P.190.
96. H. Commager, "Is Freedom Dying in America?", Look Magazine, July 14, 1970.
97» Quoted in N. Hentoff, "Subverting the First Amendment: Nixon and the
Media" in A. Gartner et al. (eds.), What Nixon is Doing to Us (1973), p.217.
98. I. Glasser, "The Constitution and the Courts", in A. Gartner (1973), p.162.
99. Goldstein (1978), p.449.
100. On the use of the grand jury as a tool of political repression see 
Donner and Cerruti, "The Grand Jury Network" (1973), pp.432ff.
101. Glasser (1973), pp.176-7.
102. Goldstein (1978), p.46 4. Goldstein presents a concise and informative 
account of the intelligence network, ibid.. pp.463-486.
103. ibid.. p.469.
-  587-
104. 19 N.Y. 2d. 496 (1967).
105. See above, Ch.IX, 3*2.
106. Epton v. New York, cert, denied, 390 TT.S. 29 (19 6 8).
107. ibid, at 33, 35.
108. R. Jackson, "The Federal Prosecutor", Journal of the American 
Judicature Society. 2 4, p.18 (June 1940).
109. Mitford (1970), p.191.
110. ibid, at Foreword.
111. Quoted in Harris (1970), p.6 3.
112. U.S. v. Spock, 416 F. 2d. 16 5 (1st Cir. 19 6 9).
113. Quoted in Mitford (1970), p.59.
114. D. Walker, Rights in Conflict (19 6 8), p.4 and 10-11.
115. Ellif (1971), pp.196-7.
116. J. Epstein, The Great Conspiracy Trial (1970), p.173*
117. ibid.. pp.254-5.
118. ibid., p.414.
119. Goldstein (1978), p.488.
120. ibid., p.487.
121., See Goldstein (1978), pp.487-493 and material cited there. A 
detailed account of the Pentagon Papers case is found in S. 
Ungar, The Papers and the Papers (1975).
122. 395 U.S. 444 (1975).
1 2 3 . ibid, at 447.
124. For criticisms of the two tests see Ch.VH 2 and 3 .
125. 447, n.2.
126. Douglas concurring, ibid, at 453*
127. For a typical reaction see Ely (1980), p.115.
128. The phrase is borrowed from H. Linde, "Clear and Present Danger 
Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto", 22
. Stanford L. Rev.. p . 1 1 6 3  (1970).
129. See for example, O'Brien, p.442 and the continuing story of the 
loyalty-security cases, Ch.X, C.
1 3 0 . 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
- 5 8 8  _
131. Before Dombrowski the Supreme Court had indicated that constitutional
questions arising out of state criminal prosecutions could be 
tackled by federal courts only after a state conviction. In j
Dombrowski v. Pfister. 380 U.S. 479 (1985) the Court held that
when criminal prosecutions were initiated without "any expectation 
of securing valid convictions, but rather as part of a plan... 
to harass and discourage [the defendants] and their supporters 
\ from asserting and attempting to vindicate the constitutional 
rights of Negro citizens" then the "chilling effect on free 
expression of prosecutions initiated and threatened" created 
sufficient "irreparable injury" which called for federal equitable 
relief, ibid, at 482, 487« The substantive rulings of that case 
are reported above, n.6l and text accompanying.
132. 401 U.S. at 42.
1 3 3 . ibid, at 4 6, 50, 53.
1 3 4 . ibid, at'52.
135. ibid, at 51.
1 3 8 . ibid, at 58.
137. 401 U.S. 66 (1971); The anarchy and syndicalism cases are 
discussed in P. Harris, "31ack Power Advocacy: Criminal 
Anarchy or Free Speech" (19 6 8), p.702.
138. 391 U.S. 367 (19 6 8).
139. For comment on the case, see D. Alfange, "Free Speech and 
Symbolic Conduct: The Draft Card Burning Cases" (19 6 8). Note,
"Symbolic Conduct", 68 Columbia Law Review, p.1091 (19 6 8); J.
Ely, "Flag Desecration: A Case Study nn the Rules of 
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis"(1975)•
140/ 367 F. 2d. 72 (2d Cir. 19 6 6).
141. U.S. v. O'Brien. 376 F. 2d. 538 (1st Cir. 19 6 7).
142. 391 U.S. at 376.
143. ibid, at 377.
144. I. Tribe, Constitutional Law (1978), p.688.
145. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
1 4 6 . ibid, at 518. Snowis (1973) provides an explanation for Black's 
change but see pp.35-37 above.
147. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
148., Justice Fortas dissenting at 6l6.
149. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
-589 -
150. 394 U.S. at 708,' quoting from N.Y.T. v. Sullivan [376 U.S. 254 
at 270 (1964)].
15 1. 403 u.s. 15 (1971).
152. H. Abraham, Freedom and the Court (1977)» p.176.
153. T. Walker, American Politics and the Constitution (1978), p.74.
154. 403 U.S. at 22 and Chaplinsky v. Nev Hampshire, above, p.225.
1 5 5 . ibid, at 2 5.
1 5 6 . ibid, at 24-25.
157. J. Ely (1980), pp.114-5; H. Linde (1970); L. Tribe (1978), 
pp.584-8, 670-4.
158. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
159. ibid, at 525, 527.
1 6 0 . ibid, at 5 3 7.
1 6 1 . 4 1 3 U.S. 601 (1973).
162. ibid, at 615.
1 6 3 . In U.S. Civil Service Commission v. National Association of 
Letter Carriers. 413 U.S. 548 (1978). the Court overruled a 
similar challenge against the prohibition of political 
activities by civil servants.
164. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
16 5. ibid, at 760.
166. Justice Stewart dissenting at 780 and quoting the majority 
opinion at 747.
167. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
168. A similar result was reached in three cases involving foul 
language: Rosenfeld v. New Jersey. Lewis v. New Orleans and 
Brown v. Oklahoma. 408 U.S. at 901, 913 and 914 (1972) and again 
in Lewis v. New Orleans. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
169. . 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
170. In Healey v. James 408 U.S. 169 (1972), the Supreme Court 
reversed the decision of a University denying recognition to a 
campus group loosely affiliated with the S.D.S. The Court ruled 
that the campus was not exempt from the protection of the First 
Amendment. If a group does not disrupt the educational process
•and abides by the reasonable regulations of student life, it 
cannot be refused the privileges attendant upon official 
recognition. For comment on Healey and other cases related to 
the recognition of student groups by university authorities see, 
Note, "Beyond Tinker and Healey: Applying the First Amendment 
to Student Activities", 78 Columbia L. Rev, p.1700 (1978).
- 590 -
171. 415 ïï.S. 566 (1974).
172. Ibid, at 574, 575.
1 7 5 . ibid, at 589.
174. 418 TJ.S. 405 (1974).
175* ibid, at 4 2 3. For an interesting analysis of the case see
EÏFT1975).
176. Goldstein (1978), p-515.
177. 397 ^.S. 564 (1970).
178. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
179. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
180. ibid, at 95.
181. ibid, at 101.
182 Professor Tribe remarks that in Young v. American Mini Theatres Inc., 
427 U.S. 50 (1976) the Court departed from the equality principle 
enunciated in Mosley. He states that this case, involving the 
showing of sexually explicit films can be seen as an "aberration": 
Tribe (1978), pp.6 73-4 . Cf. Ely (1980), p.2 3 3, n.27. however, 
the major premise of these analyses, namely that some sort of 
ideological neutrality has been established in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, cannot be sustained. In the light of previous and 
subsequent decisions, not least Grayned which was decided on the same 
day as Mosley, the latter joins this select group of Supreme Court 
decisions whose liberal rhetoric and promise never fully materialized.
183. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
184. Douglas dissenting at 122, 124.
185. ibid, at 116.
186. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
187« Marsh v. Alabama. 326 U.S. 501 (1946), at 506; see p.228 above.
188. Amalgamated Union v. Logan Valley Plaza. 391 U.S. 308 (1968), at 318; 
p.413 above.
189. 407 U.S. at 561, 564.
1 9 0 . ibid, at 5 7 6.
190a. ibid, at 567, 569.
191. Justice Marshall dissenting at 586, 581, 578.
1 9 2 . 424, U.S. 507 (1976).
193. ibid, at 521.
194. ibid, at 519, 5 2 0, 5 2 1.
-591
195» Justice Marshall dissenting at 543»
196. 424 U.S. 828 (19 7 6).
197. 407 U.S. 19 7 (1972).
198. 424 U.S. at 839, 840.
199» Brennan dissenting at 843» Marshall dissenting at 852.
200. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
201. ibid, at 2 6 2.
202. ibid, at 265.-6 .
2 0 3. 390 U.S. 1 7 (1988).
204. ibid, at 24.
2 0 5. 401 U.S. 1 (1 9 7 1).
206. ibid, at 4»
207. ibid, at 7-8.
208. 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
209. See above, p.339»
210. 401 U.S. at 34.
211. 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
212. ibid, at I6 5, 166.
2 1 3 . ibid, at 174.
214. 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
215. 405 U.S. 676 (1972).
216. ibid, at 6 8 3, 6 8 4.
217. at 685-686.
218. at 689.
2 1 9 . 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
220. ibid, at 770; Douglas dissenting at 774.
221. ’414 U.S. 441 (1974).
222. ibid, at 4 50.
2 2 3. N. Berns (19 7 6), pp.17 8-1 8 1 .
224. 430 u.s. 705 (1977).
- 592 _
2 2 5. Ibid. at 714, 715, 717.
2 2 6. ibid, at 7 2 1.
227. 576 u.S. 254 (1964).
228. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 515 U.S. 568 (1942).
229. In Beauharaais v. Illinois. 345 U.S. 250 (1 9 5 2), the Court upheld 
a "group libel" law.
230. 376 U.S. 260, n.3.
2 3 1. ibid, at 2 70.
2 3 2. at 2 7 2, 273.
233. at 279-280.
234. Justice Black concurring in the result at 293, 297*
235. H. Kalven, "The New York Times Cases A Note on the ^Central 
Meaning of the First Amendment1" (19 6 4), p.194.
2 3 6. ibid, at p . 2 2 1 and n.1 2 5 .
257. W. Brennan, "The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation 
of the First Amendment" (19 6 5), see also above, p.157.
258. 579 U.S. 64 (1964).
259. 585 U.S. 75 (1966).
240. ibid.' at 8 5.
241. .at 91.
242. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker 
388 U.S. 130 (1967).
2 4 3. ibid, at 1 5 5 .
2 4 4. at I6 3 - 4
245» Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy. 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
246. Cert, denied at 396 U.S. 1049 (1970).
247. 590 U.S. 7 2 7 (1968).
248. ibid, at 7 5 1 .
249. 403 u.s. 29 (1971).
* -
2 5 0. 376'U.s. 254 at 305 (19 6 4).
251. 403 U.S. at 46-47 (1971).
2 5 2. ibid, at 47, n.1 5 .
-  593 ~
253. 418 u.S. 323 (1974). ' j ■ ■
254. H. Kalven, ’’The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill,
Butts and Walker" (1967), P»30d.
255. 418 U.S. at 341.
2 5 6. This idea, was argued by Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment
(1 9 6 7) » p.300. Justice Powell made a number of approving references 
to Kalven in Gertz.
257. at 349.
258. 443 U.S. Ill (1979) at 136.
259. 443 U.S. 157 (1979) at 168, I69.
260. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
261. ibid, at 248, 254, 251.
262. at 255. The following passage is a quotation from Democratic 
Nationa.1 Committee v. Columbia Broadcasting System. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
263. 418 U.S. at 258.
264. B. Schmidt, "Freedom of the Press v. Public Access" (197&), p.233.
265. ibid, at 257-8. '
266. ibid, at 259.
267. H. Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana", 1 
(1965), P.2.
268. The potest movements led to an expansion of legal, political and 
philosophical writings on civil disobedience. I have found the
- following materials most interesting. On legal/constitutional 
aspects: A. Cox, Direct Action. Civil Disobedience and the 
Constitution: Wasserstrom, "The Obligation to Obey the Law" (1963);
N. Puner, "Civil Disobedience: An Analysis and Rationale" (1968);
G. Hughes, "Civil Disobedience and the Political Question Doctrine"
(1968) . Two Justices have contributed to the debate in A. Fortas, 
Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience (1968) and W. Douglas,
Points of Rebellion (1970). On the moral aspects of civil
. disobedience see: Prosch, "Towards an Ethic of Civil Disobedience"
(l967)i J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1973)» Ch.VIj R. Dworkin,
Taking Rights Seriously (1977). Ch.8. More politically orientated 
analyses are found in H. Arendt, Crises of the Republic (1973);
G. Marshall, Constitutional Theory (197l). Ch.IV: Campbell,
"Law and Order Reconsidered (1969); I* Balbus, The Dialectics 
of Legal Repression (1973)» R. Lefcourt, Law against the People 
(1971); L. Macfarlane, Political Disobedience (1971).
269. See for example, N. Puner (1968), p.718. "Civil disobedience is,
* in itself, a disavowal of lawlessness. 'Civil* can only mean 
within the law"; J. Rawls (1973)» p.366. "[Civil disobedience] 
expresses disobedience to the law within the limits of fidelity 
to the law".
See above, p.398 .270.
- 594 -
271. See above, p.396, 403» 406, 232 j
272. H. Kalven (1965), P*32* See also above, Ch.VTII, 4.1.
273. T. Emerson (1970), Ch.IX at p.387. Emerson's analysis is 
based on the distinction between expression and action which, as 
it has been argued, cannot be sustained theoretically. His 
review of the case-law remains, however, the most critical and 
complete in constitutional literature.
274. See above, pp.36-7«
275» See above, p.412, 453» 454. and Tribe (1978), pp.584-8 and 670-4.
276. p.411.
277. p.454, 408, 412.
278. B. Schmidt (1976), pp.99-100.
279. P .3 9 6 , 406 , 455.
280. p .4 1 3 ,  456.» 459.
281. Clear statements of the two rules are found in N.A.A.C.P. v.
Alabama ex rel. Flowers. 377 H.S. 288 at 307 and in TJ.S, v. Robel. 
above, p.429• I found Tribe (1978), pp.713-7» the most 
informative analysis of the application of the two doctrines in 
free speech cases. An interesting analysis of the two doctrines 
is found also; in F. Strong, "50 years of Clear and Present Danger. 
From Schenck to Brandenburg" (1969).
282 . p .4 1 1 , 448 , 445 , 450 , 41?, 468 .
283. p .4 4 5 , 446 , 448 .
284. p .3 9 5 , 406 .
285 . P .4 4 2 , 449, 450.
286. p.444, 445.451-2. In Schacht v. TJ.S.. 398 U.S. 58 (1970), the 
Supreme Court ruled that the wearing of military uniforms by actors 
performing in a play which intended to discredit the armed forces 
was protected symbolic speech.
287. J. Ely (1975).
288. T. Emerson (1970), p.627.
289 . ibid., p .6 2 8 .
290. J. Barron (1973), p«5 and Ch.ll.
291. See,, for example, T. Sinerson (1970), Ch.XVTI; J. Barron (1967, 
1973)» J. Pemberton, "The Bight of Access to the Mass Media", in 
Dorsen, The Rights of the Americans (1971): Schmidt (1976) 
criticizes most of these theories and argues for an almost 
complete editorial freedom.
- 595 -
292. See Ch.IX, 3.
J
293. p . 4 3 7 , 4 3 9 , 4 6 8 .
294» Goldstein (1978) offers various reasons for the failure of the 
various repressive measures to halt the protest movement. He 
argues that Johnson failed to "sell" the Vietnam War to the 
American public and that overt repression during his Administration 
was half-hearted. When Nixon increased both the overt and covert 
repressive activities in the late 60s, the Vietnam policy was 
disapproved by a majority of Americans, and the repressive 
measures "took away further legitimacy from an already discredited 
government’1, ibid, p.533. This analysis seems correct, but it 
underestimates the relative failure of the protest movement to 
change the overall foreign policy of the American Government and 
to link the reorientation of foreign policy with radical changes 
at home.
295* The major cases were Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and 
Reynold v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). For (conservative) 
criticisms of the voting rights case see W. Elliott (1974);
R. Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (1977) and A. de Grazia. Essay on 
Apportionment and Representative Government (1963).
296. P. Rosen, The Supreme Court and Social Science (1972), p.xi.
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